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Abstract
This  is  a  comparative  feminist  analysis  of  religion  in  local  politics  within  two 
London boroughs: Ealing and Newham. Starting from the observation that there has 
been a de-secularisation of relations between the state and civil society in Britain, it 
draws upon the feminist and anti racist critique of multiculturalism to produce new 
reflections on the shift to multifaithism. This thesis argues that the shift is the result 
of a double movement - from above and from below - and enables moral hegemony. 
By re-orienting an analysis of the religious-secular to local cartographies of power, 
this thesis makes smaller claims that run alongside and pose questions for a growing 
consensus  within  feminist  theory  that  seeks  a  distance  from  secularism,  that 
emphasises  solidarities  with  faith  based  mobilisations  and  seeks  to  uncritically 
defend religious minority claims. The data comprises 47 in depth interviews with 
'secular',  'religious'  and  'state'  actors.  This  is  supplemented  with  ethnographic 
observations  from  public  meetings,  religious  processions  and  other  events.  The 
empirical analysis discusses the following key themes: the way in which religion is 
welded to electoral politics; religious commitment as an ontological, aesthetic and 
affective  source  for  social  responsibility  and  political  engagement;  the  shared 
pastoral-policing functions of religious organisations and the state; the emergence of 
religious 'election'  as a new way of re-ordering local areas and access to welfare 
services;  the negotiation of a new wave of Muslim political  identifications in the 
context of the War on Terror; the perpetuation of a unanimist Khalsa norm and its 
implications  for  making  religious  claims;  and  a  closer  consideration  of  religious 
groups in alliance, the darker side of faith as social capital.
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Introduction
This  is  a  qualitative  study  encompassing  a  broadly  feminist  epistemological 
framework accompanied by grounded theory and a comparative analytical approach. 
This  study draws simultaneously upon the feminist  and post-colonial  critiques of 
empiricism to  emphasise  the  transformative  nature  of  research  (Gross,  1986),  to 
disentangle  and  reveal  power  relations  within  normative  practice  and  dominant 
discourse (Said, 2004). In order to take account of the multifaceted nature of subject 
positions occupied by both the researcher and research participants as they move in 
and out of spaces, this study takes its lead from Donna Haraway's (1991) privileging 
of  'ways of seeing' over more limited 'ways of being'.  Moreover, as with Haraway's 
work, this study only lays claim to ‘partial vision’ and ‘situated knowledge’ that is 
contingent upon access to limited information and tempered by interactions between 
researcher and research subjects.  This thesis  does not seek to make generalisable 
claims but rather positions smaller local claims alongside a growing consensus about 
religion and secularism in the current moment. By turning to the local arena, it seeks 
to  tell  different  stories,  some  of  which  can  pose  questions  for  or  dislodge 
assumptions at the heart of dominant feminist discourse.
There is some degree of tension on the question of how to characterise the current 
moment in British politics. My starting point is the growth of religious mobilisations 
and a sense that there has been a de-secularisation of public policy, particularly of 
relations between the state and ethnic minorities. This is distinctly contrary to the 
starting point of much current feminist research on religion, which stems from claims 
about the assimilationist tendencies of secular imposition and is motivated by the 
problematisation of the secular normative foundations of political mobilisations and 
public policy (see for instance Brown, 2008; Butler, 2008; Braidotti, 2008; Bracke, 
2008;  Fadil,  2011;  Mahmood,  2005).  There  has  been  a  distinct  methodological 
distancing from secularism; critique is no longer thought to be situated there.
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This reproach links back to the wholesale transformation of academic debate since 
9/11, or rather since the War on Terror. Paradoxically, there has been little feminist 
scrutiny of the gradual growth of fundamentalist mobilisations. Needless to say that 
Guantanamo and the invasion of Iraq were hugely significant in releasing feelings of 
dissociation,  embarrassment  and  shame at  US  and  British  imperial  claims  to  be 
carrying the mantle of human rights and particularly to be the harbingers of women's 
and LGBT equalities, re-iterating the new-old place of gender in governance,  the 
problem in Gayatri Spivak's words, that 'gender has become an alibi'. Moreover, a 
new wave of  liberal  commentary,  European  racist  populism and new streams of 
fascist  mobilisation  are  pinning  their  claims  to  the  feminist  critique  of 
multiculturalism  to  push  their  assimilationist  agendas.  This  has  turned  Spivak's 
(1985) reference to 'white men saving brown women from brown men' into Fekete's 
description of the return of this Orientalist fantasy as 'a call to white men to save 
Muslim women from Muslim men' (2006:16). The critique of secularism emerges 
from these combined concerns and is part of an expose that inheres violence within 
the concept by attempting to draw a neat line between a long list of Enlightenment 
projects  -  humanism,  liberalism,  universalism  and  indeed  feminism  -  with  each 
terming invoking the other.  Moreover, anti-racists like Fekete (2006) have collated 
the right  wing assertions  of  some of  the most  controversial  feminists  to  point  to 
feminism's  collusion  with  the  production  of  a  'cultural  code'  that  oppresses 
minorities. 
Feminist academic interventions have been concerned to produce their own critiques 
of a revival of 'civilisational discourse' where cultures and religions are ordered in a 
hierarchical fashion according to allegations about sexual (un)freedoms and gender 
(in)equality (Brown, 2008). In the process, minority religions are characterised as 
derided  and  contained.  Butler  (2008)  condemned  this  as  a  'cultural  assault'  on 
minorities.  Post  9/11  there  appears  to  be  a  growing consensus  amongst  feminist 
writers that 'sexual freedoms have been elevated to a sacred status' and exist as a 
panacea  towards  which  countries  and  communities  are  expected  to  progress 
(Werbner, 2007: 161). 
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Rosi Braidotti (2008), Sarah Bracke (2008) and Saba Mahmood (2008) have drawn 
connections between the explosion of interventions on the problems with liberalism 
and secularism to additional points about the feminist project. In a sense they are 
encouraging feminism to adjust its terms, attached so closely to anti-clericalism, in 
order to take account of a new wave of religious mobilisations thought to constitute a 
'post secular age'.  Saba Mahmood's work has been hugely influential and used to 
make the point that feminism denies its own affective dimensions when it questions 
the religious commitments of others. Stewart Motha (2007) for instance has argued 
that  feminism  is  not  able  to  deal  with  the  simultaneity  of  polity  and  piety,  of 
autonomy and heteronomy.  
It is my contention that feminist academics looking at religion and secularism in the 
current context have not really been cognisant of multiplicity or intersectionality but 
rather have made decisions to prioritise either one of two 'ways of seeing': either by 
reading 'race' through the lens of gender or by reading gender through the lens of 
'race', most commonly the latter. In moves to embrace religion as critical alterity or in 
the  search  for  newness,  many  have  overlooked  the  empirical  reality  of 
transformations in British public policy and its implications for local power relations. 
Meanwhile,  local  women's  organisations,  like  Southall  Black  Sisters,  are  still 
recounting  the  concerns  of  ethnic minority  women under  the  weight  of  religious 
imposition by both state and civil society (see Patel and Sen, 2011). Moreover, in the 
UK  context,  minorities  have  long  since  been  subjected  to  different  governing 
rationalities that particularly rely on the reification and imposition of religion. The 
other stories that this thesis seeks to tell are insights into local initiatives, the views 
of actors in local neighbourhoods, the proactive mobilisations of the religious Right 
and the religious dimensions of the development of British public policy. 
My 'ways of seeing' are borne of an affinity and close personal engagement with the 
perspectives of two London based women's organisations - Southall Black Sisters 
(SBS)  and  Women  Against  Fundamentalism (WAF).  This  thesis  emerged  out  of 
experience in the voluntary sector in each of the boroughs during the 1990s and early 
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2000s  and  a  concern  about  changing  local  landscapes.  I  recall  SBS and  WAF's 
problematisation  of  religion  in  the  public  sphere  and  particularly  the  growth  of 
fundamentalist mobilisations of all hues. I reflect on local developments from a place 
of doubt and locate concerns about minority voices, dissent and the religious Right at 
the heart of this analysis. 
I make a lot of use of two particular terms developed by Back et al (2009) - 'local 
cartographies of power' and the 'glocal'  - to refer to the shaping of relations of power 
within local urban spaces by the multiple interactions between: governmentalised 
institutions  of  governance;  transnational  networks  of  religious,  ethnic,  caste  or 
kinship  affiliations;  and  also  local  communitarian  sources  of  organising  and 
identification.  Each articulates  with  the  other  to  create  glocal  registers  for  doing 
politics.  This thesis also makes extensive use of Chetan Bhatt's detailed insights on 
the substantive dimensions of religious Right formations, their global reach and local 
incidence. Or as Michael Keith (2005) has noted, for the way that Bhatt's work draws 
out 'the geopolitical realities (that) undermine both casual theorisation of “the west 
and the rest”' and reveal the multiple ways in which 'transnational political spaces 
inhabit the cultures of diaspora populations of the contemporary metropolis'.
I have also drawn on a body of work critiquing multiculturalist practice to produce 
new reflections on the British slide into multifaithism. By recognising that this is the 
result of a dialectical relationship between state-led policies from above and religious 
mobilisations from below, subsequent chapters are organised in a way that attempts 
to  capture  both  of  these  developments,  the  confluence  of  interests  and  the 
interactions  that  bring  them  both  into  being.  Many  of  the  chapters  are  divided 
between  observations  about  the  possibilities  and  the  problems,  each  noting  the 
conditions that enable the emergence of religious political identifications but also the 
tendency of religious communitarianists to push for closure, strong boundaries and 
sealed spaces  of governance over which they can exercise influence and control. 
Moreover,  at  every  stage,  the  chapters  highlight  the  gendered  dimensions  of 
discourse, engagement and claims making. 
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This thesis is a comparative analysis of events, groups and local actors within two 
London boroughs – Ealing and Newham. Appendices A and B provide ward maps of 
each of the boroughs to give a sense of the physical organisation of the local areas.  
Newham and Ealing have interesting and comparable histories as well as divergent 
features. Both boroughs are characteristic of London's 'super diversity' quality and 
the main religions reflected within these areas are Sikhs, Muslims, Christians and 
Hindus. It could be argued that each of these is 'differentially racialised' at a national 
level  and within dominant  discourse.  Moreover,  both boroughs have a history of 
activism in relation to class, gender and ‘race’. They are home to prominent workers' 
associations,  Black feminist  and anti  racist  organisations  that  have  engaged with 
political mobilisations, intervened in the formulation of public policy and contributed 
to the shaping of local landscapes and histories.
This  is  a  qualitative  study  that  combined  47  in  depth  interviews  of  'secular', 
'religious'  and 'state'  actors with a series of ethnographic observations in order to 
capture and understand two local life worlds. Appendix C contains a list of all the 
fieldwork. Topic guides were developed and tested for the interviews and adjusted 
according to the particular public position of each actor. Appendix D provides an 
example. The topic guide was intended to reflect the key research concerns for the 
overall study and comprised a series of open-ended questions with additional probes 
in order to enable a ‘guided conversation’ (Fielding, 1996) rather than a structured or 
prescriptive  interview or  survey.  The  in-depth  interviews  were  complemented  by 
ethnographic observations (detailed in Appendix C) of local and London wide events 
including  religious  processions,  public  meetings,  demonstrations,  consultation 
sessions,  elections  and  festivals.  These  enabled  a  ‘thick  description’ of  various 
‘moments’ in the construction of local public spaces and systems of representation 
and  also  an  analysis  of  the  discursive  tropes,  concepts  and  strategies  that  are 
employed  in  constructing  or  erasing  religious  identity  within  the  public  sphere. 
Particular attention is paid to the way in which these events, spaces and discourses 
are gendered.
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Chapter 1 is a review of the key sociological debates that form the backdrop of an 
analysis of the empirical data within later chapters. In particular, it reflects on the 
critique  of  the  multiculturalism  frame,  noting  its  implications  for  representation, 
group rights and the ordering of local peoples' relationships with the state. Chapter 1 
also notes the many ways in which state policy, largely initiated by New Labour, 
created a clearing for the reinvention of communitarianism and the instigation of 
religion as a new structuring principle for governance. This has given rise to a new 
'faiths' literature, which is reviewed alongside a note about the surprising level of 
continuity between New Labour's 'faith agenda' and the current Conservative Party's 
concept of Big Society. 
Chapter 2 provides background information about the two boroughs in the context of 
a discussion about religious entanglements in local level electoral politics. In the last 
decade, religion has surfaced as an important source of opposition in both boroughs. 
This chapter reveals the many ways in which religion becomes welded to existing 
complaints  and  enters  spaces  that  may  have  been  vacated  by  other  sources  of 
critique. I also begin an important distinction between the conditions of possibility 
and the modalities of identification. I note the multiple factors that enable religious 
identification to surface and gain weight as political representation namely: problems 
with existing political parties; a lack of accountability and transparency; a lack of 
energy  and  dynamism;  the  absence  of  clear  political  goals;  individual  careerist 
manoeuvring; and the impact of evolving transnational affiliations. These points are 
balanced with reflections on the problems with religious or faith-based opposition, 
attempted  in  Ealing  by  galvanising  Sikh  identifications  and  in  Newham  around 
Muslim and Christian identifications.  
Chapter  3 gives space to  the voices of 'religious'  interviewees.  It  emphasises the 
ontological, aesthetic and affective appeal of engaging religious commitment as an 
antidote to the contemporary neo-liberal context, to inject dynamism into activity, to 
inhere  social  responsibility  and  create  political  change.  However,  as  with  the 
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openings-closings format of the other chapters, a critique emerges from a place of 
doubt,  raising  concerns  about  social  control,  displaced  agency  and  the  very  real 
abuses of power by religious hierarchies.    
Chapter  4  looks  at  religious  co-option  into  state-led  agendas  and  New  Labour's 
emphasis on strengthening religious leaderships. This chapter reveals a confluence of 
interests and pathways between the state and local religious groups organised around 
shared pastoral and policing functions. In turn this raises questions about power, the 
inside and outside of state or civil society and the ability to make clear religious-
secular distinctions. This chapter notes concord on the question of welfare provision 
and the desire to police boundaries, territories, behaviour and surprisingly also on 
questions of authority and sovereignty. The second half of the chapter focuses on 
interfaith alliances, predominantly encouraged by New Labour funding sources from 
the centre but kept at arms length by the local Newham Labour Group. As part of an 
emergent  critique,  I  focus  on  the  way  interfaith  activities  consolidate  religious 
sources of domination and persecution that transcend national boundaries and are 
often  disguised  within  new  regimes  of  governance,  in  particular  through  the 
proliferation of multifaithist (and highly gendered) notions of 'tolerance', 'decency' 
and 'respect'. These interfaith initiatives extend the already existing 'community of 
communities' principle of multiculturalist practice to turn seemingly benign sources 
of interfaith understanding into strength for the supremacist ideologies of the Hindu 
Right  and  the  normative  institutionalisation  of  an  aversion  to  Ahmadiyyas. 
Paradoxically,  it  is  the  local  Labour  Group  that  offers  a  critique  of  religious 
leaderships and a commitment to safeguard the rights of women, LGBT people, and 
dissenting minorities. 
A conversation about contested Muslim leaderships, authority and sovereignty flows 
into  Chapter  5.  Long-standing  anti-racist  activists  talk  about  their  attempts  to 
negotiate the terrain of a resurgent Muslim political identity in the context of the 
crushing  civil  liberties  impact  of  the  government's  'War  on  Terror'.  Chapter  5 
highlights the transformation of political identities in recent years and the situations 
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that  arise  for  civil  liberties  campaigners  when  religious  groups,  Muslims  in 
particular, become the objects of state surveillance rather than its allies. Moreover, 
this chapter enters a discussion about the nature and problem of proximate relations, 
drawing  out  counter  accusations  about  political  alliances  in  the  context  of  the 
securitisation agenda of the state on the one hand and Islamist  mobilisations and 
networks of religious violence on the other.  It explores the difficulties of turning 
intersectional frameworks into the praxis of defending the indivisibility of human 
rights within this new context of religious mobilisations and the War on Terror.   
Chapter 6 seeks to extend earlier critiques of the culturalist and ethnicist turn in anti-
racist  politics  to  take  account  of  the  state's  support  for  Right-leaning  religious 
projects. It shows the ways in which community formations develop at the local level 
to reinforce the moral agenda of the state. Specifically, this chapter focuses on the 
consolidation of a Khalsa norm for Sikh representation by looking at the particular 
fortunes of one organisation, the Sri Guru Singh Sabha Southall. It provides some of 
the  backstory  to  their  theo-political  leanings,  their  proactive  positioning  as  a 
significant and authoritative voice on Sikhism, as well as their symbiotic colonial and 
post-colonial relationship with the British state, the realisation of mutually supportive 
nationalist projects and hegemonic concerns about morality and the breakdown of 
society. Moreover, this chapter considers the emergence of local systems of 'election', 
where religious organisations gain the complicity of both the local and national state 
and civil society to make religious incursions into social welfare provision with the 
resultant effect of re-ordering of local areas and access to services on the basis of 
categorical religious affiliation.  This  chapter links back to the points made about 
Ahmadiyyas in Chapter 4 and forwards to the discussion of the East London Mosque 
in Chapter 7 to propose that local areas are becoming re-ordered according to new 
systems of religious election. 
Chapter 7 focuses entirely on the movement from below in the form of a surprising 
but hugely influential Christian-led socio-political mobilisation called Citizens UK. 
During the stretch of the fieldwork, this political formation moved from an emergent 
position to become a central player in the construction of civil society, state and also 
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political  opposition  narratives  about  the  role  of  religious  organisations  as  moral 
antidotes and 'swords of moral justice' against neo-liberalism and bureaucracy. This 
chapter  adds  new reflections  to  a  growing  but  celebratory  body  of  literature  on 
Citizens UK campaigns. In particular, my critique focuses on problems with  their 
Strangers into Citizens campaign, the socially conservative limits of their interests, 
and the way this faith-based political alliance acts as a source of legitimacy for local 
branches and fronts of fundamentalist organisations.    
The Conclusion draws together the key components of my critique of the power 
relations at the local interface of religion and politics. I return to the importance of 
making a distinction between the conditions of possibility, or the push factors, that 
have enabled religious organisations and religious identities to thrive as sources of 
political action, on the one hand, and then the modalities of identification, or the 
substantive  dimensions  of  political  projects  and  mobilisations,  on  the  other.  In 
particular, I identify the push factors as broadly comprising: ever-present legacies of 
colonial relations, multiculturalist governance and the Establishment position of the 
Church of England; the burgeoning gaps within the public sphere as a consequence 
of the undemocratic tendencies of the state and markets and a significant welfare 
state deficit; the dynamism, ontological, aesthetic and affective possibilities offered 
by religious frameworks to inhere political commitment and energise political action; 
the glocal impact of the rise and rise of transnational religious mobilisations; and the 
relationship between a perceived growth in religious affiliation and the importance of 
majoritarianism  within  politics.  The  substantive  problems  with  faith  based 
interventions  and  an  emergent  multifaithist  practice  are  discussed  across  the 
following  points:  the  symbiotic  relationship  between  Right  leaning  religious 
organisations  and  the  British  state  as  mutually  enforcing  nationalist  projects;  the 
utility of anti-racist, human rights and multiculturalism registers for the proliferation 
of supremacist politics at a normative local level; the use of political alliances by 
fundamentalist  organisations  to  gather  legitimacy  and  accrue  other  benefits;  the 
pursuit of  moral hegemonic agendas about sexuality, marriage and the family; the 
structuring, particularly gendered dimensions, of 'tolerance' and 'respectability'; and 
the emergence of new local systems of 'election' where local areas are re-ordered 
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according to religious beliefs with consequences for access to limited resources. 
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Chapter 1: Governing the Public Sphere, Religion and 
Civil Society
Introduction
This  thesis  is  a  comparative  feminist  analysis  of  the  normative  implications  of 
religion  and  local  politics  in  two  London  boroughs.  This  chapter  provides  an 
overview of the key policy debates that act as a backdrop for the discussions in the 
following  analysis  chapters,  which,  I  argue,  are  largely  framed  by  a  shift  from 
multiculturalism to multifaithism. This has involved a double movement, from above 
and from below, from state led interventions in the constructions of the social and 
also from the impact of social movements and international events on the political 
identifications  of  local  populations.  Therefore,  this  chapter  begins  with  an 
exploration of the key aspects of the multiculturalism frame, particularly noting its 
implications for representation and the ordering of local peoples' relationships with 
the state. I then detail the many ways in which the last decade led to a shift in this  
state-civil society framework towards multifaithism, where religious identities and 
affiliations are given primacy in decisions about social policy and delivery. I then 
move on to note the specific ways in which the Labour Party's reinvention of itself as 
New  Labour  developed  a  model  of  governance  in  which  religion  and 
communitarianism were key structuring principles. The final section discusses the 
emergence  of  a  'faiths'  literature  in  very  recent  years,  largely  because  of  the 
significant changes brought about by New Labour's 'faith agenda'. I end this chapter 
with some brief points about the incredible continuities between New Labour's 'faith 
agenda'  and  the  Conservative  Party's  relationship  with  religion  and  religious 
organisations.  This  feminist  analysis  seeks  to  highlight  the  implications  for  local 
relations of power at each turn and particularly notes the gendered dimensions of 
these debates. 
At every stage, this chapter moves towards laying the foundations for an analysis of 
the  empirical  material  in  subsequent  chapters,  to  identifying  the  key  theoretical 
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debates  within  which  the  fieldwork  is  located  and  to  specifying  the  proposed 
contributions of this thesis to existing knowledge.
From Multiculturalism to Multifaithism
This section reviews established discussions about multiculturalism and its  critics 
covering points about recognition, representation and intra relations of power. The 
section moves towards defining the emergence of multifaithism as a demand and as a 
growing practice in relations between the state and civil society, particularly ethnic 
minorities.  I  start  however,  with  a  few  generic  introductory  points  about  the 
contestatory nature of developing frameworks and practices for relations between 
state and civil society.
When brought  together,  social  democracy and liberal  political  rationality  seek  to 
quell opposition by drawing social movements into various 'settlements' (Hall, 1988). 
Two particular 'settlements' are central to this thesis: the welfare state - a post-war 
settlement between labour and capital; and multiculturalism - a settlement between 
the British state and its post-colonial migrants. Gordon Hughes (1998) provides the 
following definition of a 'settlement':
(T)he term 'settlement' in this context is used to capture the complex compromises  
and negotiated positions reached by competing interest groups and power blocs in  
specific historical contexts. The concept of settlement does not thus exclude political 
and  ideological  differences  but  instead  points  to  the  bounded  limits  to  such 
differences. A settlement thus establishes the frameworks of reference within which 
conflict, negotiation and shifting alliances take place.
[Hughes, 1998:21]
The  welfare  state  relies  on  specific  and  limited  constructions  of  three  particular 
institutions: the family; the principal (male) earner and the nation state (Orloff, 1993; 
Walby, 1994; Lewis, 1998; Morris 1998; Lister, 2003). Groups that challenge these 
constructions or lie outside them - such as the long term unemployed, single parents 
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and migrants - hold 'precarious claims' to welfare services and benefits (Morris 1998) 
and neo-liberalism has given rise to various forms of 'differentiated' citizenship rights 
and  entitlements  (Ong,  1999;  Clarke,  2004).  Moreover,  transnational  and 
international  rights  now cut  across  those  awarded on the  basis  of  residency and 
nationality (Morris, 1998) and give rise to even more complicated permutations of 
interest,  rights, citizenship, community and belonging (Soysal, 1994; Yuval-Davis, 
2006). An appeal to the European Court of Human Rights, for instance, has been a 
particularly important tool for ethnic minority women wishing to extend notions of 
citizenship  to  accommodate  religious  demands  and  diversity  (McGoldrick,  2006; 
Phillips, 2007; Wallach Scott, 2007).1
Whilst  some  commentators  have  characterised  social  policy  as  wholly  oriented 
towards the needs of capitalism, this thesis shares Orloff's (1993) perspective that 
'politics matters' - that social policy is also the result of a mobilisation from below. 
The  interface  between  state  and  civil  society  represents  a  particularly  tense  and 
dynamic zone where attempts to manage populations, subjectivities, representation 
and claims-making is highly contested (Li, 2007: 11). Claims and constructions are 
linked to political projects and there is a vying for their validation and legitimacy 
(Clarke and Cochrane, 1993; Yuval-Davis, 2006).
1 A particularly good example is the case of R (Begum) v. Headteacher and Governors of 
Denbigh High School [2005] 2 All ER 396 eventually decided in the House of Lords on 22/03/06, 
where Shabina Begum, a12 year old school girl, made use of Articles 9, 2 and 14 to argue that she was 
being prevented from accessing a state education because of the conflict between her religious 
convictions (which for her meant she should wear a full length tunic known as the jilbaab) and the 
school's uniform rules. In another case - R (Watkins-Singh) v Aberdare Girls' High School & Anor 
[2008] EWHC 1865 on 29/07/08 - school girl, Sarika Watkins-Singh, aged 14, used the Race 
Relations Act 1976, which recognises Sikhs as an ethnic group, in order to challenge her school's 
claim that wearing the 'kara' (Sikh bangle) breached the school's uniform policy which prohibits the 
wearing of any jewellery. 
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The multiculturalism settlement
Multiculturalism can be a descriptive or normative term that simply expresses an 
ideal situation where people of different origins live harmoniously alongside each 
other.  As  a  state  policy,  multiculturalism  was  born  of  a  political  rejection  of 
assimilation  and  promoted  a  simple  message  of  cultural  tolerance  (Anthias  and 
Yuval-Davis, 1992). It has been the dominant frame through which relations between 
the state and ethnic minorities within Britain have been defined and organised for a 
number of decades. Multicultural  policies have taken many forms including legal 
judgements  and  exemptions  in  relation  to  dress  codes  and  food  production,  the 
expansion of the school curriculum and the funding of culturally  specific  service 
provision or autonomous organisations (Bano, 1999; Banting and Kymlicka, 2006). 
The  recognition  of  cultural  group  rights  has  been  viewed  as  part  and  parcel  of 
challenging racism in so far as it hopes to shift negative normative constructions of 
ethnic  minorities  (Taylor,  1994;  Kymlicka,  1995;  Modood,  2007).  One  of  the 
strongest  advocates  of  multiculturalism  policy,  Charles  Taylor  (1994)  bases  his 
argument for cultural pluralism on the necessity to recognise the dialogical nature of 
being  and  therefore  to  find  ways  to  sustain  the  cultural  practices  that  minority 
communities draw upon for their own moral reasoning. Moreover, starting from the 
premise of misrecognition, dehumanisation and the need to correct historical injury 
(Taylor,  1994;  Kymlicka,  1995  and  Modood,  2007),  multicultural  demands 
necessarily imply corrective measures intended to rebuild self-esteem, to right the 
wrongs of the past, to determine the characterisation of one's own culture, ethnicity 
or  religion  and are  concerned with  ensuring  means  of  reproducing practices  and 
identities into the future. One of the strongest advocates of group rights, and more 
recently of faith-based organisations, Tariq Modood (2007), made the following case:
Identities are relational and so on, just like difference, are constituted partly from the 
outside. But the concept of identity (like ethnicity and culture as opposed to race) 
allows the "inside" more space, more agency. This is not just in relation to individual 
self  identification  but  in  relation  to  outside  perceptions,  treatment  and  social  
expectations… that is to say the subordinate group in question does not begin to take 
charge of its positive self definition, of revaluing the group, but also to define the 
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ways in which it has been inferiorised, its mode of oppression. The group begins to 
speak for itself, not just in terms of positivity but also about its pain.
[Modood, 2007: 43]
However,  this  can  have  the  effect  of  creating  discretely  bounded  cultural  (or 
religious) units with their own internal logic, commonly referred to as 'a community 
of communities' (Commission for Multi Ethnic Britain, 2000; Parekh, 2000). This 
vision of multicultural Britain, which has been extensively critiqued for promoting a 
series of separate, more or less self managing units, is being replicated through the 
concept of coexistence which underpins the more recent turn to multifaithism and is 
often referenced against the idealisation of the Ottoman millat system.
The problems with multiculturalism
Multiculturalism has been critiqued from many different directions. One of the most 
prominent  concerns  is  about  multiculturalism  as  a  system  of  representation.  In 
practice, when multiculturalism becomes state policy it necessarily carves out a role 
for  the  state  in  a  process  of  rebuilding or  protecting  the  self-esteem of  minority 
peoples through the legal and institutional recognition of practices and identities as 
well as ensuring their reproduction into the future. This necessarily involves the state 
as an  adjudicator on cultural and religious matters. The state then enacts this role 
with the assistance of whomsoever they recognise as authorities on these issues. The 
result has been that multiculturalist practice trades on a particular characterisation of 
communities determined by the interaction of the state with so called ‘community 
leaders’ who tend to be from religious institutions (Ali, 1992). In turn, this has given 
rise to a  system of power relations where social  divisions and hierarchies within 
communities  are  ignored.  Moreover,  the fact  that the British state  has long since 
privileged the religious categorisation of south Asians and built a relationship with 
religious institutions,  has led to the imposition and legitimisation of their  role as 
mediators  between  the  state  and  civil  society  (Sahgal,  1990;  Narayan,  1997). 
Meanwhile, feminist concerns have been discarded on the grounds of ‘inauthenticity’ 
and ‘Westernisation’ (Narayan, 1997). 
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The implementation of multiculturalist policies by service providers has tended to 
involve  narrow  assumptions  about  the  needs  of  ethnic  minority  communities 
including by superimposing religious over other identities (Patel, 1991; Sahgal and 
Yuval  Davis,  1992;  Gupta,  2003).  Whilst  never  denying  the  right  of  religious 
affiliation  and  practice,  Black  women's  groups  in  Britain  have  argued  that  the 
tendency of the British state and other agencies to look at south Asians primarily 
through  the  lens  of  religious  ascription  can  have  catastrophic  consequences  for 
vulnerable women and children fleeing violence  and abuse (Siddiqui,  2003).  For 
instance, this has lead to local authorities delivering young women fleeing violence 
into the hands of particularly conservative foster parents who then condemn them for 
leaving their families rather than provide effective alternatives and supportive spaces 
(Patel, 1991; Dhaliwal, 2003).
Furthermore, the codification or recognition of culture, ethnicity and religion in law 
or social policy leads to the homogenisation, reification and simplification of cultural 
practices.  Whilst  the  process  of  codifying  has  the  propensity  to  be  a  'dynamic 
dialectical  process'  between  civil  society  and  state  institutions,  it  nevertheless 
'freezes' culture (Benhabib, 2002). Needless to say that the recognition of difference 
itself has the tendency to create and perpetuate 'deep ontologies' (St Louis, 2009). 
This could lead to situations where in order to comment on Shariah Councils or on 
state funded Sikh schools, one has to be Muslim or Sikh respectively, and then not 
just born Muslim or Sikh but to be considered 'practising' and even more than this, to  
be  able  to  make one's  contribution  to  the  debate  through recourse  to  a  religious 
discourse.  Such  authenticating  criterion  has  been  a  structuring  principle  for 
multiculturalist  practice  and  can  have  the  effect  of  excluding  feminist  voices 
(Narayan, 1997; Patel, 2004).
As Seyla Benhabib (2002) has pointed out, many theorists appear to have supported 
cultural  and  religious  reifications  despite  their  contradiction  with  constructivist 
tendencies within sociology. Indeed, the 'dirty work of boundary maintenance' (Yuval 
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Davis,  2006)  necessarily  means  that  group  rights  advocates  reproduce  'the  same 
epistemic  premises'  as  those  on  the  political  Right;  namely,  that  cultures  and 
populations  are  incongruous,  that  cultures  are  innate  and  clearly  defined  wholes 
(Benhabib,  2002).  The  literature  on  mixed  relationships  most  clearly  challenges 
claims  to  cultural  purity  (Ifekwunigwe,  1999)  highlighting  the  organic  and  fluid 
nature  of  identities  and cultures  that  draw upon a  range  of  repertoires  and defy 
desires  to  fix  them  (Gilroy,  1996).  Indeed,  people's  social  locations  and  their 
positions  within  matrices  of  power  are,  as  Yuval  Davis  (2006)  has  pointed  out, 
'virtually never constructed along one axis of power, although official statistics - as 
well as identity politics - often tend to construct them in this way' (2006: 200). 
The empirical reality of migration and multiculturalism gives rise to 'multilayered, 
multi-textual and contradictory meanings' forming a dialectical experience that offers 
a radical potential for transformation (Ifekwunigwe, 1999). However, relying as they 
do upon unanimity  or  the  erasure  of  difference  and diversity  within  groups,  the 
assertion of group rights has a tendency to push out and devalue the antinomian and 
more  organic  streams  within  minority  communities  (Gilroy,  1996).  Moreover 
‘religious leaders’ and religious groups claiming to represent minority communities 
are demanding an epistemological separation of religion and culture, pushing for a 
literal  return  to  the  text  and  restricting  the  spaces  for  interpretive  and  syncretic 
representations of religions and traditions (Sahgal, 2006). Of concern to this study is 
the  way in  which  the  ‘transruptive’ (Hesse,  2000) and subversive  (Gilroy,  2000; 
Sayyid, 2003) potential of diasporic formations to unsettle and prevent the closure of 
national  identities  appears  to  have  been  challenged,  if  not  undermined,  by  the 
contrary movement of authoritarian ethnicist and religious groups that are promoting 
absolutist, hermetically sealed identities (Bhatt, 1997). 
Deliberative democracy is often presented as a way out of this quagmire. Following 
on from Jurgen Habermas' (1996) intervention on 'publics', Seyla Benhabib (2002) 
has  argued  that  if  one  were  to  approach  group  rights  from  the  perspective  of 
'democratic theory' rather than 'multicultural theory', one would tend to focus more 
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on processes of inclusion and equality rather than distinctiveness. Benhabib (2002) 
advocates the application of a deliberative democracy model 'that permits maximum 
cultural  contestation within the public sphere,  in  and through the institutions and 
associations of civil society', that seeks to interrogate claims and 'accepts that the 
political incorporation of new groups into established societies will result most likely 
in the hybridisation of cultural  legacies on both sides'  (2002:12). Whilst  she also 
notes the need to ensure some universal individual rights (as most advocates of group 
rights now do) her approach seems to suggest that some forms of violence against 
women, such as female genital mutilation, might be up for discussion. A particular 
difficulty  for  those  that  seek  to  retain  a  case  for  group  rights  whilst  nominally 
acknowledging individual rights, is that they don't really tackle the central question 
of how power works, its institutionalisation and the alignment of patriarchal interests. 
Indeed Benhabib (2002) has a tendency to argue that cultural essentialism is imposed 
on communities from the outside rather than recognising and debating how to tackle 
internal  inequalities in  real  terms.  She  rarely,  if  ever,  acknowledges  the  active 
propagation  of  such  representations  by  actors,  such  as  the  religious  Right,  from 
within ethnic minority communities.
Anne Phillips (2007) notes that two kinds of alternatives are posited as a means of 
short-circuiting the hazards of group rights: the overriding authority of regulation and 
the possibility for individuals to exit groups. Although this study is more concerned 
with the development of new forms of group claims and group rights through 'the 
faith agenda', Phillips' discussion of regulation raises an important question for the 
consideration  of  faith  based  organising.  In  particular,  would  increased  state 
regulation of these services, such as the compulsion to teach the national curriculum 
(especially closer monitoring of the delivery of sex and relationships education), or 
revised admissions policies, make the state funding of faith based schools alright or 
even  desirable?  Or  are  there  additional  questions  related  to  their  normative 
implications that need to be taken into account? 
The  practice  of  multiculturalism  also  imposes  a  normative  pressure  within 
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communities  to  comply  and  the  effects  on  ethnic  minority  women  are  widely 
evidenced by their disproportionate representation amongst statistics on suicide and 
self-harm2 as well as the incidence of domestic homicide and honour crimes.3 Indeed 
the  normative  implications  of  'community'  pressure  extend to  wider  questions  of 
autonomy,  freedom  of  expression,  the  right  to  dignity  as  well  as  the  ability  to 
imagine other possibilities and to live out non-conformist lives.
Indeed, Sahgal (2006) has argued that the role of the state should be focused on 
protecting individual rights rather than endorsing group rights of any kind and even 
Phillips (2007) suggests that where autonomous groups are formed, they should not 
be able to make representation claims. The idea is to retain 'rights bearing' status for 
individuals rather than for groups (Phillips 2007: 162). The tension between group 
rights and individual rights also reveals divergent views about the role of the state in 
2 According to Shazma Thabusom, the suicide rate for Asian women is twice the national 
average (See Thabusom, S (2005) Mental Health and Asian Women: A Qualitative Study of Women's 
Experiences, Doctoral thesis submitted to School of Health and Social Sciences, Coventry University 
and Department of Psychology, University of Warwick, May 2005); and 50-60% of women with 
mental health problems have suffered domestic violence at some point in their lives, one third of 
women that have attempted suicide or self harm have experienced violence or abuse whilst for Asian 
women this figure is closer to 50% (see Domestic Violence and Mental Health posted on 24/01/05 at 
http://www.womensaid.org.uk/domestic-violence-articles.asp?
section=00010001002200040001&itemid=940); 
Asian women complained specifically of cultural constraints and the pressure to marry as a reason for 
attempted suicide and self harm (see Dinesh Bhugra and Manisha Desai (2002) Attempted suicide in 
South Asian Women in Advances in Psychiatric Treatment (2002) 8: 418-42
3 Conservative cultural and religious values play a significant role in the enactment of 
homicides against Asian women (see Hannana Siddiqui (2005) There is no honour in domestic 
violence, only shame! Women's struggles against honour crimes in the UK in Hossein, S and 
Welchman, L (eds) Honour: Crimes, Paradigms and Violence Against Women published by Zed 
books: London); the Association of Chief Police Officers estimated that around 17,000 women are 
being subjected to 'honour' crimes including murder (see 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/a-question-of-honour-police-say-17000-women-
are-victims-every-year-780522.html). Most victims of 'honour' crimes are ethnic minority women.
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civil  society as  somewhere  between protecting  individuals  and providing welfare 
services. The difficulty with attempts to separate out the individual from the group is 
not  only  that  it  potentially  excludes  the  provision  of  specialist  ethnic  minority 
services and advocacy groups that exist because of evidence of discrimination, lack 
of awareness, cultural or linguistic skills within mainstream service provision, but 
also that it fails to take account of the significant group dimension of individual legal 
claims. Two such legal claims about religious accommodation within state schools, 
both taken by ethnic minority girls - Shabina Begum4 and Sarika Watkins-Singh5 - 
appealed  to  (and  had  their  appeals  assessed  against)  group  representations  of 
religious  injunctions  to  subscribe  to  particular  dress  codes  (the  jilbaab)  or  adorn 
particular  symbols  (the  kara).  Begum was  represented  by  her  brother,  an  active 
member of the Islamist group Hizb ut-Tahrir, and Singh had her claim confirmed by 
the Network of Sikh Organisations. In Begum's case, the school was able to ward off  
her legal challenge specifically because it qualified her claims against interpretations 
of Islam, provided by two other Muslim groups and Muslim parents, which affirmed 
that  existing  school  uniform rules  had  already  been  appropriately  adjusted  to  take 
account of religious 'needs'. In the Singh case, the fact that she defied other religious 
injunctions by cutting her hair (also one of the five Sikh symbols - 'Kesh' - if one 
subscribes to the Khalsa norm) did not appear to come to the notice of any of the third 
parties - religious, civil liberties and anti racist groups - defending her claim. Moreover, 
both claims are also discussed in relation to other equality strands - the implications of 
school dress codes for 'racial' or ethnic groups with Singh's case and 'young women' as 
a group in Begum's case.
The  point  being  made  here  is  that  whenever  someone  makes  a  claim  to  culture, 
ethnicity, religion or any kind of difference, it is validated in relation to evidence about 
requirements and practices. The desire to identify 'religious authorities' to confer with, 
to qualify, to provide guidance or to adjudicate in relation to such claims becomes part 
4 R (Begum) v. Headteacher and Governors of Denbigh High School [2005] 2 All ER 396 is a 
UK law case, decided in the House of Lords on 26/03/06.
5 R (Watkins-Singh) v Aberdare Girls' High School & Anor [2008] EWHC 1865 on 29/07/08.
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of the process of resolving them and indeed acts to consolidate the position of religious 
groups. Perhaps then this is more an issue of  divergent group claims  rather than a 
tension between individual and group rights. This is particularly highlighted by what 
has come to be known as 'the recognition versus redistribution' debate. 
Recognition versus redistribution
Nancy Fraser (2001) has attempted to challenge  what she sees as a false dichotomy 
between recognition and redistribution. She notes that each of these has, in turn, been 
argued in relation to theories of ethics which imply value judgements about what 
constitutes 'the good life' (cultural politics) on the one hand and theories of morality 
or social  justice and objective rights (social  politics)  on the other.  She advocates 
drawing recognition struggles into the realm of social justice and rights by seeing 
these  more  as  'status  models'  and  for  redistribution  struggles  to  incorporate  an 
element  of  recognition  so  that  they  are  also  seen  as  challenges  to  normative 
assumptions -  gay marriage as a redistribution claim because it  challenges  social 
relations  and  cultural  assumptions  for  instance.  Whether  she  would  also  support 
polygamy if presented as a claim by a religious or cultural minority is uncertain as is 
the question of what constitutes  normative if  religious claims are accepted on the 
grounds that they are challenges to Christian privilege but also contested by ethnic 
minority  feminists  on  the  grounds  that  religious  groups  and  leaders  have  a 
stranglehold  on  their  communities  and  are  imposing  a  patriarchal  order.  Fraser 
(2001) argues that 'an expanded concept of justice' leads to difficult philosophical 
questions  concerning 'the  relation  between morality  and ethics,  the  right  and the 
good, justice and the good life' (2001: 22). 
Actually,  a range of contributions from anti  racists  (Sivanandan, 2006) to critical 
'race' theorists (Gilroy, 1987; Hall, 1994) to feminist activists (Patel, 2004, Sahgal 
2006)  and  feminist  academics  (Fraser,  2001;  Yuval-Davis  2006;  Phillips  2007) 
provide some semblance of an answer to the group rights conundrum. In particular, 
they all appear to suggest a distinction between two versions of group rights based 
upon an assessment of the orientation of the group. On the one hand, theorists like 
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Charles  Taylor,  Axel  Honneth,  Will  Kymlicka  and  Tariq  Modood  focus  their 
argument for group rights on the need to create spaces that sustain cultural practices 
that  enable  people  to  build  positive  images  of  their  culture  or  religion  and  of 
themselves through their contact with others from the same group. This is an act in 
and of itself and has an internal orientation (Fraser 2001). On the other hand, for Iris 
Marion Young, Jurgen Habermas, Seyla Benhabib (and I would add the Institute of 
Race Relations, Southall Black Sisters and Nira Yuval Davis where they may have 
sympathy for  group rights)  the  focus  is  rather  on  the  external orientation  of  the 
group; on the need for minority communities to have an organising space to enhance 
their  ability  to  engage on a  more equal  basis  in  the  wider  political  process.  For 
instance,  Sivanandan's  (2006) recent  reiteration  of  his  earlier  distinction  between 
culturalist  organisations  and anti  racist  organisations  (supplemented  by Sudbury's 
(2001) response to Modood (1997) in defence of political blackness as a form of 
solidarity politics) suggests that collective mobilisation is rather about tackling axes 
of power.  Importantly,  it  is  concerns about  religion in  the public  sphere that  has 
prompted such assertions. 
Towards multifaithism and de-secularisation
The slide from multiculturalism to multifaithism needs to be seen as the result of a 
double movement: of state policy from above and the demands of civil society actors 
from below. Some group rights had already been recognised for minority religions 
through race relations legislation and as part of a 'multicultural drift' (Bano, 1999). 
Also, there is some evidence to suggest that minority religious political groups have 
been accessing state funding for some time; Sahgal (1992), Anthias and Yuval Davis 
(1992)  pointed  to  the  GLC's  funding  of  the  right  wing  Hindu  organisation,  the 
Vishwa Hindu Parishad, on the grounds that they were providing cultural activities 
and education. However, the last few decades saw the ascent of religious political 
movements  that  asserted  themselves  in  an  ever-expanding  ideological  void,  as 
alternatives  to  consumer  and  market  led  neo-liberalism  on  the  one  hand  and 
authoritarian versions of communism on the other. On an international level, some of 
these had already developed as part  of Independence struggles (such as in India, 
Pakistan and Egypt) and continued to thrive as post colonial articulations (e.g. the 
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Muslim Brotherhood and Hindutva). 
In Britain, the resurgence of religion as a political identity began in earnest amongst 
Sikhs mobilising support for a separate Sikh state of Khalistan in the mid 1980s 
(Cohen and Bains, 1988; Das; 1996; Dhaliwal, 2003) but it was the Rushdie Affair in 
1989 that crystallised a growing religious identity into a larger de-secularisation of 
relations between the state and ethnic minorities. Religion became a new frame for 
highlighting inequalities and for making recognition demands. Coupled with the Gulf 
War in 1991, the Rushdie Affair was used by Islamist groups to galvanise a coherent 
Muslim political  identity  that  would  assert  a  range  of  demands  to  accommodate 
Muslim 'needs' including: on schools for the accommodation of religious dress; on 
colleges or local authority offices to provide prayer rooms and halal meals; and on 
the judiciary to extend blasphemy laws to include Islam and to recognise Shariah 
ordinances  (Bhatt  1997;  Bano  1999).  Moreover,  supplemented  by  evidence  of  a 
growing racist discourse about Muslims, a range of organisations recast Muslims as a 
specific  marginalised  and  discriminated  section  of  the  British  population  (and 
international  polity)  that  defied existing  social  group categories.  The Runnymede 
Trust  (1997),  for  instance,  criticised  the  inconsistent  application  of  the  Race 
Relations Act 1976 with regards to religion because of its recognition of Jews and 
Sikhs as 'ethnic groups' but not Muslims in spite of the incidence of Islamophobia. 
Broadly speaking there have been two streams of sociological contributions on the 
resurgence  of  religion  in  the  public  sphere  that  are  relevant  for  the  subsequent 
empirical chapters. Firstly, the struggle within liberal political theory between those 
that wish to extend notions of citizenship and individual rights to make space for 
religious claims and those that view religious incursions into the public sphere as far 
more  problematic  than  accommodating  culture  for  instance.  Secondly,  a  civic 
republicanism or  deliberative  democracy  mould  which  is  again  divided  between 
those  that  defend  some  level  of  differentiation  and  others  that  see  religious 
organisations as having a revitalising role to play in democratisation. 
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Jose Casanova's (1994) seminal study of the conditions of possibility and types of 
Christian  interventions  in  the  public  sphere  across  five  countries  has  been  an 
important building block within the deliberative democracy stream. In particular, he 
questioned the existence of  a single theory of  secularisation,  for  a long time the 
foundational frame for thinking about religion and modernity, and rather pointed to 
three  different  referential  points  for  debates  on  secularisation:  the  'decline  of 
religious beliefs and practices'; the 'differentiation of secular spheres from religious 
institutions and norms'; and the 'marginalisation of religion to a privatised sphere' 
with  its  own  separate  internal  logic.  In  particular,  Casanova  challenges  those 
sociologists that have claimed causal relationships between levels of religious belief, 
urbanisation and secularisation. I would argue that the flaws in Norris and Inglehart's  
(2004)  large-scale  quantitative  study  are  one  such  recent  example  of  this  point. 
Casanova's  points  on  levels  of  religious  beliefs  are  important  with  regards  to 
reflecting on the reproductive effects of introducing a religion question in the UK 
Census and also the increased concern for religious demands as part of the sway of 
majoritarianism discussed in Chapters 2, 4 and 7. 
For Casanova, differentiation can be sustained even where religious belief increases 
and religion becomes deprivatised. Moreover, he challenges the sense of 'a return of 
the sacred' simply because he does not see religion as ever having gone away, just 
weakened, marginalised or disestablished. His thesis lays claim to the 'deprivatisation 
of religion in the modern world' on the basis of findings that the differentiation of 
autonomous spheres (he names the state, the economy, science, education, law and 
art) not based on religious norms are still a significant dimension of modern life but 
the  failure  of  secular  regimes  lays  open  a  more  public  role  for  religious  groups 
especially disestablished, denomination of voluntary religious associations. He does 
not see religion, politics and citizenship as incompatible. Rather, he argues that:
(t)he term deprivatisation has three different connotations, one polemical, the other 
two descriptive. The term is used first of all polemically against those versions of the 
theory  of  secularisation  and  those  liberal  political  theories  that  prescribe  the  
privatisation of religion as a modern structural trend necessary to safeguard modern 
liberties  and  differentiated  structures.  This  study  has  shown  that  such  an 
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indiscriminate position against all forms of public religion is unfounded, that there 
are some forms of deprivatisation of religion which may be justifiable and even 
desirable from a modern normative perspective... Namely it is my contention that the 
rejection by certain religious traditions of the privatised role to which they were 
being relegated by secular modernisation theories and by liberal political theories,  
that the role of the Catholic church in processes of democratisation, and that the 
public interventions of religion in the public sphere of modern civil societies can no 
longer  be  viewed  simply  as  anti-modern  religious  critiques  of  modernity.  They 
represent, rather, new types of immanent normative critiques of specific forms of 
institutionalisation of modernity which presuppose precisely the acceptance of the 
validity of the fundamental  values and principles of modernity,  that is individual  
freedoms and differentiated structures. In other words, they are immanent critiques 
of particular forms of modernity from a modern religious point of view.
[Casanova, 1994: 220-222]  
From  my  perspective,  there  are  two  immediate  difficulties  with  Casanova's 
propositions.  He  makes  a  large  claim  about  the  causal  relationship  between  the 
negative  impact  on  levels  of  religiosity  wherever  religious  organisations  resist 
modern differentiation. Secondly, Casanova's work does not take account of the now 
interrelated  spaces  of  state,  social,  civil  society  and  polity,  as  reflected  in  the 
empirical chapters of this thesis, nor the governmentalisation or marketisation of the 
public sphere as spelt out in the section on New Labour below. Indeed it might be 
difficult to apply Casanova's work to the Establishment position of the Church of 
England and also their active role within civil society through bodies like Citizens 
UK (discussed in Chapter 7) without categorising these as simply hegemonic and 
disregard their moral-practical interventions on labour market exploitation or vice 
versa. Also, his assertion that 'ultimately only public religions at the level of civil  
society  are  consistent  with  modern  universalistic  principles  and  modern 
differentiated structures' (1994:219) is taken to task in Chapter 5 of this thesis by 
Gita Sahgal's critique of fundamentalist gains through political alliances within civil 
society, where civil society itself is structured by power relations.  
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However, the greatest problem for this thesis with making use of Casanova's insights 
relates to the one country-one religion structure of his case studies which leaves little 
room for  understanding  the  impact  of  minority  religions  as  anything  other  than 
potential activists within civil society. How, for instance, would one make sense of 
the  institutionalisation  of  religious  leaderships,  that  do  not  occupy Establishment 
positions,  and  their  overlapping  interventions  through  state  consultation  systems, 
political parties and also civil society without simply putting these down as voluntary 
associations engaged in productive democratising interventions through civil society 
alone?
Talal  Asad  (2003)  challenged  Casanova's  assertion  that  secularisation  does  not 
necessarily end as religion becomes deprivatised and indeed this is a contradiction 
because religious interventions have a stake, a view, for instance, of what should be 
publicly funded or how education should be organised. So once religion comes out of 
its separate sphere and begins to exert influence over the other autonomous spheres, 
Asad argues that we are talking about hybrid secular-religious spaces not secularism. 
Moreover,  Asad is  of  the view that  Casanova's  support  for the deprivatisation of 
religion is highly restricted to historically specific religions that fit with the modern 
liberal project but one can take issue with Asad's response on the basis that liberal 
political  discourse  can,  as  Chapter  5  of  this  thesis  exemplifies,  be  utilised  by 
religious organisations of many different political leanings and ambitions as registers 
for  advancing  their  particular  political,  even  undemocratic,  visions.  The  Women 
Against  Fundamentalism definition  of  fundamentalism is  precisely  that  these  are 
modern religious projects that utilise state apparatus and machinery to impose their 
version of religion, to restrict dissent and control sexuality. I do however agree with 
Asad's following assertion only that his writings digest this point in the context of an 
international and US specific  discourse around the War on Terror rather  than the 
potentially very different landscapes of the local:
The point here is that the public sphere is a space necessarily (not just contingently) 
articulated by power. And everyone who enters it must address power's dispositions 
of people and things...  The enjoyment of free speech presupposes not merely the 
physical ability to speak but to be heard, a condition without which speaking to some 
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effect is not possible... To make others listen even if they would prefer not to hear, to 
speak to some consequence so that something in the political world is affected, to  
come to a conclusion, to have the authority to make practical decisions on the basis 
of that conclusion – these are all presupposed in the idea of free public debate as a  
liberal virtue.
[Asad, 2003: 183-184] 
 
Importantly,  Jose  Casanova  and  Tariq  Modood  share  the  tendency  to  refer  to 
feminism's testing of the boundaries of the public-private divide in order to make 
different kinds of  arguments for the uses and validity of religious political forms in 
the public sphere. Casanova states:
(t)he  analysis  incorporates  Seyla  Benhabib's  synthesis  of  a  radical  proceduralist  
discursive model of the public sphere with a feminist critique of the privatisation of 
gender and the feminine sphere. Such a move allows us to view the deprivatisation 
of religion in analogical terms as an agonic resistance to attempts to confine religion  
and morality to a private sphere (home) and as a normative critique of the amoral 
public sphere of 'work' – economic and state institutions. As in the case of feminism,  
this  normative  critique  leads  to  a  dual  challenge  of  established  boundaries.  The 
deprivatisation of religion has a double signification here in that it simultaneously 
introduces publicity, that is, intersubjective norms into the private sphere (analogous 
to the feminist dictum the personal is political) and morality into the public sphere of 
state and economy (the principle of the common good as a normative criterion).
[Casanova, 1994 : 217]
However,  Casanova does  not  appear  to  be defending religious  claims per  se  but 
rather the possibility of religious organisations to be one active part of a diverse civil  
society holding the state, the polity and the market to account. This is similar to the 
now prominent discourse of the Good Society and Blue Labour discussed within the 
last section of this chapter and influenced by Citizens UK, analysed in Chapter 7. Yet 
Casanova does suggest that religious interventions in the public sphere are fruitful 
because,  even  where  these  are  the  anti  abortion  campaigns  of  Protestant 
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fundamentalists in the USA, they still 'serve an important public function' because 
they test existing normative structures. It's my view that without an invested feminist 
perspective, Bhatt (1999) is right to argue that one can not override the erasure of 
ethical judgement that comes with the cultural (now religious) episteme. 
Post 9/11, Jurgen Habermas' (2006) revised interventions were a sign of the times 
where theories were rethought in the context of widespread human rights abuses and 
critique  of  secular  modern  nation  states.  Habermas  stepped  away  from his  own 
scepticism about religion to open up his communicative theory of the public sphere. 
In an exchange with Joseph Ratzinger, he conceded that as long as the legislative 
system  continued  with  its  own  autonomous,  secular  and  legitimate  processes,  a 
diverse range of voices, including religiously inspired interventions, could be part of 
a necessary active and thriving public sphere to contribute to  norms setting.  The 
problem with this intervention is not his call for a diverse, and vibrant interaction 
between as many voices as possible as an important element of thinking about what 
democracy means but rather the question, as is noted throughout this thesis, of which 
voices  are  heard.  Moreover,  the  distinct  difference  between  Habermas'  expanded 
democratic spaces (including the right of religious people to truth claims and to make 
their  interventions in religious language) and Ratzinger's acknowledgement of the 
scope of religious ethics to curtail the excesses of science whilst secularism could act 
as a counter to the pathologies of religion, is that Ratzinger asserts the validity of 
'natural law' and Creation as the ultimate foundation for human engagement. Indeed 
he precisely asserts the problems with majoritarianism as a reason for appealing to 
(and even stopping at) a transcendental source.     
In  the  British  context,  liberal  political  theorists,  but  particularly  Tariq  Modood, 
renewed their efforts to formulate an academic argument for the state recognition of 
religion as a basis for group rights and particularly as parity arguments in relation to 
new waves  of  Muslim  political  identities  and  a  specific  form of  discrimination. 
Modood (2005) identified two particular chinks in the debate about difference and 
prized these open. The first claims an inconsistency in the critique of the public-
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private separation. He charges feminists and multicultural theorists with critiquing 
the public-private in order to expand notions of entitlement on the one hand and yet 
acting  to  reinforce  this  division  to  prevent  religious  demands  from  being 
accommodated,  on  the  other.  He  specifically  notes  Will  Kymlicka's  aversion  to 
including religion as a form of polyethnic rights. Secondly, Modood (2005) argues 
that it is the increasing realisation on the part of ethnic and religious minorities that 
the British state has never been secular - in respect of the constitutional position of 
the  Church  of  England,  the  prolonged  state  funding  of  Christian  schools,  the 
blasphemy legislation that protects only Christianity and the Church representatives 
in the House of Lords - that has paved the way for claims related to religious parity. 
Indeed  at  the  heart  of  the  secularism  literature  is  a  critique  of  the  (religious) 
neutrality of the British state. Arguments about the Christian character, or rather bias, 
of  'western' nation states has been a central plank of a diverse range of interventions 
including Giorgio Agamben's (1998) and Talal Asad's (2003) analysis of the religious 
antecedents of law, liberalism and humanism to Women Against Fundamentalism's 
(1995) calls for the disestablishment of the British state to Saba Mahmood's (2005) 
critique of Orientalist reactions to Muslim women's agency.
Moreover, Modood (2005, 2007) challenges two kinds of objections to recognising 
religious group rights - that religion is ascribed whereas gender and 'race' are given 
and that religious groups are intolerant. With regards to the former, he notes that this 
is both scientifically and sociologically contentious and with regards to the latter, he 
berates the disproportionate application of women's equality arguments to Muslim 
demands and notes that gender equality is not a pre-requisite for recognising other 
forms of collective association.  He doesn't  address concerns  about  heterodoxy or 
apostasy.  For  Modood  (2007)  religious  diversity  and  particularly  the  numerical 
strength of Muslims is  an empirical fact that necessitates appropriate institutional 
recognition. Moreover, within the current climate of anti Muslim discrimination, he 
believes that the question of Muslim group rights cannot be sidestepped. Equally, one 
could  question  the  wisdom  of  such  majoritarian  arguments  where  numbers  take 
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precedence  over  a  critical  engagement  with  the  demands  that  are  being  made, 
especially where a commitment to equalities is being sidestepped as a requirement 
for their incorporation. 
The specific discrimination that Modood described in the early 1990s, found voice in 
The Runnymede Trust's report (1997) entitled 'Islamophobia: a challenge for us all'. 
The  report  pointed  to  'unfounded  hostility  towards  Islam…  (and)…  practical 
consequences of such hostility in unfair discrimination against Muslim individuals 
and communities and to the exclusion of Muslims from mainstream political  and 
social affairs' (1997:4). It notes that such hostility ranges from discourse through to 
increasing levels of physical assaults and socio-economic disadvantage. Needless to 
say this has been corroborated in more recent expositions of the 'War on Terror' and 
its  impact  on  Muslims  across  Europe particularly  in  relation  to  the  incidence  of 
physical  attacks,  raids  on  mosques,  police  harassment  and  the  association  of  all 
'Muslim'  charities  with  terror  networks  (Fekete,  2004;  Kundnani,  2007a).  It  is 
important to note the Institute of Race Relations preference for the term 'anti Muslim 
racism' or 'Xeno-racism' rather than 'Islamophobia' in order to view this as a strand of 
racism  rather  than  religious  discrimination  (see  Sivanandan,  2006;  Kundnani, 
2007a).  This  has  significant  implications  for  the  way in  which  it  is  tackled  -  as 
having some continuity with other struggles and as one aspect of a wider struggle 
against  racism  rather  than  to  see  this  as  a  religious  issue  requiring  a  religious 
response.
Moreover,  a  number  of  problems  exist  with  Tariq  Modood's  argument  and 
reverberate  throughout  this  thesis.  Firstly,  as  with  the  voices  of  other  religious 
groups, his demand for parity for Muslims hinges on a fundamental contradiction - 
that  Christianity  occupies  a  privileged  place  in  Britain  on  the  one  hand  and  an 
argument about widespread 'secular intolerance' or 'secular hegemony' on the other 
(1995:1). It is my view that the history of 'heterogeneous time' in governing ethnic 
minorities in Britain (discussed below) has meant that, even if secularism has been 
the dominant discourse, religion has consistently been an important marker in the 
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relationship  between  ethnic  minorities  and  the  state.  Moreover,  there  is  some 
evidence to suggest that responses to religious identity at a local level are highly 
variable. Far from imposing secularism or insisting upon it,  some teachers within 
state schools, for instance, view their schools as 'multi-faith' and are reluctant to use 
the term 'secular' (Dhaliwal and Patel, 2007). This does not of course undermine the 
suggestion that racism plays a part in the delivery of services and that anti Muslim 
racism is one virulent stream. 
Furthermore, Modood's characterisation of Muslims in Britain, their needs and their 
experiences, reproduces the same kinds of over simplification that form the brunt of 
his  critique  of  blackness  as  a  political  project.  He glosses  over  the  significantly 
divergent experiences and socio-economic positions of Muslims to reinforce their 
political representation through a few highly problematic organisations. Others have 
pointed to the complexities of identity and the experience of discrimination. Claire 
Mitchell  (2006)  highlighted  the  multidirectional relationship  between  religion, 
ethnicity  and nation  where  the  religious  aspect  of  identity  can manifest  in  many 
different ways including: where religion may organise or order ethnic or national 
identities, by providing some of the symbols and rituals and therefore the content of 
difference; where attendance at religious events may just be a marker of ethnic or 
national affiliation rather than an insight into levels and strength of belief; and where 
ethnic identities may become sacralised by political interventions so that religious 
concepts are used to provide a language of 'moral superiority'. In addition to this, 
Vered Kahani-Hopkins and Nick Hopkins (2002) found that different political groups 
construct  'muslimness'  and  interpret  key  Islamic  concepts  in  divergent  ways 
dependent  upon  the  respective  political  ends  that  they  have  in  mind.  This  is  a 
reminder  that  Islam  is  a  contested  source  of  knowledge  and  practice.  Kahani-
Hopkins and Hopkins (2002) provide the following illustration of how two groups 
claiming to represent Muslims in Britain -  the Muslim Parliament (referred to as 
Parliament) and the Islamic Party of Britain (referred to as Party) - make use of the 
concept of da'wah:
(A)lthough  sharing  this  condemnation  of  Muslims'  failure  to  move  beyond  the 
ritualistic, their characterisations of da'wah were strikingly different and shaped so 
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as to advance their respective projects…For the Party, da'wah is construed so as to 
bring  into  being  a  sense  of  community  which  includes  non-Muslims.  For  the 
Parliament,  da'wah is  construed so as  to  bring into being a sense of community  
based upon a particular ideological commitment; British Muslims were to distance 
themselves  from  the  West  and  identify  with  an  Islam  (and  Muslim  activists 
worldwide) committed to the realisation of power.   
[Kahani-Hopkins and Hopkins, 2002: 301]
The multi-faceted nature of identity  and socio-economic position needs  to  be re-
iterated  here  because  of  a  growing  tendency  to  collapse  these  into  problems 
pertaining to religious categories carrying its own reproductive effects, such as the 
need to consult or liaise with religious groups to resolve these issues. Notably, the 
appropriation of socio-economic disadvantage amongst Pakistanis and Bangladeshis 
(particularly Pakistani and Bangladeshi women) to make larger claims about British 
Muslims and the  incidence  of  poverty  and discrimination.6 However,  Avtar  Brah 
(2001) noted the multiple factors at play in understanding the under-representation of 
young south Asian Muslim women in the labour market in Britain. She argues that 
these are difficult to disentangle (or reduce to one factor) and include: the process 
and timing of migration; concentration in sectors that were later restructured or went 
into demise; the experience of racism in securing work and re-employment; and the 
prevalence  of  cultural  constraints  which  meant  that  some  south  Asian  Muslim 
women were confined to low paid, unregulated and unrecognised work in the home. 
In particular, Brah (2001) issues a reminder of:
(t)he  importance  of  studying  the  articulations  -  between  and  across  relations  of 
gender, class, ethnicity, racism, religion and so on - empirically and historically as 
contingent relationships. The young Muslim women narrate the contradictory codes 
of such articulations in their daily lives.
6 For instance, on 7th September 2006, the TUC issued a joint statement with the Muslim 
Council of Britain stating: ‘The TUC report Poverty, Exclusion and British People of Pakistani and 
Bangladeshi Origin published in 2005 demonstrated that many people from substantial parts of the 
Muslim community suffer massive disadvantage and discrimination: 69 per cent classified as poor 
compared with 22 per cent of the country as a whole. Overall British Muslims are three times more 
likely to be unemployed than the population as a whole.’
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[Brah, 2001]
One of the most important problems with Modood's work is that his approach to 
assertions  of  religious  'need',  'identity',  'experience'  and  'location'  are  wholly 
uncritical.  Despite  his  call  for  reflexivity  on  the  question  of  blackness,  this  is 
nowhere to  be found in his  writings  on Muslims.  As with the Runnymede Trust 
reports,  his  starting  point  is  the  heightened  identification  of  Muslims  as  a 
consequence of anti Muslim racism during and after the Rushdie Affair. If there is 
any acknowledgement of the years preceding this event, it is to characterise Muslims 
as reacting to the monoculturalism and Christian privilege of the state. Moreover, 
even though he talks  about  'political  multiculturalism',  he  overlooks  the  political 
processes that may have taken place in order to shape and assert particular demands. 
Whilst  this  thesis  takes  on  board  his  critique  of  multicultural  debates  as  having 
moved  away  from  the  politics of  multiculturalism  towards  analyses  of  legal 
judgements, it seeks to produce more critical reflections on the claims that are being 
made and to unravel the many factors at play. 
Indeed, systematic research into the politics of multifaithism at the local level has 
been limited to a few anecdotal accounts including Yasmin Ali's (1992) points on 
schooling in Bradford, my own account of youth work in the London borough of 
Ealing (Dhaliwal, 2003) and Ed Hussain's (2007) detailed narrative of his Islamist 
activism in Tower Hamlets and Newham. More recently, Pragna Patel and Uditi Sen 
(2010) located their interviews with ethnic minority women within the context of 
policy and funding shifts in Ealing. However, I believe there is considerably more 
that can be revealed about the intense and the mundane political exchanges that have 
led to normative shifts in the local landscape. This thesis makes a contribution in that 
direction.
Nevertheless,  as  Habermas  (2006)  states,  there  is  widespread  acceptance  within 
contemporary sociology that we now inhabit a postsecular world:
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This refers not only to the fact that religion is holding its own in an increasingly 
secular  environment and that  society must  assume that  religious fellowships will 
continue to exist for the foreseeable future. The expression postsecular does more 
than  give  public  recognition  to  religious  fellowships  in  view  of  the  functional 
contribution they  make  to  the  reproduction  of  motivations  and attitudes  that  are 
socially  desirable.  The  public  awareness  of  a  postsecular  society  also  reflects  a 
normative insight  that  has consequences for the political  dealings of  unbelieving 
citizens  with  believing  citizens.  In  a  postsecular  society,  there  is  an  increasing 
consensus that  certain phases of the “modernisation of the public consciousness” 
involve  the  assimilation  and  the  reflexive  transformation  of  both  religious  and 
secular mentalities. If both sides agree to understand the secularisation of society as 
a complimentary learning process, then they will also have cognitive reasons to take 
seriously each other's contributions to controversial subjects in the public debate.
[Habermas, 2006: 47]
New Labour, Religion, Equality and Communitarianism
This thesis began during the dynamic and transformative tenure of a New Labour 
government. There has been a transfer of power during the course of writing but I 
believe that New Labour's 'faith agenda'  and communitarianism provided the step 
change in thinking about religious organisations and the public sphere that continues 
to dominate contemporary conceptions of governance, the social and civil society. 
This section provides an overview of the legacy of the New Labour political project 
in so far as it created the space for religious organisations to input into public policy 
and access public funds and also accelerated a process of de-secularisation that began 
within civil society in the 1980s. 
Whilst the Thatcher era was clearly discernible as a political formation that combined 
economic  neo-liberalism  with  a  social  authoritarian  agenda  (Hall,  1988),  New 
Labour's ideological focus was rather more difficult to establish. New Labour was 
variously  described  as:  a  combination  of  economic  neo-liberalism  and  social 
democracy  (Hall,  2007);  as  a  'combination  of  liberal  individualism and  socially 
conservative communitarianism' (Jordan, 2005); and as 'economically conservative 
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but  constitutionally  radical'  (Phillips,  1999).  It  is  important  to  note  the  extent  of 
people's desire to believe in the social  democratic aspects of New Labour after a 
prolonged period of Thatcherism, unfettered marketisation and neo-conservatism but 
also  that  the  contradictory  nature  of  New  Labour  drew  people  into  a  chaotic, 
uncertain space which Anne Phillips (1999) described as a period of 'dislocation'. 
This contradictory nature was highlighted by the following: the introduction of a 
range of social democratic equalities measures; devolution and democratisation of 
the state; but also reform or rather gradual privatisation of public services; a greater 
centralisation  of  ideological  and decision  making power  and tough anti  terror  or 
surveillance legislation. 
New Labour  was constructed  through a refashioning of  policies  and priorities  to 
ensure a very public (albeit problematic) transition from what has come to be known 
as 'Old Labour'. An instrumentalist perspective on New Labour as driven by political 
expediency  (Chadwick  and  Heffernan,  2003)  was  counter-posed  by  Anthony 
Giddens'  (1998) writings  (and Tony Blair's  pronouncements)  on  the  'Third  Way'. 
Giddens  articulated  the  strongest  argument  that  New  Labour  represented  an 
ideological project that emerged out of and sought to respond to a vastly changing 
political context. His work is based on a number of premises about the contemporary 
political context which reverberate throughout the empirical chapters in this thesis: 
that communism and socialism have proven untenable (Giddens does not distinguish 
between  the  fall  of  communist  states  and  the  perceived  unviability  of  socialist 
politics); the decline of class affiliation and a significant growth in the number of non 
aligned and shifting electoral voters (who Giddens nonetheless assumes occupy a 
centrist  space);  the  durability,  sophistication  and  dynamism  of  capitalism  and 
markets; the absence of a viable alternative; and problems with welfare provision for 
having 'perverse consequences'  such as creating cultures of dependency, decaying 
housing estates and rising crime. 
A string  of  related  terms  provided  the  discursive  framework  within  which  New 
Labour  sought  to  distinguish  itself  from  Old  Labour:  'reform';  'modernisation'; 
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'renewal'  and  'relevance'  (Newman  2001).  Moreover,  remoulding  itself  whilst  in 
popular Opposition, New Labour actively co-opted phrases that had been associated 
with  civil  society  struggles  including:  'equality';  'participation';  'empowerment'; 
'choice'  and 'community'  (Jordan,  2005;  Clarke,  2007).  However,  it  became clear 
that, whilst New Labour had a tendency to 'speak with a forked tongue' (Hall, 2003), 
its'  social  democratic  or  constitutionally  radical  strand  was  subordinated  to  an 
economic neo-liberal strand (Hall, 2003).
New Labour's 'faith agenda'
Formal  state  recognition  of  faith  communities  actually  dates  back  to  the 
establishment  of  the Inner  Cities  Religious  Council  in  1992 by the Conservative 
Party. This body continued under New Labour but was moved to the Office of the 
Deputy Prime Minister  (ODPM) and located within the Neighbourhood Renewal 
Unit. Religion constituted an important component of New Labour's political project. 
New Labour radically transformed the place of religious groups in the public sphere. 
Tony  Blair's  administration  in  particular  was  actively  involved  in  a  state-led 
extension of the role  of religious groups,  particularly as representatives of ethnic 
minority  communities  and  even  as  providers  of  public  services.  This  de-
secularisation  of  public  policy  and  service  provision  was  most  obvious  in  the 
following measures. Firstly, within education: the extension of voluntary aided status 
and  state  funding  for  ethnic  minority  faith  based  schools;  the  identification  of 
religious  groups as  key  partners  in  the  management  of  Trust  Schools  within  the 
Education Act 2006; and because the overwhelming number of City Academies were 
owned  and  managed  by  religious  groups  and  leaders.  Secondly,  through  the 
introduction of the 'Faith Communities Capacity Building Fund' administered by the 
newly formed 'Faith and Cohesion Unit' within the Department for Communities and 
Local Government. This was the first time that a British government directly funded 
religious groups from the central purse. It had the effect of institutionalising religious 
identities  within  State  structures.  Thirdly,  New  Labour  extended  the  equalities 
legislation to include religious discrimination in employment and service provision 
through  the  Employment  Equality  (Religion  and  Belief)  Regulations  2003  and 
through the Equality Act 2006. It is important to note, however, that they faced a 
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great  deal of opposition to proposals to  extend positive equality  duties  on public 
providers (already in place on 'race' and gender) to promote equality in religion and 
belief.
 
There  is  significant  evidence  that  these  commitments  trickled  down  to  State 
apparatus  at  national,  regional  and  local  levels,  including  the  Greater  London 
Assembly  and  government-led  quangos,  which  began  involving  religious 
organisations as key players in the formulation and delivery of public policy at every 
level of government.7 Moreover, this central government commitment to consulting 
religious groups gave rise to the establishment of national umbrella bodies, such as 
the Muslim Council of Britain and the Network of Sikh Organisations. As a result, 
religious organisations began determining policy and practice on a wide range of 
areas but also in areas such as domestic violence where they not only lack expertise 
but where they have previously been criticised for perpetuating inequality, violence 
and abuse.8 
The particular problem of how such a practice has been rolled out uncritically across 
state  structures  is  evident  from a  number  of  GLA reports  including 'Praying  for 
Peace:  Domestic  Violence  and  Faith  Communities'  published  in  November  2006 
which reports on a meeting of religious leaders at which they discussed the role of 
religious organisations in tackling domestic violence. This meeting was organised 
and facilitated by the Mayor's Policy Advisor on Women's Issues. Moreover, research 
and  policy  funding  related  to  the  development  of  faith  based  services  or  to 
7 For instance, the document 'Consulting London: A Framework for the core GLA, LDA, 
LFEPA, MPA and TFL' published in September 2003 clearly identifies 'faith groups' as 'stakeholders' 
and institutionalises their place in consultation mechanisms.
8 For accounts of how religious groups have been involved in perpetrating violence and abuse 
against women and children or mediating women and children back into violent relationships see 
Southall Black Sisters (1990) Against the Grain, published by Southall Black Sisters and Siddiqui, H 
(2003) 'It was written in her kismet: forced marriage' in Gupta, R (ed) From Homebreakers to 
Jailbreakers, Zed Books: London. 
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consolidating the input of religious groups in policy formulation is exemplified in a 
number of Housing Corporation projects including the 'Faith in the Future' project 
(funded through their Innovation and Good Practice research grants for 2001/02). 
The New Labour literature acknowledges the overt religious affiliation of a number 
of Cabinet ministers at the time and Blair himself has been described as a 'Christian 
Democrat'  rather  than  a  'Social  Democrat'  (Marquand,  2003).  Indeed  Blair's 
'missionary zeal' did not go unnoticed and is thought to have underwritten his belief 
in himself as a 'destiny prime minister', to have spilt over into his commitment to 
family values and to have influenced his decisions on Iraq in 2003 (Martin, 2007). 
Stuart Hall referred to Blair as having a 'quasi-religious air of righteous conviction' 
that worked well with his confessional style of politics (Hall, 2007). There is also 
some commentary on the religious motivations of other Cabinet ministers, such as 
Ruth Kelly (a member of the Christian Right organisation Opus Dei) in debates on 
areas of social policy such as education and health (Brindle, 2007; Martin, 2007). 
Indeed, the speculation that Ruth Kelly's resignation in 2008 reflected her inability to 
see  through  Gordon  Brown's  commitment  to  the  Human  Fertilisation  and 
Embryology Bill  2008 was viewed as  a  clear  manifestation of the contradictions 
between the religious convictions of individual New Labour politicians, the political 
opportunism that appears to cement the 'faith agenda' and the social democratic and 
secular tenets of other New Labour commitments.9 
However, beyond these surface and journalistic accounts of New Labour's quandary 
9 For a discussion of the divergent lobbying by Catholic MPs and patients groups on the issue 
of admix embryos see The Times online 'Q&A: Human Fertilisation and Embryology Bill' by Mark 
Henderson on 26/03/08 available at: 
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/politics/article3606523.ece
With regards to the tensions within New Labour on attempts by Catholic Labour MPs to 
oppose elements of the Bill and support amendments on the issue of abortion see Allegra Stratton's 
article in The Guardian newspaper on 23/10/08 entitled 'MPs back embryology shake up but abortion 
row continues' and available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/science/2008/oct/23/stemcells
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over religion, there is very little discussion of the pressure that religious groups, as 
political formations and long-standing Labour Party allies, brought to bear. Indeed, 
the 'faith agenda' occupies a relatively silent enclave in the New Labour literature 
that both defies and appears not to be worthy of explanation. This thesis suggests that 
the 'faith agenda' could either express some kind of continuity with New Labour's 
overall  objectives or,  alternatively, can be viewed as disruptive and contradictory. 
Religion sat comfortably with both the communitarian and individualistic strands of 
New Labour's policies. Nevertheless, the 'faith agenda' had its own momentum and 
lead to unintended consequences. The empirical analysis within subsequent chapters 
attempts to capture some of these.
Self-regulating individuals and communities of allegiance
New Labour  can be  seen as  a  curious  dance between neo-liberal  economics  and 
social democratic tenets, often with neo-liberalism taking the lead, what Stuart Hall 
(2003) termed 'New Labour's  double  shuffle'.  New Labour's  break from the past 
involved  a  rethink  of  its  understanding  of  equality  -  now  seen  as  equality  of 
opportunity  rather  than  as  redistribution.  Implicated  in  this  rethink  was  the 
reinvention of the role of the state. One of the promises on which New Labour were 
elected was to counteract the bleak Thatcherite message that "there is no society, only 
individuals  and  families"  (Gilbert,  2007).  Tony  Blair  committed  New Labour  to 
recognising, valuing and reinvigorating the voluntary sector (referred to by Blair as 
the Third Sector) and social  provision (Blair,  in Chadwick and Heffernan, 2003). 
However, he wanted to do this without giving rise to the kind of anxiety associated 
with a 1970s Labour government where "nationalisation" became the Conservative 
Party's drumming baton. This involved a considerable rethink of the role of the state 
from the state as provider to the state as enabler; under New Labour the state would 
intervene in society through "social investment" and "social cohesion" rather than 
extended state provision (Gilbert, 2007). Communitarianism was New Labour's tool 
for attaining this end. Communities and neighbourhoods were given a new lease of 
life within social policy. 
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Nikolas Rose (2001) referred to New Labour's revival of communitarianism as  the 
inventiveness  of  the  New  Labour  project.  Communitarianism  enabled  them  to 
"govern at a distance" by locating people within "communities of allegiance" and 
engaging  them  in  an  "etho-politics",  a  new  moral  vocabulary  for  public  policy 
emphasising peoples' behaviour and values as the cause of problems and the basis for 
change (Rose, 1999; Rose and Miller, 2008). Rose (1999) noted the emphasis on 
ethics and values and the characterisation of the individual as a moral being (rather 
than social as within social  democracy or rational as within neo-liberal economic 
philosophy) engaged with civic virtues. The following quote is significant for this 
thesis because it highlights the moral currency at play within this new frame:
(O)ne can see signs of the emergence of a new  moral vocabulary for politics: the 
recurrence  of  terms  freighted  with  values:  partnership,  civil  society,  community, 
civility,  responsibility,  mutuality,  obligations,  voluntary  endeavour,  autonomy, 
initiative…  Human  beings  are  considered  to  be,  at  root,  ethical  creatures.  The 
problems  of  human  associations  are  increasingly  made  intelligible  as  ethical 
problems. And new ways are emerging of governing the behaviour of individuals 
through acting upon this  ethical  force field.  These ways of  governing behaviour 
through ethics, and in the name of ethics, inform the politics of the Third Way and 
cognate political programmes developed under such names as communitarianism, 
stake-holding  and  social  capital.  Each  seeks  a  way  of  acting  upon  the  ethical  
formation and the ethical  self  management of individuals  so as to promote their  
engagement in their collective destiny in the interests of  economic advancement,  
civic stability, even justice and happiness.
[Rose, 1999: 474-475]
New Labour actively sought to produce new types of subjects (Hall,  2003). After 
moving through a variety of terms - citizen, consumer, patient, service user - New 
Labour appears to have settled on a new hyphenated term 'citizen-consumer' (Clarke, 
2005).  The  new 'citizen-consumer'  is  empowered,  responsible,  self-sufficient  and 
active (Clarke, 2005). It was through the new privileged place allotted to the concept 
of  'choice'  that  the  subject  of  government  became  self-governing  (Rose,  1999). 
However, in some ways (but not all) the focus on 'choice' ran into conflict with civic 
responsibility and a  sense of community or 'New Labour's  communitarian strand' 
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(Jordan 2005). 
New Labour's citizen was characterised as liberated and independent of the state but 
also part of a network of social and community links (Clarke, 2005). This embedding 
of 'citizen-consumers' within 'communities of allegiance' was an attempt to reconcile 
the  social  and  the  economic  such  as  by  'domesticating  the  social',  where 
responsibility for issues like security, care and welfare were re-privatised and once 
again assigned to the family or household, or by 'narrowing the social' into smaller 
units of governance such as communities or neighbourhoods (Clarke, 2007). Ruth 
Levitas (2004) articulated an even more critical view of New Labour's fascination 
with 'community':
The  continuities  with  Thatcherism  were  evident.  The  New  Right  involved  a 
synthesis of free market and strong state whereas New Labour's Third Way could be 
seen  as  a  'soft'  synthesis  of  market  forces  and  'community'  where  the  role  of 
'community'  is  to  mop  up  the  damage  done  by  market  forces  and  mediate  the 
policing functions of the state and (discursively) to serve as legitimation of this.
[Levitas, 2004: 62]
The term 'community'  has historically been used by civil  society organisations to 
assert a strong collective response to injustices and inequalities (Rose, 1999) and also 
has historical connotations for the state's relationship with ethnic minorities (evident 
from the Institute of Race Relations' chronicling of anti-racist struggles in 1981 in 
'Southall: Birth of a Black Community' and in 1991 in 'Newham: The Forging of a 
Black Community'). The phrase community was recast from the solidarity politics 
that  had  been  associated  with  collective  civil  action  calling  the  state  to  account 
(Black  community,  our  community,  workers  united  etc.)  and  instead  mobilised 
towards  a  neo-liberal  agenda  which  involved  seeing  civil  society  as  a  site  for 
investment, as part of the cultivation of a new entrepreneurial ethos. Moreover, when 
used by communitarians, the term 'community' is steeped in a conservative discourse 
about one or more of the following - moral degeneration, social disorder, the rise of 
individualism and the decline of traditional associations namely church attendance or 
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trade union membership (see for instance Etzioni, 1993; Putnam, 2000). 
After the 'race riots' in the north of England in the summer of 2001 and the terrorist 
attacks on 9/11, New Labour's own sense of 'communitarianism' took a new twist. 
The development of social solidarities was no longer seen as something that could be 
left to chance or organic development but rather, this became an important area for 
state intervention and direction (Jordan 2005). The turn from 'multiculturalism'  to 
'community cohesion' is discussed in the next section. However, here I want to note 
that both civic republicanism and communitarianism gained new momentum in the 
context of the financial crisis and opened up additional spaces for religious groups. 
Prominent political philosophers such as Michael Sandel (2009) began hailing the 
promise  of  'a  new  politics  of  morality'  to  replace  a  failing  market  philosophy. 
Importantly for this thesis, religious leaders and faith-based organisations are viewed 
as useful contributors to moral debates about 'the common good', the objectives of 
government intervention and of public goods (Sandel, 2009). However, as is noted 
throughout this chapter, where such an approach is couched within the 'deliberative 
democracy' frame, it is devoid of any real grasp of existing institutionalised practices 
and power relations, of the historical influence of religious groups on public policy 
and requires an impossible clean chit before it can be put into practice. 
Moreover, though Rose (1999) appears to be suggesting that 'race', ethnicity, gender 
and sexuality carried the potential to disrupt attempts to impose 'a single set of moral 
principles' through communitarian policies (1999: 480), I want to suggest that some 
elements of these diverse political fields can  coincide  with the State's interests and 
can  be  better  understood  through  the  deployment  of  the  concept  of  'hegemony'. 
Indeed, Rose's (1999) discussion of community is incomplete because it fails to take 
account  of  the  consistent  feature  of  "community"  as  a  trope  of  governance  with 
regards  to  ethnic  minorities  in  Britain,  what  some  post-colonial  theorists  have 
referred  to  as  the  experience  of  'heterogeneous  time'  (Bhabha,  1994;  Chatterjee, 
2004) that repeatedly draws us back to multiple and simultaneous narratives. The 
post-colonial subject is simultaneously governed as someone that is  actually out of 
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step and yet also has to contend with the  negative accusation of being out of step 
with the dominant narrative. In the case of multiculturalist practice in Britain, the 
State has been complicit in the production of 'heterogeneous time'. 
Between cohesion and prevent
Part  of  the  contradictory  nature  of  New  Labour  was  evident  in  its  push  on 
communitarianism,  on the one hand,  and its  seeming willingness  to  listen  to  the 
concerns  of  black  feminism and anti  racism,  on  the  other.  So for  instance,  New 
Labour  showed  a  willingness  to  expand  understandings  of  multiculturalism  by 
establishing a Forced Marriage Working Group and issuing a statement that appeared 
to echo the sentiments of feminists when the Home Office minister Mike O' Brien 
stated "multiculturalism cannot be an excuse for moral blindness" and advocated a 
"mature multiculturalism" that simultaneously acknowledged difference and retained 
a  rights  framework for  tackling violence  and abuse against  minority  women and 
children.10 Also the possibility of change was evident in the seminal work of the 
McPherson Inquiry into the death of Stephen Lawrence, the introduction of the Race 
Relations Amendment Act 2000 and reform of the police complaints system. 
During the early part of the summer 2001, there were disturbances in three northern 
towns- Burnley,  Bradford and Oldham. Alongside a number of independent  local 
10 Home Office (June 2000) A Choice By Right: The Report of the Working Group on Forced 
Marriage  Published by the Home Office Communications Directorate and available at:
http://www.communities.gov.uk/publications/communities/choiceby2
Even then Hannana Siddiqui documented her experience of the Forced Marriage Working 
Group, which still reflected the shift from a multiculturalist to multifaithist governance frame in the 
selection of its members according to religious identity and by insisting on consulting religious 
organisation. Siddiqui argued that this process led to flaws in the final recommendations of the 
Working Group's report which allowed for mediation in cases of forced marriage represented a 
significant breach in their wider commitment to challenging violence against women where the 
involvement of statutory services in mediation had already been recognised as bad practice. See 
Siddiqui, H (2003) It was written in her kismet: forced marriage   In Gupta, R (ed) From 
Homebreakers to Jailbreakers: Southall Black Sisters (Zed Books: London).
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inquiries into these riots, the Home Secretary set up a Ministerial Group on Public 
Order and Community Cohesion and a Community Cohesion Review Team (CCRT) 
lead  by  Ted  Cantle.  The  main  findings  of  the  CCRT focused  on  the  extent  of 
segregation  and  polarisation  of  communities  particularly  the  physical  distance 
between  them  and  noted  that  this  was  exacerbated  by  "separate  educational 
arrangements,  community  and  voluntary  organisations,  employment,  places  of 
worship, language, social and cultural networks'.11 Their use of the phrase 'parallel 
lives' became common parlance and they expressed concern that distance between 
communities  could  grow into  a  fear  of  difference  and be  exploited  by extremist 
groups. They pushed for cross-cultural contact to be valued as an end in itself and to 
be  supported  or  strengthened  by  community  groups  and  the  state.  Though  the 
definition  of  community  cohesion  is  often  vague,  the  CCRT report  indicates  a 
number  of  components  including:  greater  knowledge  and  contact  between 
communities;  respect  for  various  cultures;  reducing  social  exclusion;  addressing 
wealth disparities; equality for women within communities; and a greater sense of 
citizenship, based on shared common principles; but the report also talked of moral 
principles, acceptable codes of behaviour, and effective informal social control.12 
Interestingly, whilst there is much overlap in the recommendations, the independent 
inquiries into the individual riots in Bradford, Burnley and Oldham, expressly talked 
about the scale of racist abuse, violence and views towards ethnic minorities in these 
areas but CCRT barely touched on this and indeed it is this (intentional?) oversight 
that has been the principal critique of community cohesion.13
11 Pg 9 of Community Cohesion: A report of the independent review team chaired by Ted Cantle 
and published by the Home Office.
12 Community Cohesion: A report of the independent review team chaired by Ted Cantle and 
published by the Home Office.
13 For instance the Oldham Independent Review Panel report dated 11/12/01 points to: the rise 
of the far right in the area including gaining seats in local elections; a petrol bomb attack on the then 
Asian Mayor's house; common usage of the word 'Paki' to refer to Asians in the area; self imposed 
curfews amongst ethnic minorities to avoid racist attacks; and complaints by ethnic minorities of 
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Later the same year, the horrific attacks on the Twin Towers in New York threw 
multiculturalism into disarray. Exacerbated by the 7/7 bombings in 2005, decades of 
multiculturalist  policy  and  practice  were  held  responsible  for  allegedly  turning 
Britain (and the USA and Europe) into a "soft touch". The events released a new 
wave  of  racist  allegations,  primarily  against  Muslims  and  Pakistanis,  blanketly 
accusing them of disloyalty, of bigotry, of an unwillingness to integrate or subscribe 
to  a  renewed  emphasis  on  'British  values'.  This  coincided  with  an  underlying 
discourse  about  the  incompatibility  of  Islam  and  Western  democratic  values, 
famously  elaborated  by  Samuel  Huntingdon's  (2002)  book  "The  Clash  of 
Civilisations  and  Remaking  the  World  Order".  The  context  became  extremely 
polarised  between  a  racist  discourse  about  Muslims  as  forming  dangerous  'fifth 
columns' within Britain and an anti racist defensiveness against any critique of Islam. 
Even if it had been difficult before, it now became impossible to have a reasonable 
debate  about  Muslim  fundamentalism,  the  actual  existence  of  terrorist  networks 
within Britain and the role that ought to be played by both state and civil society in 
challenging fundamentalism. 
Whilst Kymlicka and Banting (2006) question the vast quantities of literature now 
pointing  to  the  'retreat'  (Joppke,  2004)  or  'death'  (Kundnani,  2007a)  of 
multiculturalism  and  insist  that  multiculturalist  policies  and  practices  are 
institutionalised, the government's response to the events of 2001 and especially its 
shift  from  enunciations  of  'multiculturalism'  to  'community  cohesion'  have  been 
vociferously challenged. In particular,  'community cohesion'  is  thought to mark a 
turn  away  from  cultural  diversity  and  tolerance  towards  an  earlier  form  of 
assimilationism (Rattansi, 2002; Burnett, 2004; Sivanandan, 2006; McGhee, 2003; 
Worley, 2005; Kundnani, 2007b). Sivanandan coined the phrase the merging of 'the 
war on asylum with the war on terror'  to  refer  to the way that second and third 
generation ethnic minorities in Britain were no longer viewed as established citizens 
but rather as immigrants in need of integration (2006:2). Furthermore, New Labour 
people dumping rubbish or throwing bottles, both of which are common forms of racist harassment.
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was  accused  of  the  following:  placing  a  disproportionate  emphasis  on  ethnic 
minorities despite Ted Cantle and Herman Ouseley's findings on 'white flight' as a 
factor in segregation (Kundnani, 2007a; McGhee, 2003; Back et al, 2002); avoiding 
central  issues  around  socio  economic  and regional  disadvantage  (Rattansi,  2002; 
McGhee, 2003; Amin, 2005); ignoring the incidence of racism in sparking the 2001 
'race' riots in the north of England (McGhee, 2003; Sivanandan, 2006; Kundnani, 
2007a); exacerbating disaffection and compounding the experience of discrimination 
by  supporting  tough  sentencing  and  a  security  agenda  that  compromises  civil 
liberties (McGhee, 2003; Fekete, 2004; Sivanandan, 2006). 
As  one  stream  of  New  Labour's  peculiar  attempt  at  civic  republicanism,  the 
'community cohesion' policy assumed a completely flat playing field, devoid of local 
and historical relations of power, thereby leaving normative whiteness unchallenged 
or reinforced (Back et al, 2002) and invoked a patriotism that seeks to erase memory 
of the violence of British colonialism and reassert a new British pride (Back et al,  
2002; Yuval Davis, 2006; Kundnani, 2007a). Derek Mcghee (2010) described this 
combination of securitisation and a renewed interest in civic Britishness as standing 
at the crossroads between a 'politics of fear' and a 'politics of hope'. Whilst Pathak 
(2007) emphasised the need to distinguish between a post 9/11 existential crisis about 
who we are, from what kind of society we desire (2007: 269), I would like to suggest 
that the two questions are not so easily disentangled. 
Above I have already noted the moral underpinnings of New Labour's redeployment 
of 'community' and the related shift in focus from rights to values and acceptable 
behaviour but within the context of 'community cohesion', Back et al (2002), Burnett 
(2004), Amin (2005), and Kundnani (2007a) argue that it marked the revival of the 
pathologising nature of 'community'  as social policy because this moral discourse 
lambasts  the  values of  disadvantaged  sections  of  the  population,  holding  them 
responsible  for  their  socio  economic  position  and  effectively  leaving  structural, 
regional, national and even global factors unquestioned. Importantly for this thesis, 
Back  et  al  (2002)  pointed  to  the  local  level  implications  for  representation. 
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Sandwiched  between  surveillance  and  cohesion,  the  local  arena  'becomes  a 
battleground of competing ethics' (Back et al, 2002). Thus they stated:
The result is to set up two poles: the first is a consensus position defined and policed 
by the government (in sharp contrast to the pluralities of moral debate implicit in the 
logic  of  localisation)  and  the  second  is  the  province  of  extremism.  Thus,  the 
claiming of minority rights or affiliations is policed by a 'zone of moderation' that is 
ultimately defined by New Labour. The injunction to be moderate is ultimately the 
terms of inclusion within space offered to minority communities.
[Back et al: 2002]
Of course Bhatt (2006) has pointed out that religious political groups claiming to be 
'moderate' are not necessarily so. 
Whilst some social policies can be seen to be 'emancipatory' in orientation, others are 
formulated rather  on the basis  of  concerns  about  'social  order'  or are  'regulatory' 
(Cochrane  and  Clarke,  1993;  Orloff,  1993).  Notably,  British  social  policy  is 
underwritten by the connection of ethnic, cultural and religious diversity with social 
disorder (CCCS, 1982; Hall, 1988; Lewis, 1998) so that even policies geared towards 
addressing low representation, inequality or the exclusion of ethnic minorities are 
laced  with  assimilationist  and  public  order  concerns  (Lewis,  1998;  Amin,  2005; 
Kundnani, 2007).
Moreover, there is now wide agreement that gender has been a central feature of the 
new  moral  discourse  on  'cohesion',  'integration',  terrorism  and  immigration  (see 
Joppke, 2004; McGhee, 2008; Lewis, 2005 or Worley, 2005) but it has become a 
hugely  contested  and  heated  zone,  lighting  a  fire  in  many  feminist  circles.  In 
particular, Liz Fekete (2004 and 2006) argued that the new 'cultural code' at the heart 
of the new relationship between a politics of fear and a renewal of Britishness, has 
been defined by the positioning of gender equality as a new standard of governance 
that was then used as a baton to beat minority communities during periods of social 
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unrest. For Fekete (2004) and Kundnani (2007a), the national pronouncements on 
honour killings,  female genital  mutilation and the hijab became indicative of  the 
vilification of Muslims as backward,  violent,  misogynistic and emblematic of the 
existence  of  divergent  values  that  require  realignment  through state  intervention. 
Where  ethnic  minorities  are  concerned,  the  sovereignty-authority  function  of  the 
liberal  state  has  always been cross  cut  by an additional  imperative -  that  of  'the 
civilising mission' (Yuval-Davis, 2006; Li, 2007). The place of gender as a standard 
of  governance  within  this  'civilising  mission'  is  not  new (see  Spivak,  1985)  but 
several  feminists  have pointed to  its  revival  post  9/11 as  part  of a  new wave of 
'civilisational discourse' (Brown, 2008). 
Whilst  government  initiated  reports  on  community  cohesion  did  make  some 
reference  to  equality  for  women  within  communities,  noting  in  particular  the 
incidence  of  violence  against  women  and  the  lack  of  ethnic  minority  women  in 
leadership positions, there is little reference to the issue of women's experience of the 
implementation of community cohesion policy or the question of fundamentalism 
within the now widespread research and commentary critiquing the discourse. The 
single  exception  to  this  is  the  material  produced  by  Southall  Black  Sisters  and 
Women Against Fundamentalism. In addition to some of the points made above, the 
WAF/SBS  joint  submission  to  the  Commission  on  Integration  and  Cohesion's 
consultation  document  'Our  Shared  Future'  critiqued  the  Commission's  terms  of 
reference on the following bases: for focusing on 'cohesion' and 'integration' rather 
than on human rights principles, equality and non discrimination; it  assumed that 
there are a set of fixed 'British' values that are superior; there's a disproportionate 
focus  on  Muslims at  the  expense  of  discussing  fundamentalist  mobilisations  and 
undemocratic  tendencies  within  other  religions  and  communities,  including 
Christianity; it ignored the role that Muslims have played in democratic processes 
within Britain; it focused on 'community' without any sense that some people do not 
want  to  be  assigned  to  'communities'  or  of  the  internal  inequalities  within 
communities; New Labour simultaneously sought to tighten immigration rules and 
welfare  provisions  implying  that  internal  stability  could  only  be  guaranteed  by 
strengthening borders to prevent the influx of (undesirable) migrants and refugees. 
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In terms of specific points about fundamentalism and the implications of all this for 
women,  the  submission  pointed  to:  the  hypocritical  nature  of  New  Labour's 
assertions about assimilation and integration on the one hand and their pursuit of 
partnerships  with fundamentalist  networks  that  were masquerading as  'moderates' 
and as representatives, such as sections of the Jamaat-e-Islami Party, on the other; 
contradictory assertions about segregation and yet the promotion of religious leaders, 
faith  schools  and 'faith  communities';  the particular  way in  which Christianity  is 
'given an affirmed legal status as the ideological cement of national culture'; and the 
substitution  of  demands  for  equality  with  demands  for  religious  recognition, 
exchange and literacy,  particularly as espoused by right  wing community leaders 
rather than by the liberal sections of those communities. 
Importantly,  the  submission  also  pointed  out  that  one  of  the  members  of  the 
Commission for Integration and Cohesion, Ramesh Kallidai, was the then secretary 
general of The Hindu Forum which in 2006 had forced the closure of a London art 
exhibition  by  the  renowned  Indian  painter  M.F.  Hussain  on  the  grounds  that  it 
offended Hindu sensibility because of his depictions of naked Hindu female deities. 
This pressure followed on from Hindu fundamentalist threats in India towards M. F. 
Hussain. WAF/SBS drew parallels between M.F.Hussain's experience and the way 
that  minority  women  in  Britain  are  policed  for  so  called  'transgressions'  by 
fundamentalist and conservative sections of ethnic minority communities such as: in 
1994 when Asian women in Nottingham were prevented from watching the film 
'Bhaji on the Beach'; in May 1999 when artists at the Southall Dominion Centre were 
accused of offending the local community by exhibiting photographs of the lives of 
Asian  LGBT peoples;  and  again  in  2004  when  Sikhs  attacked  the  Birmingham 
Repertory Theatre and threatened the life of the play write Gurpreet Bhatti because 
her play 'Behzti' told the story of rape and power abuse within a Sikh temple.14 
14 WAF/SBS Submission to the Commission on Integration and Cohesion dated January 2007.
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Curiously,  as  much  as  the  events  of  2001  completely  transformed  the  political 
landscape, they also brought New Labour's festering faith agenda to the fore. The 
social  policy  responses  -  the  Preventing  Violent  Extremism  and  Community 
Cohesion agendas - were filtered through a growing multifaithist practice to secure a 
place for religion in structuring social policy.15 As well as the addition of "community 
cohesion" and "radicalisation" to the social policy lexicon, a number of new actors 
and systems were established. The paradox of new tiers of religious representatives 
was highlighted by Inayat Bunglawala's critique of PVE funding for the Sufi Council  
of Muslims and the Quilliam Foundation who, he claimed, have 'little or no support 
among  UK  Muslims'.16 At  the  time,  Bunglawala  was  a  member  of  the  Muslim 
Council of Britain, a close ally of the Blair administration but much derided in recent 
years for its Islamist connections. Meanwhile, the Quilliam Foundation comprises ex 
Islamists.
Importantly the Prevent policy has been matched with a large-scale transfer of public 
resources. In 2010, Rahila Gupta estimated that £12.5m had been disbursed through 
local authorities to mainly Muslim groups to tackle radicalisation in communities 
with a further £45m to follow.17 In addition to this, Arun Kundnani (2009) estimated 
15 For instance, it is clear from the make up of the Community Cohesion Review Team (CCRT) 
led by Ted Cantle that they were also viewing the north of England 2001 riots through the prism of 
religion because they made a point of ensuring 'Muslim' representation on the CCRT including: 
Humera Khan, who is founder of the Muslim women's group An-nisa and whose starting point is the 
assertion that secular feminist and anti racist organisations denied religious affiliation and failed 
Muslims; and Ahtsham Ali and Dave Hey who also claim to specifically work with Muslims. It is 
noteworthy too that Ahtsham Ali is listed as having been the President of Young Muslims UK which 
has been listed by Awaaz South Asia Watch as one of the many UK sites of the Islamic Right Jamaat-
e-Islami party.
16 See Calling Time on Prevent by Inayat Bunglawala dated 11/08/09 published in The 
Guardian newspaper and available at: 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/belief/2009/aug/11/prevent-islam-religion-extremism 
17 This religious give-away is hard to justify by Rahila Gupta dated 23/03/10 published by The 
Guardian and available at: 
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that the total amount distributed by the DCLG to local authorities by New Labour 
under  Prevent  would  come  to  around  £80  million  by  2011.  Infact,  Kundnani 
suspected that, when taken together with other pots of money allocated for Prevent 
work by other government departments, the total expenditure could be closer to £140 
million. He also found that in the context of an acute shortage of voluntary sector 
funding, voluntary sector organisations were uncritically signing up to the terms of 
this new source of funding in order to meet their core costs, notably by re-orienting 
their work towards specific Muslim 'engagement' or Muslim projects. Therefore this 
amounted to a direct and indirect state-led construction of communities.
Faith as social capital
The irony is that in the context of the 'cohesion' and 'prevent' agendas, whose starting 
point has to have been a conception of  religion as risk (as segregation on the one 
hand  and  as  radicalisation/extremism  on  the  other),  'faith'  is  being  projected  as 
cohesive  and  faith  communities  have  become  a  central  feature  of  both  policies. 
Moreover, academic arguments for the recognition of faith based welfare provision 
and religious groups as key players within civil society, have acquired a common 
sense status across political parties and is rarely systematically questioned except by 
women's organisations, LGBT pressure groups, a limited number of secular groups - 
the National Secular Society, the British Humanist Association, the Lawyers Secular 
Society - the All Party Parliamentary Humanist Group and sympathetic MPs.
Faith based organising is now well and truly embedded in British social policy and is  
particularly tied to the concept  of 'social  capital'.  Social  capital  became a central 
feature  of  the  New Labour  lexicon  after  a  renewed  interest  in  relationships  and 
networks.  This  has  been  carried  over  by  the  current  Conservative  Party.  In  its 
broadest sense, the term refers to the location of individuals and organisations within 
valuable networks and relationships based on mutual benefit, reciprocity and trust. 
People are thought to benefit not only from the financial or physical dimensions of 
their  lives  but  also to  accrue  benefits  from less  tangible  social  relationships  and 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/belief/2010/mar/23/denham-funding-religious-groups
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networks. The government has been interested in social capital because it is 'seen as 
contributing to better educational attainment, lower crime levels, improved health, 
more  active  citizenship,  better  functioning  labour  markets  and  higher  economic 
growth' (Furbey et al, 2006). Religious organisations are being positioned as forms of 
social capital that can help proliferate such benefits. 
At a general level social capital has been critiqued for its connections with Robert 
Putnam's moral communitarian philosophy, which criticises individualism and makes 
claims about the loss of connections, the decline of civil society and the supposed 
moral degeneration of the USA. He sees formal voluntary groups and community 
associations as sources of civic  and moral renewal. Such claims also underpin the 
Big Society agenda and are critiqued below. 
The 'faith as social capital' argument is curious in its understanding of how limited 
state resources are best utilised. There are multiple references to the need for state 
support in order for religious organisations to perform bridging functions. Yet it is 
unclear why, if these organisations are not already exuding social capital, the state 
should  be  funding  them  or  engaging  in  religious  literacy  in  order  to  have  a 
relationship with them when not only does it come with a high risk (of segregation, 
imposition and conflict) but there are already multiple secular organisations whose 
very foundation enables 'bridging' across communities and populations. 
Nonetheless a great deal of financial  support has followed the faith agenda. New 
Labour created the first central government fund to help religious groups consolidate 
their base. It was called the 'Faith Communities Capacity Building Fund' (FCCBF) 
2006-2008 and administered by the Community Development Foundation through 
the newly formed 'Faith and Cohesion Unit' within the Department for Communities 
and  Local  Government.  It  was  explicitly  intended  to  strengthen  the  capacity  of 
religious organisations to engage with public authorities, with each other and wider 
civil society (Spratt and James, 2008). 
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The FCCBF allocated £7.6 million to 573 organisations in its first round (2006-07) 
and  £4.5million  to  350  organisations  in  its  second  round  (2007-08)  (Spratt  and 
James, 2008: 5). Over half of the awards went to Christian groups (355 out of 923 
awards) and Muslim groups (139 out of 923 awards) but 105 non-faith projects were 
also amongst the recipients (Spratt, and James, 2008: 12). A further £30 million was 
made  available  from  the  Community  Assets  programme  to  help  faith  groups 
refurbish their  buildings (Spratt,  and James, 2008:14). In 2009 an additional £4.4 
million was made available under the Faiths in Action programme to run until March 
2011.18 Importantly,  the  Faiths  in  Action  programme standardised  the  use  of  the 
phrase 'social action', now a central component of the Big Society lexicon, and tied 
the phrase to a significant state supported,  and often resourced, role for religious 
organisations.
In addition to this, £1.9million was made available over three years to fund nine 
Regional Faith Forums intended to promote interfaith dialogue at regional level and 
work with regional statutory bodies and quangos to raise concerns about religion and 
belief in the region (Permain and Hatamian, 2010). By March 2010, the New Labour 
Communities  Secretary  John  Denham  announced  a  new  £1.2million  Faith 
Leadership  fund to 'help  faith  groups get  their  voices  heard  by Government  and 
public bodies and help play their part in delivering public services' plus an additional 
£50,000 'social action prize' for faith groups involved in innovative action.19  The 
DCLG estimates that there are now 25,500 faith-based charities across England and 
18 This Religious Give-away is Hard to Justify by Rahila Gupta on 23/03/10 published in The 
Guardian and available at:
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/belief/2010/mar/23/denham-funding-religious-groups?
INTCMP=SRCH 
19 See Denham - Announces £1million fund to help faith groups have their voices heard News 
Release issued by the COI News Distribution Service on 17/03/10 and available at:
http://www.wired-gov.net/wg/wg-news-1.nsf/lfi/412266
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Wales.20
Moreover,  during  John  Denham's  tenure,  the  DCLG  produced  'myth  busting 
guidance' to counter the concerns of religious groups that local authorities were being 
cautious  or  unfriendly  in  their  contact.21 There  was  no  real  commentary  on  the 
reasons why local authorities may not want to work with religious organisations on 
welfare  issues.  Rather  the  myth  busting  guidance  treated  objections  to  such  a 
relationship as part of 'fuelling myths', implying discrimination or prejudice on the 
part of local authorities. The 'myths' that the guidance sought to 'bust' about religious 
groups  included:  they  will  use  public  money  for  proselytising  or  worship;  they 
wouldn't want to help people they don't approve of, like atheists or homosexuals; 
single group funding has negative implications for community cohesion; funding will 
imply support for religious views/doctrine of the organisation; and it means that non 
faith based service providers in the Third Sector will be disadvantaged. 
In  this  'religious  turn'  in  governance,  religious  groups  are  depicted  as  apolitical, 
benign, philanthropic 'faith groups' that can make a positive contribution to social 
cohesion and most of the evaluations of FCCBF funded projects  (such as James, 
2007;  Spratt  and  James,  2008;  Permain  and  Hatamian,  2010)  are  absolutely 
celebratory and completely devoid of critique. For instance, the ahistorical assertion 
that religious groups have been neglected agents within civil society fails to explain 
why secular services were preferred as a means of ensuring universal access. There is 
also  a  distinct  absence  of  any critical  evaluation  of  the  political  orientation  and 
objectives of some of the religious groups that  benefited from these new spaces. 
20
http://www.communities.gov.uk/newsroom/factsandfigures/communitiesfire1/facts/communitycohesio
n/?id=1675637#question
21 Ensuring a Level Playing Field: Funding Faith Based Organisations to Provide Publicly 
Funded Services produced by the DCLG and available at:
http://www.wired-gov.net/wg/wg-news-1.nsf/lfi/412266
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Moreover, where religious organisations are praised for providing welfare services 
such as soup kitchens and clothing for those subject to immigration rules, this is not 
placed in the context of a critique of why state services fall short in these areas.
From a Politics of Values to a Politics of Virtues
The continuities  between New Labour's  'etho-politics'  and the Conservative's  Big 
Society  are  probably  self-evident  and  only  tempered  by  New  Labour's  partial 
commitment to statism and equalities legislation. Nonetheless, this final third of the 
chapter will show that a short distance now exists between the new compassionate 
Conservatives and the old New Labour project. Their proximity is marked by the 
identical  assertions  of  the  New  Labour  guru,  Professor  Anthony  Giddens,  and 
Cameron's guru, Phillip Blond, that welfarism has had 'perverse consequences' by 
creating  cultures  of  dependency  and  political  apathy.  Any  distance  between  the 
Conservatives  and  Labour  will  depend  on  what  lies  ahead  for  Labour's 
transformation but the separation is currently marked by Labour's commitment to a 
regulatory function for the state, some semblance of state run core public services 
and a better understanding of diversity. However, even as the Conservatives reveal 
themselves and the Labour Party renew themselves there is a distinct continuity on 
the  question  of  'faith  communities'  as  well  as  the  neo-liberal  uses  of 
communitarianism and devolution.
A new 'faiths' literature and field
The  view  that  religious  groups  are  legitimate  managers  and  providers  of  public 
services,  the  construction  of  ‘faith  groups’ as  a  valuable  resource  and  of  'faith 
communities'  as  constituting  valid  representations  of  ethnic  minorities  appears  to 
have acquired a  common sense logic amongst  state  and non-state  actors.  Indeed, 
religious groups are actively positioning themselves as radical voices instigating a 
'revival' of civil society (see Deneulin et al, undated) and advancing themselves as 
‘experts’ on the delivery of public services. Some studies even berate the lack of 
'religious  literacy'  on  the  part  of  the  State  and  have  recommended  that  this  be 
rectified in order to engage 'faith communities' (Furbey et al, 2006). 
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There is an emergent literature, particularly within the discipline of social policy and 
community  development  and  increasingly  within  the  area  of  social  geography, 
concerned with faith-based organisations (now widely referred to as 'FBOs') and faith 
based  services.  This  literature  echoes  a  number  of  central  themes.  Firstly,  the 
assertion that most contemporary welfare services have Christian philanthropic roots 
and  also  that  some  church-based  or  church-led  services  have  existed  alongside 
secular services in Britain for many years (Farnell, 2001; Harris et al, 2003; Furbey 
and  Macey,  2005).  Secondly,  it  welcomes  the  state's  recognition  of  'faith  based 
organisations' as part of the Third Sector and their contribution to local areas in terms 
of  providing  support  and  solace  to  the  most  disadvantaged  sections,  in  tackling 
poverty  and  social  exclusion  (Farnell,  2001;  Furbey  et  al,  2006).  This  line  of 
argument is linked to the view that religious groups are a historically neglected agent 
within civil society and that at some point in the last two decades, there has been a 
growing recognition of the discrimination they have faced in relation to state funding 
and consultation (Farnell, 2001; Smith, 2002; Furbey et al, 2006). 
Moreover, Furbey et al (2006) have argued that religious and secular organisations 
share overlapping concerns in local areas and have the propensity to work together 
on a number of issues. As such, the interests of religious organisations are thought to 
extend beyond theological concerns and beyond their congregations to encompass 
the impact of social problems on all residents (Furbey et  al,  2006). Greg Smith's 
(2002) work is an example of the way faith-based organisations claim that they have 
been  marginalised  through  systematic  non-recognition.  Amongst  his  points  on 
emerging issues for statutory bodies, he includes:
The reluctance of  local  councils  to  take faith  groups seriously.  For  one  London 
borough, it is only in the last two years that the social services has sought to become  
aware of faith communities by commissioning some small scale research about the 
possibilities  of  tendering  for  contracts  for  community  care.  Other  departments 
remain silent, sometimes even embarrassed to deal with the religious sector… the 
resulting sense of exclusion that many faith groups feel from the concerns and power 
structures of local governments and regeneration agencies.  
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[Smith, 2002: 175]
However, as has been noted in the previous sections, there is a contradiction within 
the literature because not only have there been state funded Christian and Jewish 
schools for some time, giving rise to parity claims by other minority religious groups, 
the same literature acknowledges state contact and consultation with religious groups 
since at  least  1992. Moreover,  as has been pointed out  above, there is  a need to 
develop a perspective that takes account of the policies of local Labour councils and 
the Labour-led GLC during Conservative governments between 1979 and 1997. This 
might problematise the way in which religious groups are positioning themselves as 
victims of discrimination by a secular State. 
Indeed, as has been noted above, such arguments displace other narratives making a 
case for secular services, such as ethnic minority feminist accounts of the impact on 
domestic violence work of the local state's preference to work with religious leaders 
and religious organisations. Indeed Samia Bano's (2007) study of Shariah Councils 
suggests that these are being approached by social services departments to negotiate 
on issues of child custody and protection despite her findings that Shariah Councils 
have placed pressure on women to reconcile with violent partners. 
At its most cynical, analysts see an important overlap between the Conservative and 
Labour Party's  interest  in  religious  groups as  based  on access  to  sources  of  free 
human volunteering capacity (social capital), independent funding and frameworks 
of self-help (Furbey and Macey, 2005). It has been argued that recent State interest in 
religious  organisations  is  largely  about  enabling  the  State  to  undo  welfare 
dependency  and  roll  back  the  parameters  of  the  State  without  compromising 
ideology; by involving religious groups as opposed to encouraging other sections of 
the  voluntary  sector,  the  State  is  able  to  extend  its  neo-liberal  agenda  without 
extending  its  direct  responsibilities  (Furbey  and  Macey,  2005).   From  this 
perspective, the state's engagement with faith-based organisations has the propensity 
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to be closely aligned with its perpetuation of consensus politics. However, the key 
distinctions  between the Conservative Party's  interest  in  religious  groups and the 
motivations of the New Labour project are not just related to a change in tone (as 
implied  by  Harris  et  al,  2003).  It  also  reflects  the  Labour  Party's  validation  of 
religious identities as part of its understanding of equality as parity.22 
Moreover, a view of religious groups as potential vehicles for the renewal of a social 
democratic  agenda (as  suggested by Smith,  2002) can be questioned through the 
faiths  literature's  own  findings.  In  particular,  whilst  Smith  (2002)  notes  the 
disjuncture between secular and theological frames for tackling social problems, he 
seems to be resigned to the possibility that some theological frameworks are unable 
to  implement  equal  opportunities  when  delivering  services  and  employment 
practices:
A number  of  equal  opportunity  type  issues  remain  problematic  for  certain  faith 
communities, particularly those of an Evangelical Christian variety who find it hard 
to condone homosexual practice and non Christian religious world views and rituals. 
Whilst  such  boundaries  of  faith  and  conscience  continue  to  be  significant,  it  is 
unrealistic to expect faith communities to be at ease with requirements of blanket or  
mechanistic equal opportunities statements.
[Smith, 2002: 172]
One  of  the  few  overtly  critical  positions  on  faith-based  organisations  has  been 
produced  by  the  British  Humanist  Association  (2007)  in  their  evaluation  of  the 
impact of this development on equality and human rights. They argue that, despite 
some variation, religious organisations by their very nature are not able to provide 
services that can benefit society as a whole. Instead secular services are the only 
means of ensuring people are not discriminated against on the grounds of religion 
and belief, gender or sexuality in attempting to access services or apply for jobs. 
22 This was articulated by Jack Straw as long ago as 1989 when, as the Labour Shadow 
Education Secretary, he delivered a lecture entitled 'The Next Ten Years' at a conference about Islamic 
Education and Muslim Schools on 16/07/89. 
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However, such a perspective does not distinguish between the autonomy of religious 
organisations and the autonomous organisation of other sections such as women or as 
Black  groups  who  also  cater  for  specific  sections  of  society  and  who  are  also 
protected from employment legislation when they seek to restrict their employment 
to  women or  ethnic minority  applicants.  This  raises interesting questions  for  this 
thesis  about  the  rubric  of  welfare  services  within  the  context  of  tackling  social 
exclusion  and  the  ethics  of  empowering  members  of  society  through  self-
organisation and specialist services.
In addition  to  an  emergent  literature  focusing  on the  role  of  religious  groups in 
regeneration, there have been some contributions on religion and public policy in the 
field of education. There is more critique in this area. 
In addition to Greg Smith's points above, Oliver Valins' (2002) analysis of Jewish 
day schools notes the particular interest of religious leaders in providing services that 
reinforce their  own position as  gatekeepers  and that  actively create  and maintain 
rigid boundaries along religious lines. He states:
This  provides  a  framework for  understanding why Jewish religious leaders  have 
been so keen to set the formal education agenda for their communities. To control  
the entrance criteria for schools and to be able to dictate and police the curriculum is,  
according  to  the  discourse  of  community  leaders,  a  key  to  defining  children's 
identities and thus to separate and clearly identify 'us' from 'them'.
 [Valins, 2002; 235]
Importantly,  Valins'  (2002)  analysis  of  Jewish  day  schools  also  highlights  the 
malleable and fluid issues in this area including: differences in the motivations of 
parents, children and religious leaders and the productive interaction of these actors; 
the impact of changing demographics upon the coherence and the implementation of 
community controls. This thesis is located within these complex and transformative 
spaces  and  processes  of  negotiation,  which  may  lead  to  policy  and  legislative 
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assertions, but such nuances may not be reflected in the institutionalisation of public 
policy as part of the act of governance. 
K.  Moti  Gokulsing (2006) notes  that  the state's  support  of faith-based schools is 
partly  argued  on  the  basis  of  academic  achievement  but  he  claims  incongruity 
between the 'non negotiable absolutes'  of faith based services and the purpose of 
education as learning to think critically and to question. However, Furbey and Macey 
(2005)  assert  that  there  is  now  a  real  range  of  faith  based  services  and  'faith 
communities'  with  the  propensity  to  strengthen  borders  between  groups  or 
alternatively to produce greater heterogeneity:
Thus, religion can provide the most total of all  "total environments" as currently 
expressed on both global and local stages in Christian, Hindu, Jewish, Muslim and 
other  religious fundamentalist  or  separatist  movements  and communities.  On the 
other  hand,  when  explored  from  within,  many  faith  groups  contradict  external 
impressions of static and consensual communities.
[Furbey and Macey, 2005:101] 
Nevertheless, the recent Court of Appeal judgement that the Jewish Free School's 
admissions policy is in breach of the Race Relations Act 1976, has highlighted the 
issue of boundaries for faith based schools and particularly the gendered proximity of 
'race' and faith. By viewing Jewishness as determined by the mother's origins, the 
school refused a place to a child whose mother had converted to rather than been 
born  into  Judaism even  though  the  mother  regarded  herself  as  an  orthodox  and 
practicing Jew.23 The court of appeal ruled that the school's refusal to admit the child 
were based on ethnicity rather than religious affiliation and therefore contravened the 
Race  Relations  Act  1976.  Interestingly,  discrimination  (referred  to  elsewhere  as 
selection)  on  the  grounds  of  religion  rather  than  ethnicity  would  have  been 
permissible.24 Whilst  concerns  about  the  equalities  and human rights  breaches  of 
faith schools' practices and policies are now part of a campaign run by the Accord 
23 See coverage by the National Secular Society http://www.secularism.org.uk/the-jewish-free-
school-a-case-th.html
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Coalition,25 what these institutions mean in real terms for the internal variance within 
communities are spelt out by the Rabbi Jonathan Romain in his recent article for the 
education journal FORUM:
What about internal discrimination? And we have already seen that quite a few of  
the single faith schools operate restrictive policies with Jewish schools leading the 
way in declaring that this child isn't Jewish enough or needs to be reconverted; while 
Christian schools are making unrealistic demands and forcing agnostic parents to 
attend church services every Sunday lest they jeopardise their child's place at school  
- a form of family coercion in the name of education. 
[Romain, 2007: 211] 
Moreover, Harris et al (2003)'s concerns about the Jewish voluntary sector include 
that the sector is dominated by a few large organisations (4 per cent of the total 
number of organisations account for the bulk of the total income of the sector) and 
may not be able to respond in any kind of pluralistic way to the State's new found 
interest.  Whilst  the  dominant  organisations  have  the  experience  and  capacity  to 
manage  larger  scale  projects,  they  also  tend  to  be  the  ones  with  a  focus  on 
transnational identities and projects in Israel rather than here.26 Moreover, Harris et al 
(2003) and Valins (2002) suggest reasons for the convergence of a state led and civil 
society  led  'faith  agenda':  they  point  to  an  increasing  number  of  Jewish  groups 
24 The boundaries between race and faith by Afua Hirsch dated 25/06/09 published in The 
Guardian and available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/belief/2009/jun/25/jewish-
school-race-religion
25 The Accord Coalition is a collection of religious and secular organisations established in 
2008 in order to push for legislative change to the rules governing faith-based schools. Website 
address: http://www.accordcoalition.org.uk/index.php/about/
26 Harris et al (2003) found that 62 per cent of the organisations they evaluated included Israel 
in their scope of operations. These same organisations account for almost half of the total income of 
the sector. Although Harris et al do not make this point, other sources point to an important difference 
between Jewish cultural identities in general and those based upon a strong attachment to the state of 
Israel as a political project. 
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seeking state funding because of a decline in the number of individual Jewish donors, 
itself a result of changing demographics and an increase in mixed marriages.   
Despite  a  growing  literature  on  faith-based  schools,  there  is  very  little  on  the 
particular  implications  for  ethnic  minority  girls.  The  most  detailed  insight  into 
Muslim  girls’ schools  in  Britain  has  been  provided  by  Parker-Jenkins  and  Haw 
(1996) who conducted a detailed study of six Muslim girls'  schools,  at  that time 
privately funded. Their study is highly sympathetic to state funding for faith based 
schools.  They  make  the  following  key  points:  students'  ability  to  gain  a  more 
coherent education about Islam than they are able within state schools or from their 
parents; high levels of solidarity and feelings of acceptance amongst the students on 
the  basis  of  their  shared  identity;  protection  from  wider  anti-Muslim  sentiment. 
However, their description of the school raises a considerable number of concerns. In 
particular,  the strength of solidarity amongst the pupils  is related to the restricted 
pastoral  care  provided  within  the  schools,  high  levels  of  discipline  and  a  gulf 
between students and teachers.  Moreover,  the board of governors for each of the 
schools is entirely made up of male businessmen from the local area and in order to 
comply  with  'their  interpretation  of  "orthodox"  Islam',  the  female  heads  of  the 
schools  are  not  allowed  to  attend  the  governors'  meetings  but  have  decisions 
delivered to them in an appropriate way (1996: 19). They also point out that many of 
the students they interviewed had not chosen the school but rather were sent there 
because parents wanted them to attend a single sex school. 
Importantly,  for  the  purposes  of  this  thesis,  the  'faith  agenda'  has  already 
demonstrated its own reproductive capacity, enabling itself to become a structuring 
and organising feature of society. For instance, recent statistics on religious practice 
and church  attendance  in  Britain  have  shown a  sharp  increase  in  the  number  of 
families  with  children  of  secondary  school  age  being  baptised  and  aligning 
themselves with religious entities in order to secure places at high achieving faith 
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based schools.27
Big Society, Good Society, Red Tory and Blue Labour
The current political context presents an unusual situation; the leaders of the three 
main  political  parties  have  declared  that  they  are  not  religious  and  yet  a  broad 
consensus has emerged with all three conceding a commitment to engaging religious 
organisations in politics, in public policy and as partners in the direct delivery of 
social  welfare  services.  David  Cameron  cited  religion  as  the  key  to  a  moral 
framework and "a guide to life".28 Cameron's guru, Phillip Blond, referred to this as 'a 
politics of virtue', which stands alongside New Labour's politics of values because 
religion marks out the parameters of conduct. This section argues that, when taken 
together, Big Society, Good Society, Red Tory and Blue Labour mark the frontiers of 
a  new theologically  based  and oriented  social  conservatism making a  significant 
impact on British social policy.
Nat Wei is generally credited as the Big Society architect. Now the youngest peer, 
Lord Wei is an aspirational social enterprise man that also speaks openly about the 
influence of Christianity on his life. However, the Big Society as David Cameron's 
Big Idea appears to have been born of additional influences: an ideological affinity 
with Philip Blond's (2010) 'Red Tory' and the capacity of Citizens UK and Obama-
27 See School Choice "boosting baptisms" dated 12/01/08 on BBC news and available at: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/7184540.stm
Reports on increases in baptisms particularly amongst 12 year olds as directly related to 
seeking admission to faith based schools where the admission criteria often requires confirmation of 
religious identity and also a commendation from a local religious institution qualifying the 'good' 
character and religious commitment of the applicant.
28 As quoted in Teachings of Jesus are a "good guide to life" says Cameron by Jenna Lyle dated 
6/11/09 posted on Christian Today and available at:
http://www.christiantoday.co.uk/article/teachings.of.jesus.are.a.good.guide.to.life.says.cameron/24555
.htm
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style community organising to activate and turn people out to events.
Philip  Blond is  a  theologian  and Director  of  the think tank,  ResPublica.  Blond's 
ascendancy since 2009 is  connected to  a  series of  essays  and newspaper  articles 
culminating in a book entitled 'Red Tory' in which he claims to draw on both Left 
and Right principles to identify a new middle ground for politics and to call for a 
new  'civic  settlement'.  He  proclaims  a  commitment  to  the  Left's  interest  in 
redistribution and the Right's interest in moral conservatism. At its heart, 'Red Tory' 
is a critique of both the state and of the market but I would argue that Blond is 
indefatigably anti-statist and has an unerring belief in the logic of the market. His 
idea of redistribution, however, is about ensuring everyone has access to ownership 
through social enterprise and a renewed localism. Moreover, he argues that poverty is 
caused by the higher than necessary barriers for entry to the market. Specifically, he 
is talking about rules and regulations, notably equality and diversity requirements, 
that he claims only large businesses can fulfil.
Blond's work contains a strong critique of individualism and of the state, notably the 
Rousseauian 'social contract' basis of the welfare settlement and the emergence of 
liberalism  as  a  critique  of  religious  absolutism.  As  a  consequence  of  the  latter, 
liberalism (shared by Left and Right) carries an oppressive view of god and therefore 
denies the value of religious organisations, instead choosing to look beyond such 
associations to focus on individual relationships with the state.  Blond argues that 
whilst liberalism focused on individuals, socialism focused on the state. Apparently 
neither paid any attention to the relationships between people and society. Of course 
this  doesn't  fit  with any of the historical  accounts of multiculturalism policy and 
waves of state intervention in the social, as described in the first half of this chapter. 
Nor does it reflect the consistent social pressure on women to be tied to marriages, 
families and communities. 
Blond's work marks a continuation in the revival of associationalism, an emphasis on 
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relationships  and  institutions  rather  than  individuals.  As  with  all  other  forms  of 
communitarian discourse, there is a harking back to a supposedly earlier and better 
age,  usually  before  the  establishment  of  the  welfare  state,  a  time  where  people 
supposedly did things for themselves, they looked out for other people, there was a 
greater sense of 'community', everyone was happier and local populations were more 
cohesive. Religion has always occupied a special place within such communitarian 
visions which, as discussed above in the section 'Faith as Social Capital', are closely 
linked to an anxiety about moral degeneration but also because the limited social 
welfare  provision  that  existed  prior  to  the  establishment  of  the  welfare  state 
depended entirely upon either religious organisations or individual philanthropists.
Moreover, his emphasis on the value of religious organisations combines with his 
call  for  a  revival  of  marriage,  family and blood based relationships as  important 
sources  of stability  and for  tackling poverty and social  problems.  He argues  that 
families  should  be  seen  as  offering  a  permanency  that  is  very  important  for  all 
people. Underlying his interventions is the suggestion that feminism has undermined 
rather than improved women's rights in relationships. Indeed, Blond tends to throw in 
points  about  Bohemian  lifestyles  and  birth  control  as  exacerbating  the 
individualisation of all forms of social organisation. 
These claims about marriage and the family as answers to poverty (and the 'Broken 
Britain' scenario) parallel the claims of the members of the Conservative Christian 
Fellowship now located within the Centre for Social Justice and their attempts to 
renew the emphasis on keeping the family unit together and on marriage (including 
the offer of additional financial incentives). Philip Blond's addendum on the issue 
calls for people to move away from the old public perception of 'social conservatism' 
as an attack on one parent families and minorities to one that connects it  with a 
renewed emphasis on building stable long term relationships between people and a 
sense  of  permanence.  He  often  uses  the  words  'conservatism'  and  'conservation' 
interchangeably in order to emphasise this point.
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Unfortunately, the Labour Party appears to be offering very little by way of different 
philosophical models on relations between the state, individuals and civil society. 
With the notable exception of Tessa Jowell,  there is a short distance between the 
Labour Party's discussion of Good Society and the Conservative Party's Big Society. 
Indeed  it  was  New  Labour  that  kicked  off  the  renewed  interest  in  'social 
relationships', a discourse about 'the common good' and social action, and credited 
religious organisations with a role to play. 
The political theorist Maurice Glasman and his vision of 'Blue Labour' have been 
posited as the Labour Party's answer to Blond's Red Tory. Arguably Glasman (2010) 
talks of co-operatives, devolution and social relationships from the perspective of the 
history of workers' struggles, a sense of collective action and a socialist ethics rather 
than about reifying the benefits of market driven ownership. His primary objective 
has been to redress the balance within civil society between individual rights or legal 
cases and the Labour tradition of collective action and solidarity politics. He states:
Labour  values  are  not  abstract  universal  values  such  as  'freedom'  or  'equality'. 
Distinctive Labour values are rooted in relationships, in practices that strengthen an 
ethical life. Practices like reciprocity which give substantive form to freedom and 
equality in an active relationship of give and take; or mutuality, where we share the  
burden and benefits of association.
[Glasman, 2010: 31] 
However, Glasman's piece in the Soundings journal is formulated within a distinctly 
sexist frame and his work in general attempts to bring a theological language and 
framework to questions of citizenship.29 The Soundings piece is objectionable on lots 
of counts but particularly because he depicts the Labour Party as a family unit where 
the mother and father figures represent competing strands of the Party's philosophical 
tendencies. The father figure is a working class trade unionist for whom relations 
with other people are key and he is depicted as the underdog. The mother figure is a 
29 Maurice Glasman is the Director of the Faith and Citizenship programme at London 
Metropolitan University.
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middle  class  modernist  with  a  great  deal  of  social  capital  to  hand  (education, 
resources, networks) whose politics are pinned to individual rights, freedoms and 
equalities. The mother figure is depicted as having greater power. Glasman states: 
In philosophical terms we have a Dad of Aristotelian, Common Good and traditional 
descent, and a mum from the Platonic, progressive and radical line… …The problem 
with their marriage was clear from the start.  The mum had all  the advantages of  
class, resources, eloquence, confidence and science and none of the experiences of 
hardship. There was a lack of reciprocity as the years went by and Labour moved 
towards  government.  The  mum  was  much  better  suited  to  the  demands  of  the 
modern  world,  capable  of  understanding  the  big  picture,  developing  technical 
complex policies and managing change. The trade unions only had the power to 
corrupt as there was no democracy in corporate governance… the Dad had no power 
at work and no power at home either as the Party became increasingly dominated by 
middle class policy technocrats. The marriage, you could say, became increasingly 
abusive, which is why it is necessary now for the grandparents to step in and play a  
more active role in nurturing the well  being of the child by rebuilding love and  
reciprocity between the parents. This will require a commitment to renewing cross 
class  organisation  within  the  party  and  common  action  for  the  Common  Good 
throughout the movement. The Living wage could be a good place to start.
[Glasman, 2010: 36-37]
With dad representing trade union support but impotence within the New Labour 
administration  and  mum  representing  privileged  liberalism,  the  projection  of 
feminism as individualistic, middle class and as an easy fit with neo liberalism is 
fortified. Moreover, when taken with his points on the uses of religious dimensions 
in political action below, the suggestive aspects of this analogy start to parallel a 
wider  argument  amongst  faith  based  initiatives  that  women  have  become  too 
powerful.
Glasman  identifies  the  Catholic  Church  and  the  Protestant  Church  as  the 
grandparents of the labour movement. He argues that Catholic theology fits well with 
Aristotelian notions of 'the common good' and reflects instances in the history of the 
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labour  movement  where  the  Catholic  and  Methodist  churches  have  played  an 
important role in supporting strikes. It is worth emphasising that Glasman draws his 
influence and particularly his sense of 'radical traditionalism' from his interactions 
with the London chapters of the Citizens UK (discussed in Chapter 7). Both Glasman 
and Blond relate histories of associationalism to a history of religious embeddedness. 
However,  their  projections  of  this  association  are  romanticised  and  the  power 
relations and obligations that are required to enact it are entirely overlooked. Neither 
of  them entertains  any kind of  critique  of  religious  organisations.  Glasman even 
reifies  Cardinal  Newman's  contribution  to  the  dockworkers'  struggles  but  fails  to 
mention that Cardinal Newman was a controversial figure, even long after his death, 
mired  in  rumours  that  he  suffered  from  depression  because  of  an  institutional 
pressure that forced him to hide his sexuality and love for another man. Moreover, 
both Glasman and Blond mirror the Citizens UK view of individuals, people that are 
not in association, in relationships or within institutions, as a liability. I think it would 
be fair to say that much of the academic tradition championed by Glasman, Blond, 
and also Justin Beaumont and Luke Bretherton, has been brought to the table by the 
Citizens UK and the ideological framework that they have been pushing since the 
late 1980s. 
As with Philip Blond, Glasman argues that the Labour Party gave up on the idea of 
the social and this is the space that, once vacated by Labour, has come to be occupied 
by  the  new  Conservatives.  As  one  particularly  conservative  stream  of 
communitarians they are both trying to turn the clocks back not only to an earlier 
period  of  mutualism  and  co-operatives  but  also  to  a  language  that  emphasises 
tradition, permanence and problematises individual rights based politics. Indeed the 
reason why Glasman is referred to as 'Blue Labour' is because, like Blond, he defines 
himself  as  a  traditionalist.  Glasman's  preference  for  an  Aristotelian  frame  bears 
similarities  with  Blond's  'politics  of  virtue'.  Rather  than  issuing assurances  about 
everyone's non-negotiable human rights, Glasman argues that universal values ought 
to  be  contested  and  defined  through  debate  and  exchange,  a  consensus-building 
model of 'the common good'. This reflects the tendency of the contemporary faith 
based  mobilisations  within  the  British  context  to  veer  towards  deliberative 
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democracy, the theo-political push behind a new politics of 'the common good' and 
also to steer  away from universalism or absolute rights.  Without  an assurance of 
universal and absolute rights, 'the common good' is an entirely vacuous term that can 
easily be mobilised against the most vulnerable people in local areas. 
Moreover, speaking at a conference for London churches, the Communities Minister 
Andrew Stunnell outlined how he believes that churches have a key role to play in 
the Big Society but also stated:
My Department  can  help  remove  unnecessary  red  tape  or  legislation  that  some 
currently face - and which are likely to be common to all faith based community 
projects. This, along with measures in the Localism Bill, will mean that groups are 
empowered to carry out their work even more effectively.30
Ethnic minority religious organisations have been lobbying the government for their 
slice of the Big Society cake. The Jewish Leadership Council submitted its report, 
'Big Society and the UK Jewish Community', at a meeting with Eric Pickles. The 
report calls on the government to recognise Jewish faith based organisations as active 
participants in the Big Society agenda on the basis that the language fits their work 
precisely.  However,  they were keen to  gain assurances that  they could avoid the 
obligations of the Equality Act 2010. The report states:
Voluntary  organisations  rely  on  support  from  the  public.  They  get  this  support 
because  people  give  to  communities  and  causes  they  identify  with.  Rather  than 
trying to limit community and voluntary organisations from being able to serve their 
communities, Government should understand that a major part of their success relies 
on this relationship…The legislative and administrative environment makes it more 
difficult for charities from religious communities to work effectively. Government 
30 Andrew Stunnell: Church groups can bond communities regardless of faith 
posted on 20/01/11 to the Department for Communities and Local Government 
website and available at:
http://www.communities.gov.uk/news/communities/1821863
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should avoid creating more technical hurdles for religious-based charities and should 
consider whether the current framework, following the Equality Act 2010, may be 
hindering the delivery of Big Society goals.31
This is one of the clearest indications to date that equalities legislation is an obstacle 
for  faith  groups  waiting  to  capitalise  on  the  Big  Society  agenda.  It  tugs  at  the 
arguments being made against New Labour's statism. It characterises equalities and 
indeed any regulation of faith based services as part of the red tape of bureaucracy 
that needs to be countered to secure civil society co-operation. The point being made 
by the JLC is that faith based organisations can not offer their resources to the Big 
Society plan, acquired through the sort of philanthropy that is so central to Cameron's 
argument,  unless they are able to organise and deliver services on the communal 
basis  that  their  donors  support.  The  same  article  suggests  that  Eric  Pickles  has 
offered the JLC assurances and quotes Jeremy Newmark, Chief Executive of JLC as 
saying:
The secretary of state reaffirmed that Jewish organisations do not need to dilute their  
faith-based element. He said Big Society is a harmony of different voices.32
This 'harmony of different voices' has the potential to reproduce the old multicultural 
adage that 'they look after their own'.
Cole Moreton has predicted that Christian churches may  not be able to take centre 
stage  in  the  Big  Society  agenda  because  of  their  declining  numbers  outside  of 
London and the internalisation of a secular neo-liberal outlook.33 However, others 
are arguing that ethnic minority religious organisations are thriving and growing. If 
31 As quoted in JLC Advises on Big Society by Robyn Rosen dated 9/12/10 published The 
Jewish Chronicle and available at:
http://www.thejc.com/community/community-life/42326/jlc-advises-big-society
32 ibid.
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so, we could be on the road to a differential rolling out of the Big Society agenda 
where stronger religious organisations will be at the centre of the new localism in 
ethnic minority areas whilst the majority population, especially outside of the cities, 
will benefit from a more secular mutualism because of a received wisdom about the 
declining  influence  of  the  Church.  This  could  compound  the  problem  of 
'heterogeneous time' already discussed in relation to multifaithism in the first half of 
this chapter.
Conclusion
This chapter demonstrates that religious groups and identifications occupy a very 
strong place within the context of British social policy and politics. Religion runs 
right through communitarian social organisation and governance from the early days 
of multiculturalism policy into New Labour's 'faith agenda' and is now both inside 
state policy and as a dominant discourse in civil society. A new wave of religious 
communitarianism is sustained by several contemporary components: the legacy of 
multiculturalism in politics that enables restricted view of ethnic minority religious 
projects;  morality  as  a  new source  of  both  governance  and critique;  deliberative 
democracy and a new discourse about the consensus politics of a common good; a 
majoritarianism that stems from the view that religious affiliation, belief and practice 
has grown and so religion needs to be accommodated no matter what this means for 
political principles and equalities issues.    
The place of religion within multiculturalism stems from colonial governance and 
has  carried with it  longstanding problems.  The specific  problems that  have  been 
highlighted  in  this  chapter  are  twofold:  representation  and  codification. 
Multiculturalism  is  premised  on  state  negotiations  with  a  layer  of  'community 
leaders',  usually  male  and  usually  drawn  from  religious  institutions.  This  is  a 
33 Can religion rescue Dave's Big Society? by Cole Moreton dated 4/04/10 published by The 
Independent and available at:
http://www.independent.co.uk/opinion/commentators/cole-moreton-can-religion-rescue-daves-big-
society-1935226.html
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distinctly  undemocratic  practice  that  has  long  since  been  used  to  govern  ethnic 
minorities. The position of community leaders often corresponds with a tendency to 
try and fix or codify religious, ethnic and cultural practices, a process that both leads 
to reification of particular norms and the homogenisation of communities. It relies on 
the interventions of state acknowledged religious or cultural authorities and erases 
the syncretic dimensions of religious and cultural practice or lived reality. Religious 
identity  and  affiliation  has  occupied  a  privileged place  within  a  multiculturalism 
frame  that  has  difficulty  taking  account  of  multiplicity,  the  way  that  people  are 
defined and situated through the intersection of multiple axes. Nonetheless,  some 
liberal  political  theorists  have  sought  to  extend multiculturalism in  order  to  gain 
group rights based on religion. In the last decade, and particularly because of the 
central place that religion occupied within New Labour governance, there has been a 
slide from multiculturalism to multifaithism. Moreover, the push for the recognition 
of  Muslim  group  rights  arises  on  the  heels  of  the  Rushdie  Affair  but  has  been 
propelled to legitimacy post 9/11. 
Black  feminism  and  anti  racism  has  already  provided  a  rigorous  critique  of 
multiculturalist policy and practice and its tendency to privilege religious identities 
and organisations, the way it has contributed to the development of ethnicist enclaves 
and identity politics as well as the state's preference for policies based on cultural 
tolerance over  tackling structural  imbalances  of power.  Whilst  some of the same 
critics have begun producing interventions on the new practice of multifaithism, the 
way in which this new dominant model impacts upon local cartographies of power is 
currently  missing  from  this  critique.  An  earlier  era  of  local  studies  has  been 
supplanted by a focus on the national or international picture; most notably through 
the  discourse  analysis  of  policy  documents  and  legal  judgements  and  this  is 
especially the case in relation to discussions about religion and secularism. 
Whilst  Modood's  pronouncements  about  the  politics  of  multiculturalism  may  be 
useful, his work does not do what he professes needs to be done. Whilst taking note 
of Modood's observations about Christian privilege, the growth of religious identity 
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as  empirical  reality  and  inconsistencies  in  the  application  of  the  public-private 
divide, this thesis writes against the grain of Tariq Modood's contributions in this 
field  by  providing  a  reminder  and  new  insights  on  the  contestatory  and  power 
dimensions of the politics of multifaithism by looking at the local level implications 
of the new framework of multifaithism.
Communitarianism and its strong boundaries brings with it normative injunctions for 
the behaviour of people within those groups and their  relationship with the state. 
Where male religious leaders determine these constructions and norms, it has been 
pointed out that there is a significant possibility of damage for women and minorities 
within  minorities,  with  severe  repercussions  for  those  that  transgress  norms  and 
boundaries. Whilst some have argued that the state should only ensure individual 
rights,  this  chapter  notes  that  it  is  not  always  easy  to  distinguish  between  the 
individual  and  the  community  notably  because  of  the  collective  dimensions  of 
individual  claims  as  some  are  located  within  arguments  about  the  normative 
implications for a larger number of people. 
Fraser's model for thinking about group rights as both questions of cultural politics 
and questions of social politics provides the scope for rights to include recognition 
demands  that  have  the  propensity  to  shift  normative  practice.  However,  her 
interventions also provide succour for those that would like their identity claims to 
become a part of normative relations between state and civil society. This thesis has 
the capacity  to  demonstrate  the continued importance for taking account  of  intra 
relations of power, of marginality within communities, namely that religious claims 
as recognition struggles may challenge the institutional privileging of Christianity by 
the British state at a national level but they also have the capacity to oppress others 
within minority communities. The renewed emphasis on 'the common good' derived 
primarily  from  the  deliberative  democracy  model  but  heralded  as  a  significant 
dimension of a new wave of (Christian-led) theo-political interventions, ignores the 
question of who gets to participate in this  form of consensus politics. This thesis 
provides  significant  empirical  material  to  remind  the  reader  that  those  with  the 
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potential to transgress norms are not represented in discussions about norms setting. 
Whilst critical of communitarianism, its conservative roots and its tendency to shut 
down internal plurality, this thesis argues that a lot hinges on the orientation of the 
group.  Group  recognition  has  been  claimed  by  a  diverse  range  of  organisations 
including anti racist, feminist, trade union, culturalist, ethnicist and religious Right 
projects but there are clear distinctions in the orientation of the group. This thesis 
provides a significant amount of information about some local groups in Ealing and 
Newham.  Moreover,  by  pushing  concerns  about  fundamentalism  and  de-
secularisation to the heart of the thesis, it draws out the problems with rolling out 
multifaithism and the faith agenda.
This  thesis  makes  a  significant  contribution  to  emergent  discussions  about 
multifaithism, a term that has not yet acquired common parlance but that I believe 
describes  the  current  context  in  many  local  areas.  This  chapter  has  argued  that 
multifaithism  arose  from  a  double  movement  -  from  above  through  a  state-led 
construction  of  communities  and  social  welfare  practice,  notably  through  New 
Labour's  faith  agenda  and  now  the  continued  discourse  around  society  and 
community;  and  from  below,  through  the  success  of  social  movements  in 
encouraging religious  political  identifications and lobbying for  the recognition of 
religious identities and claims by the state. So far there is little by way of detailed 
empirical research on the local dimensions of the experience of multifaithism. In 
spite of the resurgence of localism, local area studies seem to have petered out and do 
not feature a great deal in discussions about religion and secularism. The following 
chapter  demonstrates  that  this  is  particularly  the  case  with  regards  to  feminist 
interventions  in  this  field,  which  have  been  focused  on  the  national  picture  or 
international  discourse.  Rather  more  critical  feminist  perspectives  about  religion, 
civil society and the state are to be found in the writings of feminists in the Middle 
East or the South Asian subcontinent. 
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New Labour's use of 'faith'  as opposed to religion was intended to reproduce the 
sense of religious organisations as benign and philanthropic rather than as political 
bodies. This thesis views them as political formations, actively engaged in shaping 
the world around them, in lobbying the state and galvanising support in civil society.
Moreover, given that New Labour introduced such profound changes on the question 
of faith and public policy, there is surprisingly little discussion of this in mainstream 
New Labour literature and surprisingly little critique (or discussion of power) within 
an emergent 'faiths' literature and field. There is a distinct absence of accounts of the 
way  in  which  religious  organisations  mobilised  as  political  rather  than  apathetic 
cultural  formations  and  brought  pressure  to  bear  on  the  Labour  Party  and 
subsequently took advantage of the spaces that opened up through the 'faith agenda'. 
The  local  has  particularly  taken on greater  significance  since  the  advent  of  new 
policies intended to impact on 'the social', specifically through a new wave of state 
supported  communitarianism  and  delivered  through  devolved  units,  with 
neighbourhoods and communities featuring strongly in New Labour governance. The 
state's new found relationship with religious organisations travelled through these 
lines. 
This thesis explores Ruth Levitas' increasingly relevant assertion that the discourse of 
'community'  enables  the  neo  liberal  state  to  govern  at  a  distance,  acting  as  a 
secondary  source  of  policing  and a  buffer  between local  people  and the  market. 
Moreover, communitarianism, as opposed to collective solidarities, carries a certain 
social  conservatism.  Of  late  there  has  been  more  literature  produced  by  way  of 
upholding and praising the new wave of religious communitarian formations than 
providing a rigorous and productive critique. A great number of writers are upholding 
the moral and therefore social justice potential of religious organisations, even if they 
acknowledge  their  social  conservatism.  For  some  writers,  such  as  the  hugely 
influential Philip Blond and Maurice Glasman, for instance, religious groups play a 
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central role precisely because of their conservatism. This thesis acknowledges both 
the conditions of possibility, the spaces that enable religious formations to thrive, 
their  positive  contributions  but  also  draws  out  the  distinct  problems and  limited 
conceptions of the political subject that they bring with them. 
Critiques  of  community  cohesion  and  prevent  or  the  new  securities  and 
assimilationist agendas of the state since 2001 provide little information about how 
these  have  been  implemented  in  local  spaces.  Moreover,  whilst  there  is  wide 
acceptance that gender has been revived as a standard of governance and as part of a 
new 'civilisational discourse' or neo-imperialism, the actual detail of what this means 
for  the  balance  of  religious  communitarianism and the  safeguarding of  women's, 
LGBT or the rights of minorities within minorities is distinctly missing. One of the 
exceptions to this has been the work of WAF/SBS. 
Importantly,  there  is  a  moral  agenda  within  the  policy  spaces  that  now  include 
religious organisations, namely the new turn to ‘communities of allegiance’ and the 
‘etho-politics’ referred to by Nikolas Rose, the moral response to riots and 9/11, and 
the moral dimensions of the communitarian ideas of Robert Putnam's social capital. 
Much of this has been carried over by the Conservative Party even if Philip Blond 
prefers  to  call  it  a  ‘politics  of  virtue’,  more  overtly  bringing  the  theological 
dimensions and the assured place for religious institutions to the fore.
There is an emergent literature and field on faith based organising and faith based 
welfare services but they are not producing a critique. This literature is coherently 
and unanimously making the case for extending and consolidating a 'faith agenda' 
that began under New Labour. Indeed their elements of critique focus on the need for 
state and statutory bodies to recognise the agenda of religious groups rather than to 
expect  them to  fit  themselves  into  existing  secular  systems  or  pressure  them to 
secularise their work or be used, in a utilitarian way, by the state. If there is any  
recognition of the problems of 'faith' in public policy, it is limited and muted rather 
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than explored and interrogated. 
Most  of  the  recent  interventions,  notably  political  interventions  by  theology 
graduates,  such  Luke  Bretherton,  Philip  Blond  and  Adam  Dinham,  but  also 
articulated  by  Maurice  Glasman,  have  focused  on  a  combination  of  tradition, 
permanence and relationships. Religious institutions are seen as significantly under 
valued sources of both permanence and associationalism. Other than Dinham, these 
contributions also enforce the merits  of marriage and families and doing what is 
necessary  to  keep  people  in  relationships  or  focused  on  relationality  over 
individualism.  It  is  liberalism that  is  blamed  for  the  loss  of  association  and  the 
prevalence  of  individualism  but  in  the  shadows  lies  an  attack  on  feminism. 
Moreover, the view that women have accumulated too much power repeats through 
faith  circles.  This  thesis  also  seeks  to  draw  out  some  of  these  highly  gendered 
arguments and practices. 
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Chapter 2:  Religion and Electoral  Representation: a 
Fine Balance
Introduction
Religion is deeply entangled in local level electoral politics. This chapter shows how 
religion maps onto local electoral politics in surprising ways revealing the peculiar 
but also comparable interactions between political  parties  and religious identities. 
Questions about the religious and the secular become markers for revealing a range 
of contradictory practices. Moreover, the multiple ways that religion already lives 
within electoral politics speaks to the problems of establishing clear secular-religious 
distinctions. The two London boroughs in this study are currently under the control 
of  Labour  Party  councillors.  However,  there  are  significant  differences  between 
them. In Newham, power is thought to lie essentially with one man, the directly 
elected Mayor, and his cohort of Cabinet councillors. In Ealing it has been suggested 
that local authority civil  servants not elected representatives are the driving force 
behind social policy formulation, delivery and funding decisions. Critics described 
Newham as the testing ground for New Labour's policies and the Newham Labour 
Group as possessing a strong central command and corporate identity. Conversely, 
Ealing  Labour  Group  was  depicted  as  far  less  coherent  and  split  across  many 
interests and fraternal factions. The actions of the local Labour Groups are organised 
in  a  way that  seeks  to  wield  maximum electoral  support  but  also  to  circumvent 
critique. 
The Ealing Story
Control  over  Ealing  Council  has  slipped  between  the  Labour  Party  and  the 
Conservative  Party  for  some  decades,  swinging  against  the  colour  of  central 
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government and without significant majorities either side.34 There is a decipherable 
pattern across the borough in terms of Party political support. The pattern of voting 
in the Ealing North and the recently created Ealing Central and Acton constituencies 
have tended to reflect the fate of marginal seats at parliamentary elections but in 
Ealing Southall there is a long and firm history of Labour Party support. Smaller 
parties - the Green Party, UKIP and the Christian Party - have all fielded candidates 
in the parliamentary elections and a handful of council seats remain in the hands of 
the Liberal Democrats but the borough is ensconced in a largely two party race. This 
chapter shows that some ethnic minority councillors harbour divided loyalties. 
The Ealing Southall story is more akin to the Newham story. The Ealing Southall 
parliamentary seat and the council wards that it encompasses have enjoyed a Labour 
monopoly for several decades. The constituency was created in 1965 and was held by 
Labour Party MPs Sidney Bidwell (1966 until 2002), Piara Khabra (1992 until 2007) 
and Virendra Sharma (2007 to date). However, there are signs that Labour's fortunes 
may be beginning to turn. Since 2001 the Ealing Southall Labour candidate has been 
progressively losing votes, particularly to Nigel Bakhai of the Liberal Democrats, 
and in 2010 to the Conservative Party candidate Gurcharan Singh. So whilst Labour 
holds  on,  recent  years  are  indicative  of  underlying  tensions  in  the  area  and  the 
fragmentation of Labour Party support. I argue that this is connected to a changing 
relationship  with  two  elements  of  its  base:  the  secular  socialist  Indian  Workers 
Association  (IWA)  and  the  right  leaning  Sikh  Sri  Guru  Singh  Sabha  Southall 
(SGSSS).
34 In 2006 the Conservative Party gained control after eight years of a Labour council with 
elections returning 37 Conservatives; 29 Labour and 3 Liberal Democrats. However, in May 2010, 
Labour councillors won back control with a particularly high turnout (at 62.24% of the electorate 
voting compared to around a third in previous years) returning 40 Labour, 24 Conservative and 5 
Liberal Democrat councillors. The 2010 parliamentary elections gave Ealing two Labour MPs 
(Stephen Pound and Virendra Sharma held onto their seats at Ealing North and Ealing Southall) and 
one Conservative MP (Angie Bray was elected to the new Ealing Central and Acton seat). 
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Two poles of power: IWA and SGSSS
One of the most unexpected contrasts came through the seemingly divergent opening 
assertions  of  Stephen  Timms  Labour  Party  MP for  East  Ham  in  Newham  and 
Virendra Sharma Labour Party MP for Ealing Southall. Timms' political engagement 
emerged from his Christian commitments. He is a well-known Evangelical Christian, 
he plays an active role in the Christian Socialist  Movement and he has been the 
Labour Party Vice Chair on Faith Groups since 2007. In sharp contrast, Sharma has 
emerged from the notoriously secular Indian Workers Association (IWA). He was 
born into a Gandhian political  tradition and embraced family support for Nehru's 
post-independence  Congress  Party.  He  described  his  political  trajectory  as  both 
socialist and secular and located himself within a secular response to the intersection 
of class and 'race'. His political activity in Britain has travelled the beaten track of 
many left leaning black activists of his generation. He started as a trade unionist and 
a  member  of  the  IWA. He then participated  in  the  Labour  Party  Black Sections 
movement and went on to become a local councillor. He was rewarded for several 
decades of investment in the Labour Party by securing the nomination to replace the 
longstanding MP Piara Khabra. Then in 2007, he was elected MP for Ealing Southall. 
In a sense both Stephen Timms and Virendra Sharma are reflections of a particular 
generation  of  activism  and  ideological  frameworks  now  embedded  within  local 
Labour politics: social action Christians and diasporic secularists. It would seem that 
their  personal  histories  interrogate  the  structuring  stereotypes  that  project  ethnic 
minorities  as  particularly  pious  on  the  one  hand  and  the  white  majority  as 
increasingly secular if not atheist on the other. Yet in the current climate and at a 
normative level, they have more in common than expected. Stephen Timms objects 
to religious identity politics and religious political parties but supports the work of 
religious organisations on regeneration. Virendra Sharma pre-empted questions about 
faith  based  service  provision  by  making  an  important  distinction  between  his 
personal opposition to these and his role as an elected representative that is obliged 
to respond to religious demands. In spite of his principled objections to religious 
based welfare services or mobilisations, he has not actually opposed any of the local 
religious developments: he attends all the religious processions, he supports all the 
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applications  for  religious  sites  of  worship,  and  he  backs  demands  for  religious 
accommodation. Indeed he highlighted his links with the Sikh Human Rights Group 
campaign for Sarika Watkins who was excluded from a school in south Wales when 
she refused to remove her kara (Sikh bangle).35 Until recently,  Sharma even held 
membership of the largest, but also right-leaning, Sikh organisation in the borough - 
the Sri Guru Singh Sabha Southall (SGSSS). Indeed I was surprised by his political 
identification as 'secular' precisely because I had seen him at the Foundation Stone 
Laying Ceremony (26/04/09) for the first state funded Sikh primary school, which 
opened  in  his  constituency  in  2009.  He  summarised  his  links  with  religious 
organisations and religious demands as follows:
SD: You use the term 'secular'?
VS: But you also pay the same respect to other faiths. You do not discriminate, you 
don’t say that in 'secular', there’s a two ways of defining it, one is that I don’t believe  
in faith, right? The other one is-
SD: You mean like 'atheism'?
VS: That’s it, that’s near to the 'atheism' but I’m not atheist but I’m a secular. So it  
means that I pay respect to other faiths, similar like maybe doing to my own faith. 
So that’s where I come from, we do not, when I say we, the family I come from, we 
do  not  give  importance  to  religion  but  we  give  importance  to  service  to  the  
community.
[Virendra Sharma, MP for Ealing Southall, 18/09/09]
So Sharma's understanding of the term 'secular' relies on two practices: equal respect 
or acknowledgement of all religions and an emphasis on the philosophy rather than 
the literal application of religious belief. In other words this is what Ashis Nandy 
(1990) terms the  distinction  between 'religion as  faith'  and 'religion  as  ideology'. 
Indeed it is a peculiarly Indian understanding of 'secularism', which is very close to 
35 Watkins-Singh, R (on the application of) v Aberdare Girls' High School & Anor [2008] EWHC 
1865 (Admin) (29 July 2008)
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'multifaithism' and broadly translates as institutionalised religious parity rather than 
indifference or strong separation between private and public.36 This is fast becoming 
assimilated in British political cultures and constitutes one element of a slide from 
multiculturalism to multifaithism. The turn from black radicalism to managerialism 
as well  as  diasporic  political  engagement  through the multiculturalist  frame have 
contributed to Sharma's version of secularism. This runs alongside other factors that 
influence his practice, namely a pre-occupation with votes.
 
Sharma's perspective also reflects a larger interaction between two to three debates 
that cut into local Labour Party politics and have given rise to both intended and 
unintended  consequences.   At  the  heart  of  these  are  arguments  about  equality, 
difference,  parity  and  balancing  the  contradictory  demands  incurred  in  securing 
ethnic  minority  and  white  working  class  votes.  In  Southall,  Sharma  is  trapped 
between two poles of power that have impacted upon the shape of the local Labour 
Group: the Indian Workers Association (IWA) and the Sri Guru Singh Sabha Southall 
36 The Indian political theorist, Ashis Nandy refers to this as 'the accommodative and pluralist 
meaning' of secularism adopted by Indian politicians (Nandy, 1990) and Rajeev Bhargava, refers to it 
as an 'alternative conception of secularism' that is distinguishable from 'conceptions shaped by 
French laïcité and the American wall of separation variant'. See his piece Beyond Moderate 
Secularism posted on 16/09/11 at The Immanent Frame and available at:
http://blogs.ssrc.org/tif/2011/09/16/beyond-moderate-secularism/ 
Over the years Bhargava found an ally in the British multiculturalism theorist, Tariq Modood, 
who refers to himself as a secularist but is actually one of the strongest advocates of the slide from 
multiculturalism to multifaithism in Britain. Rather than focus on other factors driving religious 
claims - such as Christian privilege, the need for disestablishment and fundamentalist mobilisations - 
Bhargava and Modood argue for a broadly multifaithist response that provides religious parity. Their 
theses are underscored by connections between the fact of immigration to Britain and a crisis of 
political secularism where the empirical reality of difference is equated with the need for differential 
treatment. This aligns with the practice of Virendra Sharma's conciliatory politics that accepts 
whatever 'the community wants'. Indeed in a context of Christian privilege, a race equality man like 
Sharma might be hard pushed to argue against minority religious claims.
Yet the view that there is a causal relationship between immigration or increased difference 
and political crisis might otherwise be deemed racist. 
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(SGSSS). A great number of the Asian councillors in the borough do now or have in 
the past declared their membership of the SGSSS and its sister organisation, the Sikh 
Missionary Society. Sharma also pointed to membership of Hindu temples but what 
is interesting about the connection with the SGSSS is that only one other gurdwara 
(out of a total of twelve in the borough) is referred to by Labour councillors either on 
their declaration of interests or in interviews. There is both conflict and a confluence 
of interests between the IWA and the SGSSS. These dynamics have been brought to 
bear on the local Labour Party. 
The  following  extract  reflects  a  widespread  view  amongst  activists  that  other 
political  differences  aside,  the  IWA Southall  represents  a  much-needed  secular 
politics in the area:
What  they  were  uncompromising  about  was  the  so-called  'secular  values',  or  so 
called 'communal politics'. Punjab as you know from '47 right up to '84 is rife with 
communal politics because of the deep divisions of partition in that state which were 
infact worse than in Bengal, which were the two states that it had direct implications 
on. And the people that lead the Indian Workers Association were from so-called left 
wing progressive sections of the Indian Left who came into this country and because 
they were educated, they became so-called 'community leaders'.
[Suresh Grover, The Monitoring Group, 15/08/07]
Both Suresh Grover and the Conservative councillor Anita Kapoor (interviewed on 
18/07/10) were confident that the IWA Southall was essentially a recruiting ground 
for the Labour Party.  Indeed the IWA and Southall  Labour Party share the same 
building and it is no coincidence that the previous long standing MP, Piara Khabra, 
was both the Ealing Southall Labour MP and the Chair of IWA Southall. 
Virendra Sharma's own reference points were pinned to the particular trajectories of 
the first wave of black MPs to be selected as a consequence of the Labour Party 
Black Sections movement - Bernie Grant, Diane Abbott, Paul Boateng and Keith Vaz 
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- reflecting a politics concerned with the intersection of class and 'race' and using the 
term 'black' to define political mobilisation against racism. Sharma emphasised the 
continued relevance of anti racism, his commitment to black representation within 
the Labour Party and within trade unions. 
There  is  a  correlation  between the  politics  of  the  IWA Southall  and the  internal 
politics of the Labour Party Black Sections, which enables various sorts of religious 
identifications to live within these formations and to surface at different moments. 
According  to  both  Sasha  Josephides  (1991)  and Kalbir  Shukra  (1998),  the  IWA 
Southall can be distinguished from the Coventry based IWA (GB), on the basis of 
three key features: the leaders of the IWA Southall comprised Congress Party and 
Communist  Party  of  India (CPI)  supporters  rather  than the more leftist  CPI (M) 
sympathisers  at  the IWA (GB);  Southall's  IWA leaders were mainly middle class 
business and professional men focused on Indians as one ethnic interest group whilst 
the  IWA (GB)  focused  on  organising  Indian  labourers  as  a  class interest  group; 
Southall IWA was more moderate, wanting to integrate Indians into British political 
systems  (including  into  the  Labour  Party  through  the  Campaign  Against  Racial 
Discrimination and Labour Party Black Sections) whilst IWA (GB) retained a critical 
distance from political parties and a sense of autonomous self organisation.37 
Josephides described IWA Southall as akin to 'many ethnic associations which are 
part state funded, run welfare and social centres, and become involved with CRCs, 
Race Relations Committees and so on' (1991:265). Moreover, religious identity was 
never too far away from its mobilisations. Shukra noted strong links between the 
IWA Southall and one particular gurdwara, partly because Sikh and Hindu temples 
37 Though the point about divergent Indian political affiliations is well taken, I am not sure 
there was such a clear demarcation between the ideology and practice of IWA (GB) and IWA Southall 
within British politics because I am aware of IWA (GB) members that became central to Labour Party 
politics in Coventry and of IWA Southall members that were working class, active in trade unions 
and/or continued to emphasise class interests above all else. 
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provided  'a  platform  for  putting  views  and  mobilising  for  demonstrations  and 
meetings' (1998:16). Infact the politics of local gurdwaras impacted directly on the 
IWA. In the 1960s the IWA Southall split from the IWA London because of factional 
fighting over the control of the Sikh gurdwara in Shepherds Bush (Shukra, 1998: 17). 
In  the  wake  of  Indira  Gandhi's  1984  Operation  Bluestar,  the  IWA  Southall's 
connections  with  the  Indian  Congress  Party  came  home  to  roost  when  its  then 
general secretary (also the secretary of the Indian Overseas Congress), Tarsem Singh 
Toor, was assassinated in Southall by Sikh separatists (Josephides 1991: 262). 
Running alongside the developments within the IWAs were the changing politics of 
black  radicalism  and  expressly  ethnic  or  religious  mobilisations.  When  taken 
together, these are the conditions that enabled religious fundamentalism to live or sit 
unchallenged  within  black  mobilisations  inside  the  Labour  Party  and  municipal 
socialism. 
As the Labour Party started to take the ethnic minority vote more seriously, a number 
of changes in ethnic minority and anti racist politics came into play. According to 
Shukra,  black radicalism in Britain  shifted from large ideological  ambitions  to  a 
focus on local politics and local authorities. She refers to this as 'black perspectivism' 
and summarises its components as follows:
It  brought together the key elements of its  antecedents:  the search for pride and  
identity to develop high self-esteem; self-definition; recognition for black experience 
and self-organisation. It also shared with its progenitors their tendency to localise 
experience.  Within  the  broad  term  "black",  black  perspectivists  continued  to 
recognise ethnic difference in a way that the 1970s use of "black" did not.
[Kalbir Shukra, 1998:61]
 
In practice this involved a kind of raced managerialism working through a broadly 
multiculturalist  frame to  effect  policies,  working methods  and funding allocation 
through the new turn to municipal socialism. Black activists also became integrated 
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into the mainstream local authority or statutory bodies through this new orientation. 
So, whilst Tariq Modood launched his attack on black political identity, accusing it of 
suppressing ethnic and cultural difference, Shukra is quite right to stress that the term 
'black' encompassed a variety of strategies and identities. She is also right to draw 
out  the  proximities  between  black  radicalism  as  black  perspectivism  and  ethnic 
particularism.38 The Labour Party Black Sections (LPBS) ushered in a new politics of 
presence where the confrontational dimensions of black political activity shifted to 
the 'question of black faces in office' (Shukra, 1998: 73). Importantly, Sydney Jeffers 
(1991) noted conflicting tendencies within LPBS where one strand sought to oppose 
racism and the other indulged ethnic particularism, yet also their shared tendency to 
reify and defend anything and everything 'black'. 
Virendra  Sharma was  acutely  aware  of  Asian  activists  voicing  opposition  to  the 
unitary  term  'black'  and  he  defended  its  use,  function  and  continued  political 
relevance. Yet he spoke about having been the national officer for the Black and 
Asian committee within the Labour Party, which, according to Shukra (1998), was 
established as a less antagonistic counter weight to the Labour Party Black Sections 
movement. Also Sharma's predecessor, Piara Khabra, was one of the Asian members 
of the Black Socialist Society (BSS) that sought to challenge the legitimacy of the 
term  'black'  by  seeking  its  replacement  with  'Black  and  Asian'.  As  well  as 
representing the Asian push for greater representation on the Labour Party NEC, the 
Black and Asian committee was emblematic of the tension between ethnicists and 
black  perspectivists.  Moreover,  at  a  local  level,  it  chimes  with  Suresh  Grover's 
account of his own struggle against  a particular generation of Indian activists for 
whom the authenticating aspects of being Punjabi was part of the practice of their 
politics:
IWA represented  a  microcosm of  Sikh  Punjabi  community  within  Southall.  For 
example whenever I went to a couple of IWA meetings and I was never a member of  
38 However, what sometimes escapes mention in Shukra's work is the continued use of the term 
'black' by some political actors alongside these other developments, not as a meta narrative of radical 
liberation but as clearly distinguishable from ethnic particularism because of its outward (not identity 
based) secular project directed at challenging the shared conditions of structural and direct racism.
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IWA, but they would tell you that if you didn't speak Punjabi, you weren't Indian. 
And so, secondly, the notion of a dominant Sikh culture in Southall has always been  
there not just in terms of its cultural aspirations but in how organisations are formed, 
specifically the IWA. 
[Suresh Grover, TMG, 15/08/07]
The IWA and the Southall Labour Party incorporated people whose mixed political 
leanings were determined essentially by their perspective on the Indian state but they 
were also predominantly upper caste Hindus and Sikhs from just one region of India,  
Punjab.  As Virendra Sharma pointed out, the early leaders of the Indian Workers 
Association in Southall were mostly Sikhs. The first Asian councillor in Ealing was 
also a Sikh man called Sirdul Singh Gill (elected in 1968). Moreover, there was a 
significant overlap between early day leaders of the IWA Southall and those at the 
helm of the SGSSS. One of the founder members of SGSSS, Balwant Singh Gill, 
was  active  in  workers'  struggles  and  the  IWA but  also  had  an  interest  in  the 
establishment  of  religious  provisions  and  the  realisation  of  his  own  business 
interests. This is important because all of the diverse elements referred to thus far 
were, until very, very recently, reflected within and represented by just one political 
party, the Ealing Labour Party.  
A  large  number  of  ethnic  minority  activists  entered  Labour  Party  politics  as 
'Kingmakers'  engaged in  systems of  patronage that  provided direct  access  to  the 
Labour  leadership  and  influence  over  local  concerns  in  exchange  for  mobilising 
votes (Solomos and Back, 1995). It was not uncommon for these 'Kingmakers' to be 
drawn  from  religious  sites  of  worship  and  for  a  'machine  politics'  (using  local 
networks to recruit members and voters en masse for the Labour Party) to depend on 
caste,  religious  and  kinship  networks  (Solomos  and  Back,  1995).39 Moreover, 
39 In Ealing the contemporary connections between ethnic minority selection and kinship 
networks is there within both political parties. The longest standing ethnic minority councillors for the 
Ealing Conservative Party are one couple - Anita and Ashok Kapoor - whose son was also once a 
Conservative Party councillor. Three out of five of the defectors from Labour to Conservative have 
long term connections - Gurcharan Singh and Manjit Singh are business partners whilst the only Asian 
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according to John Solomos and Les Back (1995) ethnic minority activists within the 
Labour  Party  could  be  divided  according  to  'instrumental'  and  'ideological' 
trajectories. The instrumental types entered through their roles as general community 
advocates and they carried a very practical  agenda about  resource allocation and 
specific  issues.  The  ideological  types  entered  through  two  avenues:  either  black 
radicalism and civil  rights politics  or generic  left  activism and trade unions.  The 
latter privileged a 'sovereign Labour identity' where black activists lined up behind a 
larger  Left  struggle.  The effects  of  these processes included the establishment  of 
local elites that were gender, caste, religion and kin specific. In return, the Labour 
Party could project itself as concerned with racial equality, even if these new ethnic 
minority politicians reflected diverse ideologies and interests (Solomos and Back, 
1995: 78).
All  of  these  tendencies  and  trajectories  are  evident  amongst  the  ethnic  minority 
politicians interviewed in Ealing and Newham but they cannot be easily separated 
out into two self-contained 'types'. In particular, the fact of poverty and racism in the 
experience of migration and settlement meant that the character of ethnic minority 
engagement even for 'instrumental types' overlapped with trade union affiliation and 
some kind of  anti  racist  activity.  So,  for  instance,  Councillor  Swarn Singh Kang 
bears  all  the  characteristics  of  an  'instrumental  type'  and  seemingly  aligns  with 
Gurcharan  Singh's  'Sikh  Complaint'  (discussed  below)  but  remained  inside  the 
Labour  Party  after  the  Sikh  defections.  Councillor  Kamaljit  Dhindsa  came  into 
public life because of his father's religious work (his father was one of the founder 
members of the SGSSS). However, after the Sikh fallout, Dhindsa remained strongly 
aligned with what he described as the Labour Party's ideological commitment to a 
big  state  and  public  services.  Quite  simply,  he  could  not  ever  see  himself  as  a 
Conservative. Moreover, in the case of Muslim councillors in Newham, some of the 
'instrumental  types'  left  Labour  to  join  Respect  on  the  basis  of  an  ideological 
opposition to the Iraq invasion whilst other 'instrumental types' remained inside the 
woman to defect, Maninder Kaur Keith, is Manjit Singh's daughter. The outgoing Labour Mayor for 
Ealing was a man called Rajinder Singh Mann. He is still a councillor in the same ward as his wife 
Gurmit Kaur Mann.
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Labour Party, presumably also because it seemed to be the only viable political party 
in  Newham.  Indeed  the  Newham Story  below reflects  the  shifting  nature  of  the 
Labour Party project and what this has meant for ideological partners who either 
changed their game to fit with New Labour or left alongside some of the instrumental 
players to join ostensibly religious political parties with a stronger critique of the 
state. 
Nevertheless, Mr Randhawa, the ex President of the SGSSS, revealed a particularly 
long history of relations with the local Labour Party followed by a later separation of 
power bases between those at the helm of the IWA and the leaders of the SGSSS. 
Most  of  the  fieldwork  interviews  took  place  ahead  of  the  political  defections 
discussed in the next subsection. However, it may be not be sheer coincidence that 
soon after simmering tensions within the local Labour Party evolved into significant 
ruptures articulated as a specifically 'Sikh Complaint', the SGSSS reconfigured its 
own membership criteria to effectively exclude all but those ascribing to one specific 
version of Sikhism. It now excludes Hindus from joining, clearly pushing Virendra 
Sharma and many of his allies out of long standing SGSSS membership. 
However, Sharma attempted to sidestep or deny the suggestion that religious tensions 
and religious organisations had impacted upon the local Labour Party. For instance, 
on the question of Khalistani support amongst the local population, Sharma was keen 
to downplay the impact on Southall and particularly on the Labour Party:
SD: I was wondering about what was happening here and how it might have 
impacted on what the Labour Party were doing locally?
VS: Yeah but there was no influence of the Khalistan.
SD: Khalistanis here?
VS: That, that, that is a total myth. It was individual based not into the Labour Party 
or any political party.
SD: OK.
101
VS: It was only based around gurdwaras and the local communities. It did not make 
any impact. If I take that point there are maybe a small number of people, it was not  
huge  political  movement  locally.  Feelings  were  hurt,  I  accept  that.  The  Sikh 
community and the people who believe in that politics feels that Operation Blue Star 
hurt the feelings. As a political activist living in the community, I would say it, it was 
not that high on the agenda of the British politics. It was on the agenda of a Sikh,  
small number of the Sikh community in the local area. 
[Virendra Sharma, Ealing Southall Labour MP, 18/09/09]
This  may not  come as a  surprise to  either  Kalbir  Shukra or  Sydney Jeffers who 
highlighted the divergent objectives and politics of the activists within the Labour 
Party  Black  Sections  and  the  technique  of  evasion  or  denial  as  a  strategy  for 
sidestepping difficult issues to maintain unity. Both point to the LPBS' poor response 
to  the  Rushdie  Affair  as  an  instance  that  exemplified  both  the  internal  tendency 
towards ethnic particularism and the tactic of avoidance. Jeffers noted Bernie Grant's 
appeal  to  the  Black  Sections  conference  in  1989  to  support  the  anti  Rushdie 
demonstrators in Bradford and to extend blasphemy laws to cover minority religions 
but the Black Sections' executive decision to keep the debate off the agenda for the 
sake of retaining unity. Similarly Kalbir Shukra argued that the twin objectives of 
unity and securing the maximum number of black votes meant 'remaining silent on 
difficult and controversial matters' such as on the Rushdie Affair where LPBS 'took a 
conscious decision to ignore the matter' (1998:79-80). In Ealing, it was the Labour 
Party  Women's  Section  that  issued  a  statement  in  defence  of  Salman  Rushdie 
(Connolly,  1990:5).  The Labour  Party  Women's  Sections  across  the  country  also 
supported Women Against Fundamentalism's resolution to oppose public funding for 
faith based schools, even if by then the Party's clampdown on local autonomy and 
dissent prevented discussion of this resolution at the main Labour Party Women's 
Conference (Connolly, 1990:6). 
Contrary to the material presented thus far, Virendra Sharma emphasised objectivity 
and stated that he did not rely on religious institutions to deliver votes especially 
because those institutions were compelled to maintain distance from political parties 
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by the pressures of diverse political leanings within their own membership. However, 
when Sharma discussed particular religious demands, he did not interrogate these or 
distance himself from them but rather tended to validate them as reflections of local 
fears about the loss of culture and identity, as part of the ongoing injury of being a 
minority in Britain. The problem is that Sharma's balance between evasion, denial, 
distance and uncritical validation seems at odds with local histories where, from the 
1980s onwards, one does not need to look far at all for fundamentalist mobilisations 
and resistance to these. This begins with Khalistani calls for the secession of Punjab 
from  the  Indian  state.  These  mobilisations  are  specifically  against  the  Indian 
Congress Party and more so in light of Operation Bluestar in 1984. At a local level, 
this mobilisation was linked to the murder of Tarsem Singh Toor and violent clashes 
within  local  gurdwaras.  The Khalistani  mobilisation  was swiftly  followed by the 
Rushdie Affair. The Labour Party Women's Section collaborated with Southall Black 
Sisters and Women Against Fundamentalism on a public meeting at the Dominion 
Centre,  on  the  doorstep  of  the  IWA offices.  Moreover,  by  1992,  Southall  Black 
Sisters joined forces with other local groups, this time including the IWA, for the 
Save Our Schools campaign to prevent Sikh men from using Conservative education 
legislation to take over local comprehensive schools to create faith based schools. 
This was also the year that Hindu fundamentalists demolished the Babri Masjid in 
Ayodhya. In Southall  this  event sparked the creation of the South Asian Alliance 
Against Communalism, again with a meeting on the doorstep of the local Labour 
Party headquarters. The 1990s were marred by violence and tension between Sikhs 
and Muslims even if the electoral alliance between the BJP and the Akali Dal in India 
somehow subdued the post 1984 Sikh-Hindu tensions once more. At the end of the 
1990s, the massacre of Muslims in Gujarat lead to the revival of the South Asian 
Alliance  Against  Communalism  with  a  meeting  at  the  Ambedkar  Centre  on 
Featherstone Road, around the corner from the local  Labour Party office.  Recent 
coverage suggests increasing Islamist activity in the local area including reports that 
the fundamentalist organisation, Al Shabaab, have managed to recruit local young 
Somali men to fight overseas.40 
40 BBC Radio 4 programme File on 4: The Somali Connection aired on 2/11/10.
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It is very difficult to understand Sharma's response on the question of religion in light 
of all this. If ever there were a time to make clear statements about religious violence 
and  fundamentalism,  surely  it  would  be  now and  quite  possibly  it  would  be  in 
Southall. Indeed, Sharma has been engaged in a difficult balancing act between being 
acutely aware of the sentiments  of his  constituents  and taking a more principled 
stand. However, the next section of this chapter demonstrates that sidestepping such 
issues is not always an option.
The Sikh complaint
On 19th June 2007, Piara Khabra, the Ealing Southall Labour Party MP of 15 years 
and chair of the IWA Southall, died. Some time before his death, he had announced 
that he would not be contending the 2010 General Election and so by June 2007 
internal discussions about his replacement were already underway. He made it clear 
that  he  favoured  an  all-women  shortlist.  In  the  years  preceding  his  death,  he 
mentored a local Asian woman, Sonika Nirwal, the then Leader of the Ealing Labour 
Party. Obituaries made explicit references to Khabra's opposition to fundamentalism 
and religious divisions in the area41 and certainly Suresh Grover (TMG) recounted 
Khabra's  suspicion  of  Gurcharan  Singh  on  the  grounds  that  Singh  harboured 
communal  tendencies.  Importantly  for  this  thesis,  the  subsequent  By-Election 
brought latent frictions around both religion and gender to the surface. 
For national political parties the 2007 Ealing Southall By-Election opened up a space 
to  test  Gordon  Brown's  leadership.  Many  senior  figures  from the  main  political 
parties  visited  the  area.  The  Conservative  Party  HQ snubbed  local  Conservative 
activists and hand picked Tony Lit, the handsome son of a well-known Asian media 
moghul,  Avtar  Lit.  Within days  of the Labour Party's  decision to  select  Virendra 
Sharma as their candidate, the defection of 5 long standing Labour Party councillors 
brought simmering tensions around religion to the fore. These tensions converged 
41 See A servant of the people: First Asian Sikh MP Piara Khabra dies at age 82 by Natasha 
Brown in The Ealing Gazette, 22/06/07.
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and found voice in the Conservative Party HQ's interest in the Southall area.42 The 
same By-Election also led to the eventual exit from politics of two key women -  
Sonika Nirwal and Maninder Kaur Keith. 
In his first interview about that defection, Gurcharan Singh was frank about his sense 
of religious discrimination in the Labour Party selection process:
I suspect that they are not yet ready to have a turban-wearing Sikh amongst their  
ranks, and this has been given credence by the fact that of the seven people in the  
long-list, three were turban-wearing Sikhs and all three were rejected.43
Four out of five of the defectors were Sikh. Three of them wear turbans. A series of 
letters to The Ealing Gazette highlighted the difficulty in gaging the mood of the 
electorate with some alleging that the Labour Party had betrayed their Sikh vote base 
and  others  calling  for  Singh's  immediate  resignation.44 Moreover,  although  the 
Liberal  Democrats  denied  appealing  to  religious  vote  banks,  the  Muslim  Public 
Affairs Committee urged Muslims to vote Liberal Democrat as the only party raising 
concerns about the invasion of Iraq.45  Interestingly, the Respect Party also fielded a 
candidate but there was little move by any organisation to encourage Muslims to 
back him. In fact it is noteworthy that Iraq did not feature as a vote decider in Ealing.
In the end there were a phenomenal 12 candidates running for the July 2007 By-
42 See Defectors by Lucy Proctor, front page of The Southall Gazette, 13/07/07.
43 As quoted in Will it all be about religion and ethnicity this time? By Lucy Proctor in The 
Southall Gazette, 13/07/07.
44 Excerpt from Letters and Emails page of The Southall Gazette, 20/07/07.
45 As reported in Will it all be about religion and ethnicity this time? by Lucy Proctor in The 
Southall Gazette, 13/07/07.
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Election. All but two of them were Asian men. Other than the main political parties, 
three Sikh men stood as Independent candidates including: the former Labour Party 
activist  Kuldeep  Singh  Grewal  who  later  ditched  his  campaign  to  fall  behind 
Virendra Sharma; Jasdev Rai,  a member of the Sikh Human Rights Group;46 and 
Gulbash Singh, an Independent that later joined the Conservative Party. The smaller 
minority  parties  also  fielded Asian  male  candidates  including:  Dr  KT Rajan,  the 
UKIP candidate, who stood primarily on an anti immigration ticket; Sati Chaggar 
who stood for  the English Democrats;  Yaqub Masih for  the  Christian  Party;  and 
Salvinder Dhillon for Respect. The only non-Asian candidates were from The Green 
Party and the Monster Raving Loony Party.
In the end, Labour held onto the seat and Virendra Sharma took Piara Khabra's place 
as  Ealing  Southall  MP,  albeit  with  a  significantly  reduced  majority.   The 
Conservative Party hopeful, Tony Lit, was forced into third place amidst revelations 
that  he  donated  a  large  sum of  money to  the  Labour  Party  just  days  before  his 
selection.47 This  defeat  created  the  space  for  Gurcharan  Singh  to  step  in  as  the 
Prospective Parliamentary Candidate for the Conservative Party at  the subsequent 
General Election. In his 2010 publicity, Gurcharan Singh did not explicitly refer to 
standing as a Sikh candidate. Rather his campaign material focused on the question 
of the Labour Party's failure to intervene in pertinent local issues namely, cuts to 
local  hospital  services,  parking  and  regeneration  needs,  and  allegations  about 
Sharma's  expenses.  Indeed  much  of  the  literature  for  all  contestants  focused  on 
46 Rai's campaign leaflet outlines his communitarian philosophy advocating that the Hobbesian 
and Lockean contract between individual and state be replaced by a 'triangular contract between state 
community and individual'. Of note is the information contained within Gurharpal Singh and Darshan 
Singh Tatla's (2006) account of Sikhism in Britain that Jasdev Rai used to be the President of the 
International Sikh Youth Federation (ISYF), one of four Khalistani groups based in Britain.
47 The July 2007 by-election results were as follows: Virendra Sharma (Labour) gained 15,188 
(41.3%) votes; Nigel Bakhai (Lib Dem) gained 10,118 (27.5%) votes; Tony Lit gained 8,230 (22.4%) 
votes and Sarah Edwards of the Green Party trailed behind at 1,135 votes. The other eight candidates 
gained a total of 1,947 (just 5.3% of the votes). In the end it was the Liberal Democrats and not the 
Conservatives that captured the votes of disgruntled Labour Party supporters and overall turnout was 
lower than usual.
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Labour Party complacency. However, Sikhism continued as the elephant in the room 
and Singh persisted in defending his defection on the grounds that men with turbans 
faced discrimination in the Labour Party selection process. 
Of note is  the pitting of gender against  religion at  one minute and their  possible 
realignment  as  suppressed  alterity  at  another.  Gurcharan  Singh  claimed  the  all-
women shortlist favoured by Piara Khabra was a personalised attempt to sideline his 
bid  for  leadership  of  the  Ealing  Southall  Labour  Party.  However,  when  Singh 
discovered that all three turbaned candidates were not short listed for selection, he 
decided this reflected a wider point about Sikh representation within the Party. Given 
that a couple of Labour Party women - Jasbir Anand and Sonika Nirwal - were also 
rejected, questions of gender and religious representation potentially flowed from the 
same source. Yet few people noted that these two women are also Sikh and instead 
positioned  gender  and  religion  as  mutually  exclusive  categories.  In  a  sense  this 
parallels Shukra's (1998) observation that men dominated the Labour Party Black 
Sections whilst black women worked through the Labour Party Women's Sections. 
There is a repetitive tendency then for ethnic minority women in Ealing politics to be 
called on gender and not on 'race', which surfaces here as de-authentication of the 
Sikh background of two women that chose to remain within the Labour Party during 
the Sikh fallout.
Regardless of the absence of overt references in Gurcharan Singh's publicity material 
positioning himself as a Sikh candidate, there was a whispering campaign in the local 
area to vote for Singh on the premise that the election of a turbaned Sikh (man) to 
parliament is long overdue. Of course such an assertion simultaneously implied that 
the humanist cut-hair Sikh MP Piara Khabra was somehow inauthentic. Moreover, 
many of Singh's canvassers and volunteers at the local polling booths were young 
men  wearing  blue  turbans.  Interestingly,  the  blue  turban  in  this  context  carries 
ambiguous meaning potentially reflecting an allegiance to the Conservative Party but 
also  emblematic  of  the  connections  between  Khalsa  ideology  and  the  Khalistani 
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movement.48 Unsurprisingly, subtle symbolic parallels with 1980s Sikh oppression 
by  the  Congress  Party  came  within  easy  reach.  However,  rather  than  go  for  a 
sectarian  religious  mobilisation,  Singh's  publicity  seemed  to  indicate  attempts  to 
build a multi-faith alliance against the Labour Party and the 'secular' reputation of its 
IWA components.  One of his leaflets showed messages of support from the Sikh 
Missionary Society, the Central Jamia Masjid and the Vishwa Hindu Mandir. Even 
though  the  SGSSS  was  not  identified  in  the  campaign  material,  the  fraternal 
networks in the local area run directly from the defectors through to this body. Indeed 
up until they lost their council seats, most of the defectors were on the governing 
board of the local Khalsa Sikh Primary School, widely understood to be an SGSSS 
enterprise.
 
Virendra  Sharma was  adamant  that  these  events  marked  the  public  unfolding  of 
longstanding  personal rivalries between Gurcharan Singh and himself based upon 
their alternating fortunes within the Labour Party. He seemed to prefer this view than 
to  entertain  suggestions  that  the  fallout  reflected  outpourings  of  religious-secular 
tensions. However, this didn't prevent Sharma from referring to Singh's empathy for 
Khalistani politics. One of Sharma's campaign leaflets outlined four key facts that 
David Cameron ought to be aware of in selecting Gurcharan Singh. Fact number two 
stated: 
Cllr.  Gurcharan  Singh  supports  violence  and  murder  as  legitimate  tools  against 
opponents. At the time of the murder of then Prime Minister of India Mrs Gandhi by 
her  bodyguards,  Cllr  Gurcharan  Singh  was  reported  by  the  Southall  Gazette  as 
saying (under a headline It's a Relief says Labour Councillor), "A Labour councillor  
who has figured prominently in the fight for an independent Sikh nation said he felt 
a great "sense of relief" at the news of Mrs Gandhi's death… she has been dealt with 
in accordance with the Sikh religion" (Southall Gazette 2 November 1984). In 2007, 
a Southall resident asked Cllr Gurcharan Singh publicly in a letter in the Gazette, if  
48 The leaders of both were renowned for alternating between orange and navy blue outfits. 
This Sikh warrior image is currently being reproduced in a reversion to militant masculinist Sikhism, 
notably through the growing popularity of the west London based Akali Nihangs. See Heart and Soul 
series: The Last Sikh Warrior broadcast on Monday 31/10/11 by the BBC World Service and available 
to download at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/podcasts/series/heartsoul
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he still stood by his statement. He refused to retract it.49 
An  optimistic  view  would  suggest  that  Sharma  was  commenting  on  Singh's 
specifically communal leanings and highlighting a history of bullying (fact number 
one referred to Singh's temper and an incident where he punched someone during a 
council  meeting).  A pessimistic  view  might  suggest  that  this  was  a  politically 
expedient  manoeuvre  intended  to  characterise  Singh  as  an  'extremist'.  This 
contradiction between a denial of the Sikh/religious dimension on the one hand and 
its utility on the other could be another reflection of the uneasy way in which Sharma 
tried to balance his electoral ambitions with tangible political views. He attempted to 
avoid giving the issue a religious dimension because of a fear that it might alienate 
large numbers  of Sikh voters  (including thousands of SGSSS members)  but  also 
knew that outing Singh's Khalistani past could win other, more liberal, non-Jat Sikh, 
or  secular,  supporters  or  project  Singh  negatively  in  the  context  of  a  national 
discourse  (and  Conservative  Party  anxiety)  about  (ethnic  minority)  religious 
extremism.
Importantly, Gurcharan Singh was a prominent activist within the Labour Party for 
almost thirty years before he joined the Conservative Party. In May 2010, Singh and 
the  other  Labour  to  Conservative  defectors  lost  their  council  seats  in  the  local 
election  and  Singh  lost  out  to  Virendra  Sharma  in  the  parliamentary  election. 
Unsurprisingly, the Labour Party is declaring this a victory for unity in the borough 
and indeed that may be so. However, Singh managed a significant dent in Labour 
votes50, shaking the long-term Labour status quo. Moreover, the sentiment that led 
some  to  pull  away  from  Labour  and  vote  for  Singh  does  not  appear  to  have 
disappeared. 
49 Extract from Sharma's campaign leaflet 'Open Letter to David Cameron' dated 28/04/10.
50 Singh managed an 8.3% swing to the Conservative Party and the Labour majority fell from 
21,423 in 1997 to 9,291 votes in 2010.
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Nevertheless,  it  is  particularly interesting to  see the 'Sikh Complaint'  riding on a 
Conservative  Party  ticket.  Singh's  concerns  about  process  were  articulated  as 
follows:
The decision (to defect) was a long time coming and formed on the basis that the 
Labour Party failed to adhere to principles of fairness, equality and diversity that we 
had  expected  it  to  espouse…  Infact  the  Labour  Party,  it  appears,  came  to  a  
conclusion way back in  September  2006 that  it  was not  yet  ready for  a  turban-
wearing MP in its ranks… Let it be known that my colleagues and I have never 
demanded nor  advocated  a  seat  in  Parliament  or  anywhere  else  on  the  basis  of 
colour, creed or religion… I wanted the Labour Party to be fair and transparent in its  
procedures. I asked them to release minutes of the interview panel showing how the 
marking  was  made,  how the  questions  were  weighted,  how the  questions  about 
turban  were  relevant  to  competency  and  ability  and  whether  or  not  the  same 
questions were asked of each candidate.51
It  is  quite  possible  that  Singh's  later  emphasis  on  questions  of  due  process, 
transparency  and  fairness  were  the  only  way  he  could  reconcile  his  situation. 
Alternatively, this could be another dimension to Solomos and Back's (1995) analysis 
of  ethnic  minority  Conservative  candidates  in  Birmingham  who  engaged  with 
Conservative attempts to pluralise their composition by constructing ethnic minority 
candidates  according  to  a  nationalist  discourse  of  Britishness  rather  than  a 
particularist discourse of ethnicity, as 'One Nation Conservatism'.52 
Moreover, even if Singh's defection was more political expediency than ideological 
shift, it also highlighted the affinity amongst some sections of the Labour Party with 
Conservative  Party  values,  which  Solomos  and  Back  identified  as  including: 
51 See Gurcharan Singh's letter to The Southall Gazette published on 10th August 2007.
52 Solomos and Back also noted that the religious claims of ethnic minority candidates within 
the Conservative Party (namely the extension of blasphemy laws and faith based schools) met with 
varying responses but were notably pitched in universalist terms i.e. that existing provisions 
acknowledging Christianity should be extended to encompass all religions (1995: 164-165).
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individualism, freedom, choice, family values, aspirationalism, mobility, professional 
status, thrift, hard work and a colour-blind meritocratic philosophy (1995: 163-164). 
For sure, this is even more likely where ethnic minority professionals and members 
of business networks originally located within locally dominant Labour Parties begin 
to see Conservatives as a viable local force. Having interviewed Labour Councillor 
Swarn Singh Kang, I was struck by his particularly conservative values. The fact that 
he did not jump with the others when Sikhs were actively being recruited to the 
Conservative Party is both an indication of the security of his position inside Labour 
and ongoing uncertainty about  the perceived viability  of  Conservative support  in 
Southall. 
The potential  irony of  Singh and his cohort  taking their  particularist  claims to a 
political party associated with an assimilationist history on questions of multiculture 
and ethnic  diversity  was not  lost  on either  Virendra  Sharma or  the Conservative 
Councillor Anita Kapoor. Sharma could not contain his glee that the defection of 
these 5 Asian councillors in 2007 may have doubled Asian representation in the local 
Conservative Party but did not have any impact on the ethnic composition of the 
Conservative cabinet, which continued to comprise white men with the exception of 
one white woman. Yet Sharma invoked substantially different terms of analysis when 
it  came  to  women's  representation  within  the  local  Labour  Party.  Black 
representation  was  claimed as  the  logical  consequence  of  addressing the  balance 
between the numbers of black Labour Party members or activists and the numbers of 
black councillors and elected MPs. However, on the question of Sonika Nirwal's non-
selection for  the Ealing Southall  parliamentary seat  and the proposals  for an all-
women  shortlist,  Sharma  was  quick  to  point  out  that  'two  plus  two  does  not 
necessarily  equal  four  in  politics'.  Ultimately  he  claimed  that  outcomes  were 
determined  by  people's  investment  and  participation  in  the  party  and  the 
circumstances  at  the  time  of  selection.  From this,  men  dominate  Southall  party 
politics because they are present, they are involved and they are active. For cultural 
reasons, Sharma stated, women have been discouraged from going into politics. Also 
the combination of family responsibilities and the unsocial hours specifically acted 
against  Asian  women's  participation.  So  poor  levels  of  membership  or  activism 
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circumvented  Ealing  Labour  Group's  responsibility  to  ensure  women's 
representation. A similar line of argument was made for the particularly low numbers 
of Somali, Eritrean and other African men - they are recent arrivals, still settling in 
and only just beginning to participate in the political sphere. 
Nonetheless,  the  particular  patriarchal  bent  of  Labour  Party  politics  in  Southall 
definitely has not gone unnoticed. In some ways the intense public criticism of the 
local Labour Party after the non-selection of Sonika Nirwal and the rejection of an all 
women shortlist has lead to the revival of their Women's Section. At the 2010 local 
elections,  the  Labour  Party  stood  a  greater  number  of  women  than  they  had 
previously.53 There is also a high chance that the waning membership of the IWA in 
recent years, shifting relations with the SGSSS and the new lines of Conservative 
Party  support  had  something  to  do  with  the  diversification  of  Labour  Party 
candidates. 
Although her demands for women's political representation appear to fit better with 
the Labour Party's ideological framework, Councillor Anita Kapoor had partly joined 
the Conservative Party because of her opposition to the patriarchal Asian culture that 
dominated the local Ealing Southall Labour Party. Indeed she was particularly angry 
with Gurcharan Singh and his cohort being welcomed into the Conservative Party 
and spoke of their discriminatory practices: 
53 There is certainly a significant visible difference in the scale of ethnic diversity amongst local 
Labour Party representatives and the Conservative representatives but roughly the same proportion 
(one third) of women councillors. Of 40 Labour councillors elected in the London borough of Ealing 
in May 2010: 12 are women and 28 are men; 23 are ethnic minorities, reflecting a range of south 
Asian regional identities and religions and including Middle Eastern but only one African councillor. 
Of the 23 ethnic minority Labour councillors, 6 are women, all Asian women. Of 24 Conservative 
Party Councillors: 8 women and only 2 black minorities who are Anita Kapoor and her husband 
Ashok Kapoor. The other 15 are white men. 
Moreover, the current Labour Council Cabinet includes 3 women (1 of whom is Jasbir Anand 
who ran for selection for the parliamentary seat in 2007) and 3 ethnic minority men. Conversely, the 
2006-2010 Conservative Council Cabinet was all white male except for one white woman.
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I found them sexist, because we lost all our women. Instead of encouraging, if you 
think about it at this election there were only two Conservative women in the whole 
of Ealing Southall who fought as councillors, myself and this other English woman.  
And myself and this English woman are from my ward where I’m Chairman because 
I was adamant that I was going to make sure that two women were selected. The  
simple fact that here I am on the woman’s committee and I cannot achieve that was, 
what shall I say, it was a disgrace because I fought and I told them, and they didn’t  
listen, that we needed to make sure that in every ward we had a woman and that’s 
why the Labour people won, because a lot of women would not, knowing that the 
sexist decisions had been made didn’t work for us… If Gurcharan had not defected 
at the time of a by-election, if he had come across even when he didn’t, even when  
his own seat in the Labour Party was not threatened or not taken over by Virendra,  
which he did, then I would accept him.  And even then I accepted and helped all of  
them. But the shoddy way in which he treated some of our women members, as I  
said we lost them all, was unacceptable to me.  Because it’s not the type of Party that  
we are.
[Councillor Anita Kapoor, interviewed 18/07/10]
I am not certain how well evidenced these claims are about the nature of the local 
Conservative Party given the particularly poor representation of women within its 
leadership even before the defections. However, what is of relevance to this thesis is 
the  way  in  which  both  Singh  and  Kapoor  attached  their  respective  Sikh 
fundamentalist and feminist world-views to the fortunes of the Conservative Party, 
an unlikely ideological mate for either of them.
The Newham Story
Newham Council has been a Labour controlled borough for the best part of forty 
years. Labour councillors have enjoyed an easy dominance occupying upwards of 54 
of the council's 60 seats since 1982. Many of the key current councillors have been 
active within  the Labour Group since the  1980s and have held  council  seats  for 
between 10 to 20 years. They appear to have had a relatively consistent (albeit small) 
public mandate with between 25-35% of the electorate voting at local elections since 
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1978. Indeed in 2010 there was an unusually high turnout with 50.37% ushering in a 
full house of 60 Labour councillors as well as a directly elected Mayor from the 
Labour  Party.  Between  1964 and 2010,  Opposition  candidates  have  been  few in 
number with the Ratepayers and Residents Party taking 9 seats in the 1970s and the 
Social Democratic Liberal Party and the Liberal Focus Team Alliance managing a 
small dent in Labour dominance with 6 council seats in 1982. Moreover, Newham 
has been a safe Labour seat in parliamentary terms. Whilst boundary changes at the 
last election means there are now two Labour MPs for the borough rather than the 
usual three, the current Newham MPs Stephen Timms and Lyn Brown have been in 
office since 1994 and 2005 respectively. Lyn Brown inherited her seat from the late 
Labour MP Tony Banks who held it from 1997 until 2005. Since 1983 Newham's 
parliamentary candidates have enjoyed an electoral turnout of over 50% and large 
margins over other candidates. 
Arguably,  all  this  could  suggest  a  strong  mandate  for  the  local  Labour  group. 
However,  some interviewees painted an undemocratic  picture of  them, especially 
noting redundant Labour branches, a lack of grassroots activism, voter apathy and 
high levels of frustration over the absence of an effective and challenging opposition. 
Sarah  Ruiz,  herself  a  former  Labour  councillor,  discussed  the  lack  of  agency in 
selecting candidates and determining local priorities as one reason for the drop in 
local Labour Party support:
No, it’s not always been like this.  It’s because they’ve had any decision making 
taken away from them because unless they can be trusted to always vote for Robin 
or to always agree with Robin, then in actual fact he doesn’t even now allow wards 
to select their own candidates to stand for the council.  So if you were a member of a 
ward, if you were in the Labour Party and you regularly attended ward meetings, and 
tried to participate, and then were told yes, but you aren’t going to have any say in 
who your local ward councillor is, you would think well why not? 
[Sarah Ruiz, NVSC, 14/05/09]
These sentiments were echoed by other interviewees. Moreover, this lack of local 
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Labour Party democracy was thought to extend outwards to  a lack of autonomy, 
indeed decimation, of a potentially plural community and voluntary sector.  Newham 
Council's decamp from the frontline East Ham Town Hall to the remote Dockside 
1000  building  for  their  'back  room'  operations  is  thought  to  be  an  architectural 
reflection of these issues; there are very few private areas in the building preventing 
internal autonomy for council staff, the building is located some distance from local 
residents and there has been a distinct lack of accountability for this large capital 
expenditure in what is one of the poorest boroughs in London.54  
The borough's directly elected Mayor, Robin Wales, has been individually criticised 
for awarding himself a significant pay rise whilst simultaneously announcing job cuts 
and  reduced  salaries  for  local  authority  employees.  Of  note  are  the  multiple 
references  to  the  lack  of  political  opposition  to  these  proposals  from within  the 
Newham Labour Group.55 Mocking the authoritarian tendencies of Party structures 
and  particularly  the  absence  of  Opposition  in  Newham,  interviewees  referred  to 
Wales as 'The Dictator' and 'Our Dear Leader'. In a critique of central government 
calls  to  extend the  number  of  directly  elected  Mayors  across  the  country,  Kevin 
Blowe provided the following commentary about how power works in Newham:
If only many of us who live here in the borough had realised eight years ago what 
we were letting ourselves in for when only 26% of the population turned out to vote 
in the referendum for a directly elected mayor, there might have been some actual 
concerted campaigning in favour of a 'no' vote. For far from helping to improve local  
54 For a comment on the Dockside building see Kevin Blowe's piece Trade Award Brings 
Newham Council Excess to Wider Audience posted 28/10/10 at: 
http://www.blowe.org.uk/search/label/Newham
55 See Olympic Mayor Gives Himself Inflation-Busting Rise by Ted Jeory in The Daily Express 
newspaper dated 27/06/10 where Jeory claims: 'Sir Robin Wales, the mayor of Newham Council in 
east London, seized the four per cent rise this month, taking his salary to £81,029 a year.  His pay is 
now 34 per cent more than the £58,500 he received when he was directly elected mayor in 2002. Sir 
Robin’s decision to accept the rise came after he ordered cuts of £28million and as his staff face a 
two-year pay freeze.' Available at http://www.express.co.uk/posts/view/183369/Olympic-mayor-gives-
himself-inflation-busting-pay-rise 
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accountability, the direct election of our local mayor has seen the council turn into  
something akin to  an eighteenth-century monarchy.  For  all  intents  and purposes, 
Mayor Sir Robin Wales is Newham council. No substantive decisions can be made 
without him. But for an organisation the size of a local authority to function at all, 
many decisions must inevitably be made in his absence.  The result  is  that  every 
stratum of the council seeks to anticipate what the layer above might be thinking, all  
the  way  to  those  closest  to  the  brooding,  ill-tempered  and  unpredictable  ruler. 
Timidity  crushes  initiative,  fear  ingrains  institutional  inertia,  culminating  in  a 
mixture of incompetence and officiousness.56
Indeed both Kevin Blowe and Sarah Ruiz highlighted two particular developments in 
public policy and governance: the introduction of a directly elected Mayor and the 
new commissioning process that has replaced the older grant giving process. Both of 
these are new lines through which religious claims and identities can travel or, in the 
case  of  Newham,  comprise  potential  technologies  for  restricting  the  influence  of 
religion on public policy. Ruiz and Blowe pointed to the particular importance given 
to the vision of the directly elected Mayor and a commissioning process that has all 
but removed funding possibilities other than for a handful of large generic voluntary 
sector organisations. By extension, they argued, the council's contact with religious 
groups was viewed from a utilitarian perspective, as sources of low cost services, 
rather than as organisations tuned into or representing local needs. Moreover, this is 
characterised as the combined outcome of the Mayor's commitment to secularism 
and the marginalisation of those civil society organisations that represent potential 
critics. 
Importantly, within the last decade, Newham Labour Group's electoral monopoly has 
only been interrupted by two parties: the Christian Peoples Alliance and the Respect 
Party. For all intents and purposes, both of these have relied upon religious identities 
as  vote  banks  potentially  bringing  religion  to  the  fore  as  a  feature  of  electoral  
56 From Directly Elected Mayors - An Imaginary Letter to David Cameron  Posted on 2nd 
December 2009 at http://www.blowe.org.uk/search/label/Newham?updated-max=2010-05-
06T13%3A15%3A00%2B01%3A00&max-results=20
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Opposition and democratic critique. 
The onward march of Christianity?
In 2002, Alan Craig of the Christian Peoples Alliance (CPA) broke through eight 
years  of  Labour  Party  monopoly  by  winning one  council  seat  in  Canning  Town 
South.  In  2006,  the  CPA stood  20  candidates  at  the  local  council  elections  and 
managed  to  win  another  two  seats  for  Simeon  Ademolake  and  Denise  Stafford, 
capturing an entire ward in the south of the borough. 
The Christian Peoples Alliance emerged in 1999 out of the Movement for Christian 
Democracy, established in 1991 by three cross-party Christian MPs including David 
Alton who is best known for his opposition to abortion and euthanasia. The Christian 
Peoples Alliance website introduces them as 'a party rooted in the historic Christian 
faith that seeks to demonstrate the love of God through political service'.57  
Interviewed in 2009, Alan Craig estimated that the party had around 400 members 
though of course many more people had voted for him and other CPA candidates in 
Newham. He noted CPA's continuity with Christian Democratic parties that have a 
longer and wider presence across Europe, which were established before the Second 
World War as a reaction against the spread of anti clericalism. Similarly, Craig stated 
that  the CPA is  'a  response to  the  corrosive and aggressive  secularisation  of  our 
society and especially  of our public  life'  which CPA believes  'is  very harmful  to 
everybody'.
By 2010, however, all three CPA councillors had lost their seats. The CPA website 
suggested that the losses were more about the entrenchment of Labour Party support 
against a Conservative threat than about the unpopularity of CPA's politics amongst 
57 See http://www.cpaparty.org.uk/?page=about_us
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the British electorate.58 Interestingly, Alan Craig started out in electoral politics as a 
Conservative Party candidate and was predictably unsuccessful in a borough where 
the political landscape has been shaped by a united stand against the Conservative 
Party (Smith, 2010:162).
Moreover, in the wake of these defeats, the then Federal President David Campanale 
echoed the sentiment that opposition to 'corrosive and aggressive secularisation' is 
the defining characteristic of the Christian Peoples Alliance: 
Our team did all they could over years of faithful service to advance a Christian  
vision for Newham. But for many voters, jobs and livelihoods were at stake with the 
rise  of  David  Cameron.  Around the  country,  Christians  have chosen  to  vote  for 
parties that have backed laws which take Britain away from its history of religious 
freedom, conscience and morality. Every other European country has seen Christian 
Democrats emerge in response to the rise of secular intolerance and injustice.  In 
Britain, the CPA is but servants of the community and a voice for church teaching.  
With PR increasingly likely, it is up to Christian leaders to get smart about our post-
Christendom culture and where the CPA will fit into Britain's political landscape.59
Importantly, Alan Craig guarded against describing his interventions on local issues 
as  underpinned  by  a  literalist  commitment  to  Christianity  where  each  political 
position might  be referenced against  the bible.  Rather,  he emphasised the Party's 
commitment to generic principles such as social justice and protecting the poor. Of 
note was his  recognition of  the proximity between the  CPA political  project  and 
Cameron's  'compassionate  conservatism',  a  peculiar  mix  of  libertarian  and 
communitarian conceptions of the state where religion is charged with providing a 
58 In their own election analysis, Alan Craig commented: '…we could not resist the Labour 
tsunami of votes, as people voted all the way down the ballot paper for the party they see as the only 
defence against Conservative cuts.'  From Alan Craig and CPA Councillors Lose Seats in Newham 
Labour Tsunami Posted on 7/05/10 at http://www.cpaparty.org.uk/?page=news&id=348
59 See Alan Craig and CPA Councillors Lose Seats in Newham Labour Tsunami Posted on 
7/05/10 on CPA website at http://www.cpaparty.org.uk/?page=news&id=348
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strong moral framework. Yet there is a contradiction here between Craig's proximity 
to the Conservative ideology and Campanale's claim that in 2010 people voted for 
Labour as a protection against the Conservative Party rather than against the political 
project of the Christian Peoples Alliance. Indeed newspaper reports on the influence 
of the Christian Right on the current Conservative Party (through key figures in the 
Conservative Christian Fellowship and the Centre for Social  Justice) suggest that 
they  have  precisely  mobilised  votes  through evangelical  networks  to  usurp  local 
secular candidates.60 The same reports noted that evangelical churches have become 
an important source of black voters for the Conservative Party.61 Anecdotal accounts 
from Newham and Ealing suggest that new waves of Evangelical and Pentecostal 
churches  in  specific  parts  of  each  borough  also  comprise  the  vote  base  for  the 
Christian Peoples Alliance and the Christian Party.     
The CPA's strong values or ideological framework is set out in its aims, which are as 
follows:
From the first the Christian Peoples Alliance puts faith at the centre of politics. Our 
aim is to follow and fulfil these principles in British political life:
• Recognition of Christ's sovereignty over the nations and in politics.
• Respect of God's law as the basis for constitutional government and a stable 
60 See Secret Christian Donors Bankroll the Tories by Jamie Doward in The Observer on 
2/05/10 available at:
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/may/02/secret-christian-donors-bankroll-tories
And Christian Tories Rewrite Party Doctrine by Chris Cook in the Financial Times posted on 
12/02/10 and available at:
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/2/12400596-16ac-11df-aa09-00144feab49a.html#axzz1AJyjO0UY
61 See Tories and the New Evangelical Right by Andrew Brown posted on 10/05/10 in The 
Guardian available at:
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/andrewbrown/2010/may/10/evangelical-religion-
toryconservatives
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society.
• Reconciliation  among  nations,  races,  religions,  classes,  gender  and 
communities.
• Respect for human life given by God.
• Social Justice to address wrongs and provide restitution to the wronged.
• Careful economic stewardship of God's creation.
• Commitment to the fairness of markets and patterns of exchange.
• Peacemaking, by addressing the causes of wars.
• Open, transparent government, which subjects itself to debate and critique.62
There is a distinction to be made between religion as a motivating force for political 
engagement and the imposition of beliefs that carries parallels with Clara Connolly's 
distinction  between  'Christian  in  form'  and  'Christian  in  fact'  (1990:3).  The 
interpretation of some of these CPA objectives leaves little to the imagination but 
their founding document, the Mayflower Declaration63, offers the following detail: 
CPA views justice as 'ultimately founded in the character of God and its content is 
62 See the homepage of the Christian Peoples Website at:
 http://www.cpaparty.org.uk/?page=about_us
63 It is noteworthy that Mayflower was the name of the ship that transported the Pilgrims from 
Plymouth in England to Plymouth in USA in the 1600s. This reference invokes a close connection 
between Christianity, persecution or anti establishment, and colonisation. Coincidentally, the politics 
of the Christian Peoples Alliance bears affinity with the Plymouth Brethren. Albeit a distinct political 
formation that emerged in 1800s in Dublin and eventually took off in Plymouth, they were also 
conservative Evangelists and part of a right wing Christian mobilisation, which in 1980s lobbied to 
extend Thatcherite education policies by pushing religious arguments about parental choice to 
withdraw children from sex education classes and also assimilationist arguments about the primacy of 
Christian worship. Indeed, after he was voted out of office in 2010, Alan Craig went to work for 
Baroness Caroline Cox who infact had been part of this particular religio-political alliance fronted by 
the Plymouth Brethren in the 1980s.
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given by divine law'; they 'regard all life as subject to the rule of Christ'; CPA is 
opposed to the 'destruction of the unborn' and this is given as one example of the 
ways  in  which  'our  nation  has  failed  to  live  as  God  requires';  and  science  and 
technology are included in the 'mistaken beliefs to which we have succumbed and 
idols before which we have bowed'.64 
Greg Smith, the local chronicler of faith in politics, noted that Alan Craig's electoral 
success in Newham emerged from his involvement in a local tenants’ and residents’ 
association and a critique of estate renewal schemes. In my own interviews I found 
that  Craig's  contribution  to  local  politics  was  referenced  against  four  particular 
issues:  opposition  to  the  redevelopment  of  the  Queen's  Market  in  Upton  Park; 
opposition to proposals to establish a large Casino in East Ham; a campaign against 
the construction of a Tablighi Jamaat mosque complex at the Temple Mills site in 
West  Ham;  and  attempts  to  initiate  a  council  debate  on  sexual  orientation  and 
reproductive  rights.  In  short,  the  first  two  issues  won  the  CPA a  great  deal  of 
recognition amongst  local  civil  society actors,  placing  them at  the  forefront  of  a 
critical voice opposing the hegemonic implementation of New Labour policies and 
the weight of corporations in an area where local people suffer multiple forms of 
deprivation.65 
64 The Mayflower Declaration: Christian Democratic Values for Society by The Christian 
People's Alliance available at http://www.cpaparty.org.uk/?page=about_us
65 This emphasis on speaking up for the poor, unwaged and low waged is a consistent thread in 
the literature of the Christian parties. It is also reflected in David Campanale's (the Federal President 
of the CPA) participation in an anti cuts meeting in Kingston (as a trade unionist representative of the 
National Union of Journalists) where he emphasised the role of church leaders in speaking up against 
government policy that meant 'cuts were falling disproportionately on those least able to bear them' 
and emphasised the need for ‘a just deficit reduction strategy (that would) instead be borne by those 
with the broadest shoulders’. See Call for Churches to Combat Government Cuts and Join Striking 
Workers posted on 22/09/11 at: http://www.cpaparty.org.uk/?page=news&id=392
Also reflected in The Christian Party's demand to 'stop taxing the poor: no tax or N.I. for the 
low waged' as per the 2010 election campaign leaflet for Mehboob Ali, Ealing Southall prospective 
parliamentary candidate for The Christian Party. 
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Class as category is important here because the Christian Peoples Alliance carried the 
upper hand over the local (New Labour) Labour Group. At a very instinctive level 
the CPA were positioned on the side of valuing local people over the interests of big 
business  and  even  over  the  command  structure  of  the  local  Labour  Group  who 
mobilised support from New Labour at the Centre in order to push through the casino 
plans. When it came to the vote on the casino, the Christian Socialists within the 
Newham Labour Group abstained (on the basis of conscience) rather than voice their 
objections least of all vote against their political party, reinforcing the undemocratic 
characterisation  of  the  Labour  leadership.  On  the  Queens  Market,  a  sustained 
campaign  by  the  Friends  of  Queens  Market  highlighted  the  intersection  of 
multicultural and working class heritage and were eventually vindicated through the 
intervention of the Conservative Mayor of London, Boris Johnson. Indeed the CPA 
applauded their own role in the Queens Market victory and brought this together with 
a  critique  of  rational  bureaucracy  and  exploitative  capital.  The  following  extract 
shows  that  Craig  positions  Labour  Mayor  Robin  Wales'  'values-free'  leadership 
against the strong values of the Christian Peoples Alliance:
The value-free managerialism that Sir Robin offers is selfish, dry-as-dust and takes  
no account of local and vulnerable people - as we have seen at queens market and  
the Canning Town housing regeneration project. CPA on the other hand stands with 
the marginalised and speaks up for community- and family-oriented values. Unlike 
the Mayor,  we would never bulldoze an invaluable diverse community asset like 
queens market in favour of a bog-standard ruthless grasping WalMart Asda.66
However, the CPA's perspective on the construction of a Tablighi Jamaat mosque and 
on  sexual  freedoms  lost  them  potential  allies.  Whilst  this  would  enforce  Judith 
Butler's (2008) argument that struggles against racism carry an affinity with struggles 
for sexual freedom, interviewees raised concerns about the CPA's views on Islam 
66 See Newham mayor's attack on Christian Peoples Alliance success: “He is lashing out 
blindly at something” posted on 15/05/06 at:
http://www.cpaparty.org.uk/index.php?page=news&id=208&highlight=queens%20market
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(very close to the racist populism of Christian Democrats across Europe) far more 
frequently than concerns about their stance on sexual orientation and reproductive 
rights. Moreover, CPA's dual interests in the Tablighi Jamaat mosque and sexuality 
presented obvious contradictions. Questions of women's rights, segregation, dissent 
and rule of law were central to the CPA's critique of the Tablighi Jamaat and the 
council's  decision  to  back  their  proposals.  Yet  CPA simultaneously  stood against 
sexual  freedoms  and  invoked  a  strong  gendered  morality  as  part  of  their  own 
Christian  political  identity.  Interestingly,  the  CPA's  cutting  edge  critique  of  the 
impact of regeneration on poor local people recently collapsed into an assault on 
women's  reproductive  rights.  In  November  2011,  Alan  Craig  joined  a  multifaith 
picket  outside  the  Newham  offices  of  the  British  Pregnancy  Advisory  Service 
(BPAS) in Stratford. His statement levelled the following accusations:
BPAS has  become  a  large  money  spinning  business.  This  centre  is  commercial 
opportunism to take advantage of Westfield Stratford City and the Olympics. BPAS 
have an interest in doing as many abortions as possible.67
Similarly,  in  Ealing,  the  CPA's  allies,  The Christian  Party,  focused their  election 
literature on: opposition to contraceptive advice and sex education in schools as a 
'relentless  quest  to  undermine  parents  and  impose  a  new  morality  upon  school 
children'68; 'a call for the end to the 40 year abortion holocaust and campaign for the 
recognition of the human rights of the unborn child'69; and 'stop sex education for 
five year olds'70. Suzanne Fernandes, an ethnic minority woman from Northfields, 
had been jointly supported by the Christian Peoples Alliance and the Christian Party 
67 See Drawing All Faiths Together - Against Sexual Freedom posted 8/11/11 to:
http://paulstott.typepad.com/i_intend_to_escape_and_co/2011/11/drawing-all-faiths-together-against-
sexual-freedom.html 
68 Extract from Suzanne Fernandes' pre-election statement to The Ealing Gazette as part of their 
special election focus Small Parties, Big Voices dated 30/04/10. 
69 Extract from 2007 by-election campaign leaflet for Yaqub Masih, Ealing Southall prospective 
parliamentary candidate for The Christian Party.
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to  run  for  the  European  Elections  in  2009  and  then  stood  as  the  Prospective 
Parliamentary Candidate for the Christian Party in Ealing Central and Acton in 2010. 
However, straight after the May 2010 elections she defected from the Christian Party 
and joined David Miliband's Movement for Change. She spoke candidly about her 
involvement with the Elim Pentecostal Church and Christian Centre in Northfields. 
She  gave  as  the  reasons  for  her  defection  a  jarring  contradiction  between  her 
commitment  to  both  religious  /  cultural  pluralism  and  a  welfare  state  with  the 
Christian Party's anti-Muslim views and sense of Christian superiority. She did not 
express a change of heart or reservations on questions of morality, family, sexuality 
and sex education.71 
In Newham, it was largely the members of the Christian Socialist Movement that 
spoke out against Craig's views on sexuality but first I want to note the difficulty 
with Alan Craig's claims about secular imposition and the absence of Christianity 
from the public square. Actually Christianity and other religious commitments live 
comfortably  within  the  Newham  Labour  Group.  In  2000,  Greg  Smith  (2010) 
compiled information about the religious affiliations of local councillors and listed 
12 of them as Christian, 5 as Sikh, 9 as Muslim, 1 as Hindu and 1 as Jewish. The 
religious affiliation of another 29 councillors was unknown, 2 were listed as secular 
and only 1 as atheist. Amongst these were a Baptist Deacon, a Christian lay reader, a 
Christian priest, a Sikh gurdwara committee member, a mosque leader and a mosque 
president. However, Smith did make an important distinction between the Christians 
in politics that are 'motivated individually by beliefs and values which centre  on 
service to the whole community' and 'politicians from other faith communities (who) 
are more likely to be cast in a role as communal representative' (2010: 157).  72 The 
70 Extract from 2010 election campaign leaflet for Mehboob Ali, Ealing Southall prospective 
parliamentary candidate for The Christian Party.
71 Interviewed 16/09/10.
72 Greg Smith is a strong advocate of religion in the public sphere and of faith-based 
community organising. Smith and I come to our work from different starting points: his view is that 
there has been a secularisation of normative political practice whereas I start from the claim that there 
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latter has some bearing on the discussion in the next section on Muslims and the 
Respect Party. 
In 2009, my own research found that 17 Newham councillors listed an affiliation to 
or  membership  of  a  religious  organisation  in  their  declaration  of  interests.  By 
October 2011 this number had fallen significantly to 5 partly because the Respect 
Party, Independent and Christian Peoples Alliance councillors were voted out in May 
2010. Still, the interviews and informal discussions suggested that at least another 10 
councillors from this list had active links with one religious organisation or more in 
the borough.73 The point is that these affiliations do not manifest in the manner that 
Alan Craig would like to see them.
One important element of Newham's history is the presence of the Christian Socialist 
Movement (CSM). Both the Newham MPs and three local councillors with Cabinet 
positions are involved in the Newham branch of the CSM. It is quite possible that the 
Newham branch of the CSM was revived in lieu of Tony Blair's faith agenda or as a 
response to the local emergence of the Christian Peoples Alliance. Interviewees that 
were involved with the CSM made clear distinctions between themselves and the 
Christian People's Alliance noting three particular points of discord: a preference for 
has been a de-secularisation of relations between communities and the state. His objective has been to 
demonstrate that New Labour and its local manifestations are engaged in downplaying the role of 
religion in public life and to raise concerns about the effacement of theological content in politics. His 
suggestion is that religious organisations play an active part in democratic processes but their 
contribution is not acknowledged and should be strengthened.
73 Neither Greg Smith's nor my own counting mechanisms were particularly rigorous, as both 
involved an interpretation of religious organisations referred to on a civic document (the declaration of 
interests) supplemented with points made during informal discussions. Indeed, Smith appears to have 
assumed religious activity or representation where religion could have been narrated as a cultural 
identity. Moreover, religious affiliation and secularism are not mutually exclusive categories in the 
way that Smith appears to count them. There is nothing preventing someone with religious identity or 
links with a place of worship to also ascribe to a secular view of public policy or politics and vice 
versa. 
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mainstream  rather  than  religious  identity  politics;  positions  on  sexuality  and 
abortion; and racism. 
On  the  question  of  religious  identity  politics,  Stephen  Timms  MP distinguished 
between his religious beliefs as procuring an interest in doing politics in general and 
manifesting one's religious identity as membership of a religious political party:
Well I've always been a supporter of the Labour Party and the starting point for my 
politics has been my Christian faith, that's kind of how I've always thought about my 
political convictions, coming out of faith, has always seemed to me to be the Labour 
Party. And I think it is a complete cul-de-sac for say Christians to go off, as I said, in 
a little holy huddle of their own. It seems to me that Christians ought to be involved 
in  the  mainstream.  And if  you want  to  have an impact,  if  you want  to  have an 
influence, that's where you should be. Not kind of refusing to work with people who 
don't share your faith, but gladly working with them. So I've never seen a strong case 
for a separatist Christian Party at all.
[Stephen Timms, MP for East Ham, 11/12/09]
Of  course  there  is  a  significant  difference  between  identifying  problems  with 
religious  political  parties  as  immersed  in  a  deep-seated  identity  politics  and  as 
separatist by nature on the one hand and taking issue with them for not engaging with 
the mainstream on the other. The former is a question of ontology and the latter is a  
question of  tactics.  It  is  clear  from above that  the  CPA have not  been averse to 
alliances with others that share the same campaign specific objectives. Two other 
CSM members focussed on the ontological issues. One stated:  
And we continue to do this, our community representational role is for those of all  
faiths  and  none,  whatever  our  own  religious  affiliation,  however  strongly  felt,  
cultural, that is to our individuals. We stand as Labour Party people; we don’t stand 
as a Muslim Labour Party member or a Sikh. I mentioned those religious affiliations 
but I am convinced that we have moved a long way and my colleagues, if they were 
all  being  interviewed  by  you,  will  say  about  the  'Labour  Programme',  not  'My 
Community Programme'. Does that make sense? And I don’t think we need to look 
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too far away to find where there are various different types of Labour Parties which 
have segregated themselves clearly on different structures. Do you know to which I  
refer?
No. Tower Hamlets?
(Nodding his head) we want to avoid the danger of over identification of political  
processes with religious groups, does that make sense?
[Newham Councillor, 2/12/09]
This could be read in a number of different ways: either as form, as a preferred badge 
of allegiance, or as content, distinguishing between specific values. If this particular 
interviewee had not been making a point about different types of Labour Groups then 
his point about being Labour rather than CPA or any other religious political party 
might have provided a stronger contrast. Importantly other interview extracts project 
a far more significant distinction along the line of values. In particular, whilst the 
CPA refer to themselves as Christian Democrats, members of the Christian Socialist 
Movement are very clear that this means a distinctly undemocratic fundamentalism. 
For instance, Councillor Clive Furness stated the following:
The founding document for the CPA is called the Mayflower Declaration and within 
it there is a very telling phrase. Now I am not quoting it exactly so you'd need to  
look at the Mayflower Declaration but it is something like um, "promoting Christian 
values  as  we  understand  them".  And  at  one  sense  that's  an  entirely  innocuous 
statement because all any of us can ever do is promote the values as we understand 
them but for them it's a founding principle that they are promoting Christian values 
as they understand them and they have tended to be on the more conservative side of 
interpretation.  So it's  not  even though they call  themselves  Christian their  social  
values are actually the social values of a very conservative section of the Christian 
church.
[Councillor Clive Furness, 16/09/09]
The Councillor Revd. Quintin Peppiatt, a Cabinet member that holds the portfolio for 
127
Children  and  Young  People  but  is  also  a  member  of  the  Christian  Socialist 
Movement,  Watch (the Campaign for Women Bishops) and the Lesbian and Gay 
Christian Movement, raised a different point of distinction. He highlighted shared 
interests  on regeneration and poverty (he and Craig were equally opposed to the 
construction of a casino in Newham) but significantly divergent views on same sex 
relationships and abortion. 
It  was  more  common for  Newham interviewees to  distance  themselves  from the 
Christian  Peoples  Alliance  on  the  grounds  of  racism.  For  instance,  Councillor 
Furness stated the following about the CPA:
What they are trying to do is a question you will have to ask them but I interpreted  
that as a move to shore up their white racist vote, that's how I interpreted it. Now 
they may have another explanation but I think there was a lot of prejudice about east 
Europeans in the way in which before then there was prejudice against Africans and  
before then about Bengalis and then Pakistanis, prejudice, the focus of the prejudices  
changes time. East Europeans are this month's flavour and it was seeking to shore up 
the  prejudice  vote  by  saying  we're  on  your  side  against  these  nasty  eastern 
Europeans that are coming in and taking all your houses, they stop your children 
getting houses. That was never spoken but that was the implication. 
[Councillor Clive Furness, 16/09/09]
Indeed Alan Craig was very aware of the impossibility of a united Opposition voice 
between the Newham councillors from the predominantly Muslim Respect Party and 
the Christian People's  Alliance.  He connected this  to Respect taking 'quite strong 
exception' to the CPA's campaign against what he refers to as the 'Olympic Mega 
Mosque'. The way in which 'race', gender and a critique of regeneration collected 
together  in  the CPA discursive terrain could be understood as  the enfolding of a 
contemporary  nationalist  rhetoric  (Britishness,  civilisational  discourse  and  human 
rights) with an emphasis on marriage and family into a peculiarly localised variant of 
communitarian nostalgia.
128
There  is  some  level  of  irony  here.  Whilst  other  Christian  mobilisations  in  the 
borough -  the Faith  Sector  Forum, Faithful  Friends,  Transform and the Christian 
Socialist  Movement  -  are  white-led,  the  Christian  Peoples  Alliance  has  had  a 
significant number of black faces at its helm. Its previous leader was the South Asian 
millionaire businessman Ram Gidoomal. One of the elected candidates for Canning 
Town Ward was the African Simeon Ademolake. Indeed several interviewees noted 
that the CPA base depended upon the particularly conservative African churches in 
the borough. The CPA discourse is not about ethnic minorities per se but rather hones 
in on characterising Islam as an inegalitarian ideology. This is particularly clear in 
their support for south Asian Christians organising against blasphemy legislation and 
religious persecution in Pakistan.
The Iraq War and the Respect Party
In spite of this lack of unity amongst the Opposition, the 2006 local election created 
a fissure in Labour Party dominance in the area.  Both the Respect Party and the 
Christian  People's  Alliance  made  gains  from a  significant  anti  war  mobilisation. 
Whilst not matching the media frenzy or antics of George Galloway's campaign in 
the neighbouring borough of Tower Hamlets74, a number of interviewees referred to 
the immense excitement and energy of the period 2004-2006. There was a sense that 
the anti war mobilisation carried with it the prospect of breaking a local Labour Party 
monopoly and of giving rise to a viable Left opposition. In 2006, the Respect Party 
stood a councillor in every single ward of Newham as well as a Mayoral candidate. A 
number of people rescinded their membership of the Labour Party and a few became 
74 See Camilla Bassi, 2001; Sarah Glynn, 2002 and 2010; Richard Phillips, 2008 and Michael 
Whine, 2005 for insights into the Respect Party campaign including: its attempts to consolidate 
Muslim participation at the anti war demonstrations; the entirely pragmatic relationship between the 
Socialist Workers Party and the Muslim Association of Britain where political principles were 
jettisoned to create the veneer of a 'radical' alternative; the process for accommodating MAB's 
expectations for engagement; the desire to transfer Muslim demography into a Respect vote in areas 
with large Muslim populations; and the rationale for selecting Tower Hamlets as the site for George 
Galloway's campaign specifically because of the combination of a pro war Blairite sitting MP, a 
sizeable Muslim population and the availability of local Islamist partners.
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actively involved in the Newham branch of the Respect Party.75 Reflections on this 
political  moment  are  as  revealing  for  the  way  in  which  religion  and  religious 
identities  are  engaged  in  the  pursuit  of  politics  as  they  are  about  the  internal 
workings of each of the political parties. One interviewee claimed that she was the 
only  Newham Labour  councillor  to  go  against  Whip  action  during  the  council's 
debate on Iraq. She knew that the consequences of defying the Whip were to be 
pushed out of her seat and so she resigned. 
In  hindsight,  some  members  of  the  Newham  Labour  Group  have  been  able  to 
downplay  the  scale  and  intensity  of  the  anti  war  mobilisation  because  of  the 
subsequent  demise  of  the  Respect  Party.  However,  several  interviewees 
acknowledged the impact of the Iraq war on the local Muslim view of the Labour 
Party. Stephen Timms MP for East Ham, for instance, stated the following:
Essentially Respect drew almost all of its support from the Muslim community in 
Newham, very little support outside the Muslim community. And my reading of it at 
the time was that probably, two thirds of my Muslim constituents who voted, voted 
Respect, one third voted for me. So that was clearly quite a telling development I 
thought and a very big change in what happened in the 2001 election. I hope, well as 
I understand it, there will not be a Respect candidate standing in this constituency in 
2010. I obviously hope that many of those who voted Respect last time, will vote, 
many Muslims, will choose to vote Labour this time.
What’s the connection between Iraq, the Respect mobilisation in Newham and 
Muslims voting for them?  
It's very close, I think it’s a very close identification that there was a lot of – there 
75 In April 2003, Red Pepper magazine reported that the Labour Party membership had 
'plummeted from a high of 405,000 following the 1997 election, to just over 272,000. Anecdotal 
evidence suggests that since then, resignations have been trickling in, while a whole lot more subs 
haven't been renewed.' See Weapons for Blair's Destruction by Natasha Grzincic available at: 
http://www.redpepper.org.uk/Weapons-for-Blair-s-destruction/
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were very, very strong feelings in the Muslim community that the UK should not 
have invaded Iraq.  Many people presenting it as an attack on Islam because it’s a  
Muslim country and people did see it very much in religious terms that this was the  
UK attacking Islam.  And you know, I think there were calls in the mosques for  
people to object to what the British government had been doing and therefore vote 
against the Labour Party in the General Election… I think the Respect mobilisation 
was the electoral manifestation of the anti War mobilisation.  But it’s interesting, I  
mean one of the recollections from the 2005 Election campaign was that I spoke to a 
Hindu community organisation and I was commended, in the introduction that was 
made of my contribution for the fact that I supported the invasion of Iraq. 
[Stephen Timms MP for East Ham, 11/12/09]
This extracts reveals the way in which a number of processes coalesced around the 
question of Iraq including: the reconfiguration of Islam in Britain as a source of 
political critique; the mainstreaming of Islamist projections of the invasion of Iraq as 
a Muslim issue76; and the local impact on politicians that sided with Tony Blair.
For all intents and purposes the Respect Party in Newham relied on a Muslim vote 
bank around the Green Street and Forest Gate area. By the time of the local elections 
76 The situation is rife with contradictions and certainly not as simplistic as that projected 
within Islamist claims about the occupation of 'Muslim lands'. Firstly, the object of Blair's vilification, 
Saddam Hussein, was a staunch secularist and part of a generation of post-colonial rulers (including 
the Egyptian Hosni Mubarak and the Libyan Mu'ammar Gaddafi) that opposed Islamist movements. 
Moreover, Hussein perpetuated a violent confrontational relationship with the neighbouring Shia 
theocracy in Iran. It was the head of the Iranian government, Ayatollah Khomeini that incited 
international mobilisation against Salman Rushdie in turn fuelling a new wave of Muslim political 
identities in Britain. Ironically, the British and US invasion of Iraq in 2003 increased the space for 
Islamist factions to garner power and define the geographical region as a Muslim territory. Moreover, 
whilst the then head of the Muslim Association of Britain, Anas Altikriti, joined forces with the Stop 
the War Coalition's campaign against New Labour's war in Iraq, his father, Usama Altikriti (also the 
head of the Iraqi Muslim Brotherhood) was hand picked by the US government to join the post 
invasion interim government in Iraq. Importantly, the cost of such political machinations is 
particularly borne by women who were claimed by Blair as his subjects of liberation and yet whose 
rights were traded away in post invasion negotiations for the introduction of religious laws. 
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in  2006,  three  Muslim  councillors  defected  from  the  Labour  Group  to  run  for 
Respect  and  managed  to  capture  the  Green  Street  West  ward,  the  heart  of  the 
Pakistani  and Bangladeshi  Muslim population  in  the  borough.  However,  a  closer 
look at the political trajectory of one of the defectors, AK Sheikh, reveals that in the 
context  of  contemporary  electoral  politics,  religion  can  be  welded  to  existing 
resentments or act as a means of articulating political ambitions. 
AK Sheikh  was  first  elected  as  a  Labour  Party  councillor  alongside  three  other 
Muslim candidates in 1990. It would be fair to suggest that the timing was no mere 
coincidence - ethnic minority political activism was applying pressure on the Labour 
Party through the Labour Party Black Sections but also as Muslim identity politics, 
with the latter  being shaped by Islamist  mobilisations against  Salman Rushdie in 
1989 and the first Gulf War in 1991. AK Sheikh's colleagues - Shama Ahmad, Riaz 
Ahmad and the ex councillor Zulfikar Ali - were particularly vocal during the 1990s 
in making demands for the recognition of specific 'Muslim needs' for services and a 
Muslim centre. Such demands comprised a new feature for a borough historically 
marked by anti racist mobilisation under the all-encompassing political term 'black' 
(NMP/CARF, 1991).  By the mid 1990s, Councillor Shama Ahmad in particular was 
opposing moves to establish a secular Asian women's centre and rather lobbying for a 
Muslim  women's  centre.77 AK  Sheikh  and  Zulfikar  Ali  founded  the  Alliance  of 
Newham Muslim Associations, which affiliated to the Muslim Council  of Britain 
(MCB).  Until  very  recently  the  MCB was  the  main  platform for  New Labour's 
consultation with Muslims but derided for its  connections with the Islamic Right 
political party Jamaat-e-Islami. 
AK  Sheikh's  trajectory  is  interesting.  Even  after  he  was  voted  out  as  a  local 
councillor, he continued both inside the state and also in opposition through various 
77 The demand for some kind of Muslim centre, as an Islamic Cultural or Heritage Centre, 
continues in the borough and is particularly being pushed by two Muslim women councillors. One of 
the reasons for this could be a search for new spaces that can be developed away from established 
sites of male Muslim power.
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consultation processes and networks discussed in Chapter 4.  At a public  meeting 
organised by Islamic Circles on 4/11/10, I observed the level of pressure that Sheikh 
must  have  been under  from some local  Muslim constituents  during the  anti  war 
mobilisation.  One might argue that being seen as a 'Muslim' representative rather 
than a political party representative is an inevitable outcome if you are the Lifelong 
Secretary General of the largest alliance of Muslim groups in the borough and you 
establish a position as a representative on this basis. However, in an interview with 
him before he lost his seat in May 2010, he spoke of a confluence of issues as the 
steer for his personal path. He did not position religion as a main feature but rather 
his comments pointed to 'Muslim' as a political identity and to the faith agenda as a  
source for critiquing the local Labour Group. He certainly was interested to represent 
his anti Iraq war constituents but this was only part of the reason for his defection. 
The Iraq invasion shined a spotlight on the lack of internal Labour Party democracy. 
At that moment in particular, the Blairite leadership style and command structure at 
the heart of the New Labour project became over-determined at  the local Labour 
Party level. Moreover, Sheikh pointed to the Newham Mayor's temporary interest in 
faith groups and in parity arguments and how this was later dropped. Given Sheikh's 
role in the Faith Sector Forum during the same period as his defection from Labour 
to  Respect,  this  obligation  on  the  local  Labour  Party  to  engage  in  faith-based 
consultation may have created an unmet expectation and the space for additional 
grievance. Indeed, this is an instance in which the logic of the faith agenda being 
pushed by central government since the early days of New Labour came back to bite 
the local Newham Labour Group.
At a parliamentary elections level, however, the impact on Stephen Timms' electoral 
margin was much smaller than expected given the correlation between the size of 
Muslim populations and Respect Party support. Part of Timms' ability to surpass this 
electoral threat was no doubt connected to the dominant view of him as a politician 
with  integrity.  It's  also  possible  that  his  faith  background  and  his  gender  were 
contributory  factors.  Timms  noted  that  the  Respect  Party's  mobilisation  in  the 
mosques  was  not  'universally  successful'.  Timms'  own  political  career  had  been 
encouraged by some local mosques so his established links with religious groups in 
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the  borough  could  have  served  him  well  during  this  period.  Moreover,  in 
neighbouring Tower Hamlets, a whispering campaign about the 'loose' and 'immoral' 
character of the Labour Party MP Oona King was an integral part of the particularly 
dirty fight for the Bethnal Green and Bow seat. Timms seems to have been protected 
from such tactics perhaps also because of the absence of a central fundamentalist 
body in Newham whilst in Tower Hamlets the prolific activities of the Jamaat-e-
Islami groupings were significant players in the Respect Party campaign. 
Importantly, those that gained the Green Street ward in 2006 appear to have fallen on 
their swords. Two out of three of them left the Respect Party soon after being elected 
and became Independent  councillors.  They recently  attempted  to  rejoin  the  local 
Labour Group but were denied re-admission and there are signs that this has left 
them without local legitimacy.78 In the meantime, the Iraq War has thrown up another 
political  stage  in  the  recruitment  of  potential  Muslim  allies.  The  latest  Muslim 
Labour councillors now appear to be affiliated to two key groups -  the Newham 
Muslim Citizens Association and the Indian Muslim Federation.
 
Nonetheless, the secular Labour Group continues to negotiate the unfinished business 
of previous rounds of Muslim recruitment during similar periods of political turmoil. 
Moreover,  several  councillors  expressed  concerns  about  the  neighbouring  Tower 
Hamlets  Labour  Group  where  an  internal  investigation  into  allegations  that 
councillors  and  council  officers  were  heavily  influenced  by  the  fundamentalist 
Islamic Forum of Europe led to the dismissal of the Chief Executive Officer, Lutfur 
Ali,  and the Leader of the council,  Lutfur Rahman.79 However,  a groundswell  of 
78 The local newspaper reported that on the run up to the 2010 local elections, one of the ex 
Respect/Independent councillors, Hanif Abdulmuhit, was pelted with eggs and accused of being a 
traitor. See Labour man is hit with eggs by Eleanore Robinson in The Newham Recorder, 28/04/10.
79 See Islamists are crushed in Tower Hamlets by Andrew Gilligan posted on 11/05/10 in the 
Telegraph and available at:
http://blogs.telegraph.co.uk/news/andrewgilligan/100039244/islamists-are-crushed-in-tower-hamlets/
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support  for  Rahman,  mobilised  largely  by  the  Jamaat-e-Islami  and  Muslim 
Brotherhood alliance through the Islamic Forum of Europe, the East London Mosque 
and the London Muslim Centre, ensured that he retained and indeed increased his 
control over the borough's resources by becoming its first directly elected Mayor.80 In 
the aftermath of both Respect and the Andrew Gilligan expose of the fundamentalist 
links to the council81, the outgoing Respect Party parliamentary candidate for Bethnal 
Green  and  Bow,  Abjol  Miah,  highlighted  the  paradox  of  Muslim  political 
participation:
"When they say the mosques are infiltrating the political parties I think that's totally 
outrageous," he says.  "It's  the  politicians  who go round to the mosque trying to 
poach voters. Which councillor hasn't gone round to the mosque to beg for votes? 
They all do, irrespective of whether they're Muslims or not." The Respect Party, he 
says, is simply doing what politicians have been asking the Muslim community to 
do:  engage in  the  political  process.  "For the last  15 years,  politicians have been 
demanding that the Muslim community engages with the political process," Mr Miah 
says. "For years we've been called isolationist, backward, separatist and ghettoist. 
But when we do engage we're labelled fundamentalists. We wanted to engage and 
get involved in electoral politics. And that's what we did. And now the old parties are  
terrified because we've broken their chains."82
80 Indeed thanks to the IFE/ELM/LMC mobilisation, Lutfur Rahman has managed to increase 
his personal salary to £75,000 a year and now has direct control over the council's budget, in the 
region of £1.1 billion per annum.
81 See Radicals with hands on the levers of power: the takeover of Tower Hamlets by Andrew 
Gilligan posted on 28/02/10 and available at:
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/labour/7333537/Radicals-with-hands-on-the-levers-of-
power-the-takeover-of-Tower-Hamlets.html
82 Extract from Jerome Taylor's piece Respect, Religion and the battle for Tower Hamlets in The 
Independent newspaper on 28/04/10 and available at:
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/respect-religion-race-and-the-battle-for-tower-
hamlets-1956154.html
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I would argue that Newham Labour Group's anxieties about Tower Hamlets dynamic 
extending into the borough are not entirely misplaced. The East London Mosque 
recently joined forces with Left activists to extend their reach into Newham through 
dual  mobilisations:  against  public  spending cuts  and against  the English Defence 
League. Also, at  an Islamic Circles public meeting in November 2010, there was 
some push (from a handful of Hizb-Ut-Tahrir sympathisers) for the establishment of 
one  definitive  mosque  as  the  base  of  Muslim  representation  in  the  borough,  to 
replicate the central and influential position of the East London Mosque in Tower 
Hamlets. 
Moreover, 21-year-old Roshonara Choudhry, a young Bangladeshi woman from East 
Ham,  ensured  that,  even  after  a  change  of  government,  the  spectre  of  Iraq  and 
international Islamist mobilisations continue to cast a shadow over local politics.  In 
November 2010, Choudhry was convicted of attempting to murder the MP Stephen 
Timms. She admitted carrying out the attack as her way of avenging the murder of 
Iraqis. She would have been just 14 years old when Timms cast his vote in support of 
Tony Blair's decision to invade Iraq. 
Excerpts from police transcripts of an interview with Choudhry reveal that in her 
teens she had met Timms on a college trip to Westminster but had remained silent 
whilst he was challenged on Iraq by one of the other female students.83 Choudhry 
went on to become a prize-winning student at King's College and worked weekends 
at  a  local  Muslim  school  to  support  her  poor  family  and  others  from deprived 
backgrounds.84 In November 2009 she started downloading lectures by the American 
83 See Roshonara Choudhry: Police Interview Extracts by Vikram Dodd published in The 
Guardian newspaper on 3/11/10 and available at:
http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2010/nov/03/roshonara-choudhry-police-interview?INTCMP=SRCH
84 See Profile: Roshonara Choudhry by Vikram Dodd published in The Guardian newspaper on 
2nd November 2010 and available at:
http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2010/nov/02/profile-roshonara-choudhry-stephen-timms?
136
Yemeni preacher Anwar Al Awlaki.85 Then, in April 2010, in the final year of the 
course, she dropped out stating later that:
King's College is involved in things where they work against Muslims…Last year, 
or the year before, they gave an award to Shimon Peres [Israeli politician] and they 
also have a department for tackling radicalisation … So I just didn't wanna go there 
anymore ... 'cos it would be against my religion.86 
INTCMP=SRCH
85 Awlaki was widely referred to as 'the spiritual leader of Al Qaida' and thought to be part of 
the leadership of Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). He had been linked to those that carried 
out the 11th September 2001 attacks on the Twin Towers in New York, the Texas Fort Hood shooting 
in 2009 and the attempted bombing of a Detroit-bound jet in December 2009. He was the author of 
'Constants in the Path to Jihad' and '44 Ways to Jihad' in which he draws strong distinctions between 
believers and non-believers and describes jihad as an obligation on every Muslim. His internet 
sermons were said to have been hugely influential in the recruitment of jihadists. The Quilliam 
Foundation described Awlaki as encouraging 'a "lone-wolf" strategy, calling on followers to seize 
opportunities to attack where opportunities arose rather than work in cells, in order to increase chances 
of effectiveness.' Awlaki was an American national hiding out in Yemen. On 30th September 2011 he 
became the first US subject of an extra-judicial assassination after President Obama ordered a drone 
strike on the area where he was hiding.
See Profile: An American Jihadist by The Quilliam Foundation available at:
http://www.quilliamfoundation.org/component/content/article/63-in-the-media/877-profile-an-
american-jihadist-.html
And Profile: al-Qaida leader Anwar al-Awlaki by Vikram Dodd published by The Guardian 
on 3rd November 2010 and available at:
http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2010/nov/02/profile-anwar-al-awlaki-cleric?INTCMP=SRCH
Roshonara Choudhry also claimed that she had developed an understanding of her own 
personal role in 'fighting' for Iraqis by watching a youtube video in which Abdullah Azzam articulated 
the view, as she explained it, that 'when a Muslim land is attacked it becomes obligatory on every 
man, woman and child and even slave to go out and fight and defend the land' (quoted from the police 
transcripts, ibid). Abdullah Azzam was the co-founder of Al Qaida and the Laskhar-e-Taiba (the group 
that claimed responsibility for the Mumbai blasts in 2008) and the author of the key salafi-jihadist text 
'Defence of Muslim Lands'. The phrase 'Muslim Lands' only has meaning if one adheres to a political 
ideology of religiously sanctioned lands. Azzam and Awlaki argued that certain (Muslim) land is being 
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On Friday 14th May 2010 she headed to the local bank to settle all her financial 
affairs, ensuring that her family would not inherit her debts and that the British state 
would not be able to claim her savings.87 She then proceeded to Stephen Timms' 
regular  surgery  at  the  Beckton  Globe  where  CCTV footage  showed  her  waiting 
patiently to meet with him. It was there that she stabbed him twice in the stomach 
with a kitchen knife.  Timms survived the attack and Choudhry was remanded in 
custody. After her arrest she stated:
I thought that it's not right that he voted for the declaration of war in Iraq…
I feel like I did what I'd planned to do. I feel like I've ruined the rest of my life. I feel  
like it's worth it because millions of Iraqis are suffering and I should do what I can to 
help them and not just be inactive and do nothing while they suffer…
(Timms) very strongly agreed with the invasion of Iraq…
That made me feel angry because the whole Iraq war is just based on lies and he just  
voted strongly for everything as though he had no mercy. As though he felt no doubts 
that what he was doing was right, even though it was such an arrogant thing to do  
and I just felt like if he could treat the Iraqi people so mercilessly, then why should I 
show him any mercy?
…I think I've fulfilled my obligation, my Islamic duty to stand up for the people of 
lraq and to punish someone who wanted to make war with them.88
occupied by, and therefore needs to be liberated from, non-believers.
86 From Roshonara Choudhry: Police Interview Extracts by Vikram Dodd published in The 
Guardian newspaper on 3rd November 2010 and available at:
http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2010/nov/03/roshonara-choudhry-police-interview?INTCMP=SRCH
87 Profile of Roshonara Choudhry, ibid.
88 Police transcripts, ibid.
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Choudhry instructed her counsel not to challenge the prosecution's case.89 On 3rd 
November 2010 she was convicted of  attempted murder  and required to  serve a 
minimum of fifteen years in prison.
Even though Choudhry is  being projected  by some as  a  troubled and vulnerable 
young woman acting alone, the disquiet that her actions have caused local politicians 
was summarised in the following report:
Yes, Timms voted for the war, but that was seven years ago. He had been the subject  
of protests then, but all of it tempered by the fact that he was a well-liked MP. He 
faced protests but he never faced hatred. If anything, his East Ham constituency has 
more Muslims in it now than it did then. They make up a third of the electorate. And 
here's the thing. In May (2010) the MP who voted for the war in Iraq secured the 
biggest majority in the country. Choudhry didn't just plunge the knife; she shattered 
the consensus that existed between the MP and his Muslim constituents. For all the 
rancour evoked by the war, they had reached an equilibrium.90
Conclusion
Religion runs through local electoral politics in boroughs, manifesting as vote banks 
but also revealing itself at specific junctures to cut through the hearth of a united 
Labour Party front. Sometimes it bursts out in flashes of violence. However, I want 
to  avoid  drawing  large  generalisations  especially  because  of  the  dissimilar 
characteristics of each of the Labour Groups. Instead I draw upon Michael Keith's 
(2005) assertion that it is useful, if not necessary, to make a distinction between the 
conditions of possibility on the one hand and the modalities of identity on the other. 
In sharing this sentiment I want to conclude by outlining the reasons why religion 
89 See MP Stephen Timms stabbed in revenge for Iraq War posted on 1/11/10 at 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-london-11667620
90 From Hideously diverse Britain? How many other Roshonara Chaudhrys are there out 
there? by Hugh Muir in The Guardian on 9/11/10 available at: 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2010/nov/09/how-many-more-roshonara-choudhrys
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becomes the voice of critique and then separate those points from the substantive 
dimensions of those critical religious voices. 
At a comparative level, a key feature shared by both boroughs was a critique of party 
structures, transparency and accountability. Religion was welded to that critique. The 
issues that were raised became inextricable from questions of democratic process and 
participation.  At  some  level  this  was  a  reflection  of  ongoing  schisms  between 
equality  as  representation,  as  visible  presence,  and  equality  as  recognition,  as 
reflecting identity politics. Without belittling the actual content of the complaints or 
the religious belief dimension of that content, it is clear that, in the current climate at 
least, some strands of political opposition find it easiest to reach for religion as a 
source of discontent and as an alternative voice.
Beyond  this,  each  borough  had  its  pecularities.  In  Ealing,  questions  of  Sikh 
representation and women's representation came to the fore, almost simultaneously. 
At times one was played off against the other and at other times, the two sang in 
unison. In Newham the thrust of the critique was about the centralised command 
structure and lack of dissent within a Labour Group modelled on Blair's New Labour. 
This chapter  has shown how religion becomes the vehicle for that discontent.  In 
Newham, there is a metonymic association between a lack of democracy, the overt 
secular  commitments  of  the  Labour  leadership  (including  many  of  its  Christian 
Socialist  Movement  activists)  and  their  decisions  on  Queens  Market  and  the 
Newham Casino. In Ealing, the proximity of Indian politics provides easier parallels 
between Sikh complaints about the Labour Party and the repression of Khalistani 
forces  by  a  1980s  Congress  Party  associated  with  a  Hindu  rather  than  secular 
political culture. Moreover, the Sikhs in Southall may not be positioning themselves 
against secularism for the simple fact that multifaithism rather than secularism is the 
political culture of the Ealing Labour Party.
The second factor that comes into play is the unfinished business of ethnic minority 
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recruitment to the Labour Party. It is clear from this chapter that ethnic minorities in 
the Party represent many different political interests ranging from a Left politics, to a 
secular black Left politics, to black perspectivism, to raced managerialism, to ethnic 
particularism,  to  ethnic  communalism,  to  religious  identity  politics.  These  are 
revealed when the question of religion in the public sphere is raised. Notably, later 
chapters  will  show  that  very  conservative  ethnic  minority  politicians  have  been 
sitting comfortably within local Labour Party branches for a long time. In the current  
moment, religion gives vent to grievances and also provides the form through which 
divergent political leanings and views, once sitting comfortably within a 'sovereign 
Labour Party', are released and find expression. 
The third factor is the viability of alternative political parties. The local dimension is 
really  significant  here  because  whilst  Ealing  has  been  a  two party  race  between 
Labour and the Conservatives, the political landscape in Newham has been shaped 
by a united front against  the Conservative Party.  In Ealing it  is the Conservative 
Party  rather  than  Liberal  Democrats,  Greens  or  Respect  that  makes  gains  from 
religious ruptures. In Newham, the united front against the Tories has made other 
avenues  more  viable,  namely  Christian  Right/Democratic  politics  (especially  for 
African evangelists) and the Respect Party, thought to offer a real Left alternative but 
ultimately gaining its viability from the scale of Muslims living in the borough.
It is fair to say that across the two boroughs, these religious critics are united in their  
social  conservatism.  In Ealing they spent  decades inside the Labour Party before 
defecting and also harboured an agenda that matched the Conservative Party values 
identified by Solomos and Back (1995). Members of the Christian Peoples Alliance 
in Newham may share some concerns with the Christians within the Labour Party, 
namely poverty and the impact of regeneration on local people, but are simply not 
interested to align with Labour's equality agenda and so have never been inside the 
Labour camp. Indeed, Alan Craig initially ran as a Conservative Party candidate and 
is  now working for  the  Christian  Right  elements  of  the  Conservative  Party.  The 
Respect Party councillors ended up being recruited from amongst Muslims within 
141
Labour. Beyond a pre election concern with Iraq and a request to support a motion 
against the Nikab ban in France, Respect councillors were muted and did little to 
challenge the shifting ideological ground of the Labour Party, which should have 
given many Labour Party supporters cause to change their affiliation. 
Importantly across both boroughs, electoral politics seems to be a boys game, with 
women's voices muted and certainly not at the forefront of defections though it is 
rumoured  that  critique  within  the  Newham  Labour  Group  comes  from  Muslim 
women. However, since Ealing Labour Group is no longer subject to the pressure of 
one of its ethnic minority vote banks (the SGSSS) and has seen the demise of its 
other (the IWA), it may yet be reborn and diversify beyond Sikh Jat male dominance. 
As far as the Ealing Conservative Party is concerned, the continued associations with 
Thatcherism means they have not as yet  been reinvented as an option for ethnic 
minorities in the borough but they are certainly beginning to get an audience, largely 
thanks to Right wing Sikh mobilisations.
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Chapter 3: Religion Can Move You: Exploring the 
Possibilities
Introduction
This chapter considers the sorts of arguments that are made for engaging religious 
identities and commitments to create either social action or political change. I have 
attempted to avoid the now clichéd references to the power of religion and separated 
this chapter into ontological, affective and aesthetic reflections on the added value 
that is claimed for drawing upon religious beliefs, feelings and forms as a means of 
making the social and political field intelligible. The first half of the chapter maps 
out the claims that religious commitment confers obligations to engage with and care 
for others. The second half hones in on the numerous affective and aesthetic 
dimensions of religious belief and practice with a view to addressing the claim that 
these inject energy into interactions and therefore carry the capacity to convert 
feelings and interests into significant forces for change. 
Heaven on Earth: Living out a Faithful Life
A number of interviewees cited religious tenets with the potential to direct believers 
towards active participation in civil society, political activity and charitable welfare 
provision. Some noted the possibility for these injunctions to align across religions 
and also across religious and secular formations in order to fulfil the same objectives. 
In particular, these included respect, dignity, a common humanity, (economic and 
social) justice and love. Some of the 'religious' interviewees and advocates of faith 
based mobilisations claimed that religious belief encourages a qualitatively better 
interaction between people and also has the potential to improve interventions on 
social or political issues. This first section considers some of these ontological 
arguments.
Being Jesus, being human
Faith providers talked a lot about cohesion by asserting that religion is as much about 
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forging relations with others as it is about one's relationship to a higher being. Revd 
Canon  Ann  Easter,  the  Chief Executive Officer of The Renewal Programme in 
Newham, stated:
Jesus said 'when I am lifted up, I will lift all people to myself'.
[Revd Canon Ann Easter, The Renewal Programme, 4/11/10]
This quote epitomises the sociality of religious discourse; it can place an obligation 
on people not only to look inwards at themselves but can  also implicate their 
personal development (or 'personal walk' as Ealing based Suzanne Fernandes 
referred to it) with the problems facing their fellow human beings. As such, Revd 
Canon Ann Easter suggested that working in the voluntary or community sector 
appeals to people of faith for the simple fact that 'all the major faiths are founded on 
principles of justice and mercy and love and respect for your neighbours'.
Two heads of Catholic schools, one in Newham and one in Ealing, also lay claim to 
religious belief enabling a more caring, nurturing and loving environment for their 
students as well as a strong sense of community, identity and respect (both as self-
respect and as respectful engagement with others). The Ealing head teacher argued 
that his school was motivated by a desire to 'create heaven on earth' and was striving 
towards this by invoking the principles of charity, a sense of self sacrifice, 
forgiveness, justice and compassion in everyday life.
In addition to the quality of academic support at their schools, they also argued that 
the parents and teachers valued the ethos and the distinctive environment defined by 
religious belief. For instance, both Heads explained that students would commune at 
mass and pray at assembly every morning but also at the beginning of each class. 
Both asserted that prayer time as well as religious paraphernalia around the school, 
including Bible points and images of Catholic saints, provided important sources of 
reflection, calm, meditation and focus. The lives of saints could be an inspiration for 
the students and inhere a sense of social responsibility towards their fellow human 
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beings. Of note, however, praying not only required the students to focus on what 
they would like to achieve (producing aspirational subjects), it also called upon a 
higher being to affect the outcome. As such it continued to defy other references to 
choice and agency by invoking some sense of fatalism and displacement.
Nevertheless, for both head teachers it was their Christian beliefs that inspired them 
and enabled affirmative support for the more vulnerable students at their schools. For 
instance, the Ealing head teacher argued that a wider conception of justice, motivated 
by understanding and forgiveness rather than punishment, involved finding solutions 
that benefit and improve the individual student's circumstances rather than perpetuate 
their negative conditions and experiences. It also involved seeing students as 
individuals rather than as objectified categories (of support needs or as an ethnic 
group) or as a statistic. He proposed different arrangements rather than uniformly 
same arrangements to ensure equality of access and opportunity and referred to this 
as a moral approach to justice because it is not defined by what is fair but rather by 
what is right. Universality was punctured by exception, not exception as imperialist 
arrogance but rather as defence of the underdog and protection for the vulnerable. 
The Ealing teacher provided the following example:
By that I mean that all these nice ideas of equality and treating people so they can be 
as good as they can be is being instilled in us forever. It's not, it’s absolutely fair, it’s 
absolutely just that the girl in Reception should get extra support, it’s absolutely just 
and right that the child who is going through a horrible time at home gets treated 
differently when he thumps Fred than when matey who’s just a spoilt little person 
who wants his own way gets treated when he hits Fred. Justice isn’t about treating 
everybody the same.  You’ve got to understand where they’re coming from. Are we 
here to help or are we here to serve? To serve again is to understand why you’re 
doing it; it’s all about motivation. Service is freely given because it’s your duty to do 
it, not just helping to get a house point or helping because it will look good on your 
Ofsted form.  
[Catholic school head teacher, 2/10/09]
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This assertion was framed by his reflections on the balance between 'solidarity' and 
'subsidiarity'; Catholic schools espouse homogeneous principles based on the gospel 
values but this is simultaneously tempered to individual need and context. It’s a 
balance between 'the message' and 'the delivery' where the message is irrevocably 
uniform and universal but its implementation is particular. Moreover, as he pointed 
out in his reference to Vatican II, the delivery takes account of the local, the 
circumstantial and the vernacular. Indeed it is in the space between solidarity and 
subsidiarity that a potential continuity between secular humanist interventions in the 
Third Sector and religious humanist ones become possible. However, it is notable 
that when it comes to personal, social and health education at the school, that same 
discourse  of  subsidiarity  does  not  enable  the  accommodation  of  divergent life 
choices. Whilst there is a general recognition of the complex choices that people 
make, strong heterosexual marriage and family values are emphasised as the ideal 
model towards which pupils should strive.
Revd Canon Ann Easter also talked of how religious belief shaped her approach to 
the world. Indeed she inferred that it provides added value not only to the 
individual's worldview but also to the quality of human interactions. She stated: 
I'm quite a practical person and I like to know what difference it makes. When I 
walk my dog first thing in the morning at our local park, does my being a Christian 
make any difference to the people I talk to and what I'd do if I found someone in 
floods of tears or fallen over or, you know? … (And) Oh yes, very much yes. My 
faith is central to my life, absolutely. So I try to do everything that I do in a way that 
would be proper to my faith and would make god smile rather than frown. 
[Revd Canon Ann Easter, The Renewal Programme, 4/11/10]
This sense of living one's life in a way that 'makes god smile rather than frown' by 
helping others was reinforced by Mizan Raja of Islamic Circles who saw his purpose 
as 'to seek the pleasure of god' by 'living a god conscious lifestyle' which in real 
terms involved foregoing financial accumulation to invest in charitable community 
work. However, whilst Mizan Raja emphasised the need to get Muslims to be active 
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in mainstream institutions and civil society, he also made clear that 'a god conscious 
lifestyle' involves living 'in an Islamic paradigm'. At risk of stating the obvious, his 
sense of what makes god smile is inseparable from his sense of what it means to be a 
Muslim. However,  of particular interest is the regularity of contradiction in 
emphasising both his godliness and the significance of the temporal. He is critical of 
Muslims, like the Tablighi Jamaat, for their withdrawal from political life and also 
those that focus their energies on establishing an Islamic state. He even argued that 
around ninety per cent of Shariah is contested and open to interpretation. Yet he 
actively lobbies mainstream educational institutions through his work as a parent 
governor and member of the Muslim Governors Association for something that he 
believes can be circumscribed as 'Muslim needs' and 'Muslim values'. Central to 
these are strong views on marriage, sexual orientation and sexuality. This is one way 
in which 'solidarity' or rather 'uniformity' (a desire to fix and stipulate what it is to be 
Muslim, or a god conscious Christian or one of the many subdivisions of either) 
articulates with 'subsidiarity', the localised, contested or pragmatic interpretations of 
that religion. At its heart is a prescriptive notion of the right way to live; the 
conditions that are set on the articulation of religious commitments against the 
multiple possibilities of religion as lived socio-political reality.  
Often for the Christian interviewees, demonstrating their faith involved communal 
activities inspired by the belief that they are connected to others and to god through 
the spirit of Christ. For instance the Ealing Catholic school head teacher emphasised 
the importance of Mass and the belief that the body of Christ is passed to the 
individual through the consumption of bread and wine at mass. Similarly, the 
Newham based Catholic head teacher talked about how letting the spirit enter you 
enables a humanist connection with others. Everyone could be sacred because 
everyone has the potential to embody the spirit of Jesus. Christ's spirit could exist 
within the students at the school, within the Catholic teachers and other Catholic 
believers. As such this is a powerful metaphysical path through which to inhere a 
simultaneous sense of individual responsibility and of common humanity. 
Conversely, the belief that Jesus' spirit lives within you or within someone else could 
be an unassailable source of power as well as a frightening concept for a child, 
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especially when attached to proscriptions. 
I want to note that religious interviewees talked about the metaphysical interventions 
in their everyday lives as motivating forces for action and interaction rather than 
withdrawal or exclusion. The Catholic school head teachers emphasised the 
existential dimension of religious belief put aptly by Paul Halliwell's assertion that 
'faith is something that when you have it, you are not afraid to show its value to the 
rest of the world for you'.  He emphasised the potential positive effects of religion on 
the individual:
I firmly believe that faith when it impacts on somebody's life can assist them to 
become the person that they need to be, the best possible person that they can be. It 
causes them to be more outward looking rather than inward looking.
[Paul Halliwell, Headteacher of St Bonaventure's Catholic Secondary School, 
28/09/10]
Similarly, Balwant Singh Gill, one of the founders of the Sri Guru Singh Sabha in 
Southall, explained that he hadn't always believed, he was raised in Singapore and 
even used the term 'playboy' to describe his lifestyle there. However, he 'got' religion 
in England and described this be-getting  as at first entirely circumstantial then a 
gradual but forceful draw that eventually transformed the structure and character of 
his life. In a sense he was putting religious affiliation beyond the scope of rational 
explanation, as a hidden hand that has material repercussions. This stands juxtaposed 
against Dilbagh Chana's description of his faith as inherited knowledge, as a source 
of philosophical reflection and his public religious identification as a political 
decision in the face of anti Sikh racism. 
The more pertinent concern for this thesis is not the strength of Balwant Singh Gill's 
belief per se but rather what, if anything, it did for a man that was already politically 
and socially active in his local area. As someone that had a strong oral and written 
command of the English language, he had assumed the position of advisor and 
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'leader' at an early stage in his arrival in Britain and described helping those around 
him to access information and write letters. When he arrived he instinctively got 
involved in trade union and anti racist struggles. After be-getting religion, he centred 
his energies on building a gurdwara and consolidating Jat Sikh identity in the area. 
Not only did he describe getting religion as some kind of necessary corrective 
measure  to  his  former  life, his new focus appeared to have had the effect of 
narrowing his sense of the social world. 
Anti capital and anti state
Whichever way 'religious' interviewees talked about converting their faithful lives 
into social action or political commitment, these were often positioned against the 
stifling or unaccountable bureaucracy of the state (or the political party) on the one 
hand and the commodification of individuals and social relationships by market 
philosophy on the other. In a sense both market and bureaucracy were depicted as 
causes of de-humanisation. An alternative relationality was usually proffered. It was 
claimed that a life shaped by religious belief could empower people to construct a 
world that either exists outside of these ways of ordering or provide a counter 
balance to these forces. For instance by reigning in the harsher tendencies of 
capitalism and safeguarding a Living Wage. 
There were continuities between the focus on the individual discussed by the Ealing 
head teacher in the previous subsection and the person centred approach outlined by 
Revd Canon Ann Easter. Easter's person-centred approach was thought to fit well 
with her Christian commitments because of its ambition to enhance 'human 
flourishing' and potential. In this instance, Easter argued that it posed a contrast to 
both the state model and the business model:
What I would hope, I think whatever group it was, a faith group would offer a very 
person centred service. I did the MBA with people from the public sector and the 
private sector and we were doing critical path analysis and so on and so forth and in 
a particular group where we were grouped one private one public one voluntary 
sector and of course the public person 'well the rules, the rules, the rules say this and 
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we must have that, we can't do this and we can't do that' because they are governed 
by statute. The private sector person said 'wait a minute we can do this more cheaply, 
we ought to go blah, blah, blah'. What I said was 'when does this person want this 
service?' So apart from anything else, I think they will be very person centred. As 
opposed to profit or statute… I mean statute doesn't glorify itself by being person 
centred does it, quite the opposite. What people feel like when they go to the NHS, 
or the police or the local authority is 'I'm just a number' whereas what they'll feel if 
they come to almost any, well certainly all the voluntary sector places I know, they 
would be a person.
[Revd Canon Ann Easter, The Renewal Programme, 4/11/10]
Of note though, Easter spoke of individuals within the context of the common 
language and purpose of the Third Sector (including faith, community and voluntary 
organisations) with needs assessment, inclusivity and a person-centred approach as 
pivotal building blocks. Conversely, the Ealing head teacher projected this focus on 
the individual as a distinguishing marker of faith-based services and an important 
way in which religion counteracts the shortcomings of other public/social welfare 
services.
This search for a new way between bureaucracy and capitalism, between statism and 
neo liberalism, between an equally undemocratic command philosophy and 
unaccountable market philosophy, has formed the thrust and ironically become the 
most 'marketable' dimension of commentaries advocating a strong role for faith 
based mobilisations within civil society (see for instance Glasman, 2008 and 2011; 
and Bretherton, 2010).  However, a critique of material wealth or accumulation and 
profit is not part of the ethos of every religious institution in the two boroughs. At 
both the growing African evangelical church, Glory House, in Plaistow and the Sri 
Guru Singh Sabha gurdwaras in Southall, there is a great deal of focus on displays of 
material wealth including donations and individual accumulation. Wealth is seen as a 
reflection of god's positive intervention and donations are considered a form of 
gratitude for that intervention. At both sites, announcements about individual 
donations are made from the podium during services, often in front of hundreds of 
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people. As such, these donations become social statements carrying normative 
implications by providing the donors with social currency and prestige but also place 
a moral pressure on others to demonstrate their faith in financial terms. Moreover, 
both organisations would make reluctant critics of the state or businesses. They are 
heavily invested in relations with local authority departments and politicians and also 
gain a lot of financial support from ethnic minority businessmen.
Indeed, the potent combination of religious organisations as financial plus symbolic 
capital (particularly in the form of sacred dress) is often overlooked because of a 
tendency to characterise religious groups as having different, notably otherworldly, 
interests. However, it is also their financial worth that recently enabled the Sisters of 
St Francis of Philadelphia in USA to mobilise their assets (estimated at £13bn) as a 
means of gaining leverage for a campaign demanding a Living Wage for every 
worker of the FTSE 100.91 Indeed, in making the point that religious groups 
potentially have great power, the Revd Dr Colin Marchant estimated the cumulative 
value of church assets along the Barking Road in Newham to be in the region of £40 
million.92 
Man vs. God: competing or complimentary authorities?
The Renewal Programme is working firmly within 'man made' systems, it has 
charitable status and inputs into the development of local social policy and meeting 
local needs. It has also been involved in local 'justice' and accountability campaigns 
including the otherwise unpopular campaign to defend two Muslim brothers in Forest 
Gate subjected to an anti terror raid in June  2006.93 It is still a faith-based 
organisation, its CEO represents the 'faith sector' on the Local Strategic Partnership, 
91 FTSE firms must pay living wage, says 'shareholder nun' by Mark Leftly dated Sunday 1/05/11 
published by The Independent and available at:
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/news/ftse-firms-must-pay-living-wage-says-shareholder-
nun-2277277.html
92 Field notes on the public meeting 'Eastern European worship in Newham' dated 10/05/11.
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but its practice is increasingly secular. Moreover, Easter defines herself and the 
organisation as liberal and explains this as follows:
Christianity is a continuum; we are very much at the liberal end of Christianity, the 
liberal Catholic with a small 'c'. So we would want to say that we are here for 
everybody, we do not proselytise, we do not, I mean I have had people occasionally 
who have wanted to make donations but only if it will be given, well not if it's given 
to homosexuals or Muslims. And I've said 'sorry, we don't do it like that. If a person 
is homeless, they are homeless regardless of whether they are gay, Muslim, woman, 
male, disabled, whatever.' I think that is our stance, we are open to everybody, we 
are inclusive. So the other end of the Christian spectrum would be the 
fundamentalist sort of way that would regard the Bible as literal truths and we are 
not like that.
[Revd Canon Ann Easter, The Renewal Programme, 4/11/10]
Conversely, whilst both Catholic head teachers emphasised the ability of believers of 
different religious backgrounds to establish relationships on the basis of common 
values, they also emphasised the tension between secular and religious values. 
Indeed it was not uncommon for the word 'secular' to be associated with 
consumerism, commodification and hyper-sexualisation. Even the socially liberal ex 
President of the Ramgharia Gurdwara in Southall, Dilbagh Chana, who is opposed to 
faith based services, refused to use the term 'secular' because of its association with 
an intolerance of religious identities, and rigid, unreasonable, even aggressive, 
political movements. He depicted his own orientation to the political as open, 
empathetic and part of a deliberative, consensus building form of democratic 
participation. For him this did not need to be religious or faith based but he would 
not utilise the word 'secular'.
Mizan Raja of the group Islamic Circles also portrayed his religious political identity 
93 The Forest Gate Raids are discussed in Chapter 5. Here I want to note that both Asad 
Rehman and Kevin Blowe pointed to the difficulties in engaging non-Muslim groups in Newham for 
this campaign.
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as 'alternative' and 'counter hegemonic', as providing the framework for a better kind 
of relationality. He defined himself  as a primordial, conservative, traditional, Sufi 
Muslim. He fleshed this out through a critique of modernity and its offspring, 
feminism and secularism. His alternative vision seemed to be distinguished by the 
Arabic word 'fitra' which he claimed could loosely be equated with living according 
to a 'natural disposition'. However, the notion of 'natural disposition' marks the 
frontier of religious fundamentalism; it is buoyed up by authenticating claims about 
nature and the corruptions of culture and resurfaces especially when there are 
questions about sexuality, reproduction and gender roles. It also resonates with the 
most conservative versions of Catholicism such as expressed by  Joseph Ratzinger, 
the current Pope Benedict XVI. Ironically, Mizan Raja's multiple organisations of 
primordial political persuasion also rely heavily on (modern) technology to 
perpetuate their message. 
In spite of its football club, its youth activities, its links with local politicians and the 
promulgation of a general aspirational and law abiding cultural code for its members, 
Glory House has a strong critique of 'man made systems' including of medical 
practice and recourse to the law. They encourage self-improvement through the act of 
prayer, evangelism and church donations which, in and of themselves, are expected 
to attract positive divine intervention. They actively posit flawed man-made systems 
against the purity and desirability of god's word. 
It is really important to be clear that this is not a discourse of inaction or of the 
futility of existence. It places a responsibility on people to ensure that they are 
worthy of god's praise. Indeed the pressure on action is immense and a critique of 
complacency is endemic. Pastor Albert Odulele's sermons emphasise the need for the 
congregation to move themselves from mediocrity to significance, from a position of 
ignorance or delusion to one of realising their position 'of greatness' as the 'sons of 
the saviours'. During services, the congregation are even encouraged to turn to the 
person sitting next to them and shout the word move, urging their neighbour to fulfil 
their spiritual duty to evolve towards election. Their lives are purposeful and directed 
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but specifically towards fulfilling a spiritual mission. The role of the church is to 
assist people to release their greatness. The spirit of Jesus is also emphasised here 
and the congregation are told that as messengers of god they are endowed with great 
powers. Agency in this context is the strength to fight off the devil and the bravery to 
retain religious belief in the face of adversity.
This is a very different way of living out religious belief that poses a strong contrast 
to the above examples. The social dimension of this religious practice still means that 
large numbers of people commune; Glory House sees thousands upon thousands of 
people at four different services every Sunday and people are welcomed in by 
gracious volunteers. They also host a number of events during the week including a 
women's group (Help a Sister), study groups and a football club, all intended to build 
networks and relations between parishioners. However, communing at any of these 
places can be an act in and of itself and does not necessarily mean that they engage 
with issues outside of assertions about the strength of their belief. Other Christian 
evangelists have asserted their beliefs in the face of adversity by launching legal 
challenges against employers to gain exemption from equalities duties94 but Glory 
House expressly encourages people not to rely on 'man made systems' such as legal 
redress if they face problems including harassment or victimisation at work. Instead 
the Pastor Albert Odulele encourages prayer to strengthen one's relationship with 
god. This is expected to bring salvation in the form of god's positive intervention in 
your life. Such positive intervention is not just about the afterlife, it is expected in the 
here and now but one's agency in affecting that outcome, one's orientation is directed 
towards prayer, service and financial donation to the Church. 
Importantly, Pastor Albert Odulele was recently convicted of two counts of sexual 
assault, one on a man and another on a boy. Despite the vilification of lawyers and 
94 The case of Gary Macfarlane is one example of a growing trend. Macfarlane was a 
relationships counsellor working for the voluntary sector organisation Relate. He failed in his legal bid 
to gain exemption from counselling same sex couples on the basis of his religious beliefs. See 
Christian Sex Therapist Gary Macfarlane Loses Appeal Bid posted on 29/04/10 on BBC news online 
and available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/england/bristol/8651417.stm 
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legal systems in his sermons, he did attend a court of law. He also showed some 
recognition of the jurisdiction of that law by pleading guilty to both charges; he 
argued that these acts were committed during his personal struggle with his sexuality. 
He is still listed as the Glory House Pastor even though he is currently serving an 
eight-month prison sentence. Whilst feminists working on violence and abuse would 
view sexual assault as an act of power, Pastor Odulele's sermons have depicted such 
incidents as struggles with temptation and the devil. The metaphysical context, both 
god and the devil, are ever present. Life's events, even mundane everyday events, are 
presented as forms of either devil temptation or divine intervention. The Glory House 
website's homepage refers directly to this episode but calls upon parishioners to pray 
for both the Pastor and his victims. This response is in line with a notion of Glory 
House as 'one family', of such incidents as sin, of penance and self-reflection. Like 
other newly established African evangelical churches around London, Glory House 
is a family run business but the warmth of its volunteers (referred to as Leaders) does 
not extend to open discussion about the organisation and its practices. I was not able 
to get an interview with the Pastor or those involved with the Glory House women's 
group, Help a Sister. This tendency to close ranks is  even starker amongst other 
African evangelical groups in Newham and neighbouring boroughs.  Whilst visiting 
one service in south Newham, of Christ's Embassy, I was welcomed into the space by 
friendly parishioners excited to spread the word but then  escorted off the premises 
when I attempted to ask questions of church leaders. 
Open up the Airwaves and Let Love In
A lot of the ontological precepts for religion in social and political action discussed 
above are also affective dispositions. As orientations towards the world, they are also 
constituted by emotions, particularly by love and hope. Indeed affect and aesthetics 
are no foreigners to social and political action. There has been a long exploration of 
what can be termed 'negative' feelings, their validation and their formative or 
constitutive role in anti racist and feminist political subjectivities. Cornel West's (in 
Taylor 2009) critical disposition for instance starts from what he refers to as 'the raw, 
funky, stanky stuff of life'. He locates his philosophical inquiry through a 
mesmerising analogy between critical dissonance, his musical preference  and a life 
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that starts with catastrophe, eloquently summarised in his description of himself as 'a 
blues man' interested in 'the blue note':
The blues is personal catastrophe lyrically expressed and for black people in the 
modern world, given these vicious legacies of white supremacy, it is how do you 
generate an elegance of earned self-togetherness so that you have a stick-to-it-ness in 
the face of the catastrophic and the calamitous and the horrendous and the 
monstrous? 
(West, in Taylor 2009)
For West, as for other critical 'race' theorists, solidarity, compassion and political 
engagement are borne of pain and problems. Similarly, Sara Ahmed (2010) seeks the 
validation of 'negative' feelings including pain, hate, fear, shame and disgust as 
foundational bases for thinking and speaking out about racism and sexism. These 
'negative' dispositions have been driving forces for anti racist and feminist activism. 
In a sense that is also my overarching framework, to bring 'the funk' back into a 
consideration of religion in local politics, placing the critiques and problems at the 
centre of the analysis. However, I want to acknowledge that my interviewees were 
making other  kinds  of claims and consider these through an empathetic but also 
critical lens. 
From sorrow to joy
Contrary to West's 'catastrophe' (2009), Gilroy's 'melancholia' (2004) and  Ahmed's 
angry 'killjoy'  (2010),  a significant number of the 'religious' interviewees for this 
thesis started with the emotion 'love' as the driving force for their engagement with 
the world. Inspite of the multiple theological parables about torture, ostracisation and 
injustice, such as the sorrow and sacrifice of Jesus Christ, the transformative qualities 
of their 'love' was not tied to painful reconfiguration but rather depicted as a love 
bathing in optimism, permeating hope, endurance and affirmation. On occasion I was 
entirely mesmerised by these serene expressions of how faith informs their 
interactions with others and the many ways in which they had gained from 
spirituality in their lives. 
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As already noted above, love and individual attention are positioned against the 
bureaucratic numbers game with the latter depicted as effacing individual need and 
potential. When talking of the distinctive ethos of his school, Paul Halliwell put this 
down to 'a feeling' whilst the Ealing head teacher emphasised depth of feeling. 
Halliwell formulated this as an ethics of care:
The simple tenet of Christianity and I believe goes right the way through the nature 
of all the other religions as well is caring for each other in the way that we would 
like people to care for us in times of our need. So what we are trying to do at St Bons 
is to create an atmosphere of love, nurture and protection. Everybody in the school is 
responsible for looking after everybody else from the very smallest boy in year 7 
right to the more experienced member in the school. Everybody needs to look out for 
and care for each other. So we don’t want to see boys who are bullying each other, 
we don't want to see boys who are upsetting each other, we don't want to see 
anybody walk past a child who is injured without intervening and making sure that 
they are the people that can help them instead of just expecting somebody else to do 
it.
[Paul Halliwell, St Bonaventure's Catholic School, 28/09/10]
Similarly, over in Ealing, Balwant Singh Gill appeared to describe his experience of 
finding god as akin to falling in love. He stated: 'it’s the grace of god, he pulls you 
towards him. It's like when you meet a person, you start to like him, you start seeing 
things in him'. He claimed that this draw to a greater engagement with Sikhism was 
powerful enough to entirely recast his life. 
Moreover, the Head of a Catholic school in west London made a point of knowing 
each of the students' names in turn breeding a kind of familiarity within the school. 
During a two-part interview with him, I noted students turning up at his door without 
appointment or any kind of formal arrangement and talking to him as they would a 
friend, breaking with  rigid hierarchy and nurturing a sense of camaraderie. He put 
this down to following the gospel values, which in his view also provide a great deal 
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more than happiness; they chart a path to joy as well as a sense of sacrifice and 
compassion. All these feelings were characterised as having greater depth. 
Compassion for instance was described as more than the act of being nice. This is put 
best in his own words:
(S)o all schools seek to be nice, we seek to be compassionate.  All schools seek to be 
kind, we look to make sacrifice in order to go beyond that… It means it’s not enough 
just to be kind; you should put yourself out to go that further mile, to walk another 
mile in the person’s shoes, that it’s right to go further than would be expected, not 
just nice.  All schools seek to be fair but we’re looking for justice, a deeper sense of 
justice.  
[Catholic school head teacher, 2/10/09]
Alongside depth, he talked of longevity; he claimed Catholicism provides longer 
lasting feelings. In particular he compared happiness with joy where the former 
involves succumbing to immediate gratification, such as giving in to a child's 
tantrum, whilst the latter provides greater meaning and lasting pleasure that goes 
beyond the accumulation of material possessions. This binary positioning of shallow 
and deeper feelings, of immediate and deferred gratification, between that which is 
temporary and fleeting and that which is durable and lasting, offers an easy analogy 
with the contrast between fickle consumerism and the potential for a more 
meaningful life based on other values. Moreover, depth of feeling is necessarily 
antithetical to apathy and presumably leads to action of some variety or other. The 
point is precisely that it moves you. Leaving aside the empirical and ideological 
problems with claims about the extent of political apathy and social breakdown for a 
moment, it is unsurprising in this context that supporters of faith based mobilisations 
position them as strong antidotes to political apathy and disaffection.
Interestingly, both Paul Halliwell and Mizan Raja pointed to the restricted use of key 
concepts in the current moment. For Halliwell it was the free use of the word 'love'. 
He saw this as indicative of its loss of value, particularly in terms of people's ability 
to cherish particular relationships:
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The word that's obviously used and people in a secular society don't feel comfortable 
using it all the time, is 'love'. I believe that religion gives you a framework for loving 
everybody. Now within English we only have the one term love and it has many, 
many different understandings, many, many different uses. Lots of other languages 
have lots of different loves. If I say I love Macdonalds that means something 
completely different to I love my wife, which means something completely different 
from I love my job. We all understand what we mean by that. So everybody has this 
misunderstanding of the concept of love. Being a Christian I can be quite open about 
the fact that I love the boys I work with, I love the community I work within. I love 
the job that I do because I love the contact that I have with the people and hopefully 
when people have been with me I am not just doing a job for the job's sake I'm doing 
it because there is a demand, there is a need for people to be spiritual role models 
within society. 
[Paul Halliwell, St Bonaventure's Catholic School, 28/09/10]
Whilst Halliwell critiqued the inability of a secular reading of the English language 
to provide a fixed understanding of 'love', Mizan Raja berated the limitations of the 
English language because of its fixedness and therefore inability to convey what he 
claimed are the nuances and multiple possibilities of the Arabic word 'fitra'. 
A life without music
In some way, both Halliwell and Raja implied an absence of poetry, colour and 
texture and aligned this with an absence of religion, making the two things 
synonymous. Although Revd Canon Ann Easter's descriptions of her faith and her 
organisation were no way making the same strong distinctions between the religious 
and the secular, when asked whether the term 'secular' meant anything to her, she 
appeared to suggest something similar to the above: 
It's a word, you know. I think it's a, it's a very grey word and it represents about the 
same as a life without music, would be a life without faith or belief, of some sort, not 
necessarily Christianity, but just some sort. And the trouble is that people think they 
can do fine and then life hits them between the eyes and they lose a baby or a parent 
dies or they become disabled and suddenly they need a tapestry on which to put their 
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experience and very often particularly to do with birth and death, because you are in 
touch with eternal life, you know what happens when I die, it will be to do with a 
faith of some sort… I mean that's what happens to us. We are people and I think we 
have a sort of tripod of our foundation which is our physical, our mental and our 
emotional/spiritual and if one of those legs is missing, well we'll fall over… if you 
know about love then you know about, that's spiritual, you can't touch it, you can't 
find it, you know.
[Revd Canon Ann Easter, The Renewal Programme, 4/11/10]
Secularism was depicted as bland rather than as making vibrant multiculturalism and 
plural religious expression possible. It was characterised as a life without music and 
meaning. Moreover, spirituality was presented as synonymous with emotion, as the 
same branch of our being.
When asked about the ways in which religion can or has been a problem, particularly 
the possibility that it might bear closer analogy with enraged din than soothing 
melody, Easter argued that the positive effects of the emotional connection with the 
spiritual world have been usurped by the impact of patriarchy. For her, patriarchy 
was the primary cause of bad manifestations of religion:
(A)ll the wars that are being caused by religion, I would give you one word, men. It's 
as easy as that. And I believe that men, have you read a book called, by Rosalind 
Miles… it's called 'A Women's History of the World' and it will make you sick when 
you find out what people have done to women over the years, it is horrible. It's bad 
enough now that they have to have their faces covered up, which I think is 
appalling… I believe that men use the tenets of faith to subdue and oppress women 
and other men too. I mean slavery. Who, um I heard on the radio this morning, I 
can't remember who it was, who said 'as a child I read about slavery in the Bible' 
because of course it's not condemned in the Bible. Oh Mark Twain, it was Mark 
Twain. 'I read about slavery in the Bible and I considered that perfectly in order'. So 
it's not just women that men have oppressed and told this is god's will, it's other men 
aswell, Black people, homosexuals, gypsies. Anybody who is different from them… 
Anyhow, Rosalind Miles' thing was that men saw this person who bled every month 
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and didn't die, who filled up, a person came out, made other people, and thought that 
is so fucking powerful, I've got to contain it and I think that still rings bells now.
[Revd Canon Ann Easter, The Renewal Programme, 28/09/10]
Whilst much of what she said drew out the possibilities of spirituality and faith 
versus the way this can be changed, there are surprising continuities with the 
patriarchal and conservative contributions of interviewees for the simple fact that 
they all maintain a pure and infallible state for god and religion. This purity is 
corrupted by the fallibilities of man, and indeed for Easter, this is man in its most 
literal sense. As such she potentially relies on the same epistemological distinction 
between virtuous belief and problematic cultural practice that has been used in 
different contexts to justify a literal return to religious texts. Taken together with her 
claim to the proximate relation of emotion and spirituality, women presumably carry 
the potential to be more religious, more devout and closer to god than men. This is 
affirmed by Easter's statement that women are 'more emotional creatures aren't we so 
I think because spirituality is linked with emotion I think often all women are the 
keepers of the faith'. 
Nevertheless, her depiction of religion as music and tapestry bears some truth in the 
dynamism of the events organised by the faith based political alliance, Citizens UK, 
where music and liturgy are used to enhance engagement. One of the most notable 
experiences is the effect on the auditory and visual senses and the implications this 
has for emotional investment and attachment. There is an interchangeable use of 
visual and aural 'props' including mood enhancing music and song, film footage and 
oral testimony. I would like to argue that each of these 'props' is intended to tap and 
open up emotional pathways and breed concern, communal feelings of human 
connectedness and uplifting feelings of positivity and possibility.     
Echoes of celebratory, carnival style uplifting beats can be heard as one enters the 
events. This is welcoming but also happy music that opens the mind and body to 
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possibility and solidarity with others. Coupled with the use of testimony, the use of 
music during the main part of the meetings can move you through other feelings. As 
with songs such as, 'Under Pressure', performed by a faith based school choir to 
introduce agenda items that highlight the concerns of young people struggling with 
inner city life,  performed at the TELCO 12th Anniversary Assembly  (12/11/08), 
music can also induce more intense, reflective, philosophical moods concerned with 
human suffering. However, the Citizens UK meetings always end on an uplifting 
note and music is as much a part of this as the concluding statement by the Chair. 
The song 'People Get Ready', for instance, used at the end of the West London 
Citizens First Anniversary Assembly (4/10/06), is anticipatory, but also triumphant, 
giving a sense of determination and focus.  
Also central to the Citizens UK events is the use of testimony. It is positioned as a 
way for the audience to 'bear witness' and to connect with real examples of human 
suffering. Importantly these testimonies are oriented towards rectitude; they are 
always linked to possible demands, to a collective responsibility and to the view that 
things will improve. The power of the testimonies to evoke a range of emotions - 
empathy, concern, shock, deep admiration for the individual and the human condition 
in general - and embed concerns within the minds of power brokers was clearly 
demonstrated at the 2008 Mayoral Assembly where Ken Livingstone was reported to 
have wept whilst listening to the testimonies of knife crime victims and their 
families.95 
The use of testimony is not new - the process of making the personal individual 
experience part of a political analysis or event has long since been common practice 
for anti- racists and feminists within both Newham and Ealing. However, in this 
instance, the atmosphere is markedly different. Rather than joining a seated panel of 
speakers, the testifier usually stands up on stage in something that resembles a pulpit 
and narrates his/her particular experience. The stories might be about hardship but 
95 A collection of press clippings for the 2008 Mayoral Assembly are available on the London 
Citizens website http://www.londoncitizens.org.uk/pages/press.html
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are never about despair. They are examples of overcoming rather than just examples 
of injustice. They exude a different kind of mood, triumphant and almost euphoric. 
These heart-rending narratives are bolstered by oral and visual reminders of actual 
change and previous successes. This introduces a sense of 'salvation' (in the 
immediate, on earth, as opposed to in the afterlife) as the testifier talks of the change 
to his or her life as a result of either getting directly involved with a Citizens UK 
Chapter or as a result of their interventions. 
Several writers have commented on the ascendant nature of certain affective 
dispositions such as 'hope' delivered in various ways including through music and 
song. Moreover, these features, even if utilised within secular political contexts, are 
thought to derive their significance and 'ascendant' qualities from theological or 
mystical frameworks. On the question of 'hope', Desroche (1979) has pointed out that 
it is a 'theologal virtue' that stems from Christian Millenarianism and was transported 
for use by utopian socialist movements. Similarly, the feminist theologian Catherine 
Pickstock (2008) noted the diagonal characteristics of Deleuze's discussion of music 
where ascendant note formation enables movement beyond the present, into the 
mystical realm, creating space for a kind of going beyond. For Lisa Blackman (2009) 
affective  dispositions such as 'hope' enable moments where the body can move 
beyond itself. These are, she argues 'can do moments' that potentially espouse a 
'politics of invention' whilst for Les Back (2009) the application of 'hope' paves the 
way for indeterminacy and what he refers to as 'counter-intuitive moments' that have 
the potential to effect change. All of them speak of a certain energy, an outward 
facing energy that carries with it a transformative potential.
 
Conversely, Miller and Strongman (2002) warned  of the possibility that music can 
lead to dissociation because it places the individual on a gradient from the temporal 
to the metaphysical. Whether the rhythm takes you up to the metaphysical or brings 
you down and holds you in the temporal is dependent upon the notes and pace 
deployed. However, whilst dissociation may be an objective for some religious 
services (Pentecostalism and Sufism for instance), this is not an objective for 
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Citizens UK where music is used well to orient people towards action. They aim to 
make religious conviction relevant in the here and now rather than induce trance-like, 
out of body or meditative states. Nor is music used to induce extreme or even 
significant body movement as at some religious gatherings.  This is in line with the 
fact that 'respectability', and all of its bodily connotations, are a structuring feature of 
the Citizens UK politics.
Liturgy as form
Although not the main focus of any of the numerous accounts of the organisation, the 
aesthetic dimensions of the Citizens UK public events are interesting as physical 
manifestations of its political imaginary. All the structuring principles of the 
organisation are clearly in view: membership participation; the focus on numbers and 
turn out; tempo; respectability; and an anti individualist pro communitarian sense of 
belonging that reifies groups, relationships, affiliations and association. 
The events are highly stylised performances. They have a certain aesthetic quality 
that not only makes them alluring but also highly productive modes of organising. 
Firstly, the pressure on numbers compels member groups to mobilise, to see through 
their pledges and no doubt contributes to the scale of the events. Secondly, the 
presence of a time keeper alongside direct public questioning by seemingly 
'everyday' people compels politicians and other dignitaries to avoid rhetorical 
speeches and provide concise responses within short periods of time as well as to 
commit themselves to clear outcomes. The events are almost always filmed and any 
verbal undertakings are played back to "power brokers" at subsequent public 
meetings as a way of holding them to account. Thirdly, the use of music and 
testimony arouses empathy but also instils hope thereby enabling a stronger affective 
engagement and indeed individual commitment to the alliance and its work. Indeed, 
the atmosphere at these events is often nothing short of euphoric. Two forms of 
tempo - music and timekeeping - are used to good effect to create a celebratory and 
uplifting mood on the one hand and to impose the immediacy of time limited 
answers upon politicians, enforcing its pragmatic politics, on the other.
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There are a number of additional tools that, in the words of Catherine Howarth, 
enable the organisation to 'be taken seriously' and as such constitute parts of a 
performance during which large numbers of people are seen to be holding the 
powerful to account. There is a high level of discipline to these events in terms of the 
provision of agendas, organised seating, corporate logos and surprising levels of 
punctuality for public meetings. Moreover, the layout is often striking. On entering 
the room at Acton Town Hall for the West London Citizens first anniversary 
assembly, for instance, it was the vast number of people, the assortment of colours 
and then these end-of-row flags that stood out. The combination of this visual stimuli 
and the background music gave the meeting a cosmopolitan fiesta feel. On closer 
inspection, I realised that the end-of-row flags were placards bearing the names of 
various membership organisations. This seemed akin to the parish banners that might 
make up a Catholic saints parade. A kind of physical manifestation of the 
solidarity/subsidiarity principle, member groups as parts of the whole, but surely also 
a means of placing a physical burden on them to turn out their members by having to 
stipulate in advance the number of seats they require. Importantly, this way of 
arranging the meeting space very much reflects the Citizens UK organising principle 
that recognises people in relation to their associations, as members of groups and 
congregations, and not as individuals. Other than the organisers and the occasional 
research student, there is no arrangement for individuals to either join the 
organisation or be seated at its events.
The Citizens UK gatherings tend to be immense and vibrant. Though not always the 
case (as in the comparatively nominal attendance and rather sterile atmosphere of the 
pre-elections hustings organised by West London Citizens in 2010), Citizens UK 
gatherings have continued to grow rather than show any sign of losing momentum or 
subsiding. Part of this must be to do with what Teresa Brennan referred to as 'the 
catchiness of emotion' (as summarised by Gorton, 2007, p.338), that they can be such 
social, uplifting and enjoyable events. Their academic supporters have expressly 
referenced them as powerful images of democracy in action (Bretherton,  2010; 
Glasman,  2008;  Holgate  &  Wills,  2007;  Jamoul,  2006). The events are usually 
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chaired and stage-managed by lay people drawn from the membership groups. Both 
the language and the presence of members on the stage provide a real participatory 
feel. There are many opportunities for audience interaction between people on the 
stage and those in the rows below. Each anniversary assembly, for instance, begins 
with a roll call where one or two representatives of each member organisation step 
onto the stage, introduce themselves and their organisation, state how much they will 
be paying as 'dues' and also how they will be paying. Often these statements are 
supplemented with a note about why joining Citizens UK is valuable. Usually, the 
mention of the specific member group is met with applause from the audience below. 
The repetition of such acts cements a sense of group affiliation to the alliance and 
breeds a sense of belonging (Bell 1999). 
Audience participation at Citizens UK events is high. Membership organisations are 
also represented on stage in other ways including: undertaking specific roles, such as 
'co-chairs' and 'timekeeper'; introducing each agenda item; recounting testimonies; 
and as musicians. This breeds a sense of shared responsibility for the events and an 
affinity between the organisation and its members. Clearly this is part of the process 
of building solidarity and communality; it is part of a performance that does appear 
to have the effect of breeding identification or a sense of belonging to the alliance. 
Moreover, a regular exchange between those on the stage and those in the audience 
contributes to a heightened energy and optimism. Again a sense of contagion or 
'catchiness' is evident. This is best exemplified by the TELCO 12th Anniversary 
Assembly which took place just days after Barack Obama's election as USA 
President. The repetitive use of "Yes We Can" at this meeting engaged the audience 
and pushed a degree of certainty about their ability to directly effect change. 
However, it was also intended to re-iterate the potential success of this method as 
uniquely highlighted by the election of Barack Obama. His highly publicised use of 
the Industrial Areas Foundation mobilising strategy and Saul Alinsky's organising 
doctrine now links the work of Citizens UK with the President of the USA. It is 
difficult to imagine a more potent symbol of possibility and the rewards of 
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persistence.
Form as social control
Importantly, Maurice Bloch's (1989) work  provides a note of caution. For Bloch, 
repetition in speech or in action is a technique of control precisely because it steers 
people away from the indeterminacy of every day speech and draws them into a 
context that is predictive, pre-scripted and devoid of argument let alone explanation. 
For Bloch, repetition is a clear indication of form over content. Whilst it affects 
content, it does so in a negative sense by closing down the scope for discussion and 
imposing a prescribed formula. Repetition may be emphasis but it is also the 
abandonment of argument:
A frozen statement cannot be expanded; it can only be made again and again and 
again. Repetition reminds us that we are not dealing with an argument, since an 
argument is a basis for another argument, not the basis for the same argument again.
[Bloch, 1989: 42]
Citizens UK events appear to involve a diverse group of people. However, rather 
than examples of deliberative democracy in action, these are rigidly structured 
performances and diversity in such a context means visible difference rather than 
plurality of views. No one at the Citizens UK events speaks out of turn and their 
public events are unlike any other public meeting you might attend because even 
though there are vast numbers of members seated in the audience below, not a single 
one of them raises their hand to ask a question. Everything appears to be 
choreographed and pre-determined. Indeed a number of issues, referred to as "wedge 
issues", are definitely off the table as far as campaigning is concerned.  These are 
issues that are seen as falling within the private realm and also where it is assumed 
that there cannot be any agreement amongst the membership. In particular, this 
includes sexuality, gender, violence against women or children, abortion and 
reproductive rights. Interestingly, the word "moral" is used by community organisers 
in two different ways - as the need to re-ignite a moral compass that has been lost in 
the context of capitalism on the one hand and to refer to 'problem areas' such as 
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discussions about god, sexuality and reproductive rights, as  spaces of personal 
opinion and private preference on the other. I think that it is precisely because they 
see religious groups as the antidote to capitalism that such an antidote appears to 
bring with it strong gendered demarcations between the public and private. 
Maurice Bloch's (1989) work  on religious ritual provides further  guidance for 
thinking about 'the enhancement or effacement of propositional content' in both 
religious ritual and political speech. He argued that a focus on syntax rather than on 
individual symbols affords a stronger understanding of the meanings and effects of 
language and other forms of communication. In particular, whilst some ways of 
ordering individual units of communication enable an opening up of possibilities, 
others lead to the shutting down of what he refers to as 'propositional content'. 
Moreover, it is when propositional content is reduced that traditional authority and 
social control are strengthened. In Bloch's view, religious ritual as conveyed through 
formalised speech, intonation and song is particularly partial to closure, social 
control and the reproduction of traditional authority. Drawing on Bloch's work, I 
would like to argue that the proximity of 'political meeting' and 'religious ritual', as it 
manifests through the particular language and format of the Citizens UK events, does 
two things. It enables a semblance of creativity, vitality and dynamism. Yet these are 
tempered by other tendencies that shut down possibilities through the use of religious 
references, the repetitive use of visual imagery and particular phrases, some of the 
uses of song and the heightened formalisation of the events at both the level of 
language and the organisation of physical space.
Alongside the highly corporatised appearance of all Citizens UK events - the 
Assemblies are awash with purple, the London Citizens corporate colour and the 
May Day rallies have been saturated with standardised orange placards bearing the 
Strangers into Citizens logo - the use of repetition in language, concepts and visual 
images also marks techniques of closure, of homogenisation and of imposition rather 
than undecidability. Whilst these events are vibrant and highly entertaining, they are 
also highly orchestrated, there is little discussion and even less possibility of a 
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chance occurrence. The effects of such tendencies were clearly evident during the 4th 
May 2009 Strangers into Citizens rally at which a number of musicians performed. 
The order of the musicians, their timing and the focus of their performances provided 
ample space to contradict the Citizens UK argument that they are holding the British 
State to account. A band called Asian Dub Foundation provided the most 
confrontational music and lyrics at the event. They are renowned for their support of 
some of the more difficult campaigns challenging the criminal justice system such as 
those around deaths in custody. They are overt supporters of a socialist anti racist 
politics. However, they performed at the very beginning of the rally, before the bulk 
of the march reached Trafalgar Square, reducing both the significance of their 
presence and the impact of their lyrics. Moreover, the tone of their music was a 
jarring contrast to what followed - a number of inane displays of multicultural 
conviviality ('Chinese dragons, Mongolian singers, Bengali drummers, Igbo 
dancers'96) and then a Ukrainian folksinger who led a sing-a-long to both 'God Save 
the Queen' and 'Rule Britannia', clandestinely sealing the audience's commitment to 
everything that the British State and regency represents. These could be deemed 
'counter intuitive moments' (Back 2009) that could not have been predicted at such a 
rally and where signs and signified are jumbled and reconstituted in new and exciting 
ways. However, I think it rather enabled the substantive dimensions of its 
immigration campaign and the alliance's social control function to surface. As the 
ethnically diverse crowds below, many from embattled countries around the world 
(where the British state's historical and current involvement has done much to trigger 
their displacement) craned their heads to make sense of the lyrics on the large plasma 
screen above, they were co-opted into a conservative politics by their sheer presence. 
Maurice Bloch's words 'you can not argue with a song' (1989: 42) are  particularly 
pertinent here.
Conclusion
This chapter has been concerned to acknowledge and understand how religious belief 
96 As described by the Strangers into Citizens campaign on their website 
http://www.strangersintocitizens.org.uk/pages/get-involved/rally-4-may.htm
Last accessed Thursday 11th June 2009.
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can enhance the propensity for people to engage in the world around them, 
particularly how this orients them towards specific concerns. Some of the 'religious' 
interviewees were effectively describing humanist and social justice concerns and 
seemed to believe that their religious commitments made them care more, 
particularly more than the objectifying systems of bureaucracy or neo liberalism. 
Particular religious tenets were referred to as defining the social and political 
character of religion. Religious symbols had been mobilised to challenge 
discrimination and injustice. Notably there were signs of the rolling out of the 
Citizens UK discourse as one through which the public and political possibilities of 
religious belief has gained momentum and been carried by local actors. 
In this chapter I sought to hone in on the potential positive effects of religion. I have 
highlighted the sociality of religious discourse, particularly the many ways in which 
it is claimed as a framework for creating positive change. Interviewees argued that 
belief in god or in a specific religion could encourage people to be more outward 
facing and also provide a kind of added value to human relations. Albeit an 
explanation of the metaphysical, it was alleged to offer humanisation through feeling, 
a sense of empathy and an ethics of care. This sits comfortably with a humanist 
emphasis on solidarity and relationality. Several examples were provided where 
religiosity and humanism flow in the same direction - towards charity and 
emancipation and the collective improvement of people's lives. 
Importantly, these possibilities were contrasted with statism, capitalism and 
secularism. At the most basic level these frames were critiqued as narratives of 
rationalisation and objectification. Both the critique of an over bearing command 
state and of a ruthless neo capitalist market hinged on challenging the objectification 
of individuals, their subsumption either as numbers or as commodities. Conversely 
religion was seen to favour difference and the accommodation of individual need. 
Secularism was depicted as dour, consumerism as fickle and bureaucracy as sterile. 
Additionally, secularism was associated with a loss of meaning, of colour and of 
music. These claims are akin to Max Weber's (1919/1946) rationalisation thesis of 
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which the disenchantment of the modern world is a central element.
Many interviewees appeared to be relying upon or pointing to flawed 'man made' 
laws on the one hand and pure divinity as actually existing oppositional categories. 
Yet it seemed difficult to understand how the desires or injunctions of the divine 
could be rendered other than through fallible humans and human systems especially 
when very few claimed to adhere to a literal interpretation of any text. Indeed, a 
number of critical themes emerged that continue throughout this thesis. Not all of the 
religious organisations referred to in each of the boroughs had any interest in 
changing the situation for others. Rather for some, religious belief was expressly 
directed towards gaining a secure place in the afterlife. Also, some people's religious 
views had narrowed their sense of the social and turned them inwards towards an 
identity politics pre-occupied with consolidating their belief systems or specific sites 
of worship. 
Many of the ontological assertions about living out religious commitments through 
social action were also referred to as feelings or rather as depth or longevity of 
feeling. The positive emotions of 'religious' interviewees potentially provide a stark 
contrast with the attempts of longstanding anti racist and feminist discourses to 
validate 'negative' expressions of pain and suffering. A significant number of the 
'religious' interviewees started with the emotion 'love' as the driving force for their 
engagement with the world. Others referred to 'joy' and 'hope'. The Citizens UK 
events demonstrated that the 'catchiness' of religious emotion combined with music 
and time management could combine as a highly productive and transformative 
framework carrying the ability to energise  people  and  push forward political 
demands. Citizens UK events seemed to make use of a liturgical framework without 
the 'overt' imposition of belief (though other ways in which religion is  imposed 
through  their political work is  discussed  in  Chapter  7). In this context, religion 
seemed to make available other facets as a mode of organising such as the aesthetic 
value of religious dress and the way it can be mobilised to sanctify or strengthen 
political demands. 
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However, here I want to make a final point that whilst audience participation at 
Citizens UK events gives the onlooker a sense of participatory democracy in action, 
on closer examination the use of repetition and corporate identity are instances where 
form over content effaces real critique and democratic debate. Indeed the form at 
these events is overwhelming. A number of participants in this study talked about 
being put off by it. Citizens UK events are highly stylised performances and whilst 
they may have the desired effect of 'being taken seriously', one will find little if any 
real debate at the public events, seating is pre-arranged along lines of group 
affiliation and there isn't any space for questions from the floor. This in itself 
provides insight into the ways in which religious form can also be a source of 
control. Indeed,  the 'catchiness' of religious emotion or liturgical framework could 
come with an immense social pressure to demonstrate belonging and trust such as at 
Glory House where people were pushed to share confidential financial details on 
slips of paper and those not yet born again were compelled, indeed guilt-tripped, into 
making themselves known.
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Chapter 4: 'Vestigial States': Reviving and Contesting 
Religious Leaderships
Introduction
Naomi Goldenberg (2010) proposed that a more critical perspective within religious 
studies and feminist  theory might think of religions as 'vestigial states',  displaced 
regimes  that  continue  to  operate  as  'attenuated  forms  of  governmental  authority' 
(2010: 13-15). In correspondence, Goldenberg suggested that my description of New 
Labour's 'faith agenda' might be an indication that religions are becoming 'less and 
less vestigial' and more obviously ongoing 'fictional constructions of nation-states'.97 
In this chapter, I combine Goldenberg's observation with Foucault's (1981) analysis 
of the paradoxical pastoral-policing function of the state. Driven by an impulse to 
bind the individual to society, the state is engaged in a 'death and life game' in which 
it provides for strong productive individuals, on the one hand, and yet obliges them 
to sacrifice themselves for their country, on the other (Foucault,  1978: 147). This 
chapter argues that the interaction between the state and religious organisations is 
enabled by their shared location within this pastoral-policing frame. There is both 
concord and conflict on the question of meeting social welfare needs and the desire 
to  police  behaviour,  boundaries  and  territories.  However,  these  shared  interests 
diverge  or  run  into  conflict  when  distinct  regimes  of  authority  and  sovereignty 
collide. 
I begin by identifying a number of 'pathways' linking religious organisations and the 
state, specifically embodied in the reinvigorated role of religious leaders. The second 
part  of  this  chapter  considers  the  effects  of  New  Labour's  faith  agenda  on  the 
resurgence  of  interfaith  initiatives  and  the  consolidation  of  religious  leaderships. 
Focusing on Newham is particularly useful in this regard because 'leaders' are not a 
feature of Newham Labour Group's framework yet religious leaderships are actively 
being revived through civil society mobilisations, posing unexpected dilemmas for 
the local state. These initiatives rely on some of the same problematic tenets of the 
97 Email correspondence dated 10/04/10.
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multiculturalist model of representation including the tendency of Parekh's (2000) 
'community of communities' to reproduce intra relations of power. I argue that, when 
structured through religion rather than 'race', culture or ethnicity, these relations of 
power induce new systems of 'election'. In particular, shining a spotlight on the re-
iterative exclusion of Ahmadiyya Muslims reveals how power can be consolidated as 
the  proliferation  and  normative  acceptance  of  religious  claims  through interfaith 
dialogue. 
Over the last decade, one of the biggest questions for representation and leadership 
has undoubtedly been the state's search for Muslim partners. Goldenberg (2010) has 
argued that  Islam poses a particular  problem for western nation states because it 
'refuses the castration' required for 'vestigial' status and this has lead to a struggle to 
'domesticate Islam'. The third section of this chapter reflects on that struggle and 
moves  the  debate  from thinking about  religious  groups  as  partners  in  the  state's 
policing functions to their position as subjects of its surveillance policies. 
Pathways Between Religious Groups and the Local State
This first part points to multiple ways in which religious organisations are recognised 
by the state, especially when they share pastoral and policing functions. As such, this 
chapter questions the suggestion that secularism is being imposed.
A number of interviewees argued that religion or the voice of religious organisations 
was being marginalised in their borough. The most vociferous representative of this 
perspective was Alan Craig, whose Christian People's Alliance party is premised on 
the claim that there has been a 'corrosive and aggressive secularisation' of the public 
sphere in Britain. Connected, but different, was the view of Sarah Ruiz, of Newham 
Voluntary Sector Consortium (NVSC). She argued that in spite of the New Labour 
zeal of the local Labour Group, it was averse to engaging with religious organisations 
beyond seeing them as sites of worship. She highlighted the paradox of a growth in 
the number of religious groups in her borough, their role in supporting local people 
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and yet their  exclusion from spaces of representation and state funding. Of 1400 
Third Sector organisations on the 2009 NVSC mailing list, some 570 were religious 
groups, many of which were engaged in 'social welfare' activities like lunch clubs 
and support groups. 
However, AK Sheikh could name several ways in which the Alliance of Newham 
Muslim Associations had been liaising with the state, the local police and the local 
further education college. Revd Canon Ann Easter also stated that she was the faith 
representative on the board of the Local Strategic Partnership and had been a Faith 
Advisor to the Mayor. Indeed the following quote from Newham Councillor Neil 
Wilson highlighted the potential confluence of interests between the communitarian 
tendencies of governance and religious organisations:
Politics is about what we do as groups and religion is also about groups and group 
dynamics so we should be able to connect the two.98
Meanwhile in Ealing, several politicians, Janpal Basran of the Southall Community 
Alliance  and  the  Revd  Michael  Bolley  outlined  a  strong  relationship  between 
religious groups, the council and the police. In Ealing, it was the voluntary sector 
consortium rather than the council that was accused of attempting to secularise faith 
networks as a way of accessing central government funding streams attached to a 
'faith communities' agenda. 
The situation is by no means straightforward but there is much to suggest that there 
are multiple pathways running between religious organisations and the state. These 
pathways  are  carved  around  the  following  issues:  the  capacity  of  religious 
organisations to accumulate autonomous capital in the context of shrinking public 
expenditure;  the  fact  that  some  religious  groups  are  already  providing  welfare 
services funded by their own congregations; the incorporation of religion in welfare 
98 Councillor Neil Wilson, Executive Member for Equalities and Social Inclusion, addressing a 
public meeting entitled 'Eastern European Worship in Newham' (10/05/11). 
175
provision or as religious education, notably through the SACRE; the uses made of 
local religious sites of worship, primarily Christian churches, for the provision of 
meeting space and generic welfare services; the state funding of faith based services; 
negotiations about the use of public spaces for religious processions, festivals and 
sites of worship; and the overlap between religious and secular spatial constituencies 
(for instance, parishes and electoral wards). There also appears to be a clear policing 
role  where  religious  organisations  or  'religious  leaders'  sit  on  partnership  or 
consultative bodies to assist in managing relations between the state, the police and 
communities on anything from knife crime through to traffic and parking issues.
Meeting social welfare needs
Religious groups are readily exposed to the racialised limits  of the welfare state. 
There were many references to their long history in providing food, clothing, shelter 
and sanctuary.  The Revd Canon Ann Easter  noted that  Newham's gurdwaras  had 
been  providing  twenty  meals  per  week  as  well  as  bedding  for  The  Renewal 
Programme's homelessness night shelter. The 'langar' (free food) and 'sewa' (service) 
dimension of gurdwaras provided a constant resource for people with limited access 
to  the  welfare  state.  Moreover,  given  both  boroughs  are  marked  by  waves  of 
immigration,  settlement  and  deprivation,  the  role  of  religious  groups  in  tackling 
disadvantage has invariably implicated them in witnessing and challenging racism 
and xenophobia. In Ealing, Dilbagh Chana noted that immigration advice services 
were being provided by secular rights organisations, such as JCWI, at religious sites 
of  worship  in  order  to  reach  a  greater  number  of  people.  This  is  particularly 
meaningful for those living in the shadow of immigration controls.
The  question  of  how  welfare  services  should  be  organised  was  central  to  any 
discussion  about  the  engagement  of  the  local  state  with  religious  groups.  An 
approximate typology of secular to religious service provision could be etched from 
the interviews as  follows:  secular  services  for  all  but  attuned to  take  account  of 
religious difference including by accommodating religious holidays, dress codes and 
diets; secular specialist services organised along equality strands (gender, ethnicity 
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and age were mentioned); religious organisations providing generic services open to 
all. The latter included reference to a legacy of faith based provision that had become 
'secularised'.  In  Newham,  Revd  Quintin  Peppiatt  and  Alan  Partridge  noted  that 
Christian  buildings  were  already  being  used  in  multiple  ways  beyond  worship 
including as premises for community organisations and as sites for support group 
meetings and advice services. Newham Council  was funding some of the secular 
welfare activities taking place at these Church buildings. 
Importantly, across the interviews, there wasn't any reference to the  imposition of 
secular services. In lieu of multicultural policies, many services had been customised 
to take account of cultural,  linguistic or religious difference.  Indeed activists like 
Mizan  Raja  of  Islamic  Circles  were  organising  to  get  mainstream  services  to 
accommodate  'Muslim  needs',  for  instance,  by  encouraging  Muslim  parents  to 
become school governors at regular state comprehensives.
However, the propensity of 'cohesion' talk to turn assimilationist was highlighted by 
the actions of two key Blairite politicians - Darra Singh and Robin Wales. Darra 
Singh used to be the Chief Executive Officer of Ealing Council and gained particular 
notoriety by chairing the New Labour Commission on Cohesion and Integration. At a 
local  level  he  interpreted  'cohesion'  to  insist  on  generic  rather  than  specialist 
domestic violence services. In practice this policy was carried by a Conservative-led 
council and involved using new commissioning regimes to withdraw the annual grant 
from the local black women's organisation, Southall Black Sisters, on the grounds 
that they should be providing services for all (including for men).99 Interestingly, the 
judgement on the case recognised that 'there is no dichotomy between the promotion 
of equality and cohesion and the provision of specialist services' because part of the 
process of realising cohesion entails tackling barriers to engagement, such as racist 
99 During the judicial review hearing at the Royal Courts of Justice in July 2008, Karon 
Monaghan, the barrister intervening on behalf of the Equalities and Human Rights Commission, stated 
that Ealing council was seeking to transform 'Southall Black Sisters' into 'Southall Black and White 
Sisters and Brothers', an active assault on the nature and purpose of the organisation.
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and sexist discrimination.100 
More recently, Newham's Mayor Robin Wales sought to implement public spending 
cuts  by  taking  a  unilateral  decision  to  stop  supplying  ethnic  minority  language 
newspapers at local libraries on the grounds that this should encourage local people 
to learn and speak English and take pride in a sense of Britishness.101 Local anti racist 
activists sought to challenge this on the basis that it is 'not supported by mainstream 
thought  or  research  that  recognized  the  beneficial  and  complex  role  mother-
tongue/second-language skills play in learning English as a foreign language (and 
also doesn't) address the broader value of preserving and respecting other cultures 
within a diverse and evolving borough.'102 
However, it is difficult to translate these 'cohesion' moves into attempts to eradicate 
difference. In particular, the question of religion reveals additional dimensions to the 
way that cohesion policy is rolled out at the local level.  Each borough speaks in 
dissimilar  ways  to  the  question  of  religion  and  secularism  in  public  policy.  In 
Newham there is a strong connection between a secular public culture and cohesion 
policy whilst in Ealing there has been a stronger connection between 'cohesion', PVE 
programmes and the rolling out of a faith agenda. Whilst Ealing Council mobilised 
arguments about cohesion and the need for generic domestic violence services, it was 
simultaneously creating 'Muslim' groups as part of its PVE and cohesion policies.103 
Conversely,  Newham council  are  committed  to  some specialist  services,  such as 
100 See Lord Justice Moses' judgement in the case of R (Kaur & Shah) v London Borough of 
Ealing, July 2008.
101 See Newham's Libraries Remove Foreign Language Newspapers dated 10th May 2011 at 
BBC News online available at:
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-london-13352845
102 Excerpt from petition Save Our Language Papers available at:
http://www.gopetition.com/petitions/save-our-language-papers.html
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domestic violence services for South Asian women, but specifically invoke cohesion 
as caution on the question of funding religious organisations or indulging religious 
accommodation.  Sarah  Ruiz  of  NVSC  described  this  rather  as  suspicion  of  the 
intentions of religious organisations, particularly Muslim groups:
Yes, I think that there was always the underlying concern that any money that, and I 
have to say that I think it was the Muslim communities who suffered the most, I 
think that there was always this 'well whatever we give them money for, they’ll only 
use it for their Quran classes’.  Or if they’re having a summer play scheme, they  
won’t be playing at all, they’ll be teaching the Quran.
[Sarah Ruiz, NVSC, 14/05/09]
Ealing may not have a faith liaison officer as such but the local authority and local 
politicians continued to fund Christian denomination faith schools and had supported 
the establishment of Sikh only and Muslim only education, youth and support group 
services. The proclaimed 'secular' picture in Newham, however, was complicated by 
a  number of anomalies  namely:  the longstanding public  funding of two Catholic 
secondary schools; the perceived 'Muslim identity' of two girls-only state secondary 
schools; the sole use of one community centre, the Upton Centre, by a Hindu group; 
and the delivery of expressly faith based sexual health services. Also a number of 
independent  faith  based  schools  and  youth  groups  continued  to  exist  alongside 
statutory provision and some statutory sector employees, such as one Development 
Worker, believed these could not be discounted in borough-wide discussions about 
policy and provision. Whilst he opposed faith based services on the grounds that the 
state should not be funding 'preferences' (an interesting counterpoint to the pro faith 
services arguments about  'choice'), the council's youth services division could not 
avoid partnerships with religious groups in the borough that were providing youth 
activities. He was concerned that sidestepping these would mean ignoring the work 
103 See Patel, P and Sen, U (2011) Cohesion, Faith and Gender: A report on the impact of the 
cohesion and faith based approach on black and minority women in Ealing published by Southall 
Black Sisters and Oxfam. Available at: See http://www.southallblacksisters.org.uk/report-
requests.html
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that they were already undertaking.104 Yet to acknowledge them and bring them into 
an alliance could have its own reproductive effects, as discussed in Chapter 7.
A religious man himself, one Labour councillor offered some clarity on Newham's 
approach, specifically emphasising the tensions between accommodating religions 
and safeguarding other equalities duties, notably gender and sexual orientation. He 
refused to close his eyes to the assertion of relativistic claims that 'allow women to be 
subjugated to all sorts of pressures in the name of religion that you wouldn't tolerate 
because of other issues', difficulties with gay rights and an emphasis on separateness, 
namely purity arguments for segregated eating. Indeed he was one of the very few 
interviewees  that  recalled  the  historical  reasons  for  secularism  in  Britain.  He 
maintained that one has to 'have an honest discussion and dialogue' about religion in 
the public sphere and he did not want to simply go along with a 'faith communities'  
agenda.105 
The same councillor explained that Newham Council is not prepared to structure its 
relationship with the local population on the basis of religious categories. So, for 
instance,  they  would  not  claim  to  'have  separate  meetings  with  the  Muslim 
community' or attempt to organise the council's response to needs in this way. This 
did  not  preclude  people  from  engaging  with  interfaith  initiatives  and  he  had 
addressed meetings organised by religious groups, for instance, to raise awareness of 
the importance of HIV treatment and support for HIV sufferers.106 It seemed to me 
that rather than erase difference, his main point was to exercise caution and ensure 
there was enough emphasis on cohesive activities to counter the most divisive and 
inegalitarian aspects of religion in the public sphere. 
104 Interviewed 16/09/09.
105 Interviewed 2/12/09.
106 Ibid.
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In a sense this perspective was strengthened by the concerns of a worker at an ethnic 
minority women's  organisation in Newham. She pointed to divergent frameworks 
and  social  policy  objectives  for  religious  and  secular  providers.  She  similarly 
emphasised  the  need  for  social  policy  to  be  about  challenging  discrimination, 
strengthening equality and encouraging tolerance. In her view religious groups were 
far less likely to engage from this perspective and she questioned their input into 
consultations intended to shape the local social and political landscape. Moreover, at 
a very practical level, there were questions about the local economy to be addressed:
A need is identified and that need is usually linked to a disadvantage or barrier that 
exists for people. Ultimately it addresses a wrong that needs to be made right. So  
there  is  a  social  justice  element  to  it.  So  in  the  very  ethos,  in  the  very  sort  of 
perspective that an organisation needs to have which needs to permeate through its 
working culture,  its  frameworks,  its  policies.  All  of  that  I  think has to  be taken  
together as an organic whole. It can't be, you can't just say oh well, OK, they don't 
have that understanding so let’s give them this grant to train them. Well actually, you 
know, there has been a divestment from the voluntary sector for a very long time. 
And if you look at the level of investment that New Labour put into the voluntary 
sector, it didn't meet what was promised at all. And there are many organisations that 
would benefit from that capacity building and additional resources.
[Worker, ethnic minority women's group in Newham, 20/10/09]
In thinking about the problems with increasing the numbers of faith based services in 
their  areas,  interviewees  in  each  of  the  boroughs  applied  conditions  including: 
distinguishing between needs and demands (Councillor Dhindsa); prioritising unmet 
needs without undermining the role that religious groups play in the borough (Sarah 
Ruiz); being mindful of the ratio of faith based to secular services (Stephen Timms 
MP for instance said he would support an increase from 1% to 2% but not 1% to 
50% or 100%); and delimiting funding to services available to everyone irrespective 
of religious affiliation (Revd Michael Bolley). 
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Shared policing functions
Local states and religious organisations share some concerns and ambitions and this 
enables some strong relationships between them. This was particularly highlighted in 
the interviews with Revd Michael Bolley in Ealing and AK Sheikh in Newham, both 
of  whom  described  longstanding  arrangements  between  the  police  and  local 
'community',  namely  through  'religious  leaders'.  Revd  Bolley  explained  that  the 
police saw religious groups as a kind of 'conduit', as a 'lead into the community'. He 
viewed this liaison as a natural extension of the policing of religious festivals and 
processions. The key concern was to deal with a wider 'community consensus' that 
complained about traffic congestion and the 'nuisance' caused by 'young men coming 
in cars', particularly during Eid and Vaisakhi, but to do so without causing offence 
and  without  making  'particular  faiths  feel  that  they  have  been  trodden  down'. 
However this faith based support for the police extended out to cover cricket match 
celebrations and the search for leads on murders and ethnic tensions.107 
I put the feminist critique of multiculturalist (now multifaithist) governance and its 
colonial antecedents to Revd Bolley but he insisted that there are policing issues at 
religious festivities so it  made logical sense for the police to work with religious 
groups. However, the liaison group did not comprise representatives of all religious 
organisations. For instance, just 3 gurdwaras out of a total 12 were involved. Indeed, 
Bolley  did  not  question the  value  of  the committee as  much as  he critiqued the 
police's interpretation of the term 'community leaders' to mean 'religious leaders' and 
more so, male religious leaders since only 2 out of 20 members of the group were 
women. He ended the interview on this point:
One of the questions that would exercise me is about who is doing the speaking. And 
just going back to the case of that police meeting, the reality is that most of the time 
it is the men that are doing the speaking. That may not be in the interests of the 
women concerned. My question is not whether there should be a role but a) what is 
that role and b) who is doing the speaking. The representational role would be a  
bigger issue for me.
[Revd Michael Bolley, Holy Trinity Church, 14/07/11]
107 Interviewed 14/07/11.
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Sometimes relations between statutory bodies and religious groups are mediated by 
just  one  or  two  individuals  who  move  continuously  between  the  state  and  civil 
society, articulating or validating specific religious perspectives and religious needs 
along the way. AK Sheikh was one such person. By his own admission he wore many 
hats. At the time of the interview, Sheikh had moved from being a Labour Party 
councillor to a Respect Party councillor, he had been the Chair and Vice Chair of the 
local Race Relations Council, he was on the board of trustees for the Green Street 
mosque,  and he  was the  Lifelong Secretary  of  the  Alliance  of  Newham Muslim 
Associations. Moreover, he represented Muslim groups in relation to the police and 
the local further education college. He was also part of several civil society faith 
initiatives  discussed  in  the  next  section.  Interestingly,  he  noted  that  his  Muslim 
organisation was regularly consulted by the Mayor and had been able to raise various 
concerns including: the need for a Muslim burial ground; the recruitment of Muslim 
governors  and  school  teachers;  the  under-achievement  of  Pakistani  and  Bengali 
children at school; and proposals to fast track Pakistani and Bangladeshi staff within 
the local authority in order to tackle their under representation. However, Sheikh also 
noted the fickle nature of these consultation sessions, which he claims came to an 
end when the Mayor shifted his attention to Eastern Europeans. Nevertheless, despite 
defecting from the Labour Party, Sheikh continued a working relationship with the 
Labour Party Deputy Mayor who engaged religious  groups on strategic  planning 
issues like access to sites of worship in case of unexpected disasters.
Sheikh's  discussion  of  the  Police  Liaison  Group  and  Newham  College's  Faith 
Advisory Group were even more revealing. He noted that religious organisations in 
the borough had been concerned with crime reduction. Through the police liaison 
group,  the  sergeant  was  reporting  to  local  'religious  leaders'  on  their  policing 
operations. Sheikh's account lacked any critique of these operations. He referred to 
three particular areas of overlapping interest: young people 'going astray' in terms of 
drugs  and  crime;  'prostitution';  and  the  sale  of  alcohol.  On  the  question  of 
'prostitution', Sheikh stated that 'prostitutes' were relocating from one area to another, 
so  members  of  local  religious  groups  had  been  helping  to  catch  curb  crawlers 
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especially by using CCTV.108 He was primarily concerned to emphasise the 'offence' 
caused by the public presence of 'prostitutes' to the sensibilities of ethnic minority 
elders  and  religious  people.  Clearly,  these  are  instances  where  multiculturalist 
discourses of tolerance and sensitivity roll into multifaithist practice to enable the 
policing function of religious organisations. Secondly, religious groups in the area 
gained police support to prevent the licensing of any more alcohol vendors. Whilst 
there may be valid concerns about the relationship between poverty and alcoholism, 
Sheikh focused on the potential for crime and negative influences on young people. 
Indeed this particular mixture iterates 'clean up' operations engaging religious groups 
in other areas109 and reveals their attempts to create physical enclosures protected 
from  whatever  is  regarded  as  a  'bad  influence'.  Other  interviewees  noted  the 
disappearance of bars and pubs in predominantly Asian parts of the borough and a 
normative shift in the presence of out gay bodies. Sarah Ruiz (NVSC) argued that the 
borough had become particularly intolerant and LGBT groups had disappeared. She 
stated:
I think it is fairly conservative.  I mean (name) who works with me is a gay man, gay 
black man who lives in (name) Road. I’m not sure whether he feels safe, I don't  
know.  But I don’t think that, well actually I don’t think that Newham is necessarily  
that tolerant of people’s sexuality.  I think that’s far more of an issue in Newham… I  
mean ELOP do a bit of work, East London Out Project, but that’s about it.  And 
when you look back at how vibrant this borough was for decades. Gone.  And we’re  
wondering, I mean it’s not something that we spend all of our time talking about, but 
just like we see that actually there are very few pubs now in Newham. 
[Sarah Ruiz, NVSC, 14/05/09]
This was a slow process that had developed over time but had the effect of recasting 
108 I have used the term 'prostitution' in line with Sheikh's own terminology but placed it in 
quotation marks to be mindful of the raging debate about the sex industry and its implications for 
terms of reference.
109 Such as the campaign to clear Bradford's predominantly Asian Manningham area of 
'prostitutes' during the 1990s and the current campaign against strip clubs in Tower Hamlets, both led 
by conservative religious men.
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the physical and cultural landscape of certain areas. 
Conversely, by his own admission, Sheikh's ward was listed at the bottom end of the 
local police's crime statistics confirming the gap between moral panic and reality. 
This gives rise to two further questions. Is there any relationship between this lower 
level crime statistic and the existence of these secondary tiers of religious policing?110 
Secondly, if Sheikh's area has a low crime rate, why did it form such a significant  
part of the interview discussion? Moreover, this police-religious liaison on crime did 
not  extend to  gender  related crime such as  effective  policing and prosecution  of 
domestic violence, sexual assault, sexual harassment or stalking. It may be a huge 
relief for some readers to know that a clear confidentiality policy meant the police 
were not using these liaison meetings to discuss domestic abuse cases with local 
religious  leaders.  However,  it  was  notable  that  Sheikh  viewed  the  statistics  on 
domestic violence and sexual assault as the terrain of Victim Support and Newham 
Asian  Women's  Project,  not  really  his  concern.  Indeed  Sheikh  was  not  at  all 
interested in talking about gender-related violence. 
Nevertheless,  yet  more  instances  of  the  role  of  religious  organisations  in  micro 
security issues emerged as we discussed his chairing of the Faith Advisory Group at 
110 Rahul Rao recently used the phrase 'security had become a function of ethnic solidarity' to 
describe some of the complex dimensions of mobilisations against rioters in the London borough of 
Hackney in August 2011. See Dalston: A Worms Eye View posted by Rahul Rao on 22/08/11 at The 
Disorder of Things and available at: 
http://thedisorderofthings.com/2011/08/22/dalston-a-worms-eye-view/#more-4023
I believe this phrase has some bearing on the policing function of religious mobilisations. 
During the August 2011 riots, Southall was 'defended' by predominantly male groups from two 
prominent Sikh and Muslim sites of worship - the SGSSS and the Abu Bak'r mosque. Whilst these 
were credited for 'protecting' local people, homes and businesses from looters, they also created a no 
go zone for women. Moreover, the same 'defenders' stood by whilst black youth were harassed by the 
police. 
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the Newham College of Further Education. He stated that the group's remit was to 
'help advise what is best for the interests of the community at large'. In particular this 
had involved resolution of conflicting faith perspectives and included dealing with 
demands from Muslim students for a prayer room. On this, the group had mobilised 
consent for the college's commitment to secularism and for rooms to be provided on 
an ad hoc basis during Ramadan rather than to create a permanent prayer room as an 
institutionalised feature of the college building. It was interesting to hear someone so 
implicated in Muslim identity politics defending 'secular' spaces in this instrumental 
way. 
Moreover,  this  Faith Advisory Group had been called in to calm students  during 
discussions about the Iraq War and other international events. Sheikh stated:
Yes sure, when there are crises internationally, whether it's the Iraq war and other,  
there is a heated up debate with young people and there could be a time when they 
are taking sides, putting up their viewpoint and then we always try to see how the  
inside environment of the college is. We wanted to have everybody in safer situation 
and not to have a clash and not the incidents.  So we get the report from the campus  
manager and others who are in senior positions, the Vice Principal and the rest of it,  
so they can come and tell us is it any extraordinary activities going on and if there 
are any issues or problems to talk and the members of the other faith community 
they have their own input to tell us and to share how they seek to solve that problem.
[AK Sheikh, former councillor, 8/10/09]
Given Sheikh's defence of Hizb ut-Tahrir and his own defection from Labour to the 
Respect Party in lieu of the Iraq invasion, he occupied a curious position as mediator 
of  such  discussions.  It  felt  probable  that  his  interventions  amounted  more  to 
managerialism  than  to  any  substantive  challenge  either to  Right  wing  religious 
political mobilisations at the college or to New Labour's claims to be liberating Iraq. 
Moreover,  to  think  on  Iraq  as  an  issue  for  a  Faith  Advisory  Group  potentially 
reinforces rather than breaks through the claims of Islamic Right mobilisations and 
the closed circle of Muslim identity politics.
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Inter Faith Alliances
This section highlights the way in which religious leaderships have been revived in 
Newham through a number of civil society faith initiatives. I point to the reasons 
given for establishing these but also the problematic assumptions at play. Focusing 
on Newham has been particularly interesting in this regard because it draws out a 
series  of  unintended  consequences  of  the  New  Labour  approach.  In  particular, 
Newham is a borough where 'leadership' is singularly interpreted as centralised Party 
leadership (especially evident in the introduction of a directly elected Mayor). This 
archetypal New Labour borough did not swallow the communitarian tendencies of 
the New Labour project. Moreover, the local council is not known for power sharing 
with the Third Sector. This is particularly highlighted by their decision to deliver 
most,  if  not  all,  the  PVE  programmes  in-house.  A series  of  civil  society  faith 
initiatives potentially stand as a strong contrast to the council's approach.
Religious and community leaderships are embodiments of the complex and changing 
lines  of  power described above and they gained renewed significance within  the 
social policy frames listed in Chapter 1. Despite decades of feminist critique (such as 
Sahgal, 1990 and 2004; Ali, 1992; Narayan, 1997), New Labour's conjoined projects 
of managerialism and devolution reinvigorated the role of 'leaders' in governance. 
They  identified  'transformational  leadership',  especially  through  localised 
regeneration  /  inclusion  agendas,  as  one  technique  for  drawing  popular,  and 
particularly Third Sector, support for their policies (Newman, 2001: 99). Presumably 
this is one more reason why religious leadership, associated as it is with hearts and 
not just minds, became an affective source of complicity. One can add to this, Kevin 
Blowe's observation that New Labour's 'big tent' approach to social policy meant it 
was particularly concerned to demonstrate diverse support. This impacted on funding 
streams and consequently on the socio-political landscape of local areas. According 
to Blowe, it had the effect of 're-classifying communities'  as ever-smaller interest 
groups,  each  with  designated  'leaders'  that  could  then  be  brought  into  the  New 
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Labour 'big tent' to 'say whatever you want them to say'.111 
It was clear from interviews with councillors that they were not comfortable with nor 
wanted to promote a model of representation that relied upon engagement through 
community  leaders,  particularly  religious  leaderships.  Councillor  Unmesh  Desai 
(then  the  Mayor’s  Advisor  for  Community  Affairs)  cited  individual  surveys, 
councillor surgeries and the Mayor's Question Time slots as preferred techniques for 
consultation. Another councillor, a religious man himself, explained that the borough 
prides itself on being 'the most surveyed population in the UK' and had 'moved a 
long way' from consulting faith leaders. He gave his reasons as follows:
My  big  problem  with  inviting  faith  leaders,  they  happen  to  be  men,  not  always 
representative.  Might be well versed in scriptures but not necessarily in any issues of 
shall we say poverty, single parenthood, teenage pregnancy, HIV, Aids, all of which are 
high.  And I would say that whether we’re talking about a Bishop here, or an Imam there. 
I think it’s a very patronising approach. We’ve moved a long way I think since then. 
We’ve moved away from tick boxes but we do need to have an honest discussion where 
faith groups are segmenting populations.
[Newham Councillor, 2/12/09] 
Desai  reinforced  this  view  of  'leaders',  whether  religious  or  community,  as 
unrepresentative.  Nevertheless,  there  were  interviewees  in  both  boroughs  that 
believed interaction between religious leaders could bring cohesion and harmony at 
the local level. Whilst Janpal Basran (of Southall Community Alliance), recognised 
their tendency towards conservative agendas on immigration and crime, he described 
religious leadership as an 'invisible glue that binds the community'.112 Sarah Ruiz also 
emphasised the positive dimensions of interaction between religious leaders:
I think that we have much more cohesive communities here and we work together 
111 Interviewed 9/08/07.
112 Interviewed 20/09/10.
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and people talk.  There may well be underlying tensions but we don't have the level 
of tensions here that they do in other boroughs, really we don't. I think that actually 
there are sufficient community leaders of all faiths who work very hard at creating 
comfortable and working together relationships.
[Sarah Ruiz, NVSC, 12/11/09] 
In  Newham,  religion  became an  organising  principle  within  civil  society  at  two 
levels. Firstly, the Stop the War Coalition, including the Newham branch, relied on 
religious,  particularly  Muslim,  organisations  as  spaces  of  mobilisation.  This  has 
already been discussed in Chapter 2. Secondly, civil society organisations accessed 
central  government  funding  premised  on  'faith  engagement'.  Whilst  interviewees 
reported that other boroughs utilised this money in as secular a way as possible, faith 
engagement in Newham was earnest and lively.  Several actors referred to initiatives 
encouraging faith exchange, dialogue or alliances including: the Faith Sector Forum 
run by Newham Voluntary Sector  Consortium; Faithful  Friends;  the Three Faiths 
Forum;  Transform;  the  Neighbourhood  and  Faiths  Walk;  the  Faiths  in  Action 
trainings run by the voluntary sector organisation Conflict and Change; and The East 
London Communities Organisation (TELCO), discussed separately in Chapter 7. Not 
all  of  these  were  funded  by  central  government.  However,  Sarah  Ruiz  of  the 
Newham  Voluntary  Sector  Consortium  (NVSC)  explained  that  their  decision  to 
initiate  a  Faith  Sector  Forum  arose  from  the  conditions  set  by  the  central 
government's Community Empowerment Network funding. This grant had also been 
accessed by the Aston Mansfield Charity to produce a comprehensive list of religious 
organisations in the borough, called the Newham Faiths Directory. The faiths work 
conducted by the voluntary sector organisation, Conflict and Change, had also been 
funded by central government. 
NVSC Faith Sector Forum
NVSC secured Community Empowerment Network funding in 2003 and employed a 
dedicated Faith Sector Worker in order to set up a formal Faith Sector Forum. Aside 
from the conditions of public funding, and in spite of her critique of the New Labour 
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ideological project,  Sarah Ruiz embraced the opportunity to create a Faith Sector 
Forum because of an overriding desire to open up democratic debate in the borough 
by galvanising civil society players of all hues. She provided a stream of additional 
reasons  including:  ethical  questions  about  denying  the  value  of  religious 
organisations in a borough where religious affiliation appeared to be 'so obviously 
important to people'; the need to create 'greater understanding and working across 
communities' or cohesion; to understand the conditions for religious engagement in 
the  public  sphere  (such  as  not  setting  meetings  during  Ramadan)  without  also 
encouraging  fragmentation,  competing  demands  or  separate  faith  based  services; 
working together to prevent exclusion; and exchange of religious or cultural beliefs, 
with an emphasis on what these mean in practice. This was an experiment of great 
proportions that carried a number of unintended effects. 
The NVSC 'deliberately' recruited a Faith Sector Worker of 'no faith'. It turned out 
that the 'somebody of no faith' that Ruiz referred to was not an agnostic or atheist but 
a  white  Irish  woman  that  had  converted  from  Catholicism  to  Buddhism.  The 
rationale for her recruitment was premised on the mobility of her unassigned body. 
The lack of visible piety (and possibly also of 'race'?) was understood as neutral and 
the basis for greater engagement whilst ethnic minority religious bodies carried the 
potential for exclusion or conflict. Paradoxically, this practice reinforces one of the 
foundational  tenets  of  secular  public  culture,  namely  that  the  ostensibly  private 
nature of some people's beliefs can enable rather than avert multi-faith engagement. 
Sarah Ruiz stated:
Well, I think people found it very strange that we deliberately appointed somebody 
who had no outward faith. So we made a decision that we couldn't employ a Muslim 
or a Sikh or a Hindu because they would not have access to all the faiths that we 
needed to contact. Although she was a Buddhist, there was no outward, she didn’t  
ever talk about her own faith.  And therefore, was acceptable to all  the faiths in 
Newham because  she  posed  no  threat.   She  wasn’t  going  into  a  gurdwara  as  a 
Muslim; she just went in as Jacqui… She was a strange mix herself because she was 
a Catholic turned Buddhist.  And then I also did part of that work as, I wouldn't say I 
was as atheist as Kevin, but I have no faith.  And because I had no faith, I was very 
interested to learn about other faiths.  So I didn’t go in with any preconceived ideas,  
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I went in and worked with the groups as if they were a community group.
[Sarah Ruiz, NVSC, 14/05/09] 
It  became obvious that  the religious organisations  they contacted did not already 
have reciprocal relationships with each other. Up until this point it was the Christian 
groups (particularly the 50 or so members  of the Methodist  Circuit)  and a  small 
number  of  Muslim  groups  that  were  interacting.  Ruiz  described  religious 
organisations in the borough as 'insular', as not seeing 'themselves as part of anything' 
and 'just a place of worship' for a specific congregation. She suggested that it was the 
incentive of funding and the possibility of influencing local agendas that actually 
drew participants for this new Faith Sector Forum. The engagement was engineered 
through hard labour  as the Faith  Sector  Worker  undertook significant  legwork to 
establish contact with religious groups and actively instigated relationships between 
them. 
At their peak, NVSC had a total of 9 staff supporting three different sector forums - 
voluntary,  community  and  faith  -  as  well  as  two  annual  gatherings  of  all  three 
forums. However,  Ruiz was very clear that the Faith Sector Forum was the most 
exciting of the three, the most dynamic. In November 2004, they held a conference. 
There were 370 delegates representing about 300 religious organisations, out of 350 
religious groups in the borough at that time. The conference cost £30,000. Given that 
I  started  this  research  after  the  conference  had taken place  and the  Faith  Sector 
Forum had disbanded, I  had to rely on Sarah Ruiz's  account and the Conference 
Report  for  insights  into  the  process  and discussion.113 The  report  emphasises  the 
'super diversity' characterisation of the borough and yet the lack of interaction across 
religions. It also depicts 'faith leaders' as the subject of historical non-recognition and 
exclusion. The report states: 
113 Faith Conference Action Plan: Having Faith to Face Social Challenges within Newham by 
Newham Voluntary Sector Consortium, undated report of the Newham Multifaith Conference on 30th 
November 2004.
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They  felt  they  had  been  let  down  so  many  times  in  the  past  and  for  them  to 
participate they needed to feel they would be taken seriously and their contribution 
would be valued. They wanted an acknowledgement of the role they played in the  
community, proper representation that catered for their needs, concrete benefits that 
were visible and overall demonstration that it would be different this time.114
The Conference Report also reminds the reader that Newham Council were allocated 
£70 million (to be spent over 5 years between 2001-6), a significant chunk of the 
£1.8 billion of Neighbourhood Renewal Funding shared across 88 neighbourhoods in 
the country. The use of this £70 million was to be determined by the Local Strategic  
Partnership (LSP).115 The Community Empowerment Network grant to NVSC was 
specifically intended to support the voluntary, community and faith sectors to engage 
with and make representations to their local LSP. Moreover, there was an expectation 
attached to  the Community Empowerment  Network funding that  local  authorities 
would pick up projects generated through these grants. NVSC's Faith Sector Forum 
sent their Conference Report to the LSP with the intention of having the action points 
taken up through the Neighbourhood Renewal Fund. They also wanted Newham's 
religious groups to influence the Newham Compact, the new agreement between the 
local  council  and  the  Third  Sector.  However,  according  to  Sarah  Ruiz,  the  LSP 
'absolutely refused point blank to have it on the agenda'.116 Not only were Newham 
Council  reluctant  to  participate  in  the  Faith  Sector  Forum conference,  they were 
unwilling to debate the report. 
The spatialisation of the faith agenda
This  subsection  considers  the  implications  of  two other  civil  society  faith  based 
initiatives in Newham: the Faithful Friends and the Faiths and Neighbours Walks. 
114 Page 7, ibid.
115 Pages 5-6, ibid.
116 Interviewed 12/11/09.
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Some of the objectives of inter faith exchange and alliances were re-iterated by those 
involved in two further initiatives: Faithful Friends and Neighbourhood Walks. In 
2007, Pat Mossop, a prominent local Christian Minister, established Faithful Friends. 
Their  website  describes  the  group  as:  'helping  people  from  different  local  faith 
communities get to know one another, through evenings of food, chat and sharing of 
each other's experiences of life and faith'. Amongst its activities it lists a 'First Steps'  
visit to each other's places of worship and a specific pilot project for young people to 
gain confidence about  their  religious  beliefs  and encourage  them to embrace  the 
religious  dimension of  their  moral  values.  An events  diary  reveals  attendance  at 
annual religious festivals, Mawlid-ul-Nabi (the Birth of the Prophet), the Easter Vigil 
Service, the Vaisakhi procession, a Hindu Chariot procession, and a Christmas Carol 
Service.  Also  listed  were  themed  discussions,  namely  "Where  Does  Everything 
Come From? A chance to discuss what answers different faiths"; "Drug Problems In 
Our Community - How Can Faith Help?" and "Giving And Serving - What part does 
it play in our faith?" Moreover, Faithful Friends claims the following positive effects:
• Faithful Friends has led to friendships between people of different faiths and cultural 
backgrounds.
• Faithful Friends has given people greater confidence to share what their faith means 
to  them,  helping  counter  ignorance  between  groups  through  meaningful 
conversations between local people of faith. 117
About three years into the project, I interviewed the then convenor, Revd Barnabas 
Matloob. Both he and AK Sheikh believed that this initiative was breeding tolerance 
and understanding across religious groups. Matloob described its purpose as:
We want to make this area an example and show how we sit down in mosque, or  
temple  or  gurdwara  and  talk  to  each  other  respectfully,  or  listen  to  each  other 
carefully.  It's  not  a competition.  Whatever you have,  you have to share with us.  
Whatever  I  have,  I  have  to  share  with  you.  That's  friendship.  No  cheating,  no 
politics,  no discrimination.  Just  you have to  share  whatever  you have,  that's  the 
117 Faithful Friends homepage available at: http://www.faithfulfriends.org.uk/
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beauty of this project.
[Revd Barnabas Matloob, Faithful Friends, 19/11/10]
Whilst  the website lists  10 partners, Matloob stated the events regularly involved 
representatives of around 20-25 local religious organisations. He was not keen to 
answer the question of which groups the alliance might not be willing to work with 
but rather spoke in positive terms about engaging with anyone interested in 'bringing 
peace'.  There  was  no  obligation  to  accept  each  other's  theology  or  doctrine. 
Affirmation  was  the  central  tenet  -  mutual  recognition  of  beliefs  and  practices, 
mutual support and moving beyond tension or conflict.  Engagement was oriented 
and  described  through  the  operative  phrases  'exchange',  'respect'  and  'we  stand 
together'.  Matloob  noted  that  these  budding  friendships  had extended  to  provide 
members with support during bereavement, as indeed might be expected of friends. 
Faithful Friends certainly represented a noble attempt at resolving some longstanding 
enmities. In particular, the initiative had brokered a relationship between two large 
Shia  and  Sunni  mosques  in  the  borough,  which  previously  refused  to  have  any 
contact with each other. Matloob also referred to empathetic discussions about the 
assault on Christians in Gojra, Pakistan.118 However, he re-iterated a reluctance to 
engage with political agendas, stating 'we are not political people, we are religious 
people'. In this interview, politics was associated with tension and division and he 
was quick to  emphasise  the  distinction  between interfaith  dialogue and 'political' 
initiatives.
118 Gojra is a small town in the Punjab province of Pakistan with a minority Christian 
population. On 31st July and 1st August 2009, allegations that Christians had desecrated the Quran 
(transmitted via loud speakers by local mosques) incited violence in which Christian houses and a 
church were set alight and seven people were burnt alive. See Violence against Christian community 
in Gojra after allegations of defiling of Holy Quran posted on 1/08/09 at the Human Rights 
Commission of Pakistan website and available at:
http://www.hrcp-web.org/showfact.asp?id=12
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In May 2010, Faithful Friends organised a 'Walk of Solidarity'  around the Forest 
Gate area of the borough starting at the Ramgharia gurdwara, pausing at the Green 
Street Mosque and ending at the Emmanuel Church on the main Romford Road. A 
year later this idea was replicated by a 'Faith and Neighbours Walk' through Plaistow 
in which 70 people participated. It was organised by the E13 People Action United in 
response to 'parent and community requests for more opportunities to learn about the 
diverse cultures of the area'.119 One of the participants, Alan Partridge, explained that 
the walk was designed as a 'whistle stop tour' of five key places of worship in the  
Plaistow area that could reflect the five main world religions. Each would be given 
15  minutes  to  provide  an  introduction  to  their  beliefs  and  practices.  The  walk 
between  sites  would  provide  a  relaxed  and  informal  space  for  discussion  and 
knowledge  exchange.  From  Alan's  perspective,  such  spaces  offer  immense 
opportunities  to  develop  mutually  supportive  structures.  In  particular,  he  seemed 
concerned to learn about appropriate behaviour. For instance, he didn't know what to 
do in times of non-Christian death and bereavement, especially noting the different 
grieving processes of his West African and South Asian neighbours.120 
These are indeed intimate spaces where the idioms of respect and sensitivity take on 
new meaning and need to be guided by an ethics of care that encompasses difference. 
Alan Partridge is  a  noticeably  gentle,  careful  and considerate  man that  is  highly 
regarded in the local area. However, playing devil's advocate, I could not resist to ask 
why he couldn't just ask his neighbours what they would like and how they were 
accustomed to passing through such situations. The fact of difference appeared to 
confound him. He was concerned to identify 'norms' and 'expectations' and not to 
'insult', 'offend' or 'overstep boundaries'. It did start to feel that this was a peculiarly  
(white)  English  predicament,  something  that  ethnic  minority  interviewees  hardly 
119 See E13 Community Learning write up on the project at: http://www.e13lc.org/wp-
content/uploads/2010/11/Web-report.jpg
120 Of course these groups could also be Christian and still have different cultural practices. 
However, it is noteworthy that, alongside AK Sheikh's 'Muslim' intervention on Pakistani and 
Bangladeshi underachievement, noted above, many issues pertaining to 'race' culture and ethnicity 
now folded into issues for inter faith dialogue and religious literacy.
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talked about as a concern for how they related to others. Rather, for them, 'respect' 
and 'offence' were terms oriented towards describing the preferred treatment or injury 
of their own 'community'.
Nevertheless, the Faith and Neighbours Walk started at St Mary's Church of England. 
They  could  not  identify  a  Buddhist  place  of  worship  and  so  the  Sokka  Gakkai 
International (SGI) agreed to provide an introduction to their practice by setting up 
an ad hoc chanting space at the local Christian Harold Road Centre. The third stop 
was  at  the  Upton Park  Islamic  Centre  on  Selwyn Road.  The walk  ended  at  the 
Ramgharia Sikh Gurdwara in Neville  Road but before the end,  it  stopped for an 
introduction to Hinduism by the Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP) at the Upton Centre. 
Indeed the VHP representative, Bharat Dadlani, was quoted in the press coverage for 
the Walk. He stated:
People were free and felt comfortable in asking questions of the hosts and I'm sure 
that any prejudices and misconceptions were cleared. A better understanding of the 
faiths  was  achieved  and,  I'm  sure,  will  result  in  better  bonding  amongst  the  
neighbours taking part.121  
Three key problematics were revealed in this one moment of local multifaithism. 
Firstly, buildings are central to the local religious cartography and to the particular 
religious knowledge that is dispensed. The SGI gained a floating space within the 
Walk  only  because  the  established  Buddhist  building  was  being  relocated  and  a 
Buddhist  group  needed  to  be  identified.  Secondly,  the  proximity  of  the  local 
authority owned Upton Centre and the Vishwa Hindu Parishad was revealed. Alan 
Partridge was aware of some controversy around the Upton Centre but didn't know 
the details. Indeed the controversy is two fold. The Upton Centre represents one of 
the clearest  anomalies in Newham Council's espoused commitment to secularism. 
Even though the centre manager pointed out that he is a local authority employee and 
121 See Marchers take steps to bring faiths together by Lee Pearl in the Newham Recorder dated 
8th June 2011.
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the building is a council premises open to all122, Alan Partridge confirmed the local 
perception of it is as a place for Hindu events run by an entirely Hindu management 
group. Moreover, the Upton Centre was about to gain an even higher profile as one 
of  nine  designated  'community  hubs'  for  the  provision  of  library  services  in  the 
borough.  Partridge  noted  that  some  people  were  unhappy  about  this  precisely 
because they believed that  the Upton Centre  would 'only cater  for half  the local 
population'.123
The third dimension in this moment of multifaithism tears a hole in the attempt at a 
normative  projection  of  innocence  and  camaraderie.  The  Hindu  organisation 
associated  with  the  Upton Centre  and quoted  above,  the  Vishwa Hindu Parishad 
(VHP), is infact one of fourteen UK branches of the Hindu Right organisation by the 
same name. The VHP is the cultural face of the Sangh Parivar, the family of Hindu 
organisations that propagate Hindutva ideology as founded by Savarkar in the 1920s 
and developed by Golwalkar  in  post  colonial  India.  Hindutva  is  an exclusionary 
identity premised on a historicised claim to Aryan lineage and the construction of a 
Hindu  essence  that  'comprised  a  common  nation,  a  common  civilization  and  a 
common ‘race’' (Bhatt and Mukta, 2000: 413). Savarkar claimed the geographical 
space of India to be the Hindu holyland and condemned Muslims and Christians as 
illegitimate residents. His specific breed of Hindu nationalism has been described by 
Bhatt and Mukta as 'a racism that is not biological but reflecting a dominant ethnic 
nationalism of the late nineteenth century'  (2000:414). Savarkar's ideas led to the 
founding of the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), which then spawned several 
other  organizations,  including  the  VHP,  that  now make  up  the  family  of  Hindu 
nationalist  organizations  known  as  the  Sangh  Parivar.  Bhatt  and  Mukta  have 
described these as 'militant semi-paramilitary organization(s)' whose many activities 
engage young men and boys in 'highly disciplined physical and pedagogic "character 
building",  "manmaking"  or  "man-moulding"'  to  'prepare  members  mentally  and 
physically (to) fight for Hindutva and safeguard what was seen as the Hindu nation 
122 In conversation with the Centre Manager on 3/06/11.
123 Interviewed 3/06/11.
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against  foreign  influences'  (2000:  414).  This  highly  masculinist  and  militarized 
ideology stood in stark contrast to Gandhi's philosophy of Satyagraha ("truth force") 
and  Ahimsa  ("non-violence"),  which  the  RSS attacked  for  projecting  'Hindus  as 
weak,  effeminate  and emasculated'  (Bhatt  and Mukta,  2000:  416).  A member  of 
Savarkar's group murdered Gandhi. 
The Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP) was formed in 1964 and has been described by 
Bhatt  and  Mukta  as  one  of   'two  outstanding  successes  of  the  RSS  family  of 
organizations', the other one being the electoral party the Bharatiya Janata Party or 
BJP (2000: 419). The VHP has been directly involved in transnational campaigns for 
the alleged 'liberation' of specific areas within India, notably from Muslims, on the 
basis that these comprise historic sites for Hindu deities (Bhatt and Mukta 2000:421). 
These campaigns have incited large-scale violence against Muslims and Christians 
and led to the destruction of Muslim places of worship including the Babri Masjid at 
Ayodhya in 1992, which the VHP claim as the birthplace of their god Rama. The 
VHP have also been actively involved in 'reconversions' of Muslims and Christians 
to Hinduism, which again has not only incited physical violence against Christian 
minorities but led to sexual violence against minority women including the rape of 
Indian nuns (Bhatt and Mukta, 2000: 421). 
The  VHP then  is  by  no  means  a  benign  organization  involved  in  friendly  faith 
exchange. For all intents and purposes they are a supremacist organization actively 
propagating a  raciology and the reinvention of Hinduism as both militaristic  and 
masculinist.  As  Parita  Mukta  (2000)  has  pointed  out,  the  VHP has  particularly 
thrived through diasporic Gujarati populations in urban locations, such as Newham. 
On the role of these diasporic branches she states:
While  the  VHP and its  affiliates  have  been  implicated  in  orchestrating  political  
violence against  religious minorities in India,  the diasporic branches of the VHP 
have been crucial in mapping out a framework of global political discourse which is  
strongly  braided  with  the  political  agenda  of  the  foundational  VHP,  and  which 
foregrounds a constructed global Hindu community both as historically victimized 
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and as (necessarily)  resurgent  in the contemporary period… In Britain,  the VHP 
(UK) is prominent in hosting Hindutva ideologues who do regular lecture tours in 
the capital and in the Midlands; under the name of different front organizations, it  
receives government funding to conduct welfare activities; and having laid claim to 
be the authentic representative of all ‘Hindus’ it is involved in interfaith dialogue.
[Mukta, 2000: 443-444]
A few respondents  also  noted  that  local  children  were  attending  'shakhas'  at  the 
Upton Centre. Chetan Bhatt's research on the Hindu Right argues that whilst shakhas 
in the UK are projected as educational  and cultural  activities where children can 
improve Gujarati  language skills,  they also 'reflect a very conscious ‘catch-them-
young’ policy of the Sangh (Parivar)… (Whereby)… a sense of pride and discipline 
are imprinted'  and infact  the children's  games and songs include RSS and Sangh 
Parivar corporate hymns (Bhatt, 2000: 581-582). Indeed the shakhas were invented 
as a specific mechanism for disciplining the youth and embedding a commitment to 
fight for a Hindu nation.
Interestingly, Alan Partridge was not aware of the VHP's political purpose and yet I 
was able to recall this information from the time that I had worked in the borough in 
the 1990s. To me this was suggestive of the gradual erasure of local knowledge in 
favour of multifaith initiatives that project the world as both innocent and flat. This 
occurs through the re-birthing of social issues and interpersonal relations within faith 
frames.
Reproducing intra relations of power - the case of Ahmadiyya Muslims
Faith forums and inter faith dialogue initiatives can be diverse and can act as a means 
of breaking down barriers, of undermining myths and tackling racist and xenophobic 
fears. However, many initiatives also carry normative implications for representation 
and the ordering of local populations. 
199
In 2004, on the run up to its conference, the NVSC Faith Sector Forum encountered 
tensions  when  the  local  Ahmadiyya  organisation  applied  to  join  the  conference 
Steering Group. The larger and more established Muslim groups in the borough (and 
specifically AK Sheikh) threatened to withdraw from the conference altogether if 
Ahmadiyyas were allowed to participate. Sarah Ruiz's colleague refused to sit in the 
same room as  representatives  of  the  Ahmadiyya  organisation.  He  drew parallels 
between them and the British National Party.124 Out of fear that the alliance might fall 
apart,  Sarah  Ruiz  (NVSC)  denied  the  Ahmadiyya  organisation  a  place  on  the 
Steering Group. The Ahmadiyyas lodged a formal complaint with the Mayor, Robin 
Wales and with the local MP, Stephen Timms. Ruiz explained that she did not know 
much about Ahmadiyya Muslims and in the end sought to deal with the tension by 
allowing them to attend the conference but also conceded to pressure from the other 
groups by not putting Ahmadiyya leaflets in the conference packs. According to Ruiz 
the Ahmadiyya group distributed leaflets themselves on the day.125 
As  noted  above,  when  the  Faith  Sector  Forum  came  to  an  end  some  of  its 
relationships-building  work  was  replaced  by  Faithful  Friends.  Again  the  larger 
organisations gathered for informal discussions about shared religious tenets. One 
might  have  assumed  that  given  his  own  personal  experience  and  knowledge  of 
religious hate and intolerance, Revd Barnabas Matloob, the co-ordinator of Faithful 
Friends,  would  be  more  mindful  of  the  marginalisation  of  communities  within 
communities. However, he also refused to include local Ahmadiyyas on the basis that 
this might upset the larger mosques. Indeed he accepted that these larger mosques 
were justified in being offended by Ahmadiyya participation and, as with Mizan Raja 
of Islamic Circles, placed the onus firmly on Ahmadiyyas to renounce their religious 
claims in order to improve their treatment by others. 
It was difficult to fully understand what had taken place without delving into the 
124 According to Sarah Ruiz, 12/11/09.
125 Ibid.
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particular  place  of  the  Ahmadiyyas  in  Islam,  their  persecution,  the  theo-political 
leanings of other Muslim groups in Newham and also the Ahmadiyya relationship 
with Christianity. 
The Ahmadiyya sect of Islam emerged as one stream of an Islamic revival under 
colonial rule and reflected 'the extent of religious competition in north-western India' 
during  that  period  where  an  ailing  Islam  was  positioned  between  Christian 
missionary  zeal  on  the  one  hand  and  the  emergence  of  the  Arya  Samaj,  Hindu 
nationalism,  on  the  other  (Robinson,  1988:  9).  The  sect  was  founded  by  Mirza 
Ghulam Ahmad in 1889 in the town of Qadian in East Punjab,  now in Pakistan. 
Ghulam Ahmad projected himself as 'a symbolic representative of Krishna and Jesus 
as well  as  an Islamic Mahdi'  or  messiah and as  'having the same relationship to 
Muhammad as Jesus did to Moses; as Jesus brought the period of Mosaic order to an 
end so (Ghulam Ahmad) brought that of Muhammad to a close' (Robinson, 1988: 
10).  Mirza  Ghulam Ahmad denied  both  the  position  of  Muhammad as  the  final 
prophet of Islam and also the finality of Christ's ascendancy. Indeed he claimed that 
Christ had been reborn and travelled throughout South West Asia to eventually be 
buried in Kashmir and moreover, characterized Christ as a 'drunken, a coward (who) 
consorted  with  prostitutes'  (Robinson,  1988:10).  The  Ahmadiyyas  experience 
animosity from Muslims and Christians alike. 
Despite similarities with the Bahais, the Ahmadiyyas continued to locate themselves 
within Islam and have not sought secession (even if they broke away from Sunni 
Islam  and  have  separate  places  of  worship).  Importantly,  the  Ahmadiyyas  are 
pacifists  and  opposed  to  jihad.  Their  focus  is  rather  on  missionary  work  and 
Robinson  (1988)  has  described  them  as  highly  educated,  energetic  and  well-
organized proselytizers. As such they occupy a contentious place within the history 
of the south Asian subcontinent. 
Whilst Shiraz Maher would be quick to point out that animosity towards Ahmadiyyas 
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is  commonplace  and  not  necessarily  an  indication  of  fundamentalist  politics,126 
Ahmadiyyas have increasingly become a focal point for fundamentalist mobilisations 
across the south Asian subcontinent and amongst the diaspora. The Ahmadiyyas were 
a particular focal point for the authoritarian invocations of the Islamist  ideologue 
Maududi who was imprisoned in 1953 for publishing a vitriolic attack against them 
(Hussain,  2010:  5).  By 1974,  the Ahmadiyyas  were declared  non-Muslim by the 
Pakistani government. Their subsequent persecution has taken many forms. Firstly 
they have been harassed and criminalised through the use of blasphemy legislation, 
campaigns to have them banned and injunctions preventing them from referring to 
their places of worship as 'mosques' or to themselves as 'Muslims'.127 Secondly, they 
have  experienced  decades  of  direct  physical  violence  including  most  recently  a 
simultaneous  massacre  at  two  Ahmadiyya  mosques  in  Lahore  killing  nearly  100 
worshippers.128 Thirdly, they are prevented from retelling their history such as by the 
recent forced closure of one Ahmadiyya group's exhibition of non-Urdu translations 
126 As discussed with Ghaffar Hussain and Shiraz Maher on 26/09/11.
127 See Hossain, S., (2004) 'Apostates', Ahmadis and advocates: Use and abuse of offences 
against religion in Bangladesh in the WLUML Dossier: Warning Signs of Fundamentalisms co-edited 
by Ayesha Imam, Jenny Morgan & Nira Yuval-Davis 
Available at: http://www.wluml.org/node/563
128 According to Ansar Ahmed Ullah (3/10/07) the Jamaat-e-Islami incited a riot that killed 
thousands of Ahmadiyyas in the 1950s and has persisted in its fierce opposition to the sect. More 
recently, the group Khatme Nabuwat has been actively inciting violence against Ahmadiyyas in 
Pakistan, Bangladesh and here in Britain. 
For just a few of examples of dozens of news items on violent assaults against Ahmadiyyas see:
Ahmadi minority fearful after militants kill at least 80 members (30/05/10) posted to WLUML website 
and available at: http://www.wluml.org/node/6355
and
Protests Rise Against Muslim Sect by Roland Buerk (23/04/05) posted to BBC News website and 
available at:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/4476121.stm 
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of the Quran.129 The extent of their persecution led them to move their head quarters 
from Punjab to London (Robinson, 1988: 11).
The Ahmadiyyas have relied to some degree on British paternalism and protection as 
an increasingly persecuted religious minority whose status is accepted as grounds for 
asylum  in  Britain.  Even  though  London  is  the  base  for  their  head  quarters, 
Ahmadiyya Muslims continue to be a minority and British Islam is still very much 
dominated by Sunnis. Of 321 mosques in Britain in 1998, 87 per cent were Sunni and 
only 3 per cent identified as Ahmadiyya (Peach, 2006: 640). Moreover, Ahmadiyyas 
have continued to face harassment in local neighbourhoods in Britain. For instance, 
in 2010 the police launched a hate crimes investigation after reports that leaflets were 
being distributed in mosques in Kingston calling on worshippers to kill Qadiyanis (a 
far less respectful term for Ahmadiyyas) and a poster campaign in Tooting called on 
people to boycott Ahmadiyya businesses and sack Ahmadiyya employees.130 Since 
2010, Ahmadiyyas have embarked on their own 'community peace bus' campaign 
calling for religious tolerance. In May 2011 one such bus toured Newham and was 
welcomed by Stephen Timms MP.131 
129 The Deadening Silence Of Good Intentions by C.M.Naim posted on 18/11/11 at the Outlook 
India website and available at:  
http://www.outlookindia.com/article.aspx?279021
130 See Religious hate leaflets found in Tooting, Streatham and Kingston by Omar Oakes posted 
on 14/10/10 and available at:
http://www.yourlocalguardian.co.uk/news/local/wimbledonnews/8451668.Relgious_hate_leaflets_fou
nd_in_Tooting__Streatham_and_Kingston/
And
Worshippers told at Tooting Islamic Centre to boycott Ahmadiyya shops by Omar Oakes posted on 
14/10/10 and available at:
http://www.yourlocalguardian.co.uk/news/local/wimbledonnews/8451539.Worshippers_told_to_boyc
ott_Ahmadiyya_shops/
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Some  interviewees  referred  to  the  history  of  British  protection  as  a  source  of 
justification for their  own feelings  of  animosity.  The British and Pakistani  states' 
relationship  with  the  category  'Ahmadiyyas'  seemed  to  provide  a  framework  for 
Revd Barnabas Matloob's refusal to engage with the issue of their marginalisation in 
local initiatives. Matloob noted that the Pakistani state's view of Ahmadiyyas as not 
Muslim was part of the reason for his own conclusions. Secondly, the British state's 
historical  and  contemporary  support  for  Ahmadiyyas  was  reason  enough  for  his 
acquiescence.132 
The proliferation of a sense of conspiratorial distance from the Ahmadiyyas was even 
projected  by  the  otherwise  left-liberal  Alan  Partridge  who stated  'yes,  I've  heard 
about  them'.133 Curiously  then  Ahmadiyyas'  assertiveness  in  challenging  their 
persecution could place the onus further on them for being victimised. Clearly there 
are potential parallels between this logic and the backlash against feminists that seek 
to challenge sexism.  
I want to briefly note two more subtle effects of these local multifaithism initiatives. 
Firstly,  having  been  so  clear  about  secularism  and  their  critique  of  religious 
leaderships, there were signs that Newham Council's approach was being stirred and 
brought  under  pressure.  At  one  meeting,  the  Mayor  apologised  for  providing 
refreshments  during Ramadan and was immediately reprimanded by Revd Canon 
Ann Easter for not issuing similar apologies to Christians during Lent. According to 
Sarah Ruiz this  was an example of a concern that  minority religions were being 
acknowledged, albeit in this tokenistic fashion, whilst Christianity continued to be 
hidden or down played.134
131 News item in The Newham Recorder dated 18/05/11 and also see: 
http://www.loveforallhatredfornone.org/
132 Interviewed 19/11/10.
133 Interviewed 3/06/11.
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Secondly, religion became a structuring feature of local discussions between the state 
and  civil  society.  This  is  to  be  expected  when  religion  becomes  organised  as  a 
'sector'.  At  a  more  recent  public  meeting  hosted  by  the  Newham  New  Deal 
Partnership  (NNDP),  once  again  the  local  council  were  criticised  for  ignoring 
religious  groups  as  important  civic  players.  Councillor  Neil  Wilson  repeatedly 
referenced  his  interventions  against  an  Anglican  identity.  Clearly  this  was  a 
legitimising technique intended to both defend the local council  and also provide 
Wilson with an authoritative voice. At this meeting, religious identity was a marker 
of authenticity, securing the right to speak or be heard and reminiscent of the most 
insular forms of Black identity  in  the 1980s and 1990s.  This was clearest  in the 
decision to have Albanians represented by a  mosque in Walthamstow rather  than 
offer a platform to the Newham based secular Albanian centre whose representative 
was seated in the audience and clearly had more information about the local Albanian 
population than those on the panel.135
Respectfully engaging women through religious groups
Following on from the discussion about the NVSC Faith Sector Forum conference 
above, a number of points about gender/women emerged that reflect larger gendered 
codes for faith based engagement.
The Hindu spokesperson at the NVSC Faith Sector Conference discussed above, was 
an  ethnic  minority  woman  who  provided  information  about  Hinduism,  which 
included claims about the different but equal roles for Hindu men and women. All of 
this was framed within an emphasis on family values. She stated:
Hindus have  strong family values  and both  partners  have  equal  status.  It  seems 
134 Interviewed 12/11/09.
135 Field notes on seminar 'Eastern European worship in Newham' (10/05/11) organised by 
Newham New Deal Partnership.
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outwardly that the women haven't got freedom but actually Hindu religion states that 
strength from each person contributes to run the family, using the strengths of both  
partners.  For  example  a  man is  physically  strong.  Equally a  woman has  certain 
strengths like a naturally loving nature and she has got the strength to surrender. In 
order for family life to run smoothly all these have to combine and that is what has  
been taught to us, especially girls, from a young age. So equality doesn't mean that  
both the partners are doing the same thing, but using the strength from each partner 
and that is a real equality and that is practiced in our faith.136
This  notion of  women learning to  surrender  seems to be repeating  through faith 
circles. In Forest Gate,  Sara Jawad Malik was running training sessions for local 
Muslim women called 'The Surrendered Muslimah' based on her adaptation of Laura 
Doyle's  (1999)  self  help  manual  'The  Surrendered  Wife'.  Mizan  Raja  of  Islamic 
Circles had invited Malik to run these workshops because he believed that there is a 
growing disparity between Muslim women and Muslim men, that Muslim women 
were running ahead with high expectations and unrealistic demands. He stated:
At the end of the day, the Muslim women have all the opportunities in the world, and 
the opportunities are being given by many organisations.  The biggest obstacle, I 
personally believe with a lot of the women here, its money.  A lot of them say for  
example we’re doing the one-day Muslim youth course coming up.  A lot of them 
don’t want to do it because the youth work is basically working antisocial hours.  It  
means  the,  wages  are  crap…  But  90%  of  the  time,  the  women  are  very 
materialistically orientated, both hijabi and non-hijabi. They want a quick solution to 
a problem. Look you’ve got a generation of Muslims who came in the 60s and 70s 
whenever  it  is.   In  one generation,  our  women are  far  more educated,  far  more  
successful, far more economically independent.  It’s not just the Muslims. The other  
communities are the same, Sikh girls, Hindu girls, Jewish women, all of them are 
complaining.  It’s men in general who have failed. In practice, men in general can’t  
catch up with our women, can’t catch up.  But the other turn has been what?  We’ve 
created a  generation of  Sex in the  City and whatever,  Ally McBeals.  Have they 
found happiness?  No. But they want a quick fix solution to all the problems.  It’s not 
going to happen overnight… Part of the problem is you see, and that’s the reason 
why we do the marriage events.  The marriage events, personally has opened my 
136 Jayashri Dandawate, page 9, ibid.
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eyes to things like never before.  Because I’ve had judges, ambassadors, women, 
come to me for husbands.   90% of the times one deals with one’s ego.  So stop 
blaming religion and men for everything and actually start dealing with, maybe 'I  
need to look in the mirror'.  And think 'am I really looking for spirituality or am I  
looking for materialism?'  And you’ll find a lot of the time nobody wants to sacrifice. 
The root of the problem is, until the women sit down, calm down, sacrifice. If you 
want change, you’ve got to sit down, calm down. Stop blaming men for everything.
[Mizan Raja, Islamic Circles, 7/12/09]
Muslim  women  were  projected  as  selfish,  individualistic  and  materialistic.  Sara 
Jawad Malik was called into train women to hold down their relationships including 
by re-orienting them to the spiritual commitments of marriage i.e. beyond making 
material demands of their husbands or potential spouses. I attended one such session. 
The other participants seemed to be genuinely struggling to make their marriages 
work but were unaware of established Asian women's groups in the borough and had 
been attracted to the 'Muslim' nature of these workshops. The workshop was a heady 
mixture  of  the  temporal  and transcendent  where  the  motivation  to  do something 
about one's relationship in the present was guided by an overarching commitment to 
the word of Allah. The message, however, was unmistakably clear: women should try 
to suppress their disappointment in men, avoid nagging and see something positive in 
every little  thing that  their  husbands do.  Whilst  formally not  condoning violence 
against women, the onus was entirely on women to make their relationships work. 
The  underlying  sentiment  advised  women  to  express  more  appreciation  and  less 
criticism  and  most  certainly  to  avoid  confrontation.  Laura  Doyle's  book  is 
undoubtedly a critique of the legacy of feminist empowerment. These sessions for 
Muslim women are not publicly funded but need to be seen in the context of highly 
contested attempts to establish local norms and practices. 
I want to briefly return to the NVSC Faith Sector Conference for a moment and note 
that  the  workshop  on  'myths'  raised  similar  concerns  about  non-traditional  roles 
impacting on families. Under the recommendations, there is a specific section on the 
equality of women and it is very interesting that the areas of concern are by and large 
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to do with domestic violence.137 Yet it is unclear why these issues need to be tackled 
on  a  faith  basis  especially  when  there  are  already  long  standing  women's 
organisations  working  on  them.  Indeed  many  domestic  violence  agencies  have 
argued that  religious discourse is  part  of the problem. A worker  at  one Newham 
based ethnic minority women's organisation stated:
(A)lot  of  times  women  justify  the  inequality  or  the  violence  that  they  have 
experienced because of their religion, because, you know, it's the way their religion 
is or it’s the way it is in the community… they often use religion as a justification for 
being oppressed, for unequal treatment, that there is a religious justification for their  
unequal  position  in  society  or  in  the  family,  in  relation  to  men.  So  you  know,  
patriarchy and religion, those ideas become confused into this, in the supremacy that  
religion has in their lives. And many times women say they remained in an abusive 
relationship because in their religion, women are viewed in a certain way or men are  
supposed to be able to control their wives and that men are supposed to be able to  
exercise their privilege within the relationship.
[Worker, ethnic minority women's group in Newham, 20/10/09]
In  2006,  NVSC managed  to  secure  a  much  smaller  and  shorter  grant  from the 
Community  Development  Foundation  to  employ  a  part  time  Faiths  Participation 
Worker  that  followed  through  on  some  elements  of  the  Conference  Report  by 
running interfaith sessions with women and young people.  What struck me about 
these inter faith initiatives was the way in which issues themselves seemed to be born 
again, devoid of historical context and therefore any recognition of the reasons for 
secular provision or the longstanding work of secular groups in the borough.
Moreover,  many  of  the  interfaith  initiatives  referred  to  throughout  this  thesis 
comprised men, of a particular generation, talking mostly to other men. The question 
of  engaging  women  through  religious  institutions  was  very  controversial  with  a 
couple  of  interviewees  asking  for  their  comments  about  interactions  with  pious 
women and religious groups to be anonymised.  
137 Pages 18-19, ibid.
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When interviewees were asked what they thought might be the impact upon local 
ethnic minority women of a growth of religion in the public sphere, most of them 
were quick to point to high levels of religiosity amongst ethnic minority women and 
particularly to faith based services and organisations in the borough that are lead by 
women. The suggestion that faith based engagement might be a problem for women 
was pre-empted by assertions that these pious women are successful and active in 
public  life.   Yet  others  advocating  engagement  with  religious  organisations  also 
based their claim on the concern that isolated ethnic minority women could become 
further removed from the public sphere if they were not engaged through religious 
groups. 
Some of the examples provided by councillors of interaction with women through 
local  religious  organisations  were  problematic.  In  one  instance,  Revd  Quintin 
Peppiatt (a local councillor and vicar), a very sweet man, pointed to higher levels of 
religiosity amongst ethnic minorities than the white English population of Newham. 
He then provided an example of 'engagement' with a religious congregation in order 
to highlight the representation of ethnic minority women. However,  this  revealed 
normative segregation and real problems with his definition of 'engagement': 
I always say my largest Christmas service is in the temple rather than in a church.  
The church we get quiet at Christmas but when I go down to the local Hindu temple  
they do a Christmas talent show come Christmas sort of thing festival celebration 
and I am always one of the slots… I wonder how much they can understand because 
some of them don’t speak English too well in terms of the women. Nobody asks but 
I do my stuff and talk about Christmas and what it means to Christians. It’s about  
inter-faith dialogue isn’t it?  
[Revd Quintin Peppiatt, Newham Councillor, 20/10/09]
He seemed happy recounting interactions like this when there appeared to be very 
little interaction to speak of. He knew that the Hindu women had no idea what he 
was talking about and there was no real exchange but he referred to it as dialogue. 
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Moreover, on the question of how much he is able to engage with Muslim women 
through mosques, he noted their absence but was decidedly hands off about the issue, 
saying that the presence or absence of Muslim women in mosques was an internal 
issue for Muslims. 
Several  other  councillors  pointed  to  the  problem  of  interacting  with  the  local 
mosques. One female councillor in particular explained that she had real difficulty 
getting  the  support  of  Muslim  men  in  her  ward  who  were  actively  trying  to 
undermine her ability to represent them. On one occasion, she attended a meeting to 
find she was ushered into the back room of the venue and forced to address the group 
of men in the neighbouring room through a wall. 
This  mode of  non-engagement  was matched by dress  codes  that  emphasised  the 
embodiment  of  'respectfully  respectful'  interactions  with  religious  organisations. 
Another councillor's description of 'community cohesion' was deeply entangled with 
a sense of religious coexistence, which was actually underwritten by gendered dress 
codes: 
Because every time I am going to church, I take Councillor Marway with me, he’s a  
Sikh, I take Akbar Chaudhry with me, he’s a Muslim.  And if he’s doing something, 
if they’re doing anything, we all go to the Hindu temple and we all put our scarves  
on.  Every time I go anywhere when I am in Newham, if I am going to any event,  
you will see me with my shawl.  And when I get to wherever I am, as soon as I find  
that it’s Muslim or they are just doing a prayer, I’ll put my shawl on, that’s how to 
respect each other.  And I think we do that very well in Newham, you wouldn't see 
anybody wearing a  short  skirt  when there  are  some other  religious groups,  they 
won’t do it.  You know, so I think the community cohesion and the way we do things 
in Newham is actually something that some boroughs should emulate.
[Councillor Joy Laguda, 2/12/09]
Far  from  the  social  and  ideological  engineering  that  is  being  supposed  by  the 
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implementation of Prevent Violent Extremism programmes particularly by focusing 
on women's representation (see, for instance, Kundnani, 2009), I found a real lack of 
willingness  or  interest  in  challenging  the  views  of  ethnic  minority  religious 
institutions. 
Contesting Muslim Leadership
The search for Muslim partners has been another important dimension of the debate 
on religious leadership. Post 9/11, one might have predicted that Blair's 'faith agenda' 
would crumble in the face of spectacular displays of religious violence. Instead, he 
was able to exploit its beneficiaries and line up Muslim 'leaders' to defend his War on 
Terror. This section focuses on the 'soft' yet insidious side of the government's War 
on  Terror  as  Preventing  Violent  Extremism  (PVE)  programmes.  By  shining  a 
spotlight on the expenditure of PVE funding in Newham it highlights the struggle 
over authority and sovereignty amongst Muslim groups that seek to control rather 
than oppose or critique PVE as public policy. This section also highlights the way in 
which Newham Council's response to PVE both reinforces and contradicts the central 
government agenda. On the one hand, Newham has contradicted the objective of 
identifying and co-opting partners by undertaking most of the PVE work in-house. 
On the other hand, it has utilised a 'cohesion' and 'Britishness' mantra not that far 
removed from the national call to patriotism and shared values, as a mechanism for 
sidestepping both Islamism and religious conservatism. At the heart of this struggle 
over power is the commitment 'omnes et singulatum', the balance between the role of 
the  state  in  safeguarding the  security  of  its  population  and its  role  in  protecting 
individual rights to freedom of expression and dissent,  especially the freedom of 
religion and belief (Foucault, 1978; Rose 1999). 
After the 7th July 2005 suicide bombings of the London underground, New Labour 
established a Preventing Violent Extremism Working Group which identified four 
particular areas of concern through which radicalisation needed to be tackled at the 
local level: decision making and community engagement; deprivation and inequality; 
identity and debates about Islam; and Islamophobia. In essence the idea was to enact 
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forms of 'engagement' with Muslims to counter disaffection and engage in religious 
literacy to counter extremist projections of Islam. In 2007 New Labour launched the 
Preventing  Violent  Extremism pathfinder  programme which  sought  to  fund local 
projects that would work with Muslims to encourage them away from extremism. 
The Prevent programme comprised one strand of the government's Contest counter 
terrorism  strategy.  So  whilst  Contest  focused  on  the  hard  face  of  terrorism 
legislation,  intelligence  gathering  and  the  criminalisation  of  terrorist  networks, 
Prevent  was  to  focus  on  the  'softer'  issues  like  disaffection  and  religious 
understanding.  Of course  none of  this  really  addressed questions  of  poverty  and 
deprivation  or  the  contribution  of  the  Iraq  War  to  disaffection  or  radicalisation. 
Rather, Prevent can be seen as a form of old style government co-option, bringing 
risk factors within the realms of governance rather than allowing them to foment as 
opposition forces and critics on the outside. Moreover, according to Arun Kundnani 
(2009), funds were not distributed on the basis of local need and plans but rather in 
direct proportion to the numbers of Muslims living in each area, making Muslims or 
Islam the sole focus of the policy. Particularly pertinent in the context of Cameron's 
recent  speech about  'muscular  liberalism'  is  that  in 2009 New Labour revised its 
counter-terrorism strategy and introduced Contest 2, which included a commitment 
to widening the focus of interest from 'violent extremism' to 'extremism' to ensure 
that organisations could be prevented from accessing state funding and support if 
classed  as  'extremist'  and  even  if  they  were  not  involved in  criminal  activity  or 
violence.
On 4th  November  2010,  the  Islamic  Circles  held  a  public  meeting  at  the  Froud 
Centre in Manor Park entitled 'Question Time: PVE in Newham - £2 million missing 
& unaccounted for'. The publicity material called for greater transparency in local 
government  and  sought  to  address  how  central  government  grants  under  the 
Preventing Violent Extremism (PVE) programme were allocated locally and to find 
out  what  sort  of  work  was  being  undertaken.  The  publicity  material  contained 
additional comments about Newham Council's evasiveness and lack of response to 
requests  under  the Freedom of  Information Act  as well  as  reference to  enquiries 
about  'corruption'  within the council.  The  sardonic  tone  of  the publicity  material 
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extends this suggestion of corruption to allegations that PVE grants were used to 
'employ  relatives  of  councillors  to  attend  English  language  classes'  and  to  pay 
advisory consultants that were 'former spooks and Met Police Officers which bill into 
the thousands'. However, the publicity material also berated Newham's Muslims for 
being  apathetic  or  consumed  by  material  goals  namely  'the  Olympics  property 
bubble' rather than investing their energies in useful acts of holding the local State to 
account.
 
A long  list  of  politicians  and  speakers  were  invited  including:  newly  appointed 
ministers  Andrew  Stunnell, Parliamentary  Under  Secretary  of  State  to  the 
Department for Communities and Local Government, and Sayeeda Warsi, Minister 
without Portfolio & Co-Chairman of the Conservative Party; the Mayor; and all 60 of 
Newham's councillors. The Conservatives, Stunnell and Warsi sent their apologies 
(Raja claimed that Warsi sent hers by text message indicating her relationship with 
Muslim  groups  and  his  relationship  with  central  government)  but  not  a  single 
Newham (Labour) councillor responded to the invitation 'to explain themselves'. In 
the end the meeting was introduced and lead by Mizan Raja. 
 
In addition to the lack of participation of invited speakers, the meeting did not match 
my own expectations of attendance on the basis that at an earlier in depth interview, 
Mizan Raja had claimed an extensive e-list membership. Moreover, the meeting took 
place within days of the conviction of a local Bengali woman, Roshonara Choudhry, 
for the attempted murder of the local  MP Stephen Timms and soon after  Barack 
Obama's call for the extra-judicial killing of the Yemeni based American national, 
Anwar  Al Awlaki.  So  I  was surprised  to  count  just  25 people  at  the  event.  The 
attendees were predominantly south Asian men. The only non-south Asian male in 
the  room was  an  English  researcher  from outside  London.  There  were  only  six 
women present including myself and three particularly outspoken women (in hijab) 
at the front of the room. Aside from an Urdu teacher seated behind me and the two 
representatives  of the Newham Muslim Alliance (including AK Sheikh),  the vast 
majority of participants were in their late twenties to early thirties. Importantly, in 
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comparison  to  the  highly  structured  performances  of  the  Citizens'  UK  events 
discussed in Chapters 3 and 7, this was all very ad hoc, people were seated and spoke 
freely without any chairing. The only formal restrictions that I sensed were rather 
about 'authentic' representation and dress. I was particularly conscious that I was one 
of the few non Muslims in the room and that my skirt, low cleavage, uncovered hair 
and net tights seemed out of place in a room where the women were more than 
modestly covered up.
A number of the men seated at the centre of the room were able to kick start the 
discussion by explaining what sort of information their FOIAs had retrieved. Even 
then, it  was clear that Newham council  had dragged their feet in responding and 
avoided providing any real detail on the way in which their PVE programme had 
been  devised,  who  had  been  consulted,  the  names  of  any  providers  and  /  or 
consultants and exactly how funding had been allocated. There was a general sense at 
the meeting that  the pressure on Newham Council  should continue and could be 
increased by engaging the local or national press.
However, rather than an expected critique of PVE as public policy, the meeting soon 
switched to a discussion about Muslim representation in the borough. AK Sheikh and 
his colleague were criticised for the complacency of local mosques. A number of the 
young men at the back of the room argued that a large central mosque akin to the  
East London Mosque in Tower Hamlets would be better because it would be active in 
the  local  area  and exist  as  a  central  place  for  engagement  with  Muslims.  Kevin 
Blowe (25/04/08) had already noted that AK Sheikh was working with the police's 
Gold Group. AK Sheikh claimed two things: political paralysis on account of being 
voted out of office and Green Street mosque had been active in representing Muslims 
such as by working with local schools.
Only the women at the front of the room wanted to steer the meeting back to a 
discussion about PVE expenditure and the accountability they expected as taxpayers 
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rather than as Muslims. Nevertheless, it was clear that the meeting was less about 
challenging or critiquing the nature of PVE and more about mobilising pressure to 
see  how the  money  had  been  allocated.  Indeed  at  our  pre  meeting,  Mizan  Raja 
revealed that he had accepted PVE funding to take young people to Turkey and then 
Bosnia. It was unclear what those trips were about and how they fulfilled the role of 
Preventing Violent Extremism.
 
There  was  very  little  reference  to  Muslim fundamentalism,  its  local,  national  or 
global impact and what, if anything might be the appropriate way to tackle this rise. 
Several members of the audience expressed defensiveness in relation to the press 
coverage of the Roshonara Choudhry verdict. However, their interest was not in how 
Choudhry had become radicalised but rather concern that the individual actions of 
someone  that  they  depicted  as  disturbed  and  emotionally  vulnerable  were  being 
projected  by  the  media  as  an  example  of  the  persistent  problem  of  Muslim 
extremism. The discussions that I had with Mizan Raja before the meeting and HT 
sympathisers after the event were particularly insightful. Firstly Raja's view of the 
problem in relation to Roshonara Choudhry was rather that she was the product of a 
dysfunctional family than politically motivated by her readings of Awlaki's sermons. 
Secondly, he suspected that Awlaki (and Ali Al Timimi and Moazzam Begg) were 
decoys for an imperialist agenda and even suggested that there was no firm proof that 
Choudhry had been accessing Awlaki's material on the internet. Indeed his defensive 
reaction  to  the  question  of  Muslim  fundamentalism  involved  reverting  to 
conspiratorial  claims  questioning  the  authorship  of  the  internet  material  being 
assigned to Awlaki and Ali Al Timimi. He maintained that both men were highly 
respected scholars. Infact in order to challenge the slippery concept of 'extremism', 
he noted that Sufi speakers at the recent Global Rally for Peace and Unity (summer 
2010) did not fulfil the image of Sufis as peace loving and otherworldly but rather 
also advocated jihad. 
In addition to this point about the slipperiness of the term 'extremism' and in line 
with Kundnani's (2009) analysis of the social engineering dimensions of the PVE 
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agenda,  Raja  noted  that  Newham  Council  had  used  part  of  its  PVE  money  to 
establish a GCSE in Islamic Studies. Conversely, if Raja had any kind of analysis of 
the  reasons  for  fundamentalism  or  religious  violence  this  was  focused  on  the 
breakdown  of  the  family.  Indeed  he  accepted  that  he  shares  with  Cameron’s 
Compassionate Conservatism as view that  social  issues are a consequence of the 
behavioural problems caused by the breakdown of family and society.
 
After  the  PVE public  meeting,  two  of  the  young  south  Asian  male  participants 
boarded the same bus to Stratford station and continued criticising Newham Council. 
This time the basis of their complaint was the Council's refusal to rent rooms to the 
Hizb ut-Tahrir. A question about why anyone should want to rent public premises to a 
fundamentalist group sent an otherwise friendly interaction into a tense and heated 
exchange. It  was met with the charge that Hizb ut-Tahrir  is  a legitimate political 
party  with  a  formal  membership  and  with  support  in  the  local  borough  whose 
residents pay taxes for the public use of such buildings. Moreover, the same men 
claimed that Shariah was widely supported amongst Muslims (one boomed 'Muslims 
want  this,  it  is  what  they  want!')  supplemented  with  a  reference  to  the  hugely 
controversial Policy Exchange report on Muslims in Britain.   
For  his  part,  the  then  Councillor  with  the  portfolio  for  Community  Affairs  and 
Community Intelligence, Unmesh Desai, did not seem to be focused on Muslims in 
the borough but rather on a range of 'extremist' ideologies ranging from jihadism to 
the predominantly white racism of the British National Party. He described a PVE 
agenda oriented towards a number of features: encouraging civic engagement and 
deterring political alienation; pushing away from segregation by actively inducing 
opportunities  for  interaction  across  differences;  encouraging harmonious relations 
between diverse sections of the population and challenging discriminatory ideologies 
such  as  anti  Muslim racism and anti  Semitism.  Contrary  to  the  general  flow of 
classless debates on cohesion, Desai seemed clear that material inequality persists as 
an issue that could give rise to grievance. He identified a series of routes through 
which these objectives could be fulfilled, specifically noting education and schools 
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work,  leadership  training,  active  citizenship  and  funding  for  a  range  of  cross 
cultural/ethnic leisure activities including sports events,  Flag Days (that mark the 
Independence Day of the countries of origin of Newham's residents) and a gala night 
that annually showcases difference. Moreover, he didn't seem at all reluctant to reel 
off the names of a number of organisations that he had been meeting with a view to 
commissioning PVE work including: Hope not Hate; Searchlight; the Anne Frank 
Foundation; the Quilliam Foundation; the Change Institute; the Swift Centre; Active 
Citizens Foundation and the Holocaust Memorial Trust.
However, given the number of complaints that I had been listening to about political 
practice and lack of democracy in Newham as well as the lack of debate about the 
Iraq invasion,  it  did  seem ironic that  Desai  issued a  commitment  to  engagement 
between the Council and the local population, a willingness to hear grievances, and a 
desire to ensure a sense of ownership and develop a democratic 'Newham Agenda'. 
Moreover, he acknowledged the role of the police and the surveillance dimensions of 
PVE.138  On the question of unity, cohesion and Britishness he certainly was talking 
about a policy of social construction: 
So it's actually being positive and using the Prevent agenda, and the money, it’s not  
an agenda following the money, which has happened elsewhere, but here using those 
resources  to  promote  our  way  of  bringing  communities  together,  which  is  the 
Newham approach to community cohesion. Not seeing groups in isolation but using 
collective  resources,  collective  structures  to  actually  promote  the,  to  actually 
promote that  unity in  practice.   You can talk about  Britishness  in  isolation,  this  
debate about  what  is  British,  to a large extent  it  remains a very abstract  debate,  
Britishness is actually created in practice.
[Unmesh Desai, Newham Councillor, 8/10/09]
Desai later argued in a CiF piece for The Guardian that countering ideology is an 
important dimension of tackling extremism. He stated:
138 Interviewed 8/10/09.
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(Mehdi) Hasan defends the Federation of Student Islamic Societies against claims of  
not  doing  enough  to  challenge  extremist  ideology  by  saying  that,  in  holding  a 
conference on campus extremism, they have done their bit. One wishes it was so 
simple.  Many  of  these  societies  have  over  the  years  invited  odious,  hate-filled 
speakers who are virulently anti-Semitic, anti-gay, anti-west and ideologues of terror.  
Unchallenged by a liberal academia who prefer to view such activity through the 
prism of academic debate and free speech, is it any wonder that such an environment 
has produced people like the alleged transatlantic bomber, Umar Abdulmutallab, ex-
president of the University College London Islamic Society? 139
Furthermore,  he referred to Hasan's  points about the impact of foreign policy on 
extremism as 'an excuse' that reflects 'lazy thinking'.140 Indeed, whilst Raja seemed to 
deny the active mobilisation of Islamist groups and some anti racist activists focused 
solely on the State, Desai seemed unable to acknowledge the role of the British State, 
to critique the terms of the PVE debate or to reflect on the slipperiness of the term 
'extremism'  and  the  propensity  for  its  use  against  dissenting  political  voices  or 
Opposition.   Moreover,  the  ease with which his  response could  be  linked to  the 
revival of patriotism was demonstrated in the comments reply to his article:
I don't know what Britishness is but I do know that all Britains share a common 
sovereign. Perhaps school children should have to sing God Save the Queen each  
morning as they face the Union Jack. Britishness may be a hard thing to unite around 
but all Britains can unite around their fealty to the Queen. Singing God Save the 
Queen will likely be preventative in the development of hardened Islamists owing to  
the God in question's main interlocutor being Rowan Williams rather than the Grand 
Mufti.141
139 No you can not treat violent and non violent extremism separately by Unmesh Desai posted 
on 14/06/11 at The Guardian's Comment is Free section and available at:
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2011/jun/14/violent-extremism-tackled-london
140 Ibid.
141 Ibid.
218
Conclusion
This chapter focuses on the state's attempts to construct and consolidate communities 
through various social policy and funding measures. It is particularly interesting to 
consider the situation in Newham because the local state has not been willing to 
reproduce every element of the New Labour project even if it has been referred to as 
a model New Labour borough.
It is Goldenberg's suggestion that religious organisations can be viewed as 'vestigial 
states' that clears the way to see the shared pastoral and surveillance functions of the 
state and religious organisations. This relationship between the state and religious 
groups  is  embodied  in  the  role  of  'religious  leaders'.  In  the  last  decade,  central 
government has been actively reviving religious leaderships across the country. Some 
interviewees argued that religious leaders can promote cohesion and harmony but 
this chapter problematises this suggestion by raising questions about their tendency 
to  police  territories,  boundaries  and  behaviour.  Also,  Newham Council's  critique 
poses its own questions about 'community'  or 'religious'  leadership as a model of 
representation particularly with regards to their input on social issues.
Moreover, the section on inter-faith alliances shows that the engagement between 
religious groups is structured through the normativisation of the tropes of tolerance, 
decency and respect. These interfaith alliances are akin to Parekh's 'community of 
communities' in which the principle of co-existence enables relationships but also the 
perpetuation of certain views and values  as norms and the consolidation of intra 
relations of power through interfaith dialogue. This is exemplified in the paradox that 
the Hindu Right can live comfortably within spaces established to create 'tolerance' 
whilst the repetitive exclusion or marginalisation of Ahmadiyya Muslims assumes 
the  status  of  a  common  understanding  across  religious  leaders  and  their 
organisations, even amongst the most liberal-left. Also, the spatial dimensions of the 
faith agenda are demonstrated in the glocal impact of Ahmadiyya persecution as well 
as  the  ability  of  the transnational  supremacist  project  of  VHP to sit  comfortably 
within  the  local  area  because  of  its  physical  premises.  Both  the  relationship  of 
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religious organisations and the British state since colonialism as well as this issue of 
how local space is organised and utilised by religious communitarianism runs over 
into Chapters 6 and 7. 
Also at the heart of interviews about engagement with faith based initiatives were 
anecdotes  of  the  gendered  nature  of  these  encounters  premised  on  'respect'  and 
requiring either physical distance between men and women or gendered codes of 
dress as pre-requisites for engagement. The 'respectfully respectful' nature of faith-
based interaction was extended to push aside feminist legacies of empowerment and 
enforce  the  normative  injunction  for  wives  to  'surrender'  to  their  partners  at 
workshops  for  Muslim  women  struggling  with  difficult  marriages.  This  was 
'surrender' to differentiated gender roles and acquiescence over confrontation.
 
Particularly interesting is  the fact  that some of these exchanges and relationships 
were enabled by less visibly religious white bodies considered 'neutral'. Moreover, 
the unfinished business of local views of Newham council  as undemocratic were 
strengthened  when  they  either  refused  or  restricted  their  engagement  with  these 
central government funded inter faith initiatives. Yet it was the Newham councillors' 
repeated commitment to secularism (and the reasons for its emergence) and a critique 
of the undemocratic nature of religious leaderships that acted as a greater protection 
for LGBT and women's rights and also the inclusion of minorities within minorities, 
such as the Ahmadiyyas, in an area where some streets had been 'cleaned up' of out 
gay bodies and pubs or bars.  
Newham is even more interesting as the site for tackling violent extremism because 
the borough has been the subject of surveillance and brutal anti terror policing but 
also of religious fundamentalist mobilisations. Whilst the police continue to have a 
relationship with (older) religious leaders, they do not appear to have credibility in 
the eyes of younger people, more likely to turn to Islam as an alternative political 
narrative and authority. One instance where a socially conservative group attempts to 
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hold the local council to account for the expenditure of PVE funding notes the focus 
is not on any of the expected issues - fundamentalism or the problem with PVE 
funding - but rather focuses on legitimate Muslim representation and a lack of local 
transparency.  This  is  a  problematic  situation  in  which  Newham  Council's  anti 
democratic  tendencies  open  up  spaces  of  critique  but  that  critique  is  led  by  the 
religious Right and social conservatives. Even if Newham's Labour Group is the only 
one challenging religious intolerance and hatred, they are subject to critique precisely 
because they are seen as far from democratic or transparent. The fact that they chose 
to  deliver  most  of  their  PVE programme  in-house  is  seen  as  another  means  of 
avoiding Third Sector participation or critique.  Moreover,  having retained a clear 
distance from New Labour's managerialist revival of 'leaders', Newham Council does 
reinforce New Labour's assimilationist turn to 'cohesion' and 'Britishness', partly as a 
technique to sidestep Islamist and socially conservative religious leaderships. 
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Chapter  5:  From  Anti  Racism  to  Muslim  Identity 
Politics
Introduction
This chapter focuses on sociologically important themes about the ways in which 
anti  racist  activists  have  attempted  to  negotiate  the  growth  of  Muslim  political 
identifications, on the one hand and the state's War on Terror, on the other. I begin 
with activists' own reflections on the changing political context and the reasons for 
the  emergence  of  Muslim  political  identities  and  groups.  I  then  consider  their 
attempts to challenge the encroachment of anti terror policing on civil liberties within 
the context of a resurgent political Islam. This section is followed by a note about 
what religion reveals of the divergent political locations amongst anti racists vis a vis 
the State,  silences  on the  incidence of  religious  violence  and techniques  that  are 
utilised  to  shift  the  focus  back  to  the  State.  This  does  not  mean  that  I  wish  to 
underplay or ignore the appalling State practices and legislation that have actively 
undermined civil liberties since 9/11. Rather, creating a space to pay attention to both 
the silences and the strategies is a significant element of the critique being offered by 
this thesis and an important means for rebalancing the focus of both academic and 
local  political  debates  from  the  victims  of  State  terror  to  the  victims  of 
fundamentalism.
Beleaguered Anti-Racism, Emergent Islamism
As  part  of  the  fieldwork  for  this  thesis,  I  interviewed  a  number  of  anti  racist  
organisations and activists covering each of the boroughs and/or the London area in 
general.142 With the exception of the significantly younger member of the 1990 Trust, 
all of these interviewees came into political activism during the 1970s and 1980s 
142 This included: Suresh Grover of The Monitoring Group or TMG (formerly known as 
Southall Monitoring Group or SMG); Asad Rehman and Kevin Blowe of Newham Monitoring Project 
(NMP); Ansar Ahmed Ullah of the International Forum for a Secular Bangladesh or the Nirmul 
Committee; Pavan Dhaliwal of The 1990 Trust; Sarbjit Johal of the South Asia Solidarity Group 
(SASG); and Wilf Sullivan, the Race Equality Officer at the Trades Union Congress (TUC).
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heyday of anti racism and 'black' politics. All of them noted the demise of anti racist 
politics and the rise and rise of religious identities, particularly Islam. A number of 
reasons were given, some of which were attached to key moments. Importantly, their 
combination signalled a double movement, from above and from below, which had 
enabled the growth and consolidation of religious political identifications. 
Firstly, organisations that had emerged during the 1970s/80s had become immersed 
in service provision or the consolidation of their individual group, which meant that 
the thriving dynamism of that formative period had gradually subsided and a vacuum 
opened up. In Newham, Kevin Blowe also noted that the decimation of community 
organisations in the south of the borough opened up a space for the proliferation of 
evangelical Christian groups, a particular focal point for newer African communities. 
Secondly, international events had impacted on the particular growth of a Muslim 
political  identity.  The specific  historical  moments referred to included: the White 
Revolution  in  Iran,  the  Rushdie  Affair,  the  assault  on  Muslims  in  Bosnia  (and 
criticism of the Blair-led NATO intervention) and the invasion of Iraq. Whilst some 
interviewees  maintained  that  the  faith  agenda  had  been  largely  state-led,  Asad 
Rehman (NMP) noted that young people that might otherwise have engaged in anti 
racist  politics  split  off  when  Bosnia  happened  and  veered  towards  Islamist 
organisations.  These  Islamist  groups  provided  a  new  narrative  for  international 
events that drew connections between Afghanistan, Palestine, Algeria, Bosnia and 
Chechnya. Suresh Grover (TMG) argued that this emergent Muslim political identity 
accelerated at a pace that could not have been anticipated prior to the twists and turns 
of New Labour's War on Terror. He stated: 
Some people have said they knew this was going to happen and they could have 
predicted 7/7. I think everyone in their worst nightmares expects the worst but I  
don't  think  anyone  had  shown  historically  and  consistently  the  growth  and 
immediate  mass  radicalisation.  The  reason  I  say  that  is  because,  objectively,  a 
number  of  circumstances  existed  and  began  to  come  into  play,  which  no  one 
expected. Yes we could have expected Iraq to be invaded but prior to the Labour 
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Party coming into power,  we would not  have thought  they could invade 3 or  4 
countries in that space of time. Yes we didn't have any illusions that Blair would  
build a welfare state but  we didn't  expect  them to take a position that  2 million 
people  coming  on  to  the  streets  would  not  have  any  impact  on  the  Labour 
government. Even I expected some kind of reaction from the Blair government. But 
that  march only succeeded in stopping this government and the Americans from 
invading Iran, in a preventative way. 
[Suresh Grover, TMG, 14/02/08]
Thirdly,  New Labour's administrative / managerial  approach to government relied 
heavily on the construction of 'faith communities' and the consolidation of religious 
leaderships. Ansar Ahmed Ullah noted the following impact in Tower Hamlets:
In  the  eighties  and  nineties,  I  don’t  think  that  religious  groups  were  consulted. 
Secular  groups  were  consulted.  I  remember  that  if  the  police,  if  the  local 
administration, the Home Office wanted to consult with the local community, the 
local Asian, Black, Bengali community, they came to groups like the Bangladesh 
Welfare Association, groups like the one that I was involved with, the Federation of 
Bangladeshi Youth. And in those days, faith groups had no role to play as far as I’m 
aware. Today the police, the central government, the local administration, the local 
political parties, consult faith groups when it comes to consultation with the local  
community. The East London Mosque is in a prominent position when it comes to  
consultation. It is one place where government ministers, local government, central 
government and other agencies will  go and consult  with them when it  comes to  
consulting local community, they will not go to the welfare association or even to 
Brick Lane mosque. So the representation of the local community has shifted not  
only to faith groups but to  one faith group, the one that is lead by JI (Jamaat-e-
Islami). So that has definitely happened in the last 10-15 years. 
[Ansar Ahmed Ullah, Nirmul Committee, 3/10/07]
Amongst most of these anti racists there was a sense of regret that a certain kind of 
(better)  politics  had  been  lost  and  was  being  replaced  by  more  problematic  and 
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closed identifications.143  Suresh Grover depicted the most positive dimensions of 
that  period  of  political  activity  as  located  within  a  larger  Left  socialist  and 
emancipatory project connecting many streams of disadvantage (class, race, gender 
and sexuality) and dynamic debates about political ideas.144 He described the ways in 
which anti racism was located within a cultural politics that embraced art and music 
and created spaces for new hybrid forms. Moreover, it  was a period of hope and 
possibility where activists in these new movements pushed out beyond their comfort 
zones  to  make  seemingly  impossible  demands  that  transgressed  the  bounds  of 
political structures and social policy. Importantly, several interviewees described the 
youth  movements  of  that  period  as  breaking  with  an  established  hegemony 
143 This is also part of the momentum behind recent attempts to document and revisit the most 
positive dimensions of 1970s and 1980s activism. See, for instance, Anandi Ramamurthy's work on 
Kala Tara (at http://www.tandana.org/) and Shakila Maan's work on The Southall Story (at 
http://www.thesouthallstory.com/). Both projects emphasise the secular and diverse basis of local 
struggles. In her essay on Asian Youth Movements, Anandi Ramamurthy (2006) argued that young 
people's affinity with the political notion of a Black identity was 'resolutely secular and non-sectarian' 
and invoked a 'unity in diversity' approach to religious and cultural identity (2006:46).
144 The interview with Kevin Blowe revealed more recent attempts to supplement activism with 
political debates. He referred to the particularly vibrant Radical Activists Network (RAN), created in 
2004 after the London meeting of the European Social Forum. RAN was expressly set up to create a 
space away from the imposing politics of the organised Left (and its anti racist wing) and saw itself as 
a network of non-aligned Left-leaning people. As such it encompassed the kind of rainbow spectrum 
alluded to by Suresh Grover in his account of 1970s Southall. It brought together discussion of 
policing issues with a wider civil liberties agenda that encompassed a critique of the international 
development paradigm and environmental consciousness. However, it is my view that this initiative 
also carried a less than critical edge on religion and politics, especially when it came to Islam. So, it 
may have sought to break away from The 1990 Trust / Operation Black Vote / SWP schema of 
assuming that Muslim representation equals religious representation as well as the Stop the War 
Coalition's conspiratorial murmurings about Jews, but some of the individuals involved with this new 
circle (and the connected 6 Billion Ways event) also embraced theo-politics and provided platforms 
for two key Islamic Right personalities - Tariq Ramadan and Moazzam Begg. Moreover, sexuality and 
reproductive rights were not part of these debates. I think this goes some way to showing that, post-
9/11, feminism or LGBT rights continued to be seen as outside anti imperialist and class politics 
whilst the new religious/Muslim turn was inside them.
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comprising religious and community leaders. Anandi Ramamurthy's (2006) essay on 
Asian  Youth  Movements  described  the  divergent  approaches  of  the  older  more 
established ethnic minority and religious leaders as 'integrationist' and the younger 
members of the Asian Youth Movements as based on 'open revolt'. The former, she 
stated, 'wanted to work with and through British social and political organisations 
and wanted negotiation' whilst the latter were characterised by direct action methods 
and a discourse of self-defence (2006: 42).
Suresh  Grover's  reflections  on  the  changing  political  context  are  particularly 
illustrated by his comparison of the responses to the 1979 riots, on the one hand and 
the 2001 riots, on the other. Whilst he noted similar causes - Far Right mobilisation 
and police harassment  -  and parallel  responses  in  terms of  local  community self 
organisation, he also highlighted the following: 
In '79, despite gross brutality by the police, arrest of something like 750 people and 
charge of 345 people, we were able to mount a campaign and actually turn things 
around, develop a national campaign on Blair Peach. In the first four weeks of trials,  
the conviction rate was 74%. We turned it to 51%. 23% difference! 11 people were 
sent to prison. We had TUC arguing for disbanding SPGs (Special Patrol Groups).  
There was that Left stream that supported us. Come to 2001, media goes down and 
members of parliament like Marsha Singh, who were part of the youth movement  
with people like me in Bradford, asked for more policing and water canons! The 
Blairite legacy had taken over and no dissent whatsoever, massive police arrest, 500 
people arrested and massive number of young people had gone missing. And who 
takes  them  in?  Their  parents  and  the  mullahs!  And  how  many  people  were 
convicted? In our case because of the movement that existed around us, 1 person, in 
345 people charged, only one person pleaded guilty. But with Bradford riots, 99% of 
people pleaded guilty. 
[Suresh Grover, TMG, 14/02/08]
Of note here is the role of religious organisations in handing over rioters through 
forms of soft policing. 
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Several anti racist activists continued to emphasise the possibilities that 'black' as a 
political concept inheres. However, they drew clear distinctions between their use of 
the term and Tariq Modood's (1988, 1994) projection of it in his critique. Even whilst 
interviewees noted the empirical  reality  of  significant  transformations  in political 
identifications,  they  did  not  support  suggestions  that  the  term  'black'  repressed 
religious identities and cultural differences in favour of a constructed homogeneity 
defined largely by the British Caribbean experience. Rather they appeared to be in 
agreement on a number of key points. Firstly, several of them argued that the phrase, 
'the black community', had not been intended to erase difference but rather to create a 
layer of unity based on shared experiences of racism, colonialism and immigration 
rules. Secondly, religious identities and places of worship had always existed and 
were a daily reality as people prayed and practiced their religious beliefs at many 
levels.  This  also  involved  anti  racist  activists  attending  religious  events  where 
religious rites were being performed, for instance, for someone that had been killed 
through racial violence or in custody. Suresh Grover referred to the religious service 
for Zahid Mubarak, the Asian teenager that was murdered in 2000 by his racist cell 
mate at  the Feltham Young Offenders Institute,  and the request from Doreen and 
Neville Lawrence to invite a preacher to lead a public meeting about the murder of 
their son, Stephen Lawrence. Moreover, anti racist organisations had worked with 
religious groups on shared areas of concern,  notably on campaigns against  racial 
violence  and  immigration  rules,  which  had  a  wide  appeal  because  they  were 
obstructing family reunification. 
In comparison, Suresh Grover (TMG) depicted the new wave of religious political 
identities as parochial and inward facing with little cross over or empathy with other 
spaces of politics. He noted that amongst the informal networks in Beeston, Leeds, 
'Islam is  a  way  of  life,  everything  is  about  Islam'.  The  point  here  is  that  some 
political  identifications  are  now based  on  an  Islamist  cartography  of  a  so-called 
'Muslim  world'.  This  comprises  a  view  of  the  actions  of  the  British  State  and 
international affairs  through a religious lens coupled with conceptions  of Muslim 
sovereignty.  Rather  than  revealing  a  previously  forgotten  natural  affinity,  this 
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religious  cartography has  been constructed  by  Islamist  social  movements.  It  is  a 
modern  invention  that  presumes  unity  across  a  Muslim  community  (Ummah) 
irrespective  of  local,  regional,  historical  and  ethnic  differences  (Bhatt,  1997).  It 
contests the overriding authority of the British State, defers to Muslim intermediaries 
and indeed it decentres the political subject through a dangerous 'coupling of human 
self-importance  and  a  denial  of  responsibility  for  human  agency'  by  displacing 
agency and authority to god (Bhatt, 1997:106). At the local level, this is an important 
feature  of  new  'glocalised'  identities  and  related  political  formations  that  knit 
diasporic kinship and political networks together and transform them into context-
specific local actions (Back et al 2009: 5). Mizan Raja and Islamic Circles, referred 
to throughout this thesis, are prime examples of such a politics. 
These  changes  have  given  rise  to  new systems of  representation,  related  claims, 
authenticating and legitimating practices.  Asad Rehman (NMP) expressed a great 
deal of frustration with the fact that religious identity had become a pre-requisite for 
engagement.  This  is  best  illustrated  by  his  frank and open revelations  about  the 
preference of some Muslims subjected to anti terror policing to be less interested in 
being (legally or otherwise) represented by those with a clear perspective on the State 
and their preference to project Muslims as 'prisoners of war' and connect with people 
that fulfilled their criteria for Muslim religious practice. In particular, he gave the 
example of those expressing a preference to be represented by the solicitor Mrs Irani 
because she wears a hijab rather than by Gareth Pierce who has a strong track record 
of uncovering miscarriages of justice.145 Rehman's points were affirmed by Mizan 
Raja's assertion that Harris Rafique of the Sufi Muslim Council could not claim to 
represent Muslims because 'he doesn't even pray'.146 
Rehman described his own interventions as attempts to break through what he saw as 
a self-fulfilling mirror game between the State and Islamists, each reinforcing the 
145 Asad Rehman, 9/08/07.
146 Interviewed 7/12/09.
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other's terms in order to consolidate a view of Muslims and the West as incompatible. 
Thus he stated:
Well actually what you need to be doing is moving this to a space, if you define it as  
Muslim, nobody else is going to engage with you. Unless there is something else and 
it gives people a language that they understand, where people can see the concepts,  
they can relate to you, they can see you as a human being, they can do all of those 
things. If you do what the State wants you to do, you just reinforce each other. It's 
like the dance of the devils ain't it? We all know Bush needs Osama, Osama needs 
Bush. And it’s the same in terms of this. The right wing loves the fact that the State 
represses and the State loves the fact that there are these mad Muslims. They justify 
each  other  and,  you  know,  we  were  trying  to  break  that  discourse  within  our 
communities, or at least within a limited area of our community because we weren't 
able to fight everywhere. 
[Asad Rehman, NMP, 9/08/07]
In particular,  Rehman seemed exasperated  by  the  inability  of  these  new Muslim 
political organisations to locate their experience as one facet of anti racist and civil 
liberties struggles.
Grover,  Blowe  and  Rehman  seemed  clear  that  there  is  an  established  Muslim 
leadership and then other Muslim representatives located outside the spaces of State 
governance. Many people have argued that not all Muslims look to 'religious' leaders 
and rather define on secular lines but within the spectrum of Muslim identity politics 
certain groups are not represented. Kevin Blowe argued that Newham's mosques are 
not ethnically diverse. They are predominantly Pakistani and Bangladeshi. Somalians 
are excluded. Suresh Grover was quick to point out that many of the young men 
articulating jihadi positions that he had been working with do not see themselves as 
represented by Muslim groups like the Muslim Council of Britain and the Muslim 
Safety Forum who position themselves as intermediaries between Muslims and the 
state.  Grover  noted  the  groundswell  of  Somali  politicisation  and  its  lack  of 
representation  amongst  predominantly  South  Asian  and  Middle  Eastern  Muslim 
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leaderships in Britain. He described a meeting that he had attended in west London 
dominated by Hizb ut-Tahrir activists where the audience largely comprised Somali 
young  men.147 Interestingly,  Rehman  noted  that  the  new  religious  political 
identifications  engaging  younger  people,  particularly  Hizb  ut-Tahrir,  are  at  some 
level, broader than 'race' based politics because they encompass people from a range 
of ethnic, cultural, national and linguistic backgrounds. Paradoxically, Chetan Bhatt's 
(1997) work draws out the distance between the diverse membership of these new 
religious  political  mobilisations  and their  supremacist  politics  constructed  around 
restricted hereditary claims to land, blood and rights.
 
Moreover,  these  arguments  about  membership  and  representation  are  particularly 
interesting because of their parallels with Ghaffar Hussain's (Quilliam Foundation) 
points  about  the  distinct  tactical  differences  amongst  Islamic  Right  groupings. 
Specifically, the Jamaat-e-Islami groups (manifesting in Britain as the Bangladeshi 
and Pakistani dominated Muslim Council of Britain, East London Mosque and the 
Muslim Safety Forum) are interested to work through the British political system in 
order  to  Islamicise  existing  relations,  such  as  by  fielding  political  candidates  in 
elections and by creating enclosures of governance where they can exercise influence 
and control (such as the Muslim Council of Britain's guidance for schools). The Hizb 
ut-Tahrir, on the other hand, do not field political candidates, they still aspire to a 
revolutionary overhaul of the existing system and the establishment of an Islamic 
state, notably the return to a Caliphate. The Jamaat-e-Islami groups view the Hizb ut-
Tahrir as an 'out of control younger brother', even if in real terms they have very 
similar ideological ambitions.148 So it is a simple but important fact that, for all the 
reasons just given and many others, those 'Muslim leaders' in relationships with the 
State quite possibly do not represent the young people subscribing to other Islamic 
Right groups and particularly those at the harsher end of jihadi politics as well as 
State  surveillance  practices.  These  other  Islamic  Right  groupings  seek  political 
leverage through civil society rather than the State. 
147 Interviewed 14/02/08.
148 As discussed at a meeting on 26/09/11.
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'We  are  willing  to  get  our  hands  dirty,  not  shout  from  ivory 
towers': Negotiating the Terrain of the War on Terror
Importantly  the  transformations  outlined  in  the  previous  section  appear  to  have 
impacted on the nature of anti racist organisations; during the height of the War on 
Terror they seemed to be almost entirely focused on the surveillance functions of the 
State. There was an acceptance that the terrain had changed, bringing about a new 
alignment of interests between those challenging new forms of racism and defending 
civil liberties, on the one hand, and those engaged in Muslim identity politics, on the 
other. By seeing themselves as civil liberties organisations that check the power of 
the  State,  anti  racist  activists  made  an  active  decision  to  negotiate  this  difficult 
terrain. This section considers those difficult negotiations. 
Anti racists employed a number of strategies for negotiating this complex new field. 
The starkest distinction in approaches came from juxtaposing the contributions of the 
Nirmul Committee's 'no platform' position and the 1990 Trust's decision to establish 
a 'Faith and Race Committee'. Ansar Ahmed Ullah spelt out the Nirmul Committee's 
view as follows:
And I guess the argument one could use, well if one was to work with say the white 
working class poor communities and you wanted to find groups that could go and 
work with  that  community,  well  I  guess  you would not  choose the  BNP or  the 
National Front because of their racist views or their right wing ideology. The same 
situation we’ve got here. If you wanted to work with the Muslim community, then I 
think, for us, it would be wrong to get the JI (Jamaat-e-Islami) or their front groups 
to go and work with that community. Whereas I have no problem with the Brick 
Lane mosque. So it's not faith groups per se, it's what groups we are talking about. 
And if those groups are in the business of oppressing other communities, or are seen 
as Islamist, then we can’t really work with those groups. Not only that, we must  
oppose them and challenge them just as one would do with the BNP and the NF.
[Ansar Ahmed Ullah, Nirmul Committee, 3/10/07]
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Conversely, some of the people that both Ansar Ahmed Ullah and Suresh Grover 
were critiquing as part of their work for Awaaz, the south Asian anti communalism 
network, were part and parcel of the post New Labour religious leadership that The 
1990 Trust had engaged for their new Faith and Race Committee, namely the Muslim 
Council of Britain and the Hindu Forum. Pavan Dhaliwal explained The 1990 Trust 
position as follows:
We identified that this has become, from before we were talking more about race 
politics, we've seen that it has become more about religious politics as well. Religion 
has been brought into it. So we can't ignore that, that is absolutely fine for people to 
assert themselves on the basis of their religion, it's not their primary identity but it  
would  be  part  of  their  identities.  And  if  people  you  know  sign  up  for  these 
organisations, they feel represented by them, then we are happy to sit at a table with  
them as well to see what they think are the pressing issues of the time and how we 
can may be support. So in the current climate, if we have all those religious leaders 
at the table and then the Muslim leader says well this is our problem here and this is  
what  we  are  facing,  then  the  other  leaders  can  also  work  with  and support  the 
Muslim leader and the Jewish leader on their issue. It's  like strength in numbers 
really. (It’s) about them supporting everybody else. And the Trust has got a history in 
that, in terms of race relations and anti racism. There is no conflict in having an  
element of religion in that as well. 
[Pavan Dhaliwal, The 1990 Trust, 3/12/07]
Members  of  The  Monitoring  Group  and  Newham  Monitoring  Project  described 
attempts at more nuanced positions, emphasising the complexity of the field. Thus 
Suresh Grover stated:
From September 11th things are very different in organising than they were before.  
Some of the meetings we have gone to such as in Beeston (Leeds) where 3-400 
people turn up involving around 20 activists, out of which 9 are now in prison for  
terrorist  activities… So the milieu we work  with is  like  that,  some of  them are 
innocent,  some  of  them implicated  because  they  knew others… In  Beeston  our 
question was how did it happen and how can we stop it happening? ... We are willing 
to get our hands dirty, not shout from ivory towers. We go into areas for work where 
the  view  is  not  censored.  (That  includes)  pockets  of  white  under-privileged 
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marginalised geographical areas, poor people, no one cares a shit for them. People 
have censored themselves from that group because they are deemed racist. We came 
to the conclusion that if it comes to working in that area then we have to go there to 
defeat them there. 
[Suresh Grover, TMG, 14/02/08] 
Similarly Asad Rehman (NMP) spoke of his decision to engage with some elements 
of Muslim identity politics in the hope that he could convince them to rethink their 
framework and draw them away from Islamic Right organisations. On his contact 
with Newham Public Affairs Committee (NPAC), he stated:
So it was this, are they a progressive force? Can you influence them? Can you make 
them a progressive force? How do you make them progressive? And I  felt,  you 
know, that these are people worth fighting for, you know. You shouldn't allow just 
because  somebody  says  these  people  are  religious,  that  they  should  align  with 
reactionary forces.
[Asad Rehman, NMP, 9/08/07]
Suresh Grover drew parallels between the contemporary work of his organisation on 
Muslims and the War on Terror and their previous work with Sikh men subject to 
arrest and detention at the height of Khalistani mobilisations in 1980s Southall. He 
argued that TMG's approach had been to 'look at a local situation, try to understand it 
in a global sense and try to develop a secular response'.149 In practice this 'secular 
response' was actualised through a series of distinctions that sought a clear separation 
between  TMG and  any  kind  of  validation  of  fundamentalist  politics  rather  than 
seeking to push religious practice and beliefs out of political spaces altogether. So, 
for instance, Grover referred to the following: working on cases referred by religious 
groups and attending religious functions such as memorial services for victims of 
violence but not those set by fundamentalist groups (Grover had refused to attend a 
service organised for Ricky Reel's family by a known Khalistani front organisation); 
149 Interviewed 14/02/08.
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engaging with religious organisations on pertinent issues (such as discussions about 
Ayodhya  and  their  willingness  to  oppose  immigration  rules)  but  not  mobilising 
through religious sites of worship or with a view to mobilising people  as religious 
people  (Grover  identified  this  as  a  'critical  difference'  between  TMG  and  SWP 
approaches  during  the  Stop  the  War  Coalition);  being  reflexive  about  allowing 
religious practices to take place in otherwise secular spaces but not institutionalising 
these practices so that they become mandatory. 
To a greater or lesser degree than each other, both TMG and NMP accepted some 
Muslim practices during the Stop the War Coalition's demonstrations. For instance 
Grover noted that he had no problem with a call to break fast in Trafalgar Square at 
the end of one demonstration that happened to coincide with Ramadan. Indeed Asad 
Rehman (NMP) organised the food for the breaking of fast. Grover did not feel that  
these practices were Islamicising the character of public protest. As with some of the 
responses to the question of religious welfare services Grover's conclusion hinged on 
points about proportionality. Specifically, he argued that half the demonstrators were 
Muslim and so when there was a request (he made a point of emphasising that it was 
not a demand) it did not seem unreasonable to allow a 3 minute recital from the 
podium by a Muslim preacher in comparison to the 15 minutes given to the Christian 
Bruce  Kent  who  spoke  on  behalf  of  the  Campaign  for  Nuclear  Disarmament. 
Conversely,  Grover  opposed Ken Livingstone's  attempts  to  institutionalise  prayer 
rooms at  meetings,  such as  at  the European Social  Forum event  in  London, and 
described this as a tokenistic politics. Particularly interesting was the way in which 
Grover linked the accommodation of religious needs as part of an ethics of care (such 
as the prayer  spaces  available  to  patients  and family members  in  hospitals)  with 
accommodating requests for prayer at demonstrations.
The particular way in which defence of civil liberties merged with the dynamics of 
anti Muslim racism was illustrated by what came to be known as the 'Forest Gate 
Raids'. On 2nd June 2006, an estimated 250 anti terror police officers carried out an 
armed raid at a terraced house in the Forest Gate area of Newham, in which 23 year 
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old Mohammed Abdul Kahar was shot in the shoulder and then detained along with 
his brother, 20 year old Abul Koyair. The police claimed to have been acting on 
intelligence that there was a chemical device in the house intended to kill hundreds 
of  people.150 The  Independent  Police  Complaints  Commission  was  called  in  to 
investigate the shooting. News reports suggest that Newham's Respect Party called a 
local meeting very soon after the event at  which Yvonne Ridley told Muslims to 
boycott the police because of their Islamophobia.151 Abdul Kahar and Abul Koyair 
were released after the police failed to find the suspected items. Assisted by NMP, 
the  brothers  appointed  Gareth  Pierce  as  their  legal  representative  and  made  an 
application for damages and a formal complaint against the police.152 
The Forest Gate Raids revealed the extent of police surveillance that had been under 
way in  the  area,  notably  that  the  Kahar  brothers'  workplace  lockers,  emails  and 
telephone messages had been accessed and monitored. The morning after the raid, 
those members of NMP that live in the local area had woken up to discover several  
streets cordoned off by anti terror police giving little information on what they were 
doing.  Kevin  Blowe  explained  the  multiple  reasons  why  local  people  became 
concerned and NMP decided to get involved in the case:
But the issue without a doubt was the Government’s reaction to the terrorist threat  
and  the  consequences  of  its  rhetoric  around that.   And the  fact  that  one  of  the 
consequences could be that people storm into somebody’s house at 5 o’clock in the 
morning, shoot them and potentially run the risk of being able to kill them.  That’s  
150 See Police Raid Hunt Chemical Device posted on 3/06/06 at BBC news online and available 
at:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/5042724.stm
151 See Calls to Muslims over Police Help posted on 7/06/06 at BBC news online and available 
at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/5054600.stm
152 The Kahar brothers' own account of that terrifying ordeal during which they were shot at and 
physically assaulted by the police and then vilified by the press, can be read here: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/5075618.stm
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what mobilised people. It was the shock that the State could do that… And so, our 
involvement on it was as a civil liberties issue and as an issue around the targeting of 
people on the basis of the colour of their skin.  And I do accept there is such a thing 
as  Islamophobia,  clearly,  but  I  think  it’s  a  form  of  racism  rather  than  being 
something that’s different.  I think we’d all probably argue that’s the case.  But that 
was the focus.  For others it wasn’t, clearly, there were other people who saw it as an 
attack  on  Muslims  specifically,  and  others,  like  Newham Muslim  Alliance  (AK 
Sheikh) didn’t want anything to do with it, they were dragged kicking and screaming 
by people like (name).
[Kevin Blowe, NMP, 25/04/08]
Asad Rehman stated that he had been arguing within Muslim circles to change the 
narrative proferred by Islamist interpretations of such experiences as an assault on 
Muslims. Notably, the police killing of the Brazilian Jean Charles De Menezes threw 
up a space to unite such experiences under a larger defence of civil liberties and 
critique of State powers. Rehman described the symbolic unity between the Menezes' 
family  campaign  and  the  Kahar  brothers  during  the  subsequent  NMP-led  march 
through Forest Gate:
The Menezes came and they walked with them. Abdul Kahar and his brother went 
then to the anniversary of Jean's death and wore Brazilian tops. We were showing 
that actually the victims of this War of Terror were not so just because they were 
Muslims. So you see this was a completely different discourse. We were trying to  
challenge whereas they were trying to make out that it was an Islamic response to all  
of these things. And we were saying absolutely not, it should be a response based on 
rights. It's a rights response. That's what you should have. It's a rights framework. It  
was not a religious framework that we would be basing our responses on.
[Asad Rehman, NMP, 9/08/07]
However, in contrast to Grover's statement above about seeking a 'secular response', 
Rehman decided on a faith-based dimension to the campaign around the Forest Gate 
Raids. I believe it is worth reproducing Rehman's own description of the thinking 
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behind this at length:
The  response  within  the  community  to  these  things,  they  wanted  to  keep  that 
response as being a Muslim response. We said absolutely not, absolutely not, that is  
not a response. It's a response that goes across the board. So, for example, when the  
two boys were shot, when Forest Gate happened and Kahar was shot, we got Gareth  
(Pierce) to be the rep. And that was a big fight to get Gareth to be the lawyer. She got 
them out.  We  held  a  press  conference.  Where?  In  a  church.  Who did  we  have 
opening it? We had a priest there as well.  We were showing that  this was not  a  
Muslim issue. This was not an issue of 'they are Muslim' or 'he is Muslim'. This is an 
issue of we are citizens and as citizens, the State is violating our rights… It didn't 
necessarily have to be a faith based response but it was important in terms of, you 
see, you've got to remember how people talked about the shooting. Mad Islamists, 
beards,  suicide  bombers,  24  hours  before  London  is  poisoned.  I  mean  it  was 
completely Islamophobic and the whole of the media that whole week was talking 
very much in terms of, we have to cordon off these streets immediately, you know 
250 police officers, cos this is the most serious threat that London has faced and we  
have these Islamist terror networks and you don't know who is under the bed. It was 
like the 'red scare'. It was that type of thing. Then you suddenly had this priest there  
and then you had these boys, yes they had beards but they were talking about how 
the cat was scared and they don't know where it has gone and the garden and how 
the peas that  their  mum was growing were destroyed.  And these were,  we were  
challenging the State who was saying that somehow these people are not British,  
they are Muslims. And we were saying well actually you can't get anymore British 
than this… Here you had two very,  very likeable  lads  but  who challenged your 
impressions  because  when  you  looked  at  them,  they  had  all  the  characteristics,  
beards, shaved heads. (One was) a postie and one working in a supermarket, they 
were the classic good boys.
[Asad Rehman, NMP, 9/08/07]
As far as a 'no platform' position was concerned, Suresh Grover drew a distinction 
between sharing a platform with the British National Party (BNP) or Abu Hamza and 
being politically active in the same spaces as the Islamic Right. Moreover, he had 
been invited to speak at a public meeting where Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT) were on the 
panel  and  his  response  had  not  been  to  step  away  from attending  but  rather  to 
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participate in the event and also speak out against them. Interestingly, both Kevin 
Blowe  and  Asad  Rehman  were  clear  about  avoiding  the  distinctly  separate 
demonstrations organised by Al Muhajiroun outside Forest Gate police station after 
the 2006 Raids but noted that the NMP events had included HT. This is a complex 
area  so  I  want  to  narrate  the  way  in  which  Blowe  and  Rehman  attempted  to 
understand and negotiate this without imposing weighty judgements. 
On the activity around the Forest Gate Raids, both Kevin Blowe and Asad Rehman 
were up front about the fact that HT members had attended the same meetings and 
had also mobilised participants for NMP's march. HT was not invited to join the 
platform of speakers for these events but neither Blowe nor Rehman saw cause to 
exclude  them  from  participating.  Yet  it  did  seem  from  Blowe  and  Rehman's 
descriptions that they were uneasy with HT's presence. 
The difficulty I found was the distinction being made between Al Muhajiroun and 
HT. It was clear to me from these interviews that the way these anti racist activists 
were relating to HT members had changed since the 1990s when I had personally 
witnessed a far stronger separation and indeed explosive arguments with HT about 
their demands for a Caliphate and their critique of 'man made' systems. Now, in this  
new  context,  there  was  a  begrudging  acceptance  of  their  presence  and  even  a 
suggestion  that  HT  had  changed.  However,  the  only  changes  that  interviewees 
specified were superficial, a change in tactics rather than ideology, specifically that 
they  could  be  distinguished  from  the  'table  thumping'  of  Anjem  Choudary  (Al 
Muhajiroun). Examples were provided of HT's engagement with 'rational' debate and 
their  willingness to work in alliance,  including engaging with seemingly unlikely 
candidates such as Peter Oborne of The Spectator. Two specific reasons were given 
by Rehman for engaging with HT activists - to try and draw individuals away from 
their Islamist world view and because too many other people were scared of working 
on the War on Terror. Indeed he made a very interesting distinction between speaking 
out  about  the  BNP  and  challenging  the  State's  War  on  Terror.  In  Rehman's 
experience, the latter had been the more difficult and unpopular area of work. Indeed 
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the reluctance of established religious leaderships and non-Muslims to sign up to the 
campaign left  Rehman in a  position where most  of the bedfellows were Muslim 
organisations. As convincing as Rehman's personal accounts are of his own struggles 
on these issues, some parts seemed not to make sense to me such as why, in the 
context of some 2 million people having marched against the invasion of Iraq and the 
Blairite War on Terror, it was difficult to identify secular partners for such work. 
Nevertheless,  Rehman provided multiple examples of how, for the best  part  of a 
decade post-9/11, he had been attempting to counter the traffic of Islamist political 
domination,  and  especially  of  the  new  War  on  Terror  terrain  including  by 
participating in debates on the Islam Channel and speaking on platforms otherwise 
dominated by the Islamic Right. Moreover, the search for Muslim 'progressives' led 
to  the foisting up of  Moazzam Begg and Tariq Ramadan as  articulate  'moderate' 
speakers that could draw Muslims to a civil liberties and human rights framework 
that also engages with other political spheres. 
I am sure the ironies of Rehman's actions were not lost on him. Yet in 2010, the 
Quilliam Foundation  launched a  research  report  claiming that  the  Islam Channel 
promotes intolerance and violence against women and had provided platforms for a 
number  of  speakers  supporting  religious  violence  including  Anwar  Al  Awlaki's 
sermons and sets hosted by members of the Hizb ut-Tahrir.153 Moreover, I attended 
one meeting that Rehman addressed that had been jointly organised by the Campaign 
Against  Criminalising  Communities  (CAMPACC)  and  The  Centre  for  Study  of 
Terrorism (CFSOT). My personal view is that, certainly by the date of this public 
meeting (14/03/08),  Rehman's  impact was nominal  and his participation involved 
being squeezed on to the tail end of a long list of Right wing speakers including: 
Kamal  el-Helbawi  (who  was  listed  as  the  CFSOT Chairman  but  is  actually  the 
Muslim  Brotherhood's  key  spokesperson  in  London),  Saghir  Hussain  of  Cage 
153 Re-Programming British Muslims: A Study of the Islam Channel by Talal Rajab published by 
The Quilliam Foundation in March 2010 and available at: 
http://www.quilliamfoundation.org/index.php/component/content/article/723
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Prisoners, Azad Ali of the Muslim Safety Forum and Muhammad Habibur-Rahman 
of the Islamic Forum of Europe. Indeed, given that the interview with Rehman took 
place some years after many of the key events marking the War on Terror and his 
huge personal investment in struggles against this attack on civil liberties, there was 
an element of tragedy in Rehman's own admission of defeat, even if he argued that 
the alternative would have been to do nothing at all. Thus he stated: 
I think, what we did was not always perfect. But what we did was we tried to remain 
true to principles and we tried to remain engaged and active. We didn't disengage 
and we didn't do nothing. Now, sometimes we learnt. We did things and we learnt.  
Now I, I, on a personal level now, I'd say that I tried to engage on lots of different 
levels and some of them failed. The forces were too strong. That is not because the  
concept was bad, it was just that we didn't have the forces. We didn't have enough 
progressive  people  to  take  on  people  that,  not  even  in  the  way  that  the  1930s 
Communist Party organised in terms of discipline, numbers, organisation, political 
identity, all of those things. Our people don't want to get their hands dirty or prefer to 
talk about all of these things at dinner tables. But don't actually want to engage in the  
hard fight that community politics actually is, because these politics are forged, not 
in abstract, they are forged by doing those things and yes you are going to make 
mistakes. Of course I've made mistakes, I look back and I think I have always tried 
to do the right thing but some of these initiatives have given too much support to the 
right wing Islamists.
[Asad Rehman, NMP, 9/08/07] 
Fundamental Silences
This  new  terrain  comprises  muddy  hills  down  which  one  can  slip  slide  into  a 
working relationship with the religious Right whose fast changing tactics act as a 
veneer for their consistently undemocratic and supremacist visions. This is not a note 
of condemnation from 'ivory towers' but rather an observation on the problems of 
engagement  within  this  field.  In  real  terms,  what  is  to  be  done  when  one  is  
sandwiched between two poles of ostensibly Right wing 'Muslim representatives': the 
Salafist constellation of groups, such as the Islamic Human Rights Commission and 
Cageprisoners  on  the  one  hand,  and  the  Jamaat-e-Islami  led  Muslim Council  of 
Britain and its local branches, on the other? 
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It is clear that NMP and TMG shared the perspective that they hoped to shift these 
issues away from questions about religious identity and towards a wider rights-based 
framework discussing civil liberties. Their alignment was clearest in their critique of 
the tokenistic way in which the SWP had assumed the Muslim Association of Britain 
(MAB) to be the voice of  all Muslims and the way this had lead the Stop the War 
Coalition  to  move  from  hosting  a  range  of  different  Muslim  speakers  to  only 
religious  Muslim  speakers  selected  by  MAB.  However,  there  is  a  qualitative 
difference between their ideological frameworks. NMP see their focus as the State 
and particularly its policing function. Any interventions in local struggles between 
ethnic minority communities is rather about pulling minority communities or local 
populations away from divisions or sectarian struggles so that they can stand united 
as a check on the State ('United We Stand, Divided We Fall'). Having said that, I have 
noted above that, as a 'progressive Muslim', Asad Rehman saw his role as two fold: 
to fight against the crushing blows to civil liberties post-9/11 but also to challenge 
the voices of violent Jihadi politics seeking to dominate the response. He expected 
Sikhs and Hindus to go into their respective areas and challenge the incursion of the 
religious Right there. Grover, however,  described TMG as being located within a 
larger liberatory and emancipatory project that is not only concerned with the power 
that lies with the State but rather with inter-related struggles that cross over between 
State and communities, to concern themselves with other dimensions of power such 
as violence against women. TMG has historically also challenged communalism. 
With a few exceptions, there was little recognition amongst interviewees that anti 
racist, civil liberties and human rights groups could afford legitimacy to the Islamic 
Right. Part of the reason for this lay in the lack of clarity about the ways legitimacy 
is acquired. Moreover, for NMP, I think it is fair to say that any legitimacy for the 
Islamic  Right  was  not  seen  to  match  the  power  and  problem  of  the  State,  its 
surveillance functions and the 'War of Terror'. One could suppose from this that the 
sheer  fact  of  religious  organisations'  locations  within  civil  society,  rather  than in 
relationships with the State, could make them the underdog.  
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However, on 7th February 2010, the particular problems arising from working on the 
War on Terror in the context of fast paced Muslim radicalisation were brought to a 
flashpoint  by Gita Sahgal's  public critique of Amnesty International's  relationship 
with  former  Guantanamo  detainee,  Moazzam  Begg  and  his  organisation, 
Cageprisoners. Sahgal, the former Head of the Gender Unit at Amnesty International, 
gave an interview to The Sunday Times in which she declared that 'to be appearing 
on platforms with Britain’s most famous supporter of the Taliban, whom we treat as a 
human rights defender, is a gross error of judgement'.154 In summary, she argued that 
Moazzam  Begg  and  Cageprisoners  are  located  within  salafi-jihadi  networks  in 
Britain  and have  been  actively  promoting  particular  Islamic  Right  tendencies  by 
publishing  and  reproducing,  in  a  non-critical  way,  salafist  lectures  and  books 
including those of: Abdullah Azzam, thought to be a founder of the jihadist group 
Lashkar-e-Taiba; Dhiren Bharot, connected to Al Qaeda; Anwar Al Awlaki and Ali Al 
Timimi,  thought  to  be  the  spiritual  mentors  of  a  number  of  convicted  Islamist 
bombers. She also criticised Begg and Cageprisoners'  sympathies for the Taliban, 
which  she  described  as  an  inherently  and  systematically  discriminatory  political 
project.  At the heart of her critique were questions about the legitimacy acquired 
through alliances as well as the role of human rights organisations in challenging the 
violations  and  political  projects  of  non-state  actors.  She  called  for  a  clearer 
distinction  between  hearing  the  horrendous  experiences  of  former  Guantanamo 
inmates and legitimising them as partners because of the propensity of such alliances 
to enable the entrenchment of certain Islamic Right ideas and discourses. She used 
the word 'sanitisation' to describe this process. 
Until I started to look into this issue I had little information about the nature of the 
154 Amnesty International is ‘damaged’ by Taliban link by Richard Kerbaj dated 
7/02/10 published in The Sunday Times and available at: 
http://www.human-rights-for-all.org/spip.php?article2
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Jamaat-e-Islami,  Salafism and the Muslim Brotherhood.  Indeed I  was also of the 
view that the word 'jihad' could just as easily be used to refer to self-determination 
struggles,  the  mainstay  of  anti  imperialist  movements  and  post-colonial  writing. 
Sahgal's notion of 'sanitisation'  shed new light on this word. I watched numerous 
speeches by Moazzam Begg in which he consistently compared 'jihad' with liberation 
struggles such as in Ireland and South Africa. He also repeated the claim that whilst 
the word 'jihad' was now being vilified, it had previously been of use, even to the US 
government for whom 'jihad' as Mujahideen had been so useful in fighting against 
the  Russian  invasion  of  Afghanistan.155 Infact  'jihad'  is  about  making  clear 
distinctions  between  believers  and  non-believers  and  part  of  the  lexicon  of 
discriminatory  communal  projects  that  label  certain  lands  as  'Muslim  lands'  and 
claim to be liberating them from anyone that is considered an illegitimate resident. 
These are closed political projects structured by strong views on the role of women, 
opposition to apostasy and heterodoxy.
Notwithstanding the great number of criticisms that Sahgal did not substantiate her 
claims about Begg and Cageprisoners in good time or in a language accessible to 
others, I want to highlight two particular responses from Left activists that suggest 
there is some kind of flipside to what academics like Sara Ahmed mean when they 
talk  about  proximity  and  how  racism  works.156 From  Ahmed's  perspective,  the 
repetitive proximity of certain words can produce and reproduce racist discourse and 
in turn has material effects. For Ahmed, the proximity of certain words reveals the 
155 Such as Moazzam Begg: Against Islamophobia: June 2008 loaded up by 'adycousins' on 
18/07/08. Accessed on 21/02/10 at:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HJPpSP_eY3M
These arguments are re-iterated at other public meetings including at a Goldsmiths College event 
organised by Lewisham Stop the War Coalition, loaded up by 'adycousins' on 9/05/07. Accessed on 
youtube on 20/02/10 at: 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=41m5_lmWUMU
156 Problematic Proximities, or Why Critiques of "Gay Imperialism" Matter by Sara Ahmed 
posted in October 2009 to http://monthlyreview.org/
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short  distance  between  liberalism  and  racism.  From  Sahgal's  perspective, 
relationships between human rights or civil liberties organisations and the Islamic 
Right  can  'sanitise'  fundamentalist  discourses  and  their  political  projects;  she 
highlighted a short distance between anti racism, human rights and fundamentalism.
Responses to Sahgal's claims have been met with accusations that these depend upon 
'guilt by association', and in the words of one activist, that Sahgal's condemnation of 
Begg in 'a court of feminism' was akin to 'the thought crimes aspect of the law on 
anti-terrorism'. Another posting described this as the 'end result of furious bullshit 
campaigns around the world against NGOs like Amnesty International, premised on 
utter bad faith and tissue-thin innuendo. I trust those responsible are pleased with 
themselves' followed by a link to a piece in the Israeli Haaretz newspaper reporting 
on the findings of an Israeli poll that large numbers of Israelis would back a gagging 
clause against human rights groups. There is no mention in the article of Amnesty 
International or the Sahgal/Begg Affair. Yet such retorts are pertinent because of the 
continuity they reveal on the question of time. They repeat an old cycle where anti 
racists have highlighted reasons why it is inappropriate to talk about women's rights 
or  intra  relations  of  power.  This  cycle  includes:  1970/80s  objections  to  public 
campaigns on domestic violence because of the pathologisation of the Black family 
(also  reproduced by the  feminist  contributions  in  the  CCCS (1982) volume 'The 
Empire Strikes Back'); to the possible impact on immigration laws of a campaign 
against forced marriage; to accusations that criticisms of Begg and Cageprisoners 
have  directly  undermined  both  the  campaign  to  close  Guantanamo  and  also 
Palestinian rights.
A number of accusations based on proximity were made almost immediately against 
Sahgal to undermine her claims including: that the interview took place in The Times 
rather than any other newspaper; that some of the pro Iraq War Euston Manifesto 
group (known as 'The Decents') jumped in almost immediately behind her; that the 
journalist  Martin  Bright  also  embraced  her  cause.  Unsurprisingly  then,  Sahgal's 
allegations were met with counter allegations that she was less than perfect because 
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of her own associations. References to her 'strange bedfellows'  enabled questions 
about her motives.  She was characterised as pro war, anti  Muslim, and even pro 
Zionist. It was particularly curious to see a longstanding member of Women Against 
Fundamentalism being accused of being a Zionist and more so, that few people saw 
this as a contradiction.
Karima  Bennoune  (2008),  Professor  of  Law  and  a  member  of  the  Centre  for 
Constitutional Rights (CCR) in New York, argued that a more rigorous and 'fuller 
human rights position' (located within a radical universalist framework) obliges civil 
liberties groups to tackle both Terror and Torture as different permutations of the 
same intention to compromise human dignity and the value of human life. One task 
is neither greater nor less important than the other. Thus she stated:
Furthermore, abuses on which the human rights movement classically focuses, like 
torture, rest on the same philosophical assumption as practices, like terrorism, which 
claim  the  attention  of  many  concerned  with  security.  This  assumption  is  the 
permissibility of instrumentalizing severe and deliberate human suffering.  Such a 
commonality suggests that, to take the approach that best champions human dignity, 
one  must  look  attentively  at  the  human  rights  impact  of  both  what  is  labeled 
“terrorism” and what is labeled “counter-terrorism.”
[Bennoune, 2008: 6]
Sahgal had argued that upholding the 'universality' and 'indivisibility' of human rights 
ought to be the way to ensure a consistent and morally robust position on both the 
War on Terror and fundamentalism.157
Interestingly,  Kevin Blowe's  willingness to recognise the need for a debate about 
157 'Soft Law' and Hard Choices: A Conversation with Gita Sahgal by Deniz Kandiyoti dated 
19/04/10 published by Open Democracy and available at:
http://www.opendemocracy.net/5050/deniz-kandiyoti/soft-law-and-hard-choices-conversation-with-
gita-sahgal
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Muslim fundamentalism specifically called for stepping outside the terms set by the 
State by disentangling this from the State's War on Terror: 
I think in a sense they are two debates that overlap but they’re not the same debate.  
And part of the problem, I think it’s absolutely true, that people find it very difficult  
to have an argument about,  for instance, Islamic fundamentalism or any types of  
fundamentalism.  Is that they try and lump the two debates together as though they 
are linked, but actually they are two separate debates. And it’s partly to do with the 
fact  that  the Government tries to lump the two things together, by that  sense of  
saying those arguments say you need to get your house in order.  Well, to which my 
immediate answer would be whose house?  There isn’t such a thing as ‘the Muslim 
community’.   If  you  accept  the  argument  there’s  no  such  thing  as  'the  Muslim 
community', whose house are you talking about? ... I think there needs to be a good 
solid discussion about what do we do, how do we confront the issue about who are,  
about fundamentalism, whatever kind, because it’s a deeply reactionary conservative 
thing which is completely opposed to the type of Left politics that we argue for.  It’s  
a more difficult debate to have because I don’t know the answers in a sense, because 
a  lot  of  the  answers  around  how you  address  fundamentalism  are  either  about  
defeating people through ideas, which is not simple, and is not an argument I would 
use for instance in relation to the BNP, or it’s about placing demands upon the State 
to intervene, which I also don’t accept because they will always use those demands 
against everybody in a blanket way.  
[Kevin Blowe, NMP, 25/04/08]
However, most of the anti racist groups referred to in this thesis describe themselves 
as human rights organisations or work within a human rights framework. Karima 
Bennoune demonstrated the connection between the two debates and appealed for a 
rebalancing of the emphasis of human rights groups from the rights of victims of 
State torture to the need to also safeguard and protect the victims of terror, of non-
state armed military groups.  In her own facing down of the bravado surrounding 
CCR's decision to act on behalf of Anwar Al Awlaki, she called for an equally pro-
active legal campaign for the protection of victims of religious fundamentalism, an 
area that she feels has been neglected by civil liberties groups and legal academics. 
She stated:
246
How can we defend the principle that assassinations are wrong by standing silently 
next to an advocate of assassinations? I urged CCR to find other ways to challenge  
the Obama administration's policy without associating with Awlaki. I appreciate that 
CCR says  it  merely  seeks  to  challenge  US government  policy,  and  opposes  all 
killings of civilians. Yet, the organisation has been quiet about who Awlaki is and 
what he has done, describing him simply as a "Muslim cleric" or a "US citizen"… 
Awlaki should not be assassinated as a result, or subjected to human rights abuses,  
but he should be brought to justice in accordance with international law for his own 
crimes  against  humanity.  And  he  clearly  should  be  denounced  by  human  rights 
advocates, rather than represented by them when he is at large and not a detainee.158 
Conclusion
This  chapter  engages  with  the  positionings  of  anti-racist  activists  and  their 
experience of Muslim identity politics. They provide a number of reasons for the 
transition from anti racist politics premised on a secular Black unity to a growing 
Muslim political identity including: the professionalisation and growing self interest 
amongst social movement groups; the demise of a larger Left liberatory narrative; the 
growth of an Islamist narrative that offers explanations for global and local events 
and the active consolidation of religious identities and religious leaderships by the 
state. These features have converged to ensure that Muslim political identifications 
are all the more viable and have grown at a pace that might otherwise have been 
unimaginable. 
As much as they could see the reasons, most of them were not comfortable with this 
new  politics,  which  they  described  as  inward  facing  and  parochial.  Only  one 
interviewee  took  a  no  platform  approach  to  Islamism  and  only  one  directly 
reinforced  the  terms  of  the  state  and  established  an  advisory  group  made  up  of 
religious leaders already recognised by the state. The others sought to negotiate what 
158 Why I spoke out on Anwar Al Awlaki by Karima Bennoune posted on 19th November 2010 at 
The Guardian and available at: 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/cifamerica/2010/nov/19/human-rights-usa?
INTCMP=SRCH
247
they saw as a complex terrain.
The War on Terror reinforced both the power of the state and some anti racists' focus 
on the surveillance dimensions of the state. So their engagement with the field arose 
from  a  sense  that  local  politics  is  'forged'.  That  means  one  has  to  engage  and 
influence it or construct it in whichever way one wants, one shapes the political field. 
Also  several  interviewees  didn't  want  to  pander  to  self-censorship  post-9/11  and 
wanted to invest in changing the perspectives of people being recruited by Islamists, 
those being radicalised. Moreover, there was a growing alignment of interests around 
the need to  challenge  the state's  incursion on civil  liberties  and a  new securities 
agenda. 
Apart from The 1990 Trust, there seemed to be an acknowledgement that these new 
political identifications were either Right wing or very conservative. There was an 
interesting discussion about the negotiation of religious-secular boundaries. Religion 
as practice existed within anti-racist political spaces for many reasons including as 
rites of passage for those murdered in racist violence or in custody. Without repeating 
the multiple distinctions  proferred by Grover,  I  want to  focus on the question of 
fundamentalism. 
A key distinction between Grover and Rehman was Grover's assertion that he sought 
secular  solutions.  Whilst  both  challenged  the  tactics  of  an  SWP approach  that 
enabled the Muslim Association of Britain to select  all  Muslim speakers,  Grover 
continued to seek a secular response whereas Rehman had definitely engaged more 
in  faith  based  responses  including  identifying  other  Muslim  voices.  Rehman 
described himself as a 'progressive Muslim' and seemed to see himself as carrying an 
ethical  and  moral  responsibility  to  influence  Muslim  debates.  Whilst  these  new 
Muslim voices began to speak within and to a larger civil liberties and human rights 
framework  that  Rehman  had  been  pushing  Muslims  to  locate  their  experiences 
within, some of the personalities were firmly located within Islamic Right political 
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constellations.
Notably the cumulative effect of such exchanges was highlighted by Sahgal's critique 
of Amnesty International, which revealed the ability of the Islamic Right to work 
through human rights spaces in order to proliferate a particular understanding. These 
spaces could enable the 'sanitisation' of Islamic Right projects. Sahgal's point was 
that  working  with  partners  enables  the  accrual  of  benefits,  gives  access  to  new 
resources and spaces. The Muslim groups and leaders referred to by all interviewees 
in this thesis were all right wing, with the Jamaat-e-Islami dominating the spaces 
created  by  the  State  and the  Hizb  ut-Tahrir  and Salafists  dominating  the  spaces 
within civil society.
Anti  racists  sought  to  challenge  the  surveillance  agenda  and  also  the  growth  of 
Muslim political  identities by pushing away from the terms of the State but they 
seemed to be pushing towards the terms of other Islamic Right factions, if for no 
other reason than the capacity of these new political formations to carry their agendas 
into other forums.
One of the most significant effects of this process seemed to be an almost automatic, 
proximity of feminist concerns with the iterations of the state because of the role 
afforded to the state to intervene in the proliferation of fundamentalist  ideologies 
whilst,  on  the  other  hand,  the  anti-racists  were  concerned  to  influence 
fundamentalists  because  theo-politics  and  particularly  political  Islam  was  being 
brought into the inside of anti imperialist politics. This is not to say that either side 
directly agreed with or pushed either the draconian anti civil liberties measures of the 
state or the supremacist politics of the religious Right. 
Moreover,  the  British  National  Party  appeared  to  be  a  normative  marker  for 
determining  partnerships  but  this  could  run  in  many  different  directions.  In  the 
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previous  chapter,  Sarah  Ruiz  referenced  the  BNP  to  explain  her  colleague's 
description of Ahmadiyyas as 'beyond the pale'. In this chapter, Ansar Ahmed Ullah 
based his 'no platform' position towards the fundamentalist Jamaat-e-Islami on the 
anti racist history of a 'no platform' approach to the BNP. In Chapter 7, I note that the 
only organisation that Catherine Howarth of the Citizens UK would not want to work 
with was the BNP. The Citizens UK is otherwise an alliance of religious groups that 
is reluctant to talk about racism and sidesteps questions about fundamentalism for 
fear of breaking the bonds between its member groups. So the BNP could act as a 
reference for socially conservative religious forces, for the persecution of a minority 
sect, or as a comparison for objections to fundamentalist Islam.
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Chapter 6:  Shape Shifting and Sikhism in Southall
Introduction
This chapter seeks to extend earlier critiques of the culturalist and ethnicist turn in 
anti-racism to take account of state sanctioned religious projects. It reveals the ways 
in which community formations develop at a local level notably how addressing the 
question of negative identity plays out in a way that actually reinforces the moral 
agenda of the state.  It also shows how these formations draw strength from state 
agendas. Indeed both the state and local religious groups are engaged in a complex 
dialectical process that brings them both into being.  
As noted in previous chapters, Sikhs have been active within various overlapping 
political  fields  for  some  decades  including  workers'  struggles,  anti  racism  and 
electoral  politics.  This  chapter  provides  an  important  backstory  to  some  of  the 
religio-political  identifications  in  the  Southall  area  and  demands  for  religious 
accommodation. In particular, it focuses on the ideological tendencies of the main 
Sikh organisation, the SGSSS, whose numerical and physical presence are both cause 
and consequence of its prominence in the representation of Sikhs, claims about their 
belief systems and religious practices. This is followed by a critical engagement with 
claims for religious accommodation, notably in relation to food and schooling. This 
chapter shows how attempts to move beyond cultural negation, including by making 
religious  demands,  has  the  propensity  to  create  the  negation  of  other,  more 
ambiguous, Sikh traditions and practices. The final section of this chapter extends the 
analysis within Chapter 4 of local relations of power and precedes the discussion of 
the East London Mosque and social capital in the next chapter in order to develop an 
argument about the local emergence of new systems of 'election' and access to finite 
public resources. 
Constructing Sikh Boundaries 
In Southall, there are twelve gurdwaras but one specific organisation, the Sri Guru 
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Singh  Sabha  (SGSSS),  dominates  the  field.  This  section  provides  background 
information about its political leanings. I also note its cultivation of a relationship 
with  the  British  state  and  the  ability  to  perpetuate  Khalsa  norms  through  this 
connection. 
The Khalsa norm, Singh Sabha movements and Khalistan
Gurharpal Singh and Darshan Singh Tatla (2006) describe the formation of the Sikh 
identity  as  structured by three  particular  struggles:  the  birth  of  Khalsa  as  formal 
resistance to Moghul rule; the emergence of the Singh Sabha movement as a reaction 
against the colonial administration and the rise of the Hindu Right Arya Samaj; and 
the  Khalistani  mobilisation  for  the  secession  of  Punjab  from  the  Indian  state. 
Structured by the Khalsa norm and carried largely by Jat  Punjabis,  these staging 
posts are pivotal in the attempt to construct a uniform, bounded 'Sikh community' (or 
Panth). My view is that these antagonisms produced three key adversaries that repeat 
as  figures  within  the  dominant  Jat  Sikh  imaginary,  drawing  renewal  through 
projections  of  itself  as  victorious  and  valiant  yet  continuously  fighting  external 
threats  from Muslims/Moghuls, westernisation/British colonialism, and Hindus/the 
Indian state. They are the Jat Sikh's significant Others and are periodically recalled as 
part  of  the  process  of  identity  consolidation.  Importantly,  from  the  1800s,  this 
progression is abetted by the procurement of a paternalistic relationship between Jat 
Sikhs and British colonisers, which has carried a mutual indebtedness to the present 
day.  Inspite  of  the  many  inherent  contradictions  of  these  narratives,  the  specific 
trajectory  of  the  Khalsa  norm  secured  a  place  within  the  contemporary  British 
political and welfare system. 
Sikhism actually originated with the syncretic folk tradition, devotional practice and 
charitable work of Guru Nanak who emphasised meditation on a formless god and 
pushed against unanimist and orthodox tendencies within Islam and Hinduism (Singh 
and Tatla, 2006). Nanak's practice was intertwined with a social equality agenda and 
opposition to caste. However, he was succeeded by a further nine gurus that made 
major transformations to the theological content and objectives of the religion. The 
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struggle  against  Moghul  rule  from  the  1600s  was  specifically  marked  by  Guru 
Hargobind's instigation of a sense of Sikh sovereignty by establishing an Akal Takht 
(seat of temporal authority) opposite the Golden Temple (seat of spiritual authority) 
and a boundary wall around Amritsar (Singh and Tatla, 2006). It is this process that 
was strengthened by successive Gurus and particularly settled during the reign of the 
10th  Guru,  Gobind,  who  established  the  Khalsa.  Singh  and  Tatla  described  its 
founding as follows: 
(Gobind was) the last guru who introduced new major innovations that were to lay 
the foundations of modern Sikh identity. First, on Vaisakhi (Sikh new year) 1699 he 
baptised the Khalsa (the pure), the elite saint-soldiers of the fledgling community 
who were to be distinguished by external symbols of identity, the five Ks - kesh 
(unshorn hair and beards), kacha (short drawers), kirpan (sword/steel dagger), kara 
(iron bangle)  and  kanga  (comb) -  and  were  renamed as  Singh (male)  and  Kaur 
(female). Second, before his death Guru Gobind invested the guruship in the Guru 
Granth Sahib, thereby terminating the line of personal guruship. In due course these 
two changes were to draw the boundary around Sikh identity much more clearly than 
hitherto: whereas the end to personal guruship set a limit on schismatic pluralism,  
the  Singhs (and Kaurs)  of  Guru Gobind were destined to  assume a  pre-eminent 
position within the panth (Sikh community).
[Singh and Tatla, 2006: 13]
By the 18th century, Moghul rule was in decline and a Sikh sense of state formation 
was in the ascendancy. Maharaja Ranjit Singh in particular managed to generalise the 
Khalsa norm in Punjab and established an elite Khalsa army. Thereafter, the decline 
of  this  Sikh  regency  and  the  British  annexation  of  Punjab  in  1849  marks  the 
beginnings of a paradoxical relationship between Sikh and British sovereignty,  in 
which  Jat  Sikhs  espousing  a  Khalsa  norm,  gained  a  privileged  position  and 
consolidated this at an economic and cultural level across Britain and the Punjab. 
They  were  duly  rewarded  for  their  co-operation  with  British  colonisers  in  the 
projection  of  Punjab  and Sikhs  in  particular  as  'orthodox,  separatist  and martial' 
(Singh and Tatla, 2006: 15). There was also real economic recompense. Singh and 
Tatla  (2006)  and  Dilbagh  Chana  (interviewed  14/06/11)  noted  material  rewards 
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including income, pensions and rights over some of the most productive land in the 
Punjab.  Moreover,  this  was  the  beginning  of  a  new  system  of  patronage.  Two 
histories and sovereign identities were assimilated through the confluence of mutual 
privilege along status and class lines. 
As  Singh  and  Tatla  (2006)  point  out,  both  colonial  rule  and  anti  colonial 
mobilisations  then  created  the  conditions  for  the  emergence  of  the  Singh  Sabha 
movement of gurdwaras. On the one hand, these attempted to strengthen a sense of 
Sikh identity in the face of a new politicised pressure from the Hindu Arya Samaj to 
incorporate Sikhs and extend the Hindu base. On the other, they sought unity and 
coherence  in  the  face  of  colonial  attempts  to  restrict  the  independence  of  Sikh 
gurdwaras and convert  these into administrative and tax paying civic institutions. 
Importantly,  it  was the Singh Sabhas that established 'distinctive Sikh rituals that 
have subsequently become enshrined in the Rahit Maryada (Sikh code of conduct)' 
(Singh and Tatla, 2006: 17). The political continuation of the Singh Sabha movement 
was consolidated in the establishment of a new legal body, the Shrimoni Gurdwara 
Parbhandal Committee (SGPC) and carried politically by the Shrimoni Akali  Dal 
(SAD). 
  
The migration of Sikhs to Britain provided a new context for the development of this 
identity. In Southall, the first gurdwara was established by a merger of two separate 
Jat  groups from different  regions  in  the Punjab.  This is  the body that  eventually 
established  itself  as  the  SGSSS  and  purchased  two  prominent  sites  -  first  on 
Havelock  Road  and  then  on  Park  Avenue.  Dilbagh  Chana  (14/06/11)  noted  the 
ongoing close links between the SGSSS and the dominant legal and political bodies 
in Punjab, the SGPC and the SAD. 
In  accounts  of  the  1970s  onwards,  a  number  of  commentators  have  noted  the 
transnational relations between Sikh gurdwaras in Britain and the mobilisation of the 
Sikh separatist Khalistani movement in India. I want to briefly note the persistence 
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and  proximity  of  the  Khalistani  agenda  but  its  precarious  relationship  with  the 
SGSSS. The SGSSS was originally led by Jats with a combination of SAD and IWA 
sympathies. After Operation Bluestar, two things happened: Sikh sympathies for an 
otherwise unpopular claim to independence from the Indian state received a huge 
boost and secondly, a number of young men involved in Khalistani politics fled the 
Indian state's crackdown in Punjab and claimed asylum in Britain. According to both 
Radhika Chopra (2011) and Suresh Grover (interviewed 15/08/07) many settled in 
Southall.  The impact  was that  a  fairly  integrationist  SGSSS gurdwara committee 
came  under  pressure  from  a  new  wave  of  militancy  and  indeed  Didar  Singh 
Randhawa  (interviewed  11/05/09)  recalls  that  the  gurdwara  was  taken  over  by 
Khalistanis from the late 1980s into the 1990s. They were eventually usurped by an 
older  generation  of  SAD  supporters,  and  original  founders  of  the  gurdwara, 
concerned  about  the  scale  of  debt  and  mismanagement  but  also  because  the 
Khalistani cause had started to peter out in India and the SAD relationship with the 
Indian state was recovered. It would not be appropriate then to accuse the current 
SGSSS of being a Khalistani body as such but I want to note the continued proximity 
of  the  Khalistani  cause  to  the  SGSSS.  In  particular,  there  is  a  common  Khalsa 
ideology that lies at the heart of both the Singh Sabha formations and the Khalistani 
movement. Moreover, the Khalistani front organisations in Britain are never too far 
away. I attended one of the annual '1984 Never Forget' demonstrations in Hyde Park 
organised by Khalistani front groups. It had been advertised at one of the SGSSS 
sites even if Balwant Singh Gill (interviewed 21/05/09) was clear that the charitable 
nature of the SGSSS didn't permit it  to overtly claim such affiliations. Moreover, 
there  is  an  easy,  often  seamless,  intermingling  of  Khalistani  flags  and  Khalsa 
symbols at the annual Vaisakhi processions, which are entirely organised and led by 
the SGSSS. I would suggest that the key distinction between the two is not really 
about  religious  beliefs  as  both  are  underwritten  by  the  Khalsa  norm  but  rather 
marked  by  their  respective  integrationist  and  confrontational  strategies  with  the 
SGSSS  committed  to  the  production  of  law  abiding  subjects  and  invested  in 
relationships with the British and Indian states.  There are potential  parallels  here 
between the points made in the previous chapter about the relationship between the 
muted perpetuation of Jamaat-e-Islami codes by the Muslim Council of Britain and 
the more rhetorical style of the Hizb ut-Tahrir's call for a return to the Caliphate. 
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Notably, in both cases, there are generational differences.
Making Sikh Claims
This section considers the kinds of claims that have been made in respect of religious 
accommodation  as  part  of  social  welfare  provision.  In  particular,  by  making 
connections  between  Sikh  claims  and  earlier  forms  of  religious  accommodation, 
these claims were being positioned as 'rights' or 'needs' rather than as preferences.
You are what you eat
One  particular  dimension  of  religious  accommodation  was  the  issue  of  dietary 
requirements. The 'communing' dimensions of religious belief are often highlighted 
by advocates of faith-based organising, referred to in Chapter 1, to emphasise the 
altruistic  side of  religion.  This  has  indeed been an important  element  of  support 
provided by religious groups to those not covered by the welfare state, particularly 
reaching  out  to  precarious  subjects  surviving  the  strictures  of  immigration  rules. 
However,  this  projection  of  the magnanimous dimensions  of  religious  belief  was 
fractured  by  competing  demands  for  the  accommodation  of  religious  dietary 
requirements. Conversely then, some demands revealed the etymological connection 
between  'communing'  and  'communalisation',  the  sectarian  strengthening  of 
boundaries against outsiders.
Some  Sikh  interviewees  talked  about  demands  for  jhatka  meat,  which  involves 
severing the head of the animal  with a  sword rather  than slicing its  throat  as in 
Muslim or Jewish ritual. Rai (2005) noted that jhatka is part of the Rahit Maryada, or 
'Sikh Code of Conduct', but has not been common practice amongst Sikh families in 
Britain. As noted above, the Rahit Maryada was introduced by the Khalsa imperative 
of the Singh Sabha movements. In all the time that I had spent with Sikh Punjabis in 
London and India, I had never before come across such demands. Both Gurcharan 
Singh and Dilbagh Chana explained that demands for jhatka meat arose as a follow 
on  from the  accommodation  of  Muslim  demands  for  halal  meat.  There  are  two 
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aspects  to  this  issue.  The first  is  to  understand its  theo-political  location.  If  one 
travels the Khalsa/Gobind road of Sikhism then one might view jhatka as one of 
Sikhism's defining characteristics. However, if one travels the Nanak road, it really 
doesn't  matter  what  you  eat  because  Being  is  defined  by  one's  philosophical 
orientation towards the world rather than by the enactment of rituals. The second part 
is to consider this demand as an effect of the consolidation of both Muslim and Sikh 
identities and of the more subtle and normative aspects of the Khalsa-Singh Sabha 
trajectory. I would like to suggest that the development of a demand for jhatka meat 
reflects attempts to position the Gobind tradition as the primary representation of 
Sikhism in Britain. It also arises from another aspect of this tradition and that is the  
emphasis on asserting strong distinctions between Sikhism and Islam (indeed of the 
naturalisation of an enmity with Muslims that relies on recalling the Moghul era), 
something  that  was  not  there  for  Nanak  who  rather  claimed  Sikhism  as  an 
amalgamation of various facets of both Hinduism and Islam.
As noted in Chapter 3, for some people religious belief is an existential reality. It has 
implications for their everyday lives, the way in which their world is organised and 
exchange is conducted. This could pose a number of ethical questions for the state as 
summarised by Revd Michael Bolley:
This comes back to the question of a diverse community of people that  have strong 
religious beliefs that affects daily life in terms of what food they will eat and then there  
are questions about what is the responsibility in terms of the state's role vis a vis that. Is 
it the case that we provide one thing that has to suit everybody. And you say well is that 
actually possible and if it's not possible then you got to make special provision and then 
got to put funding into making provision. Whether we are talking halal meat or whatever. 
So there is a whole issue there about accommodating difference. Then if you are going to  
accommodate difference then you can't say one size fits all.
[Revd Michael Bolley, Holy Trinity Church, 14/07/11]
Conversely,  Dilbagh  Chana  argued  that  the  reality  of  democratic  participation 
required  people  to  think  beyond  themselves.  In  this  projection,  the  state  has  an 
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arbitration function. He stated:
In a civilised society, in an organised civil society there are always allowances that  
people have to make, civilisation is artificiality because you are going to have to put 
down your strongly held views… Something may be comfortable and right for a 
certain set of rules but doesn't have to continue to be of the same benefit. The state  
then has to decide if it must provide facilities. Democracy actually prides itself on 
the facility that it can create for differences of opinion to be addressed in a forum,  
with opportunity to be given to individuals to express that opinion and to come to a  
consensus. It means that people at the extremes of that consensus are going to have 
to compromise for 'the greater good'.
[Dilbagh Chana, 14/06/11]
Chana's  tendency  towards  a  deliberative  democracy  model  is  enhanced  by  a 
discourse of 'the common good'. Both Chana and Bolley made multiple references to 
this  phrase,  part  of  a  political  language  proliferated  through  local  actors  by  the 
Citizens  UK.  It  is  particularly  interesting  that  the  practice  involves  consensus 
building,  which seeks to  establish a  central  point  between extremes.  This  central 
point fluctuates in line with the changing context and nature of society. I want to 
recall the limits of this deliberative approach as discussed in Chapter 1 specifically 
that it is not premised on political principles but rather depends on who participates 
in the debate. As such this model presumes the space is flat and does not take account 
of local cartographies of power. If the field is dominated by vociferous Right-leaning 
or conservative actors, determinations will also flow in that direction. This is clear in 
the claims that flow from the predominance of the Khalsa norm and is also the case 
with the Strangers into Citizens campaign discussed in Chapter 7. 
Living by the Jewish example
In the melange of recognition politics, additional claims were made in relation to 
Jewish and Christian accommodation. Dilbagh Chana, not a supporter of faith-based 
services, explained that the drive for Sikh schools, for instance, is referenced against 
the particular success of Jewish mobilisations in Britain.  
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Sikhs have continuously quoted Jews as an example for what the Sikhs ought to be 
trying to do but Sikhs forget that the Jews have 5-6000 years of history and what  
they believe today comes from the result of centuries of discussion and talks within 
itself and there was a historical need for that. We don't have that. The world is a very 
different place today… Jews were a persecuted people that just ran from place to  
place.  (They  are)  the  only  other  religious  group  that  is  supported  in  the  Race 
Relations  Act  1976 as  you know… Number  one it's  convenient,  two it’s  a  very 
obvious grouping, they can't compare themselves with anyone else. 
[Dilbagh Chana, 14/06/11]
The problem with the dynamics of the Sikh claim is its arbitrary location within the 
realm of 'race' and ethnicity whilst Islam and Hinduism remain within the socio-legal 
status of religion. This is clearest when Dilbagh Chana attempts to explain why Sikhs 
reference  the  Jewish  example  rather  than  the  Muslim  one.  There  is  normative 
acceptance  of  a  Jewish  claim  that  denies  legitimacy  to  those  that  converted  to 
Judaism and infers a settlement between Christians and Jews that other groups seek 
to replicate:
Muslims are not the same ethnic group. You can be a Muslim but in ethnicity terms 
you can be miles away. A Jew is born a Jew, there is no way you can become a Jew. 
But Sikhs you can become?
But yes that’s where they make their mistake. That’s why I say that in comparing  
themselves with the Jewish community they don't know what they are talking about. 
It's convenient?
Because it gives them strength. Simply because the Christians cannot go against the 
Jewish interests. 
[Dilbagh Chana, 14/06/11]
It  struck  me  that  the  distinction  between  the  SBS argument  for  Black  women's 
groups and those making religious claims was their orientation. Whilst the former is 
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oriented towards challenging Black women's position in wider society, particularly 
their experiences of racism and sexism, the latter were immersed in discussions about 
the inside and outside of group boundaries. Chana also highlighted the effects of 
religious accommodation either as inspiring others  to make similar claims (Sikhs 
following the Jewish example) or as a source of competition and tension (Sikhs on 
the  accommodation  of  Muslim demands  for  halal  meat).  Indeed Ranu Samantrai 
(2008) noted that religious claims abound precisely because of the prior acceptance 
of other religious claims and the overall  Establishment position of the Church of 
England.
Moreover,  the  Court  of  Appeal's  finding  in  2009  that  the  Jewish  Free  School's 
admissions  policy  was  in  breach  of  the  Race  Relations  Act  1976,  was  a  strong 
reminder  of  the  gendered  proximity  of  'race'  and  faith  in  determining  religious 
boundaries and pursuing the framework of other religious claims. By defining Jewish 
as determined by the mother's biological origins, the school refused a place to a child 
whose mother had converted to rather than been born into Judaism even though the 
mother regarded herself as an orthodox and practicing Jew.159 
159 The boundaries between race and faith by Afua Hirsch dated 25/06/09 published by The
Guardian and available at:
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/belief/2009/jun/25/jewish-school-race-religion
Interestingly, the Court of Appeal ruled that the school's refusal to admit the child was based 
on ethnicity rather than religious affiliation, thereby constituting a breach of race relations law, but 
leaving discrimination (referred to elsewhere as selection) on the grounds of religion untouched. 
Subsequently, other Jewish schools have revised their criteria to emphasise degrees of religiosity. This 
has resulted in a Jewish (born) girl being denied a place in favour of a non-Jewish girl who had greater 
proof of Jewish religious practice including synagogue attendance. As Calmus quite rightly points out, 
this was 'the first case to give substance to fears that the JFS ruling would effectively exclude Jewish 
children from non-observant homes'. 
See Jewish girl's King David place goes to non-Jews by Jonathan Calmus dated 11/06/10 published by 
The Jewish Chronicle and available at:
http://www.thejc.com/news/uk-news/32947/jewish-girls-king-david-place-goes-non-jew
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An equally problematic issue with regards to the multiple references to the Jewish 
experience  was  the  way  in  which  the  history  of  Jewish  persecution  became  an 
important metaphor for keeping the Khalistani cause alive. After my second meeting 
with Didar Singh Randhawa, the former President of the SGSSS, I noticed a booklet 
on his desk entitled '1984: The Sikh Kristallnacht'. The publication of this document 
coincided with a national march (now an annual event) on the 25th anniversary of 
Operation Bluestar, led by Khalistani factions in Britain. Whilst the organisers may 
be recalling the Indian state's massacre and anonymised mass cremation of around 
800 bodies near Amritsar during a 'clean up' operation, this London based graphic 
mobilisation (with young people carrying coffins, large pictures of bloodied bodies 
and photographs of the missing or dead) lines up self determination arguments (with 
the backing of the Green Party and Tamil groups) to regularly renew the case for a 
separate Sikh state.160
The 'right' to a state funded Sikh school
Unsurprisingly,  the  comparative  socio-legal  status  of  religions  in  Britain  has 
collected  around  the  debate  about  faith  schools.  Some  interviewees  would  not 
support faith-based services, such as Sikh housing, on the grounds of segregation but 
fervently argued for the 'right' to state funded Sikh schools. I want to hone in on 
discussions  about  the  establishment  of  the Khalsa Primary School,  the first  state 
funded Sikh primary school in Britain. This debate provides insights into the way 
that melancholia and morality gain relief through religious communitarian arguments 
about education.
In Southall, interviewees highlighted cultural challenges to assimilationism that pre-
date the confrontational anti-racist politics of the 1970s/80s. These revealed that for 
some  ethnic  minority  activists,  breaking  through  white  hegemony  also  involved 
questioning  Christian  worship  and  pushing  for  linguistic  and  religious 
160 From fieldnotes on the 1984 Never Forget demonstration from Hyde Park to Trafalgar 
Square on 7/06/09.
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accommodation.  Three  Southall  councillors  became  involved  with  local  schools 
because  of  a  commitment  to  getting  those  state  secular  schools  to  teach  Asian 
children  their  mother  tongue languages  -  Punjabi,  Hindi  and Urdu.  Amongst  the 
reasons given for the importance of linguistic inheritance were statements about the 
loss of knowledge, history and traditions amongst second generation Asians. They 
also noted that religion had been one component of a larger lobby for racial equality, 
which  included  demands  to  promote  Asian  teachers  and  recruit  ethnic  minority 
school governors. Councillor Swarn Singh Kang for instance came to Britain in 1965 
and  recalled  his  anxieties  about  racism  as  cultural  domination,  the  normative 
production of white/Christian superiority and the potential 'threat'  of losing Asian 
children to 'Westernisation':
The  education  head  teacher  and  education  department  thinking  we  came  from 
culturally poor backward areas so they wanted to completely assimilate our children 
into their culture. And they were against our children to speak their mother tongues.  
This was the attitude in schools and the general thinking was that our children were 
retarded. After some time, we kept going in that environment but when we saw our  
children are drifting away, away from our culture and under the influence of British 
culture, so then we became very much aware and we were thinking we came here for  
good living but were losing everything because we came here to earn more, to get 
better living, but then we saw our children are culturally drifting away. You know, 
children are our property, these are our values.
[Councillor Swarn Singh Kang, 28/09/09]
This emphasis on owning children parallels the communitarian anxieties about losing 
women, projected as the vessels  of culture and community renewal  (Anthias and 
Yuval-Davis,  1992;  Yuval-Davis,  2000).  Moreover,  concerns  about  the  loss  of 
Punjabi are not unconnected to the growth of a dominant Khalsa discourse in the 
latter half of the twentieth century. The Punjab based language movement (Punjabi 
Suba) of the 1950s and 1960s in India sat alongside a post colonial anxiety amongst 
Sikhs that they had been overlooked in the carving up of India and Pakistan and their  
identity (taken as a package including religion and language) would be subsumed 
within an ostensibly Hindu Indian nation-state.  The Punjabi  Suba movement was 
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eventually swallowed up by a revitalised Khalsa ideology that claimed the language 
as one more marker distinguishing Sikhism from Hinduism and Islam. Indeed some 
of the Southall interviewees would have precisely transported this perspective and 
adapted it to a British discourse about racial equality. However, Chopra points out 
that Punjabi can be written in three ways - either as Gurmukhi, meaning the words of 
the Guru, or Shamukhi, a persio-arabic script, or increasingly as roman script in the 
context of globalisation and diaspora (2011:1).
Kang  further  explained  that  the  SGSSS  had  been  an  important  platform  for 
mobilising on these issues:
There were teachers and other good thinking people that had come from India and 
we had a good platform in the gurdwara so we formed an association of parents and 
then we recruited some parent governors in the schools, it was given a very broad 
name so any faith can enter. 1978. Called the Association of Asian Parent Governors.  
Before this Association came into force we tried to contact the education department 
to say we have an identity - faiths, culture and language - we want to impart that to 
our  children  and  it's  important  for  us  because  if  our  children  don’t  know  our 
language we can't impart our faith, language was important to keep the faith alive… 
we  thought  we  are  not  Christian,  why  should  our  children  be  taught  Christian 
education. Our association went from home to home and said this legislation only 
makes  sense  when Christian  kids  but  we  are  not.  So  we sent  petitions  in  large 
numbers to homes and schools demanding our own worship. 
[Councillor Swarn Singh Kang, 28/09/09]
The demands of this association were couched in the language of 'parental rights' and 
diversity, two streams that have continued as key facets of a religious lobby within 
education.
As a consequence of pressure from the Association of Asian Parent Governors, local 
schools  started  to  introduce  Asian  languages  and  mark  religious  festivals.  Four 
festivals in particular were referred to throughout this research - Vaisakhi, Diwali, 
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Eid  and  Guru  Nanak's  birthday.  Moreover,  Swarn  Singh  Kang  described  the 
introduction of a Multicultural Officer within the education department as intended 
'to see that demands of ethnic communities was heard and met'.161 Standing Advisory 
Councils  for  Religious  Education  (SACREs)  were  established  to  provide 
determinations for those schools that wanted to change their Christian worship to 
collective worship on the basis of the numbers of ethnic minority children in their 
classes.  Historically,  SACREs  contained  Asian  councillors  with  strong  religious 
identities,  particularly  invested  in  determining  how  their  religion  was  projected 
within mainstream state schools. 
By 1992 some of these lobbyists saw the 'grant maintained status' option within the 
Conservative Education Act 1988, which offered state schools the opportunity to opt 
out  of  local  authority  control,  as  providing  the  space  to  convert  a  local 
comprehensive into a Sikh school. Pragna Patel recalled that Southall Black Sisters 
allied  with  other  secular  forces  in  Southall  to  establish  the  Save  Our  Schools 
campaign.  This  campaign  successfully  opposed  religious  organisations.  Thus  she 
stated:
One of  the  earliest  shocks to  the  system,  to  people  was the way in which Sikh 
fundamentalists  in  Southall  tried  to  take  over  using  a  particular  piece  of  Tory 
legislation to try and get certain state schools within Southall to opt out.  And in fact, 
if  you like, it  was perhaps one of the moments of Southall  history when secular  
forces  had  to  really  come  out  as  secular  forces  to  oppose  that  kind  of 
fundamentalism… feminists had already come out because of the Rushdie Affair… 
More or less everyone accepted that the religious groups could not get their way. 
[Pragna Patel, Southall Black Sisters, 15/10/07]
According to Patel, a key element of the demand for this Sikh school related to the 
desire to control and police young women. However, none of the other allies in the 
Save Our Schools campaign wanted to draw attention to this for fear that raising 
gender might fracture the alliance (Southall Black Sisters, 1991).
161 Interviewed 28/09/09.
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 The campaign to oppose the opt-out was won but in 1993 a privately funded Sikh 
secondary school, the Guru Nanak Sikh School, was established across the border in 
Hayes and this has had significant reproductive effects. In 1999, not long after New 
Labour  came  to  power,  the  school  gained  Voluntary  Aided  status,  marking  the 
fruition of two processes: New Labour's pre-election promise to extend Voluntary 
Aided status to ethnic minority faith based schools as part of its parity approach to 
racial equality; and links nurtured between the SGSSS and Labour Party politicians. 
Randhawa confirmed the Guru Nanak Sikh School's fraternal links with the SGSSS. 
He  applauded  the  gurdwara's  work  in  raising  money  for  the  school  and 
demonstrating its viability and the strength of demand for Sikh schools in the area. 
This placed the SGSSS' subsequent lobby for the Khalsa Primary School in good 
stead because it could be referenced against the popularity (judged by long waiting 
lists) and academic success of the Guru Nanak secondary school in Hayes. 
Southall Councillors confirmed that the demand for the Khalsa Sikh primary school 
in Norwood Green came from the SGSSS and was strengthened by their capacity to 
independently  fundraise  vast  sums  of  money.  Importantly,  Councillor  Dhindsa 
explained that the local council  has not opposed the establishment of faith based 
schools in the borough but more so,  the council  had to do very little aside from 
authorise the development because SGSSS had already raised significant funds from 
its  congregation and synchronised these with central  government  programmes. In 
actual fact, the gurdwara provided just 10% of the capital expenditure to build the 
school whilst central government provided 90% of the capital and the local authority 
now meets 100% of the running costs. This is not to belittle the SGSSS' phenomenal 
capacity to raise millions of pounds but to highlight the reproductive effects of its 
operations,  namely  access  to  both  spaces  of  representation  and  additional  state 
resources. 
According to  Didar Singh Randhawa the demand for the Khalsa Primary School 
came from the 'sangat' (the Sikh community of believers, another Khalsa term) who 
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wanted the younger generation to acquire knowledge of their  religion.  Randhawa 
explained that the school would provide the same curriculum as any other school but 
with a stronger focus on providing information about Sikhism. The interplay of the 
terms  'sangat'  and  'seva'  take  on  a  new  dimension  here.  Rather  than  project 
themselves as a political body engaged in initiating demands, Randhawa's multiple 
references  to  serving the  sangat  acted  as  a  veneer  for  the  role  of  the  SGSSS in 
perpetuating a specific cultural politics. 
Former  Councillor  Gurcharan  Singh summarised  the  constitutive  elements  of  the 
ongoing demand for Sikh schools as follows:
Alot of parents want their children brought up a particular cultural way. And they 
say, they want their children to be taught Punjabi, they want children to be taught 
religious education and that is not possible in a state school. They would like their  
children not cut their hair, they would like that children have a 'jura' (hair tied above 
the head) and children or girls do not cut their hair either and (that they) behave in a  
particular way. Basically, if they are educated in Punjabi, they are speaking Punjabi,  
they do not, they don't forget their cultural background or their religious background.  
So say, normally the state school tells you how the Gurus were brought up, where 
they were and that kind of thing. But in a faith school they are likely to give more  
information about the Sikh gurus, and like in Muslim schools they would be telling 
what the code of conduct is for Muslims. 
[Gurcharan Singh, former councillor, 9/10/09]
Indeed Gurcharan Singh described the Sikh school as a 'need' rather than a 'demand' 
and  summarised  this  'need'  as  having  two  dimensions:  religious  instruction  and 
academic results. 
Councillor  Dhindsa  made  additional  arguments  that  highlighted  the  problematic 
dimension of narratives about migration and belonging. He claimed that one reason 
for lower standards and achievement in state schools arose from the level of support 
and attention required by the children of new migrants. This was detracting from the 
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ability  of  a  more  established cohort  (also  ethnic  minorities)  to  achieve  their  full 
potential. He also noted that some teachers had low expectations of ethnic minority 
children whilst  the culture of faith based schools induced higher aspirations.  The 
Sikh school  in  the  neighbouring  borough became a  means  of  circumventing  the 
pressure on teaching that came with waves of migration. This is a curious paradox, a 
narrative about the difference of a specific minority crystallises as an argument to 
escape the reality of structural inequality for others. Councillor Dhindsa took his son 
out of the local secondary comprehensive as Somalian and Afghani children entered, 
not because he had anxieties about mixing, he was certainly more to the left than 
Gurcharan  Singh  and  Swarn  Singh  Kang.  Rather  he  noted  that  new  waves  of 
migrants  needed additional  teaching support  which,  because  of  the limitations  of 
funding versus capacity and needs, meant that less attention was being given to the 
more  'ready'  children  (to  use  the  word  'capable'  would  feed  the  suggestion  that 
children with greater English proficiency are also more 'capable'). Curiously then, the 
state  was now funding local  Sikh and Catholic  schools,  which in  turn became a 
siphon  for  ensuring  that  second  generation  Sikh  children  would  achieve  good 
academic results. At some level these arguments and actions parallel the 'white flight' 
phenomenon  of  the  1970s  and  1980s  but  without  the  geographical  relocation  of 
households. The Sikh schools become a means of escaping the problems associated 
with 'race', poverty, migration and a retracting welfare state without anyone actually 
moving out of the area.
Moreover, Councillor Dhindsa, a governor on a secular state school and otherwise 
unsupportive of faith based services,  admitted that  the Sikh school  in Hayes had 
provided his son with the following: good academic grades; an excellent grasp of 
Punjabi; a real confidence in carrying his religious identity, particularly noted by the 
pride  with  which  he  wore  his  turban.  He  compared  his  son's  (Sikh  identity) 
confidence with his own acquiescence when he arrived in Britain in the 1960s.
Questions about exclusivity or inequality were sidestepped through a new discourse 
of affirmation. In this context religious schools were not described through public 
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statements about what they oppose but rather a positive articulation of opportunity 
and diversity. Yet curiously when Gurcharan Singh provided an example of the scale 
of demand for the Sikh secondary school in the neighbouring borough, it was of a 
Hindu parent that had written to him because his  child had been denied a place. 
Particularly important in the context of the predominance of Khalsa ideology, was 
Gurcharan Singh's distinction between supporting those faith schools that provide 
'mainstream faith education' and being cautious when it came to supporting similar 
demands from 'fringe' communities with a 'different interpretation of the religion'. As 
such he bolstered the projection of SGSSS as mainstream Sikhism. In this way, social 
welfare provision and society itself becomes re-ordered where the most Right wing 
interpretations  are  couched  as  normative  whilst  other  Sikh  practices  (potentially 
including the Afghani and Ravi Dass gurdwaras) come to be positioned as 'fringe' 
elements  carrying  all  the  metonymic  associations  with  religious  bigotry  and 
sectarianism. 
Yet Gurcharan Singh passed off questions about the discriminatory nature of faith 
schools with references to the Jewish and Christian settlement in education and the 
reality of selection:
Discrimination would be if you say “no, you can’t have that, only Sikhs can have it  
or Christians can have it.” So I do not regard this as discrimination. Selection we  
always do in  our  life,  we make selection,  we go out  and buy a  different  'subzi' 
(vegetable curry) and all these things, we always make selection. 
[Gurcharan Singh, former councillor, 9/10/09]
This corresponds with the points made by other Labour councillors such as Kamaljit 
Dhindsa and Swarn Singh Kang. Taken together they seemed to enact a process of 
rationalisation utilising the tropes of 'choice' and 'achievement' to justify phenomena 
that  they  otherwise  described in  affective  terms  -  as  demands  arising  from loss, 
mourning and victimisation.  Perhaps this  rationalisation provided the authority to 
sponsor  religious  initiatives  that  potentially  conflict  with  the  (nominally)  secular 
politics of their Ealing Labour Group. Moreover, as the head of a Catholic school 
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astutely  observed,  local  politicians  are  vigilant  about  the  possible  backlash  from 
making any strong statements against faith-based schooling. 
At the heart  of this  discussion are questions about  the purpose of education -  as 
enabling control or as nurturing critical enquiry. As already noted in Chapter 1, K. 
Moti  Gokulsing  (2006)  has  argued  that  whilst  the  state's  support  of  faith-based 
schools may be pitched as a concern for academic achievement, the 'non-negotiable 
absolutes' of faith based services do not fit with a view of education as learning to 
question and to think critically. 
Moral Decline and Religious Codes of Conduct
Concerns  about  cultural  and  religious  transmission  and  the  need  to  counter  the 
relegation  of  ethnic  minorities  to  images  of  themselves  as  'backward'  flowed 
seamlessly into concerns about 'Westernisation', slip sliding into a discourse about 
the failure of state schools and onwards to statements about the need for a stronger 
morality. It was claimed that greater discipline and better values could be provided 
through an expressly 'Sikh code of conduct'. 
Gurcharan Singh was not advocating a withdrawal into religious orthodoxy but rather 
a greater engagement with society through a Sikh morality:
Muslims have a different code of conduct. Sikhs have a different code of conduct.  
Sikhs are basically, our basic code of conduct is like reciting Gurbani, going to the 
gurdwara, doing all these sorts of things. I do not want that a faith school will bring 
up children who are so religious or orthodox or something, but I would like that that 
faith be integrated into the normal society… Also I believe it imparts higher moral 
values. State schools do not do that, unfortunately. Although we give the education, 
which is basically common to everyone: speak the truth, don’t do anything wrong, or 
anything else, we do not go into great details about that one… Well, I have come 
across in my life so far, more children getting into trouble who are from state schools 
than children who were coming from faith schools. And I think that people in faith  
schools are, if I can use the word in inverted commas, are 'strict disciplinarians', and  
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that  sometimes  is  lacking  in  State  schools…  And  the  culture  seems  to  be  ‘let 
children do what they want to do’ and other culture seems to be ‘we are treating 
children as adults.’ 
[Gurcharan Singh, former Councillor, 9/10/09]
To identify different codes of conduct but also claim commonalities for faith-based 
education is  an interesting juxtaposition that  reproduces the 'different but equally 
strong' tenets of the multiculturalism model of old. Indeed Councillor Swarn Singh 
Kang revealed a history of reciprocal relationships between religious organisations in 
Ealing  in  which  they  joined  forces  to  press  for  religious  accommodation.  Each 
religious group defended the ontological separateness of the others. Kang's defence 
of faith schools was also anchored in claims about moral frameworks by which he 
essentially meant discipline, restraint, respect for hierarchy and the need for teachers 
to be moral role models. This is a strong example of Nikolas Rose's (1999) 'etho-
politics' that places the onus on people's behaviour and sees moral rectitude as the 
answer to crime, drugs, domestic violence and poverty. Kang stated:
What is education for? It gives children the knowledge to be successful in their lives, 
one is just to earn their living and the other is moral education, which is important.  
Livelihood and morals. Morals tells them their discipline. In Sikh faith we say that 
all humans are equal and we should respect everybody especially the teachers that 
teach you and they are in a good place in society, they give you moral education and 
other education to stand on your feet throughout life, treat other children as equal.  
Against bullying, crime and drugs. If there is good moral education children will  
stay away from these things… Crime here in this country is not  due to poverty.  
Poverty is created because they get bad habits such as drugs and start robbing others  
and can't work or when they create problems between husband and wife, so create all 
these things like violence in families, comes from husband being drunkard and he 
not  looking after  kids.  That  sort  of  thing brings problems.  It  doesn't  come from 
poverty. It’s a self-made problem.
[Councillor Swarn Singh Kang, 28/09/09]
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However, the demand for faith schools as arguments about religious transmission are 
in conflict with the empirical fact that the criteria for admission to faith schools is 
entirely  dependent  on  an  already  existing  religious  commitment,  knowledge  and 
practice.  So  concerns  about  control  and  discipline  move  even  further  to  the 
foreground. This paradox is highlighted by another one of Swarn Singh's statements:
And these schools have waiting lists and will only give admission to parents that are  
really Sikh, that come from religious families. But state schools are bound to accept 
every  child  even  from  families  that  don't  care  for  their  children,  that  are  split  
families, that's why there is ill discipline in schools because some families don't have 
any moral values, their parents are drunkard and druggies and those kids mix up with 
the others and we say few black sheep spoil the whole group. There are a few kids in 
the school that are anti-social or bully but it's because the parents have no hold on 
them.
[Councillor Swarn Singh Kang, 28/09/09]
As is clear from these rather shocking comments from a Labour Party councillor, the 
faith  schools  debate  also  reveals  the  fact  of  ethnic  minority  conservatism sitting 
comfortably at the very heart of nominally Left political projects.  
Even more alarming was the proximate nature of arguments made by Swarn Singh, 
Gurcharan Singh and the views of the Christian Right politician Alan Craig. Craig 
also invoked connections between religious communitarianism and morality and in 
turn mobilised these towards a critique of secular state schools:
And it is no wonder that if you provide kids with that sort of moral framework and 
the desire for excellence and good teaching and believe that actually children need to 
be taught well within that framework, that moral and ethical framework, then no 
wonder these schools are doing well. Provided the schools are teaching the children 
to be good citizens, members of the community teaching them to understand other  
religions other faiths and no faith then I think the faith schools are a very good thing.
[Alan Craig, Christian Peoples Alliance, 22/10/09]
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It is safe to say that for Alan Craig, all roads lead to the breakdown of the family and 
the role that religion would play in keeping the family strong:
The family is at the core of Christian teaching. And as our society has decided it says 
farewell to the basic Christian underpinning of our society, the basic Christian moral 
capital, so our families begin to break up.  And we try experiencing new types of 
family, and the net effect we can all see on the street; it’s self evident for anybody to 
see.
[Alan Craig, Christian Peoples Alliance, 22/10/09]
Points about family and morality were high on the agenda of many interviewees and 
cut across political parties to connect conservatism of all backgrounds. 
Ranu Samantrai (2008) cited the differential socio-legal status of religions in Britain 
as one aspect of the technologies of ethnicity deployed by the state. Foucault's work 
has already pointed to the way that morality and discipline are constitutive elements 
of  state  technologies.  However,  I  want  to  add that  this  is  a  grotesque parody of 
Fanon's  call  for  the  need to  validate  the  black  psyche.  Here  we see  that  psyche 
bolstering the contemporary meta-narrative of the Conservative Party's rhetoric about 
'doing God' where the quest for strong moral frameworks provides public validation 
for organised religion. The Conservative ideology relies on a Victorian morality that 
comfortably intermingles with a multicultural ethos derived from (Victorian) colonial 
governance and supplanted to Britain in order to manage south Asian communities 
here.  Ethnic  minority  communities  now travel  that  road  in  order  to  access  state 
resources. In turn, the particularly conservative minority religious projects that have 
emerged actively contribute to a growing British political consensus about religion, 
morality and the breakdown of the family. 
Conversely, Dilbagh Chana warned against using religious ideas as a moral compass: 
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(Morality) is a difficult word to find acceptable definition because what is moral for 
one group can be construed as not moral or immoral for another. So for instance one 
group might believe that girls have the right to choose their own partners but you 
may have another group that thinks it’s the male members of the group that make 
that decision. The state has to find ways to keep out of that kind of battle. That is 
when most problems start. Religion can be a very dangerous thing. Because in a lot 
of issues, in a lot of periods in history, it has been responsible for very major cruel  
events…  The  religions  were  involved  in  education  when  education  was  not 
available. Churches were responsible for creating conditions where education was 
provided because there was no other facility. Now that education is available in an  
organised fashion there is no need for it to be organised by religion. The practical  
result of faith schools is that it has created a lot of division.
[Dilbagh Chana, 14/06/11]
This was matched by Pragna Patel's  grave concerns about claims to  a distinctive 
morality amongst Hindu schools in London and her strong critique of the acclaimed 
virtues of faith-based schooling:
And I  think  what’s  happening  is  in  the  process  of  re-building,  re-inventing  and 
strengthening  religious  identity,  actually  the  worst  most  horrific,  the  most 
oppressive, the most prejudicial, bigoted, discriminatory aspects of our own religions 
are being kind of projected as part and parcel of that difference. 
[Pragna Patel, Southall Black Sisters, 15/10/07]
Conclusion
In conclusion,  I  want  to  draw together  some comparative  points  to  highlight  the 
emergence of new systems and practices of 'election' within local areas.
In Southall one Sikh organisation (the SGSSS) out of twelve in the local area has the 
ear  of  local  and national  politicians  and increasingly  harnesses  public  resources. 
Beyond the two key SGSSS gurdwaras, the Miri Piri and the Ramgharia gurdwaras 
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also carry the Khalsa norm. Miri Piri literally means temporal-spiritual, as derived 
from the assertions of Hargobind noted above. Also the Ramgharias are engaged in 
mimetic processes of building authority (referred to by Singh and Tatla (2006) as a 
form of ‘Sikh sanskritisation’) where they stake a claim to the Khalsa norm even if  
they have also faced discrimination from the Jat dominated Singh Sabha gurdwaras.
 
Beyond this, the entire stretch of Sikh formations is represented in some shape or 
form within Southall and potentially provides a rich array of Sikh heterodoxy. There 
are a number of caste based sects - Adi Dharmis, Ravidassis and Valmikis - and sects 
based  on  admiration  for  particular  Sikh  preachers  or  devotion  to  living  saints  - 
Namdharis, Radhaswamis, Nirankaris, Nanaksar, Beas - and also a distinct group of 
Sikhs from Afghanistan whose language and religious practice is entirely different. 
Some of these carry historical tensions with the Singh Sabha movement because of 
its unanimist tendencies. For instance, there has been violence towards Nirankaris 
that lay claim to a living guru after Gobind closed the line of succession. Moreover,  
some of the gurdwaras claim to have been established because of their experience of 
discrimination by the Jat Punjabi led SGSSS. 
Importantly  this  plurality  amongst  Sikh  belief  systems  is  not  reflected  in  local 
relations with the state. For instance, only the SGSSS and its sister organisation, the 
Sikh Missionary Society, are referred to by councillors in their declarations. The low 
caste  Ravidass gurdwara is  based in Councillor  Dhindsa's  ward and a far shorter 
distance from his home than the SGSSS. However he carries membership of the 
SGSSS and claims that although he visits the Ravidass gurdwara, he is not able to 
become a member because of their  caste  focus.  He did,  however,  admit  that  the 
Ravidass gurdwara had been complaining about the ways in which they were being 
marginalised in the relationship between religious organisations and the state. 
This is an interesting claim that relates back to the points made by Gurcharan Singh 
above that seem to imply that non Singh Sabha or Khalsa versions of Sikhism are 
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somehow inauthentic. If you ask the SGSSS why there are other gurdwaras in the 
area, they say that those other sites of worship are sectarian whereas the SGSSS, as a 
Singh Sabha gurdwara, does not restrict its membership to caste affiliation and is 
open to all.  Indeed interviewees claimed that as the primary reason why they are 
recognised and consulted by state officials, precisely because they are a non-aligned 
gurdwara of generic membership. Yet this becomes a counter factual statement when 
one notes the predominance of Jats at the helm and the claims of discrimination that 
led other sects and castes to self-organise.
 
Moreover,  the  SGSSS  recently  changed  its  constitution  to  establish  even  tighter 
boundaries for the Sikh claim by restricting membership of its gurdwaras to those 
that  use the names 'Singh'  and 'Kaur'  and accept  that  guruship ended at  Gobind. 
There are local views that this change in the constitution is linked to the re-iteration 
of the original Singh Sabha distancing from Hinduism and happens to have coincided 
with the local Sikh defections from the Labour Party discussed in Chapter 2. It also 
coincided with the establishment of the Khalsa Primary School for which admission 
is connected to religious affiliation. It is likely that the SGSSS acts as gatekeeper or  
validator for admissions to that school.  Put differently, by delimiting who can be 
considered Sikh according to the Khalsa norm, there are real material consequences 
for the ability of those that do not fulfil this criteria to be able to access publicly  
funded education services. 
   
The SGSSS has actively and continuously renewed its power and local and national 
standing in two specific ways: by investing in the prominence of its buildings and 
through the annual Vaisakhi processions. Figure 1 shows one of two SGSSS sites in 
Southall,  the  Havelock  Road  gurdwara.  Its  large  golden  dome  is  visible  from 
Southall station and it has become a key tourist attraction. It is listed as the largest 
Sikh gurdwara in Europe. The capacity of the SGSSS to raise its own funding was 
specifically highlighted by the cost of purchasing and refurbishing the two sites. In 
particular  the  former  President,  Didar  Singh  Randhawa  (interviewed  11/05/09) 
recounted the following figures: the premises on Park Avenue cost £1.2 million of 
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which £800,000 was raised from the congregation and the rest attained as a loan; the 
Khalistani  leadership  of  the  gurdwara  (1987  -  1994)  defaulted  on  the  loan 
repayments  landing the organisation in  £1.8million debt,  of  which £800,000 was 
repaid through congregation donations within six months; the Havelock site cost a 
total of £18 million to refurbish to its present condition and this was part covered by 
a loan of £14 million, which they have been paying off at a rate of £1 million per  
year;  recently  they  purchased  the  land  at  Norwood  Hall  for  the  Khalsa  Primary 
School for £2.7 million. Aside from specific collections for 'causes', a regular income 
is raised from the performance of religious rites.
I have positioned the picture of the SGSSS site against figure 2, a picture of the East  
London Mosque whose building also attracts a great deal of attention. It is important, 
to  note  the  differential  racialisation  of  the  Sikh  gurdwara  and  the  East  London 
Mosque vis a vis the national state. The gurdwara focuses on links with politicians 
and doesn't  bother  much  with  civil  society  alliances.  However,  the  East  London 
Mosque is continually renewing its power through local civil society mobilisations 
like  TELCO  and  the  United  East  End  alliance  also because  of  the  differential 
racialisation of Islam and its contingent hot-cold links with the state. However, there 
are  similarities,  including  the  architectural  design.  Both  sites  also  enable  the 
organisations  to  make  representational  claims  and  carry  their  own  reproductive 
effects. They are both developing a 'cradle to the grave' position in their local areas, 
notably by performing religious rites but also by developing on site, in house, advice 
and  support  groups  right  through  from  an  investment  in  children's  activities  to 
women's groups and spaces for the elderly. The religious rites are a source of private 
income and some of the welfare services provide access to public funding. 
Moreover, Dilbagh Chana (14/06/11) suggested that the Vaisakhi processions were 
another significant source of income for the SGSSS. I would like to argue that they 
are also a hugely significant source of renewing power and relations with the state 
and the perpetuation of the Khalsa norm. Notably they are rife with ritual and re-
iterate the Khalsa norm as frequently as possible. Figure 3 illustrates the Panj Pyare, 
276
men  acting  out  as  saint-soldiers  ordained  by  Gobind  in  1699.  This  is  a  highly 
prestigious role. One set of the Panj Pyare carry flags and the other set carry swords, 
together emphasising the militarised nationalism at the heart  of the Khalsa norm. 
Figure  4  shows  the  way  in  which  the  same  norms  have  been  rolled  out  and 
encouraged amongst the students of the Khalsa primary school. The Panj Pyare walk 
barefoot from the SGSSS' Havelock Road site, through the main streets of Southall 
to a final prayer at the SGSSS' Park Avenue site. It is a dramatic display of Sikh 
sovereignty with the SGSSS firmly at the centre. It has been estimated that the 2011 
Vaisakhi  procession  in  Southall  received  100,000  participants  and  certainly  this 
annual event has become an important source for consolidating ties with local and 
national politicians. 
Added to this, figures 5, 6 and 7 reflect a number of nodes in the formulation of the 
symbiotic British-Khalsa Sikh identity: the predominance of the Gobind version of 
Sikhism seen in the use of orange and the Nishan Sahib (Sikh flag); the importance 
of ritual in enforcing purity; the strength of militarization through the entrenched 
projection of Sikhs as a 'martial race' and the enactment of martial arts by young 
people in the processions;  and their  complicit,  reciprocal  and mutually  validating 
relationship with the British state. Members of the local Territorial Army (figure 5) 
often march at the front of the procession alongside Sikh men that fought for the 
British  Army  (figure  6).  Finally,  figure  7  shows  the  projection  of  new  hybrid 
identities encompassing imperial British and Khalistani signs as mutually enforcing 
and co-existing. As can be seen from figure 7, women are not excluded from these 
projections, they are also reproducers of the nationalist discourse, and for a religion 
depicted as perpetually at war, the image of them as fighters is prevalent. A sense of 
honour, now built into the Rahit Maryada (the Sikh code of conduct devised and 
determined by the Singh Sabha movement), structures these images; the pride of the 
flags and the covering of the head and the body ensure Sikh ascription, modesty and 
honour.
Additional insights can be gained by paying attention to the comparative fortunes of 
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the dominant Khalsa version of Sikhism and the persecuted Ahmadiyya version of 
Islam  (discussed  in  Chapter  4),  right  through  from  the  colonial  encounter  to 
contemporary relations with the British state. Both the Singh Sabha trajectory now 
dominating the Southall landscape and the Ahmadiyyas facing marginalisation within 
Newham’s civil society emerged in the context of the rise of the Arya Samaj. Both 
constructed  themselves  against  Hindu and Muslim Others.  Both  found patronage 
amongst British colonisers. Clearly these histories are long but are ever present in the 
glocal politics of British public policy. Neither of them appears to have a critique of 
the British state. Yet in one instance the state offers protection and in the other it 
supports a body that perpetuates discrimination against others.
278
Figure 1: Sri Guru Singh Sabha Southall
Havelock Road, Southall
Photograph taken by Clifford French
Dated 31/03/08 
Posted at http://gallery.nen.gov.uk/asset80217_14645-.html
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Figure 2: The East London Mosque
Whitechapel High Road, Tower Hamlets
Photograph taken by Nick Baines dated 18/09/09
Posted at http://nickbaines.wordpress.com/2009/09/18/diversity-challenge/east-
london-mosque/
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Figure 3: 'Southall Vaisakhi Procession' 
posted on 10/04/11 to the Visit Southall Website at: 
http://www.visitsouthall.co.uk/News/NewsDetails.php?recordID=439
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Figure 4: 'Thousands turn out for Southall's Vaisakhi Parade' 
Image reproduced from Ealing news item 
by James Gates dated 12/04/11 and available at:
http://www.ealinggazette.co.uk/ealing-news/local-ealing-news/2011/04/12/thousands-turn-
out-for-southall-s-vaisakhi-parade-64767-28507556/
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Figures 5, 6 & 7: Vaisakhi Procession Southall
Photographs by Roberto Capocelli (dated 12/04/2009)
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Chapter 7: Faith in Political Action - The Citizens UK
Introduction
This chapter focuses on the movement from below, the changes taking place within 
civil  society  that  have  impacted  upon  the  State's  relationship  with  religious 
organisations.  The  comparative  dimension  of  this  thesis  was  premised  on  the 
predominance  of  Sikhs  in  Ealing  and  Muslims  in  Newham and their  potentially 
differential relationships with the state. However, the level of Christian mobilisation 
in each of the boroughs was an unexpected discovery. The legacy, indeed revival, of 
Christian interventions in the public sphere gained equal place and even began to 
dominate the picture. This chapter focuses on one particular Christian-led but secular 
civic  alliance,  the  Citizens  UK,  which  is  organised  on the  basis  of  geographical 
'Chapters' that encompass the two London boroughs. West London Citizens (WLC) 
covers  four  boroughs  including  the  London  borough  of  Ealing  whilst  The  East 
London  Communities  Organisation  (TELCO)  covers  five  boroughs  including  the 
London borough of Newham. 
During  the  stretch  of  the  fieldwork,  the  Citizens  UK  moved  from  a  marginal 
emergent  position to  acquire  a  central  place  in  British civil  society.  Indeed their 
significance  can  not  be  overstated  in  the  current  political  context  where  the 
restructuring of the state and also some of the critics of that restructuring as well as 
those  advancing  faith  based  mobilisations  now  coalesce  around  the  same  ideas. 
These ideas have been articulated and pushed out into the public sphere by Citizens 
UK and their growing base of academic supporters. As discussed in Chapter 1, the 
Citizens  UK  is  an  important  reference  point  for  the  revival  of  a  (religious) 
communitarian discourse that now forms the bedrock of Big Society, Good Society, 
Red Tory and Blue Labour as well as other resurgent emphases on associationalism 
and relationality. Surprisingly little is available by way of critique. 
If the alliance draws great interest and is the subject of little if any interrogation, this 
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begs the question of what is novel and exciting on the one hand and what is usual and 
accepted as common sense on the other. This chapter suggests that the answer lies in 
the  taken  for  granted  and  simultaneous  novelty  of  religious  organisations  in 
contemporary  society.  They  are  already  an  established  feature  of  multiculturalist 
engagement and yet it is the liturgical framework, the symbolic weight of religious 
dress and the central place of religious organisations in the alliance that has drawn 
the interest of academics, even if this entails overlooking the problems of engaging 
some religious  groups.  A lot  of  academic  attention  has  already been paid  to  the 
Living Wage Campaign (see Bretherton,  L.,  2010; Glasman,  M.,  2008 and 2011; 
Holgate, J and Wills, J., 2007; Jamoul, L., 2006). Also, the aesthetic dimensions of 
the Citizens UK initiatives have been discussed in Chapter 3. Therefore, this chapter 
focuses on three specific areas: a critical analysis of the tenets; the 'Strangers into 
Citizens' campaign; and a focus on the darker side of faith as social capital. 
Broad Based Organising
Previously  known  as  the  Citizens  Organising  Foundation,  the  Citizens  UK  was 
established in 1988 by Neil Jameson but also with a great deal of assistance from the 
Church of England. Jameson, a particularly charismatic man, was frustrated by what 
he described as service-oriented social work. He travelled to the USA where he was 
inspired by the ideas of Saul Alinsky and Edward Chambers of the Industrial Areas 
Foundation, now famously debated as part of Barack Obama's personal history of 
community  organising.  Jameson  imported  six  main  features  of  Saul  Alinsky's 
organising  model  namely:  a  focus  on  building  and  strengthening  one  to  one 
relationships, freedom being defined in terms of association such that collectivism is 
favoured over individualism; financial independence from the state – the core costs 
of  the  alliance  are  covered  by  member  groups’ contributions  in  terms  of  dues; 
research – a problem solving approach that focuses on how to turn problems into 
winnable issues; tensions – the idea that one has to seize and take power which will  
not be willingly ceded by power brokers; the importance of holding Assemblies as a 
fundamental  way of ensuring accountability;  and to encourage and bring through 
leaders from the community. This section considers Citizens UK's adaptation of these 
to the London context. 
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Constructing geo-political communities of action
Drawing on the work of the Industrial Areas Foundation, Citizens UK's 'Chapters' see 
themselves  as  'broad  based  organisations'  in  which  large  numbers  of  people  are 
brought together through an alliance of membership groups in order to campaign on 
clearly  identified  and  "winnable  issues".  There  is  an  emphasis  on  galvanising 
qualitative durable relationships between institutions. Citizens UK specifically seeks 
groups that they claim have longevity in local areas and they emphasise the kind of 
permanency that  comprises  the backbone of recent  interventions  by Philip  Blond 
(2010) and Maurice Glasman (2011) discussed in Chapter 1.
The campaigns are organised on the basis of a problem solving approach that lays 
claim to a strong distinction between pragmatic and ideological politics. Organisers 
are supposed to assist groups to identify "mutual interests" and convert these into 
achievable goals. Citizens UK expects member groups to move beyond their specific 
remit in order to work on issues outside their usual concerns and carry an agenda 
determined by the larger geopolitical alliance. It is for this reason that there has been 
much discussion about the ability of 'single issue' groups to feel motivated to join the 
alliance.  The Executive  Director,  Neil  Jameson claimed that  'single  issue'  groups 
could not fit with the framework because they can't see beyond their own issues but 
the ex Lead Organiser for West London Citizens, Catherine Howarth, stated she had 
been actively trying to engage the migrant women's charity, Kalayaan, whose main 
reason for not joining was the high (£600) membership fee and a lack of time to get 
involved in issues beyond the immediate focus of their organisation. However,  my 
own discussions  with those that  decided not  to  join  the alliance  revealed deeper 
problems including: a view that the organisation is undemocratic; it places too much 
focus on turning out numbers for events at the cost of political principles; it focuses 
on 'law abiding' citizenship; and it has shown a distinct unwillingness to work on the 
more difficult issues, namely trafficking, deaths in police custody and the impact of 
anti terror legislation.
Nonetheless, Citizens UK Chapters have been particularly adept at bringing together 
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the interests of local residents, consumers or service users with low paid workers in 
the construction of geographically bounded communities of political  action.  They 
lobby at the point of consumption (rather than production), by raising working terms 
and conditions as concerns about the quality of care or the quality and desirability of 
services. It is widely argued that Citizens UK has shaken awake some sleeping and 
defunct trade union branches through its  highly regarded Living Wage Campaign 
(Bretherton, L., 2010; Glasman, M., 2008; Holgate, J and Wills, J., 2007; Jamoul, L.,  
2006).  Indeed there is  much to be applauded as  the Living Wage Campaign has 
brought real material benefits for some of the poorest and most precarious workers in 
London including a significant number of ethnic minorities, particularly women.
Importantly,  Citizens  UK  espouses  an  overtly  communitarian  politics;  the 
membership emphasis is on institutional affiliation and there is an implicit critique of 
individualism:
Individuals can’t join these organisations. You have to be in an institution so we have 
a lot of people coming to us saying I want to join and I really like your campaign on 
such and such.  And you say sorry you can’t, go and form a group and then bring the 
group  in  to  membership.   Because  partly  what  we’re  trying  to  do  is  to  create 
associations.   We  think  that  democratically,  democracy  in  Britain  is  seriously 
threatened by people pretending that they are free when they’re just individuals and 
actually  we  believe  it’s  our  experience  that  people  are  free  if  they’re  in  an 
association with people because that controls, that contains the centre of activity or  
fundamentalist activity of the left or the right.  So people are healthier in association, 
even if it’s with their extended family. People just running around on their own are a  
liability for democratic process.  
[Neil Jameson, Executive Director of Citizens UK, 7/06/05]
This is a communitarian politics where it is assumed that freedom is derived entirely 
from association  against  a  narrative  that  equates  individualism with  self-interest. 
Also key for this chapter the way Jameson associates groups with containment on the 
one hand, and fundamentalism with unaffiliated individuals,  on the other.  This is 
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juxtaposed against the events that took place exactly one month after this interview. 
On 7/7/05, just a few streets from Citizens UK's offices, Shehzad Tanweer, enacted 
his association with a global Muslim polity, by detonating a bomb at Aldgate station 
that killed seven people. 
Moreover, individuals do have two fairly significant roles to play within Citizens 
UK's chapters. Firstly, as Community Organisers or charismatic Leaders that are able 
to galvanise and nurture relationships between member groups. Secondly, individual 
personal  testimonies  and  trajectories  take  centre  stage  at  the  public  events  as 
discussed  in  Chapter  3.  During  the  opening session  of  their  Leadership  Training 
event (13/07/07) participants were expected to divulge intimate historical accounts of 
their personal paths (resembling Suzanne Fernandes' Christian evangelical 'personal 
walk'). Participants introduced themselves with a mixture of reflections on political 
but hypocritical family members, of proximity to corrupt and inept political systems, 
of religious belief and the desire to make it relevant to everyday life and of either  
witnessing or directly  experiencing the hardness of life.  By and large these were 
narratives of disillusion and a desire for hope. Interestingly I was the only one at this 
training event that talked about ideological - socialist, anti racist, feminist - political 
commitments. Moreover,  I was  pushed for the names of my supervisors and any 
mentors.  This  focus  on  inspirational  mentors  chimed  with  the  notion  that  the 
participants  could  themselves  become  leaders  and  resonated  with  the  American 
evangelical style emphasising charisma and the art of persuasion. 
Professionalisation, political apathy and public trust
The  Citizens  UK  is  concerned  with  political  apathy  and  a  breakdown  in  the 
connections between the individual, family and community. It positions itself as an 
alliance  that  is  'reweaving  the  fabric  of  society'  (Deneulin,  Hussein  and  Ritchie, 
undated).  This  claim  is  based  on  the  view  that  state  funding  regimes  and 
bureaucratisation enabled co-option and inured political apathy. Other interviewees 
reinforced this  point about professionalisation and the way service contracts have 
reduced the propensity of groups to engage with campaigning. 
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For  some,  the  Living  Wage  Campaign  highlighted  a  sense  of  deficit  in  secular 
organising.  One community organiser  expressed a deep frustration with her trade 
union, one of the five largest trade unions in the country. She complained about their 
lack of responsiveness to migrant workers that she had spent long hours recruiting to 
the trade union branch. In contrast, she saw Citizens UK as a particularly dynamic 
force that seemed both willing and able to listen to and press the concerns of the 
workers  that  she  had  mobilised.  Yet  Chapter  3  has  shown  that  beyond  the 
performance of democracy, Citizens UK is itself a rigid hierarchical body with quite 
a fixed remit. 
Moreover,  there  is  an  emphasis  on  financial  autonomy,  particularly  financial 
independence from the state to avoid co-option and an apathy that stems from service 
contracts. The core costs of the alliance (and sizeable staff team) are supposed to be 
covered  by  member  groups’ contributions,  referred  to  as  'dues'.  However,  the 
problems with this are clear from Citizens UK's continued reliance on Charitable 
Trust funding for around 75% of its budget.162 Even more pertinent since the election 
of this current Coalition government is the way that Citizens UK's communitarian 
discourse has been utilised by the Conservative Party to frame a further retraction of 
the  state  and  public  sector.  Ironically,  this  in  itself  has  led  to  the  resurgence  of 
political  activity because of a widespread commitment to a role for the state and 
public institutions.
162 This is a figure that was provided at the Leadership Training on 13/07/07. The Citizens UK 
funders listed on their website (at 27/01/11) demonstrates even more clearly that there is a problem 
raising money solely through dues and there is little distinguishing them from many other voluntary 
and community organisations in receipt of mixed funding - from state bodies, charitable trusts and the 
private sector - since the incursion of neo-liberal governance. Specifically their list of funders includes 
the Metropolitan Police and the Mayor of London's office. See: 
http://www.citizensuk.org/about/funders/
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Activating religious groups
Citizens  UK's  membership  includes  trade  union  branches,  schools,  university 
departments and more recently, ethnically defined community associations. However, 
religious institutions  are  at  the helm when it  comes to  determining the alliance's 
agenda. According to one of the Lead Organisers, this is because they are particularly 
good at mobilising large numbers of people for demonstrations and assemblies:
To be honest the backbone is the faith communities. The schools and the labour unions 
are important players but they are not the central players in terms of the weight that  
they bring to the organisation and the input that they have in what we are doing… the 
voluntary sector,  the kind of service delivery oriented voluntary sector tends to be  
quite poor at organising citizen turnout. We take the discipline of being able to turn out  
to public meetings to press your interests and to demonstrate a kind of connected body 
of people that are visibly together in a room pressing somebody who is powerful for 
something really seriously. The groups that are good at that and make strong members 
of  our  network  (are)  the  churches  and  mosques  and  temples…  (They)  are  more 
comfortable placing a real expectation on those people to play their part in the public 
life of the neighbourhood and make their demands and be active citizens.   
[Catherine Howarth, former Lead Organiser WLC, 18/08/06]  
Religious groups are characterised as congealed masses of membership that can be 
activated  to  great  effect.  Organisers  are  involved  in  getting  people  to  see  their 
religious identity as relevant in the here and now and getting religious institutions to 
recognise their obligation to campaign for socio-economic justice:
The vision is one where, OK, if you hold the view as a Christian, Muslim, or any of 
our faith traditions say you can't just pray; you have actually got to act. The vision is 
of an organisational vehicle that actually gives you a practical means of living out 
your faith and the demands and expectations of your faith.
[Catherine Howarth, former Lead Organiser WLC, 18/08/06]  
So the Living Wage Campaign is driven by our members' experiences of racism and 
our members in that instance are mostly black cleaners who are not in unions, who 
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often go to black Pentecostal churches and praise Jesus on a Sunday and get nothing 
from their congregation. The congregation does not know what to do with their work 
problems so that they continue to praise Jesus and they think that will sort of change 
the world. A few of them join TELCO hopefully because we say we can help you 
praise Jesus if that's what you want to do, but you have to do something about the  
wages and conditions of your workers if only because, and this is totally pragmatic,  
the  collection plate  is  getting emptier,  Father,  that  people  have not  got  as  much 
money as they had so if you want to fight for Jesus you've got to give these people 
the experience of what the Kingdom of Heaven is about. 
[Neil Jameson, Executive Director of Citizens UK, 7/06/05]
The architects and some academic supporters of Citizens UK go further by arguing 
that community organising can assist  religious groups to realise  their  potential  as 
‘first force’ rather than ‘third force’ members of the voluntary sector on the basis that 
their moral vision is an antidote to the liberal political system and capitalism and 
therefore,  best  placed  to  lead  a  'contra'  civil  society.  Deneulin,  Hussein,  Ritchie 
(undated) and Barry Knight (2003) argue that 'first force' groups remain outside of 
partnership relations with the state and thereby retain their radical edge. They also 
note the British state's  increasing interest  to engage faith-based groups in service 
provision but appeal to religious groups not to succumb to this temptation. So this 
sense of engaging in the public sphere is no longer about making a case for faith 
based service provision but rather about supporting the capacity of religious groups 
to  uphold  what  Maurice  Glasman  (2008)  has  referred  to  as  the  'sword  of  moral 
justice'; to mobilise the social democratic tenets of religious organisations in order to 
reign in the excesses of capitalism by reasserting their moral telos.
Catherine Howarth and Neil Jameson referred to the Citizens UK as a 'secular civic 
alliance' that may comprise many religious organisations but where 'the agenda will 
not be about faith at all, it will be about neighbourhood matters and economic affairs' 
(Catherine Howarth,  22/08/07).  Jameson has stated that  he wants to get  religious 
groups  'off  religious  issues'  (7/06/05)  and  the  alliance  has  the  capacity  to  steer 
religious  groups  away  from  closed  identity  politics  towards  an  outward  facing 
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concern for the 'common good' in local areas. 
Many reasons were provided for seeing religious organisations as central  players. 
Firstly,  they  are  seen  as  natural  partners  for  associationalism  because  of  their 
congregations and also as institutions that could act as spaces for debate. Secondly, 
religious groups demonstrated a greater capacity to bring people out for actions not 
least  because  of  the  growth  of  congregations  in  London.  Thirdly,  there  is  an 
assumption that religious leaders  embody the trust of people at a time when other 
studies  are  showing  a  distinct  decline  of  trust  in  politicians  (such  as  Pattie  and 
Johnstone 2007). Religious leaders were depicted as counsellors, representatives and 
providers for the lowest paid and most vulnerable members of society. Indeed, the 
alliance  has  been  actively  mobilising  religious  leaderships,  already  bolstered  by 
multiculturalist practice, and the subject of decades of Black feminist critique. At the 
Strangers  into  Citizens  rally  in  2007,  the  speakers  comprised  notaries  from  the 
Catholic  Church,  the  Church of  England,  the  Jewish  Board  of  Deputies  and the 
Muslim Council of Britain. Moreover,  Chapter 4 has already noted the interest of 
religious groups in liaising with rather than opposing the state and the multiple ways 
in which they can act as a second tier of policing, as advisors to the state, as members 
of state funded multifaith exchanges and increasingly as providers of state funded 
services.
Fourthly, both the former lead organiser (Catherine Howarth) and the current lead 
organiser  (Julie  Camacho)  of  the  West  London  Citizens  (WLC),  view  religious 
organisations as more participatory and democratic than other Third Sector bodies, 
which they depicted as dour and dogged either by rigid hierarchies or state funded 
service contracts. Conversely, the question of whether or not secular groups were 
willing to work with religious institutions was taken without context and history to 
project those that expressed concerns as afraid of diversity and pluralism and also 
entrenched in closed ideological positions. When social relations are dislocated in 
this way, when they are removed from their historical and socio-political location, 
new fictional narratives are introduced (Bell, 1999) providing a great deal of space 
292
for religious authoritarian movements (Bhatt, 1997).
Yet organisers claimed religious groups to be interested in equality even whilst they 
admitted institutionalised sexism and other potential biases:
Religious organisations are really, of course, in the way that people sometimes get  
treated, and especially women, I agree there’s a bias there.  On the other hand, they 
do have a  kind  of  philosophy of  equality  amongst  people  in  the  eyes  of  God I 
suppose, which is a real challenge to the way that society is so kind of economically 
stratified.  And out there in the labour market we’re certainly not all equal.  Out there  
in  the  housing market  we’re  certainly not  all  equal.   Out  there  in  the  education 
market we’re certainly not all equal.  In that sense, I feel as society becomes more 
and more unequal, the role of faith communities in challenging that to some extent is 
crucial.
[Catherine Howarth, former Lead Organiser WLC, 22/08/07] 
One of the key problems with the premises underlying Citizens UK's mobilisation of 
religious organisations, is the projection of religious groups as having been passive, 
social and cultural formations that need to be encouraged into political activity. This 
thesis  starts  from  the  perspective  of  de-secularisation  and  a  view  of  religious 
organisations  as  political  formations  that  have  been  actively  garnering  and 
consolidating power. Moreover, Citizens UK was established in 1988 during a period 
that saw a marked and sophisticated mobilisation by religious organisations of all 
hues (Sahgal, G and Yuval Davis, N 1992; Marty, M.E. and Appleby, R.S., 1994; 
Bhatt, 1997; Bruce, S, 2000). That was an important decade for the re-orientation of 
religious  organisations  including,  as  highlighted  in  the  previous  chapter,  by 
exploiting spaces created by Thatcherism for a new conservative morality. 
Citizens UK's emergence can be seen as part and parcel of this widespread rethink by 
religious groups about their relationship with the public sphere. Lina Jamoul's (2006) 
research provides a rare insight into the history of the Citizens UK and makes clear 
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that the alliance was founded and constructed by a small group of people connected 
to the Church of England including Neil Jameson, who at the time was the Director 
of the Church of England's Children's Society for the west of England and Wales. 
Jamoul explains that the motivation lay in the confluence of the following factors: 
the impact of Thatcherism on trade union organising and economic deprivation; the 
first Church of England 'Faith in the City' report which noted the unfolding of an 
'urban crisis'; the lack of a Church perspective on that crisis but also concerns about 
'declining  church attendance and the weakening of  the Church of  England as  an 
institution' (2006: 70-73). Moreover, Jameson came across the IAF as early as 1979 
but was not able to act upon this until the late eighties when the Cadbury Trust paid 
for 'social workers, faith leaders and researchers to go to the US and attend IAF's 10 
day training,  building  a  cadre  of  broad-based  organising  advocates  that  included 
Barry Knight, Stephen Lowe the Bishop of Hume, Jack Nicholls the Archbishop of 
Sheffield, and Tim Stephens, the Bishop of Leicester' (Jamoul, 2006). Neil Jameson 
set  up  the  first  Chapter  in  Bristol  as  early  as  1988.  It  wasn't  until  TELCO was 
established  in  1996  and  the  Living  Wage  Campaign  took  off  that  people  really 
noticed his work and yet Citizens UK had already been in existence for around a 
decade.  The initial  setting up was funded by the Church of England through its' 
newly  established Urban Fund.  The Church of  England continues  to  be a  major 
contributor to the alliance. 
Moreover, the claim that this is a 'secular civic alliance' is also undermined by the 
normative insistence on religious affiliation. Religious identity is often assumed and 
reified  during  interactions.  At  my  first  meeting  with  the  former  West  London 
Citizens Organiser, Catherine Howarth (8/08/06), she voiced concerns about access 
to  Sikh groups  and  had clearly  assumed  that  I  am a  practicing  Sikh  who could 
potentially nurture such connections.  She introduced herself as a Roman Catholic 
and it was clear her identity was principally constructed around the axes of 'faith' and 
'place'.  The  latent  tendency  to  locate  people  in  terms  of  'religious  identity'  and 
'location'  was particularly highlighted at the Leadership Training event (13/07/07) 
where one of the facilitators interjected during a role-play exercise and insisted that 
my role-play partner ask me more about my 'Hindu identity and background'. I had to 
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explain that I didn't have a Hindu identity, whilst it was the case that my parents are  
religious (but they are Sikhs not Hindus) I didn't have any religious affiliation. Infact, 
the facilitator had interrupted a line of questioning where my role-play partner was 
practicing  his  ability  to  glean  the  kinds  of  issues  that  need  addressing  in  my 
neighbourhood, Southall. I was emphasising the prevalence of sexual harassment and 
my focus  on women's safety but  these were displaced and religious  identity  was 
super-imposed. The Citizens UK's reluctance to consider sexual harassment to be one 
of their concerns relates to the proscription of "Wedge Issues".
By their admission, the Citizens UK membership is deeply conservative. The telling 
of personal stories at the Leadership Trainings hung in direct contrast to the stated 
unwillingness to deal with "wedge issues", viewed as private not public concerns. 
Notably,  these encompass personal relationships,  sexuality,  domestic violence and 
divergent  theological  interpretations.  These  are  seen  as  issues  on  which  the 
membership is unlikely to reach agreement. They are informally known as "wedge 
issues" because of their propensity to fracture the alliance (Denuelin et al, undated). 
The Strangers into Citizens Campaign
As an extension of their concern with working terms and conditions, the Citizens UK 
initiated the Strangers into Citizens (SiC) campaign in 2006 calling for a one-off 
amnesty for around 450,000 undocumented migrants currently living in the UK. The 
SiC  literature  made  the  following  point  about  the  responsibility  of  the  Catholic 
Church to campaign on issues affecting its increasingly diverse and economically 
disadvantaged migrant congregations: 
Go to any central London Catholic church on a Sunday and you are struck by the  
numbers  and  diversity  of  its  congregation.  In  other  denominations  –  the  black 
evangelical congregations, or some Anglican parishes – the diversity is less marked, 
but the immigrant presence is just as strong.  Some of the foreign-born are wealthy 
professionals: middle-class people who have moved to London to work in well-paid 
jobs. Others are passing through –to study, say. But very large numbers are working 
in the capital’s low-paid sector, unskilled or barely skilled. A massive 90 per cent of 
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London’s unskilled jobs are done by migrants.163
If numbers is a good measure, the SiC campaign appeared to have gathered a great 
deal of support.164 In May 2007 they held a rally in Trafalgar Square for which they 
mobilised  over  10,000  people  including  representatives  of  the  main  Christian 
churches, the Jewish Board of Deputies, the Muslim Council of Britain and three of 
the five largest trade unions in Britain as well as a host of community organisations 
working in the field. They managed to usurp the attention from what was becoming 
an increasingly tired and weathered trade union lead May Day rally. In comparison, 
the SiC campaign comprised a lively mix of thousands of people. By 4th May 2009, 
SiC claimed  this  figure  had doubled  to  20,000  people  who marched  from three 
different points in London to a rally in Trafalgar Square.165 Heightened press interest 
in the demonstrations stemmed from the crowded religious services that marked their 
starting  point  and  the  parade  of  religious  clerics  that  dominated  the  speakers' 
platform at the end.166 
163 From Stranger into Citizens Briefing Paper No 1: Out of the Shadows, the story of the 
Strangers into Citizens Campaign by Austin Ivereigh available at: 
http://www.strangersintocitizens.org.uk/index.htm
Last accessed 10/06/09. 
164 See the following newspaper articles: Earned amnesty for illegal workers by Will Somerville 
in The Guardian (23/07/08); Phoney policies only backfire: we need an amnesty for illegal immigrants 
by Polly Toynbee in The Guardian (4/05/07); Why we should grant illegal migrants an amnesty by 
Anthony Browne in The Independent (26/09/08).
165 http://www.strangersintocitizens.org.uk/pages/get-involved/rally-4-may.htm
Last accessed 11/06/09. 
166 Ruth Gledhill estimated the turnout at 20,000 in her piece for The Times Online on 4/05/09 
and available at: 
http://timescolumns.typepad.com/gledhill/2009/05/strangers-who-hope-to-become-citizens.html
296
Moreover, these were incredibly vibrant demonstrations that sought to highlight the 
plight  but  also  the  scale  of  undocumented  workers  in  London.  As  discussed  in 
Chapters  4  and  6,  religious  organisations  have  a  history  of  intervening  on 
immigration  and  this  stems  from both  the  levels  of  religious  affiliation  amongst 
migrant workers, and the local impact of a shrinking, racialised welfare system that 
discriminates on the basis of immigration status. According to Catherine Howarth, 
the  SiC  campaign  enabled  religious  organisations  to  raise  the  concerns  of  their 
congregations and sew the practical support they were already providing to a larger 
concern with public policy. A 'moderate proposal' emerged, which was intended to 
'win  political  support  nationally';  it  was  considered  more  radical  than  proposals 
advanced by the vast majority of politicians but less radical than that being advanced 
by anti borders groups like No One Is Illegal. Thus Howarth stated:
It  was  about  trying  to  get  a  balance  between  something  that  would  really  be 
progressive and enable people in that horrendous limbo of living here illegally to 
have  a  chance  to  stay  and  something  that  would  be  politically  palatable  and 
achievable.  So in that sense, it was a perfect example of what we try and do in 
London Citizens, which is to come up with demanding but achievable campaigns, 
things that we don’t think are kind of pissing in the wind of totally being impossible 
politically  to  win.   But  which  are  nevertheless  really  about  shifting  things  in  a 
progressive direction.
[Catherine Howarth, former Lead Organiser WLC, 22/08/07] 
The  outcome  was  a  proposal  that  advocated  an  'earned  amnesty'  delivering 
exceptional leave to remain in Britain for those that have already been in the country 
for four years and successfully completed an additional two years during which they 
should be working and self financing. Its Early Day Motion gained the support of 97 
MPs across the political parties.167 Whilst the campaign made a compelling argument 
about the financial  benefits  of legalising migrant workers and the ways in which 
regularisation  can  prevent  further  exploitation  and abuse,  its  demands have  been 
problematised.  In  particular,  its'  'qualifying  criteria'  makes  a  strong  demarcation 
between 'deserving' and 'undeserving' categories of migrants (Gupta 2007). In order 
167 http://edmi.parliament.uk/EDMi/EDMDetails.aspx?EDMID=37768&SESSION=899
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to qualify for and complete the additional two year pathway to citizenship, one needs 
to have a clean criminal record; to have been working and self-financing (i.e. no 
recourse  to  public  funds);  to  demonstrate  knowledge  of  English;  and to  provide 
employer and community references. Indeed the campaign literature (and speeches 
on 4th May 2009) noted that as many as 750,000 undocumented migrants were living 
in the UK at that time but only proposed to regularise 450,000 of them. Those that 
fall  into  the  'undeserving'  camp  are  categorised  on  the  grounds  of:  legality; 
employment or economic productivity; and also patriotism. The intersection of such 
categories  in  the  context  of  immigration  may  be  usual  but  makes  for  a  very 
conservative campaign. 
More than this, there has been a tacit understanding that Britain has a right to police 
its borders and that a one off amnesty may justify tighter immigration controls. The 
text of their Early Day Motion is as follows: 
That this House recognises the cross-party commitment to tightening UK borders 
and  reducing  undocumented  immigration;  notes  with  interest  that  such 
undocumented immigration has fallen by well over 50 per cent in Spain following 
the 2005 regularisation programme; further notes that a regularisation would lead to 
significantly less opportunity for low paid workers to be undercut in the UK labour 
market as well as increased tax revenue for the Exchequer; recognises that the status 
quo leaves 500,000 people with no recourse to the police or justice system open to 
abuse, exploitation and profiteering by criminal gangs; and welcomes the debate on 
regularisation led by a broad collection of think tanks, unions, academic institutions, 
religious  organisations  and  service  providers  and  the  Strangers  into  Citizens 
campaign.168
SiC point to the Spanish case in their defence but both Gupta (2007) and Kundnani 
(2007) noted the particular problems with the Spanish experience, specifically that it 
drew out many undocumented migrants that did not qualify for the amnesty and this 
in turn enabled a high level of deportations and a tightening of immigration laws. So 
the  proposals  offered  government  the  possibility  to  police  and  regulate  areas  of 
168 Ibid.
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society  and  economy  previously  inaccessible  to  them.  This  is  particularly 
problematic in the context of an organisation premised on countering the totalising 
power of the market and the state. The proposal itself can only be understood in the 
context of the problems with deliberative democracy models, where consensus can 
be determined by majoritarian concerns rather than political principles. Historically, 
immigration campaigns conducted by anti racist groups may also have fallen short of 
a 'no borders'  position for pragmatic reasons where they have focused on gaining 
exceptional arrangements for a few. However, they have not gone so far as to ask for 
these  in  exchange  for  the  state's  right  to  tighten  border  controls  and  strengthen 
immigration rules. 
It is clear that the SiC material is concerned to counter dominant arguments against 
immigration,  such as claims about  opening the floodgates,  abuse of  process,  and 
financial burden on the state. Yet this demarcation of 'deserving' and 'undeserving' is 
a  moralistic  category  that  bears  echoes  in  religious  text  and  was  performed  by 
religious leaders at the May Day rallies. Whilst they drew on parables to illustrate the 
injunction  to  'love thy  neighbour'  and welcome strangers,  their  speeches  and the 
qualifying criteria of the campaign act together to re-introduce notions of 'election' as 
a normative concept pinned to the enactment of particular law abiding subjectivities.
Moreover, whilst elsewhere those campaigning on immigration have highlighted the 
particular gender dimensions of immigration and the scale of sexual violence against 
women with uncertain immigration status (Brah, A, 1996; Anderson, 2000; Gupta 
2007) and this  was also reflected in  SiC's  collection of  case examples169,  neither 
gender  nor  sexual  violence  featured  as  aspects  of  the  campaign's  demands, 
background  information  or  within  its  four  briefing  papers.  Indeed,  there  was  a 
distinct  lack  of  correlation  between  the  particularly  degrading  experiences  and 
circumstances of the protagonists in the SiC stories and the remit of the campaign; 
several of them entered the country 'illegally', were unable to work, in need of health 
or state welfare because of the impact of trauma, and would have been ineligible for 
169 http://www.strangersintocitizens.org.uk/pages/the-campaign/stories.htm
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the proposed 4+2 Pathway to Citizenship or 'Earned Amnesty'. 
Finally, I want to focus on the use of the Union Jack and other tropes of Britishness,  
namely the singing of 'God Save the Queen' and 'Rule Britannia' at the end of the SiC 
rallies (described in Chapter 3). I believe they assist in the revival of an expressly 
imperial sense of Britishness that has accompanied the marginalisation of questions 
of power relations within recent government interventions in 'the social' (community 
cohesion, social capital, social investment, social enterprise). Since 9/11, religion in 
particular has been framed within questions of loyalty and disloyalty to the British 
state. As a consequence, a pace has gathered which seems to attempt a metonymic 
association between religiosity, cohesion and patriotism. 
Whilst there has been some change since the seminal study by Paul Gilroy (1987) of 
the integral 'race' dimension of Britishness, others working on immigration and 'race' 
have continued to  emphasise the 'race'  dimension of  the  immigration debate  and 
indeed a renewal of the assimilationist tendencies of the British state (see Back et al, 
2002; Gupta, 2007; Kundnani, 2007; Lewis, 2005; and Yuval-Davis, 2006, McGhee, 
2010). It seems to me that growing displays of these imperial signs by religious and 
ethnic minorities are an extension of what Back et al (2002) argued in their critique 
of 'community cohesion' as leaving normative whiteness unchallenged. 
I asked Catherine Howarth about the origin of the decision to use the Union Jack and 
the  choice  of  songs.  Her  response  seemed  to  indicate  the  desire  of  membership 
organisations to reclaim existing (indeed older) notions of Britishness rather than to 
critique or reconstruct them. She stated: 
For almost all the actual documented and undocumented migrants that took part in 
the march… you can see the pictures, people carried that flag. And people want to be 
British and they're quite proud of, they feel, you talk to migrants, some people have 
had an awful experience of this, that or the other, but my overwhelming experience, 
and I'm not universal, but my overwhelming experience is that people are amazingly 
300
positive  about  Britain  as  a  country.  And  my response  to  that  is  that  well  what  
London Citizens are trying to do as an organisation is to make Britain something to 
actually be proud of... The thinking was that it was important to demonstrate what a 
positive contribution migrants have to make. What a sense of loyalty to, and kind of 
a sense of loyalty that they have to this country. That it would disarm Right wing 
opponents  to  see  migrants  carrying  the  Union  Jack.  It  was  also  echoes  of  the 
absolutely extraordinary Million Person March in Los Angeles last year where the 
American flag was carried by thousands of mainly Mexican and Latin American 
migrants who were undocumented in America. That migrants and people of different  
races and nationalities, faiths and colours are what makes Britain a great country and 
a good country.
[Catherine Howarth, former Lead Organiser WLC, 22/08/07]
When long-term British residents raised the problems with deploying such symbols, 
this was downplayed as 'some people (are) just allergic to the Union Jack because of 
its  associations  with  right  wing  bigoted  racist  parties  and  people'  (Catherine 
Howarth, 22/08/07). This wasn't the only time that community organisers sought to 
dismiss  concerns  about  the  ideological  underpinnings  or  critical  value  of  their 
campaigning. I certainly felt that critique was not received well, if at all, and that the 
alliance falls far short of the antagonistic character that is being claimed in some 
academic  accounts  (such as  in  Lina  Jamoul's  thesis,  2006).  Moreover,  Howarth 
revealed that the SiC team were accused of peddling 'imperialism' and criticised for 
the nature of the demands by what she described as 'fringe organisations', reflecting a 
minority view. 
After a while I certainly had the sense that certain issues and styles of organising 
were considered old hat. This included: an aversion to the Union Jack; caution about 
working with religious groups; individualism of any kind; black self organisation; 
single issue or ideological campaigns, amongst which a desire to end all racism was 
noted by Neil Jameson as wholly unrealistic and unworkable. 
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Building Power and Legitimacy: the Dark Side of Social Capital
Advocates of the concept of social  capital have used the phrase 'the dark side of 
social capital' to make passing reference to some of the problems with the concept. 
As  such  the  phrase  is  now  common  parlance  for  reference  to  some  generally 
accepted shortcomings, namely the inherently discriminatory nature of many faith-
based organisations (referred to in this thesis as systems of 'election') and the poor 
representation  of  women  within  the  upper  echelons  of  religious  institutions. 
However, this propensity for social capital and faith-based organisations to have a 
'dark side' is frequently acknowledged but rarely elaborated. 
Importantly, the key differences between James Coleman, Robert Putnam and Pierre 
Bourdieu's uses of the term social capital depend upon the incorporation or denial of 
power  relations  and  their  understanding  of  individual  agency.  Putnam's  work  is 
particularly popular in the emergent 'faiths' literature but his version of social capital 
is distinctly functionalist whilst Bourdieu's own writings were rather about the vying 
of interests and the production of legitimacy through networks (Siisiainen, 2000). 
Citizens  UK has  tended  towards  this  functionalist  projection  of  social  capital  as 
networks of mutually assisting relationships of trust,  oriented towards the greater 
good. Rather, this section explores the ways in which Bourdieu's sense of networks, 
as  spaces  that  are  exploited  and  provide  aggregate  rewards,  applies  to  the 
membership of the Citizens UK, who, I argue, have gained much by way of symbolic 
and economic capital through alliance working. In particular, Bourdieu stated:
Social capital is the aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are linked to 
possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of 
mutual acquaintance and recognition – or in other words, to membership in a group 
– which provides each of its members with the backing of the collectivity-owned 
capital, a ‘credential’ which entitles them to credit, in the various senses of the word. 
These relationships may exist only in the practical state, in material and/or symbolic 
exchanges which help to maintain them. They may also be socially instituted and 
guaranteed by the application of a common name (the name of a family, a class, or a 
tribe or of a school, a party, etc.) and by a whole set of instituting acts designed 
simultaneously to form and inform those who undergo them; in this case, they are 
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more or less really enacted and so maintained and reinforced, in exchanges. Being 
based  on  indissolubly  material  and  symbolic  exchanges,  the  establishment  and 
maintenance of  which  presuppose reacknowledgment  of  proximity,  they  are  also 
partially irreducible to objective relations of proximity in physical (geographical) 
space or even in economic and social space.
[Bourdieu, 1986: 242]
Moreover, he argued that these are not natural but rather they are constructed and one 
profits from them through their continual renewal but also carries a responsibility for 
supporting the position of the others (Bourdieu 1986: 242). I believe this goes some 
way in explaining what is happening in the Citizens UK's insistence on working with 
the Jamaat-e-Islami lead East London Mosque. The limits of Bourdieu's analysis, 
however, is that it remains economically deterministic and I want to argue that whilst 
I  agree  with  his  sense  of  the  'elective'  nature  of  alliances  and  the  East  London 
Mosque do access resources through the alliance, their main concern is not economic 
but rather the perpetuation of a particular ideology.
 
The power analysis
Citizens UK has been particularly applauded for reviving relationality, a geopolitical 
relationality that garners the associative strength of local civil society organisations 
to  revive  a  collective  dimension  to  campaigns  for  socio  economic  change  (see 
Jamoul, 2006 and Massey, 2005). Their understanding of power is drawn from the 
Industrial Areas Foundation model and is now famously depicted in the following 
photograph  of  Barack  Obama  conducting  a  training  session  on  community 
organising. 
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Source: http://tinyurl.com/c25zbq7
The same analysis is taught within the Leadership Training run by Citizens UK.   I 
attended  one  such  training  event,  conducted  over  three  days  to  enhance  the 
development  of  relationships  between  participants.170 The  Citizens  UK  power 
analysis  is  not  complex. It  identifies a number of key power brokers -  the state, 
corporations and the media. It also notes the role of the state and media in protecting 
corporate interests and power. Citizens UK's response to this matrix of power calls 
for civil society organisations to build geographically based political communities of 
resistance based on mutual interests as opposed to the self interest of corporations, 
the  state  and  other  power  brokers.  Through  association,  these  civil  society 
organisations are thought to constitute a kind of counter-power, groups that gain and 
mobilise power through their relationships with each other. This power analysis relies 
on fairly strong binary notions of state and civil  society. It does not identify any 
organisation  as  'powerless'  but  rather  depicts  a  battle  between  a  politics  of  self-
interest and one defined by mutual interests and the 'common good'. Power itself is 
thought to flow from the equation 'organised money plus organised people'. 
However, I found the Citizens UK 'power analysis' lacking so I queried the omission 
170 From fieldwork notes to the Leadership Training event on 13/07/07 and 14/07/07.
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of  religious  organisations  from  the  power  matrix  particularly  pointing  to  the 
Establishment position of the Church of England. Even if Neil Jameson, the trainer at 
that  particular  session,  acknowledged  the  material  wealth  of  some  religious 
organisations,  he  certainly  did  what  he could  to  revert  back to  a  focus  on large 
corporations.  Indeed  not  only  does  the  omission  of  religious  groups  reflect  an 
incomplete picture of power brokers, it also reveals a great deal in its inability to take 
account of the movement of people and groups across spaces and to create and utilise 
pathways between civil society and the state, a lining up of interests, and hegemony 
at both material and discursive levels. 
Importantly  for  this  thesis,  this  flawed  analysis  of  power  prevents  Citizens  UK 
organisers and participants from taking account of the long-term legitimacy that is 
sought by Right wing constituents of the alliance. Indeed the alliance represents a 
collection of quite powerful organisations, political formations, which are asserting 
their own realignment of the public/private divide, that are reproducing rather than 
stretching the bounds of state endorsed morality, and whose claim to autonomy from 
the state can be questioned.  
 
Fundamentalists in alliance
The  Citizens  UK  analysis  of  power  intentionally  avoids  the  structural  position, 
ideological  commitments and ambitions  of its  religious member groups.  This has 
significant implications that have not thus far been discussed by other analyses. Two 
kinds of arguments were presented by Citizens UK (and other interviewees) to bat 
away  difficult  questions  about  fundamentalism,  alliances  and  legitimacy.  Firstly, 
there  was  a  common  belief  that  fundamentalists  could  not  be  in  alliance.  Thus 
Catherine Howarth stated: 
It  would  be  an  impossibility  for  fundamentalist  organisations  to  be  involved  in 
London Citizens I think.  Because I  think they are,  they basically reject  different  
fundamentalists and they can’t  handle the fact  that other people who don’t share 
their religious views can also stand for the common good and that we can work 
together with each other.  And I think all of these faith communities are grappling, 
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some more than others, with the challenge of fundamentalist people within their own 
communities… to me fundamentalist attitudes are ones where people hold a kind of 
dogmatic view that their own position is the correct one.  That by definition people 
that hold different views are wrong, are destined to go to hell.  And obviously that 
shades at the worst end into willingness to actually undertake violent acts towards 
other people, even towards people from your community with whom you disagree. 
So  that’s  absolutely  intolerable  in  a  democracy.  Our  values  are  fundamentally  
democratic values.  And fundamentalist values are I think anti democratic.
[Catherine Howarth, former Lead Organiser, WLC, 22/08/07]
Indeed  Howarth's  contribution  presents  an  interesting  dilemma:  how  can  anti 
democratic fundamentalists be part of a democratic alliance? The problem lies in an 
understanding of  fundamentalism as  being so immersed in  one's  beliefs  that  one 
cannot  connect  with  those  that  do  not  hold  the  same views.  Other  interviewees 
equated fundamentalism with orthodoxy, where religious belief entails a retreat from 
public life. The perception of fundamentalism here is of 'narrowness' and isolation 
but this is a misconception. One only needs to look at the representations that are 
made on the issue of gender, sexuality and reproductive rights at any international 
conference (see for instance Women Against Fundamentalism (1995) report on the 
Beijing Conference) to see that fundamentalism depends upon public presence and 
on the ability  to  forge alliances  with other  groups nationally  and transnationally. 
Connections are built around the furtherance of mutual interests but also an implicit 
reassurance that some areas remain off limits. So there are potential parallels with 
Citizens UK.
According  to  Catherine  Howarth,  the  simple  fact  of  being  'in  relationship' 
circumvents  the  possibility  of  fundamentalist  views  and  can  stop  or  alleviate 
prejudice. At some level there was hope that engagement with the outside world and 
with other religious groups would force the more Right wing members of the alliance 
to let go of their prejudices, to embrace diversity and find a common commitment to 
the alleviation of human suffering. This is thought to be the case because the alliance 
forces groups into a  relationship with Stranger  Others  and compels  them to find 
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common ground. Neil Jameson provided anecdotal evidence of the way membership 
groups had grown in their understanding of the Other because of a new physical and 
political proximity fostered by Citizens UK.
Secondly, there were concerns about being too purist in politics. Rahila Gupta has 
referred to this as 'the counsel of perfection' accusation levelled at feminists when 
they  raise  questions  about  political  alliances.171 For  Howarth,  to  talk  about 
fundamentalism was to 'go in there looking for problems'  (22/08/07).  Instead she 
emphasised  that  'these  organisations  are  totally  imperfect,  society  is  imperfect, 
human  beings  are  imperfect'  (22/08/07).  This  sense  of  an  alliance  of  imperfect 
organisations chimes with Luke Bretherton’s contribution as his  argument for the 
political enactment of one's faith is precisely based on the understanding that one can 
act in the present, to make changes to an imperfect world (which he calls ‘Babylon’) 
and still aspire to a perfect heaven. So the deal is precisely that one works through 
seriously  flawed  institutions  towards  pragmatic  ends  rather  than  expecting  an 
ideological affinity. Bretherton and Howarth reinforce each other's assertions as she 
views human behaviour  as 'naturally  problematic  and selfish and full  of sin'  and 
interaction with these fallen human beings as an attempt at getting them to be 'their 
best  possible  self'.  These  comments  bear  resemblance  to  the  comments  of  other 
Christian interviewees discussed in Chapter 3.
Moreover, Howarth likened taking a stand on fundamentalism with refusing to work 
with the Catholic Church because it doesn't allow women priests. This comparison is 
interesting, not only because it highlights the prevalence of sexism across institutions 
and  the  difficulties  that  entails  for  political  activity,  but  rather  because  the 
imperfection of  Christian institutions  becomes a  norm that  prevents a  critique of 
other,  notably  minority,  religious  organisations.  To  begin  to  question  Christian 
institutions at the centre and the forefront of the Citizens UK carries the potential of 
disintegration.  Given  that  part  of  the  unmarked  background  for  the  alliance 
171 See Feminism and the Soul of Secularism by Rahila Gupta dated 8/03/11 and available at:
http://www.opendemocracy.net/5050/rahila-gupta/feminism-and-soul-of-secularism
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comprises  support  for  Joseph  Ratzinger  and  also  Austin  Ivereigh's  attempts  to 
circumvent critique of the Catholic Church (he was an organiser for Citizens UK 
whilst  he was fending off critique of the Catholic Church during its child sexual 
abuse  scandal),  there  is  a  potential  for  complicity.  Moreover,  to  then  expect  the 
alliance to critique or distance itself from other religious organisations leaves them 
open to questions of hypocrisy and double standards. Indeed it carries the potential of 
reflecting a spotlight back on to the bigger players within the alliance and its various 
Chapters. 
Nonetheless,  amongst  TELCO's  longest  standing  members  is  the  East  London 
Mosque (and  its  sister  organisations  the  London  Muslim Centre  and the  Islamic 
Forum of Europe). South Asians in Tower Hamlets, with long histories of anti racist 
and community activism, have been writing about the links between this triumvirate 
and the fundamentalist  Jamaat-e-Islami Party (JI).  The JI  was formed in 1941 in 
colonial India and is based on the work of Abu a'la Maududi, one of the first Islamic 
Right thinkers to formulate an ideology of an Islamic state and of modern jihad. The 
JI has been implicated in the genocide that took place at the "war of liberation" of 
Bangladesh.  This  political  moment  marked  a  significant  rupture  between  secular 
Bangladeshi nationalists and the Islamic Right.  The JI continues to be associated 
with 'acts of systematic repression, anti-minority hatred or violence in Pakistan'.172 
On  their  influence  in  Tower  Hamlets,  a  member  of  a  local  group  of  secular 
Bangladeshis pointed to the following: 
By far the most organised and biggest political Islamist group is the Jamaat-e-Islami, 
which  also  operates  in  England,  but  under  different  names….  They  have  front  
groups. In the east end of London their biggest group is the East London Mosque,  
the London Muslim Centre and then a number of groups that are organised around 
that centre. Mainly the Islamic Forum Europe, Dawatul Islam, the YMO and there 
are a few other community youth groups that operate in Tower Hamlets… one could 
say that the leadership or some of the key figures of MCB (the Muslim Council of 
Britain) are definitely members of Islamist or fundamentalist groups like the Jamaat-
172 For more information about the Jamaat-e-Islami Party see The Islamic Right - Key 
Tendencies produced by Awaaz-South Asia Watch in June 2006.
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e-Islami. Some of the leadership are definitely from that strand… like the current  
secretary general  (Dr Abdul Bari)  is  Bangladeshi JI…  You will  see a clear link  
between them and JI because over the years they have had regular key leaders of JI  
visit the East London Mosque and meetings, seminars, conferences being posted by 
the East London Mosque where the JI leadership and the East London leadership are 
sharing a platform and sharing views… they have always defended JI people. Every 
time we have challenged JI ideology or when their leaders have come over here,  
there has been a very strong defence from the East London Mosque.
[Ansar Ahmed Ullah, Nirmul Committee, 3/10/07]
Tower Hamlets is  a politically fused borough, very tense.  There are a number of 
mosques and secular and cultural organisations (and now also sections of the local 
Labour Party), some of who played a central role in the definitive anti racist struggles 
of the 1980s, that are now engaged in what can only be described as a cultural war of 
attrition to counter what they claim is the expansionism of the East London Mosque. 
I want to highlight four points from their arguments: the East London Mosque and its 
partner  organisations  have  links  with  fundamentalist  political  groupings  in 
Bangladesh and Pakistan; in Britain they have been mobilising through local political 
parties of all hues but also drawing legitimacy from civil society alliances and anti 
racist mobilisations (such as the recent United East End coalition against the English 
Defence  League);  they  have  established  pathways  into  the  local  state  to  access 
limited  resources  whilst  secular  community  spaces  in  the  borough  have  been 
decimated;  and  the  East  London  Mosque  has  come  to  be  regarded  as  the  main 
representative  of  Muslims in  the  area  such that  despite  the existence  of  over  40 
mosques  in  the  borough  of  varying  ideologies  and  practices,  the  East  London 
Mosque has maximum space to reproduce its particularly narrow version of Islam. 
Some secular  Bangladeshis  in  the  borough take  a  'no  platform'  approach  to  this 
triumvirate akin to the stands taken in relation to the British National Party. In effect, 
this is an equalisation of two forms of Right wing politics. 
It  is  noteworthy  that  Citizens  UK's  unwillingness  to  look  critically  at  religious 
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organisations differs from the practices of its American counterpart,  the Industrial 
Areas  Foundation.173 However,  when questioned about  the  East  London Mosque, 
Catherine  Howarth  claimed that  she  would  only  entertain  criticism if  there  were 
information about their behaviour here in London and particularly in Tower Hamlets, 
rather than about their connections abroad. For me, this was another indication of 
Citizens  UK's  preference  for  form over  content,  for  numbers  and outcomes over 
political principles. Paradoxically, for an organisation that overtly refuses to work on 
gender/sexuality/reproductive  rights  as  'wedge  issues',  Howarth's  comment  below 
shows that she referenced her commitment to tackling violence against women as a 
way to defend Citizens UK's allies. This inversion of the dominant discourse about 
gender as a standard of governance that restricts or moderates religious mobilisations 
(as here the same claim enables fundamentalist ones) also carries epistemological 
problems because, as can be seen below, Howarth is not really certain of what she 
knows about the East London Mosque but she still stands boldly by the claim that 
they are a local force for good:
I'd have a much bigger problem if I felt that East London Mosque were supporting 
views  which  were  extremely  repressive  of  women  within  Tower  Hamlets  or  
something like that. That's what would really bother me…if they weren't challenging 
domestic violence or if  they were encouraging negative views towards people of 
other faiths. But it seems to me they, what I know and obviously I don't sit in there, I  
don't speak Bengali and I don't spend a lot of time with them, but they are broadly 
locally a force for good I think.
[Catherine Howarth, former Lead Organiser WLC, 22/08/07] 
This  is  also  interesting  for  the  way  in  which  geo-political  spaces  are  imagined. 
Citizens UK identifies along the axes of faith and place, it  is about turning one's 
religious convictions into a force for good at the neighbourhood or local level. The 
socialist  feminist  geographer,  Doreen  Massey,  is  also  one  of  Citizens  UK's 
173 Both Mark Warren's presentation at the 'Faith and Citizenship Conference' in London on 
27/08/08 and Andy Banks' (1991) writing on the Justice for Janitors Campaign indicates that the 
American Chapters make some level of distinction between progressive and non progressive religious 
groups. They also include organisations regarded by Citizens UK as 'single issue' groups, such as 
women's or environmental groups. 
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supporters. Yet if Massey (2007) has articulated any critique of Citizens UK at all, it  
is  a  wish  to  see  them making  clearer  transnational  connections  so  that  they  are 
linking local politics with the global and not just picking up on the way that global 
capital impacts on the local. Most of what she says is about taking account of the 
transnational nature of corporations by linking the struggles of local workers within 
areas of Britain with workers in other parts of the world, no doubt akin to socialist 
internationalism. Notwithstanding the fact that the East London Mosque are actually 
considered  a  problem  for  women's  rights  and  people's  freedoms  within  Tower 
Hamlets, I believe that Citizens UK also has an ethical responsibility to take account 
of transnational networks of religious violence where fundamentalist organisations 
are fast learning to separate out the language used in the British context and their 
activities abroad.
The aggregated benefits
The TELCO 12th Anniversary Assembly (12/11/08) provided an insight into how 
local politics actually takes place and can directly or inadvertently provide a space 
for the consolidation of fundamentalist forces, paving the way for them to access 
limited  public  resources.  The  event  was  clearly  being  used  to  nurture  and forge 
political ties between local councillors, businessmen and fundamentalist groups in 
Tower Hamlets. Abdul Bari of the Muslim Council of Britain (referred to above by 
Ansar  Ahmed  Ullah  as  a  JI  member)  was  given  centre  stage  and  provided  the 
keynote address for the event. Members of the Muslim Council of Britain, the East 
London Mosque and local Labour Party councillors grouped together in the seats at 
the front of the hall, networking, shaking hands and congratulating each other. The 
Citysafe item on the Assembly agenda was led by a member of CADAA, a body 
closely  allied  to  the  East  London Mosque.  The CADAA representative,  a  young 
Bengali man, was given a platform at the TELCO event as part of their emphasis on 
personal  testimonies.  He talked passionately  about  the prevalence  of  drug use  in 
Tower Hamlets and his own personal 'salvation'. East London Mosque have for some 
time been lobbying for access to state funding for their existing drug and alcohol 
rehabilitation work with young people in the borough. Indeed Catherine Howarth 
noted  her  support  for  their  bid  to  receive  public  funding  for  this  work  even  if 
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otherwise she would not encourage religious groups to engage with service contracts. 
At the TELCO Assembly, the local council representative announced that it would 
release more funds for their 'safer city' work. It seems likely that the East London 
Mosque, and their various mutations, would be seen as a strong contender for such 
funding. 
Clearly, legitimacy for members of Citizens UK chapters is gained on lots of fronts.  
If nothing else the Citizens UK publicity machine gives its members the appearance 
of being highly relevant in so far as 'relevance' has come to be closely associated 
with numbers. When combined with earlier points about the active erasure of other 
identities  and political  histories,  one can see how this  is  likely to  ferment in the 
reproduction and institutionalisation of the government's own 'faith agenda' at a local 
level. However, it is worth noting that there is a slight imbalance in this alliance. If 
Lina Jamoul's (2006) account of TELCO's Whitechapel Watch campaign is anything 
to go by, the East London Mosque could be gaining far more from Citizens UK 
affiliation than they are putting into the alliance and its campaigns. Jamoul's (2006) 
thesis notes that TELCO provided support for the East London Mosque's (ELM) bid 
to secure the land on which the London Muslim Centre was later built. She also notes 
that  TELCO saw through  the  Whitechapel  Watch  campaign  in  2003  whose  key 
components  were  determined  by  the  East  London  Mosque  and  comprised  street 
cleaning and 'law and order' concerns including public drinking and prostitution. The 
demands  were  akin  to  those  made  by  the  West  London  Citizens  Bin  the  Rats 
campaign which included increased rubbish collections but also greater policing and 
surveillance equipment. 
Even though Citizens UK is opposed to state funding contracts, I believe the alliance 
still acts as a power broker enabling religious groups to increase and consolidate their 
relationship  with  the  local  and  national  state.  In  turn,  this  helps  religious 
organisations position themselves as representatives, as recognised by local people 
and other agencies and therefore as viable recipients of public resources. Of course 
the East London Mosque does not rely solely on its participation in TELCO. It has 
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been working on many fronts to extend its reach. Its sister organisation, the Islamic 
Forum of Europe, fielded and boosted political candidates both through the Labour 
Party and the Respect Party. This Jamaat-e-Islami triumvirate is also very close to the 
current Mayor Lutfur Rahman who now has overall control of the borough's budget. 
Ansar Ahmed Ullah emphasised the subtle ways in which power is consolidated, 
legitimacy is gained, resources are annexed, Right wing Islam is perpetuated and 
dissent is quashed. For instance, he stated the following about the Jamaat-e-Islami 
groups in Tower Hamlets and the uses of their client base:
Generally if you wanted to consult with young people, again the youth groups that  
are most active and organised, are the groups that are being lead by (JI) …I think 
they are following the Islamist way of working… Hamas, Hizb ut-Tahrir, they all 
have this way of providing community welfare. They will have hospitals, clinics that 
provide  health  support  or  they  will  have  their  own  schools  that  will  provide 
education to young people. And I guess in times of crisis, they could fall back and 
draw support from their contacts in those groups. I give you one example. A few 
weeks back there was an Islamist that came over here from Bangladesh, a guy called  
Delwar Hossain Sayeedi (recently indicted for war crimes), and we called a demo at  
Altab Ali Park, not too far from East London Mosque to protest about his presence 
here… so the young people that go to their clubs and people that go to mosque, they 
were told that, this guy is an Islamic scholar and as Muslims we have to provide 
protection for this guy. That it’s their duty as Muslims to go out there and challenge 
us lot who were demonstrating outside the mosque.
[Ansar Ahmed Ullah, Nirmul Committee, 3/10/07]
Moreover, when one brings into view anecdotal evidence from a number of ethnic 
minority  women's  groups  across  the  country  that  are  struggling  against  the 
consequences  of  the  government's  faith  and  cohesion  agenda,  the  Citizens  UK 
approach acquires a new significance. In this context the conflict over representation 
has huge implications for the allocation of resources and access to the democratic 
process. Sandhya Sharma, a feminist activist from Manchester complained that:
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We too are finding that we are struggling over and over again to fight for what small  
resources are available to look at women, to look at women's inclusion, to look at 
domestic violence against women. We are fighting that out in the new battleground 
of faith and cohesion… There is less access to resources and space to argue your 
validity… you are  constantly asked to  justify,  to  validate  your  very  existence… 
increasingly  the  faith  networks  are  getting  involved  and  they  are  getting  the 
money… (and) I've seen quite a few organisations, which traditionally have been 
secular becoming Muslim women's organisations because that's where the money is 
at;  the money is  at that  place.  If  you look at,  I  was looking at  various different  
funding sources and it is all what Pragna was talking about, faith-based approach to 
this, faith-based approach to education, faith-based approach to integration, this is 
how its gonna play out now, so as long as you are faith-based you have a shot at 
some funding and there is a real competition for those resources, for those spaces 
and those voices. Whose voices are the government listening to? Unfortunately, it's 
certainly not people like mine. The space and the voice is very much taken up by 
people from faith networks.174
174 Speaking at 'Faith, Equality and Cohesion' on 25/11/08 a public meeting organised by 
Women Against Fundamentalism. The full video footage of this speech can be viewed at: 
http://www.womenagainstfundamentalism.org.uk/videos/sandhya.mov
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Conclusion
This thesis was produced against a growing consensus amongst feminist and critical 
theorists that religious identities are suppressed and faith-based mobilisations need to 
be validated. I set out to produce a feminist analysis invested in a transformative 
process that seeks to unpick naturalised and common sense assumptions by revealing 
the power relations underlining the construction of discourses, policies, practices and 
local landscapes. Notably, by pushing a concern about religious Right mobilisations 
to the centre of the analysis, I have characterised religious organisations as active 
political agents rather than as passive, cultural or social groups. Moreover, I sought 
to position smaller local insights against the paradoxical dimensions of a post-9/11 
meta  narrative  that  simultaneously  claims  religious  organisations  are  a  resurgent 
feature of the democratic polity and yet also that secularists are at pains to exclude 
and deny religious demands.  I attempted, quite literally, to activate Donna Haraway's 
(1991) call to 'situated knowledge' by producing a contingent contextualised analysis 
of religion and politics through a comparative study of two London boroughs. 
The result is an empirically grounded account of the place of religious identities and 
organisations within local cartographies of power, particularly drawing attention to 
the multiple ways that transnational religious Right formations gain succour from 
new regimes of governance, civil society mobilisations and spaces of multiculturalist 
tolerance.  Moreover, I decided to focus on the mundane rather than the spectacular 
because  I  wanted  to  emphasise  the  slow  process  with  which  these  frameworks 
become accepted as common sense and rolled out as normative practice. 
Multiple interventions (including those of key feminist theorists) reflect  a growing 
consensus that religious mobilisations represent critical alterity or counter hegemony, 
concluding  that  religious  demands  ought  to  be  accommodated  or  embraced. 
However,  Chapter 1 of this thesis points to a great deal of recognition of religious 
organisations at all three levels of Jose Casanova's (1994) sense of the public sphere: 
the  state;   political  parties  and  civil  society.  Religion  runs  right  through 
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communitarian  social  organisation  and  governance  from  the  early  days  of 
multiculturalism policy into New Labour's 'faith agenda' and is now both inside state 
policy and a dominant feature of civil society and political Opposition. In Chapter 1, 
I argued that this new wave of religious communitarianism is sustained by several 
contemporary components: the legacy of multiculturalism in politics that enables a 
restricted view of ethnic minority religious projects; morality as a new source of both 
governance and critique; and a revised discourse about deliberative democracy and  a 
consensus politics of 'the common good'. Moreover, an emboldened role for religious 
groups  emerged  in  the  last  10-15  years  within  the  moral  framework  of 
communitarianism, the moral responses to riots and 9/11, and the moral dimensions 
of the particularly conservative use of the concept of social capital. Philip Blond's 
(2010) 'politics of virtue' is not new but rather carries over discourses started under 
New Labour and accentuated by the current  Conservative Party,  in  turn bringing 
theological  dimensions  and the assured place for  religious  institutions  even more 
acutely to the fore. 
In  Chapter  1,  I  proposed  that  there  has  been  a  slide  from  multiculturalism  to 
multifaithism within British public policy, by which I am not just talking about the 
empirical  fact  or reality  of  religious  difference so much as  the growing place of 
religion  as  an  organising  principle  for  British  governance  and  civil  society  (qua 
Stuart Hall's (2000) distinction between the adjective use of 'multicultural' and the 
substantive governance frame of 'multiculturalism'). This thesis makes a significant 
contribution to  emergent  discussions about  multifaithism, a term that  has not  yet 
acquired common parlance but that I believe describes the current context in many 
local areas and definitely merits the attention of feminist theory. I have drawn upon 
feminist and anti-racist insights on multiculturalist theory and practice in order to 
digest the features of this new multifaithism. Whilst taking note of Tariq Modood's 
observations about Christian privilege, the growth of religious identity as empirical 
reality and inconsistencies in the application of the public-private divide, this thesis 
writes against the grain of Modood's extensive offerings on multiculturalism, religion 
and citizenship. Indeed his pronouncements about the politics of multiculturalism are 
very useful but his work does not do what he professes needs to be done because he 
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tends  to  validate  rather  than  critically  evaluate  religious  claims,  identities  and 
mobilisations. In this thesis I specifically sought to use the feminist commitment to 
uncovering  power  relations  in  order  to  draw  out  the  politics  or  contestatory 
dimensions of multifaithism. 
In concluding,  I draw upon Michael Keith's (2005) assertion that it is useful, if not 
necessary, to make a distinction between conditions of possibility and modalities of 
identification.  In  sharing  this  sentiment  I  acknowledge the reasons why religious 
identity, religious organisations and multifaithism have grown in public prominence 
within  the  two boroughs  and then  develop a  critique  of  the  substantive  political 
interventions and projects that thrive as a consequence.   
Conditions of Possibility 
This section provides a brief summary of the numerous push factors, from above and 
from below, that were highlighted as reasons why religious  groups and identities 
have grown in prominence within the two boroughs. I have broadly grouped these as: 
legacies and ever-present histories; critical gaps; the movement from below; and the 
numbers game. However, these are interdependent factors that have acted together to 
enable and sustain faith-based interventions.     
Legacies and ever-present histories
There is a long colonial history to some of the features of religion in contemporary 
British governance, one that has tended to invite undemocratic religious leaderships 
in  to relationship with the state  and encouraged the closure of  identities  through 
simplified processes of representation, codification and institutionalisation. Such a 
framework has  difficulty  taking account  of  the syncretic  practice  of  cultures  and 
religions and the ways in which people are located at the intersection of multiple 
axes. The unfinished business of colonial and multiculturalist governance means that 
some elements of the 'faith agenda' were already in place by the time New Labour 
came to power. 
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Running alongside this is the Establishment position of the Church of England as 
well as historical settlements between the state and Catholic, Anglican and Jewish 
leaderships to enable publicly funded religious schools. Ranu Samantrai (2008) cited 
the  differential  socio-legal  status  of  religions  in  Britain  as  one  aspect  of  state 
technologies of ethnicity giving rise to contemporary religious claims. Chapter 6 of 
this thesis drew out the morality and disciplinary dimensions of state technologies 
and matched these with the unrelenting call to validate the black psyche. I reflected 
on the expressly moralistic and disciplinary arguments made in defence of the first 
publicly funded Sikh primary school in Britain.  In particular I argued that ethnic 
minority  religious  organisations  once  subject  to  the  assimilationist  tendencies  of 
Conservative Party politics now ride the flow of a Victorian morality and (Victorian) 
colonial governance to make their claims and access state resources. In turn, they 
bolster the contemporary meta-narrative of the Conservative Party's quest to deploy 
organised  religion  as  a  means  of  providing  strong  moral  frameworks  and  they 
actively contribute to a growing British political consensus about religion, morality 
and the breakdown of the family. 
The second aspect of this unfinished business concerns ethnic minority recruitment 
to the Labour Party.  Both boroughs continue to be dominated by the Labour Party 
despite  attempts  at  Opposition.  Whilst  each  of  the  Labour  Groups  has  unique 
characteristics  they  share  tendencies  related  to  the  articulation  of  Labour  Party 
development with histories of migration and settlement. Part of this articulation was 
reflected in the way Labour Party MPs in each borough talked about secularism, 
which joined together as a similar multifaithist practice, indicative of the impact on 
the Labour Party of a membership base comprising Christian Methodists on the one 
hand and the South Asian import of a multifaithist form of secularism on the other. It 
is noteworthy that both tendencies should meet in local London spaces and see eye to 
eye on the basis of a prior encounter. 
However,  Chapter  2  also  draws  on  Kalbir  Shukra  and  Sydney  Jeffers'  work  to 
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emphasise that ethnic minorities within the Labour Party represent many different 
political  interests  including  Left  politics,  secular  black  Left  politics,  black 
perspectivism, raced managerialism, ethnic particularism, ethnic communalism and 
religious identity politics. Moreover, the Labour Party actively created vote banks 
reliant on caste, religion and kinship networks (the basis of what Solomos and Back 
(1995) term ‘machine politics’). During the course of this thesis, previous interests 
encompassed by a more unified class position were fractured along the lines of some 
of  these  vote  banks,  which  were  tapped  for  an  expressly  religious  venting  of 
accumulated grievances, and revealed divergent political leanings amongst those at 
one time sitting comfortably within what Solomos and Back (1995) referred to as a 
'sovereign Labour Party'.
I also wondered what the actions of those that chose to remain within the Labour 
Party after these religiously inflected seizures might reveal, if anything, about the 
scope of a ‘sovereign Labour Party’. Councillor Dhindsa stated very clearly that he 
stayed inside the Labour Party because of his commitment to a public sector. Several 
Newham councillors and the Ealing Southall MP voiced a specific commitment to 
secularism. It is also noteworthy that the interface between Labour and the new faith-
based mobilisations was largely male, only two women defected, the vast majority 
stayed close to the Labour Party.  Moreover, in both boroughs, the Labour Groups 
were able to rely on decades of embeddedness to ride the power struggles brought 
about by faith-based mobilisations and religious political parties. Some participants 
argued  that  this  was  quite  simply  because  of  the  perceived  lack  of  viability  of 
alternative political parties and the persistence of a view of the Conservative Party as 
a  pro-cuts  'Nasty  Party'.  The  local  dimension  is  significant  here  because  whilst 
Ealing has been a two party race, the political landscape in Newham has been shaped 
by a united front against the Conservative Party, which made other avenues more 
viable, namely Christian Right politics and the Respect Party. In Ealing it was the 
Conservative  Party  rather  than  Liberal  Democrats,  Greens  or  Respect  that  made 
gains from religious ruptures. The Ealing Conservative Party has begun to get an 
audience amongst ethnic minorities in the borough largely thanks to Right wing Sikh 
mobilisations.
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Critical Gaps
A key feature of both boroughs was a critique of party structures, state transparency 
and corporate accountability. Religious mobilisations were welded to these critiques 
and were often inextricable from questions of democratic process and participation. 
Research  participants  positioned  the  dynamic  possibilities  of  religious  political 
mobilisation and faith  based provision against  the authoritarian tendencies  of the 
state and the unscrupulous market philosophy of corporations. The objectification of 
individuals  either as numbers or as commodities was contrasted with the ability of 
religious  groups  to  favour difference and accommodate  individual need.  Some 
interviewees described religiously inspired humanist and social justice concerns and 
claimed  that  their religious commitments made them more  caring  and  attentive. 
There were dozens of examples of religious groups acting as a buffer against the 
welfare state deficit; as organisations  readily exposed to the racialised limits of the 
welfare state, they provided charitable services to counter the impact on local people. 
Not all of these claims were tied to religious demands. Whilst Ealing Labour Group 
was specifically subjected to accusations of religious discrimination, mobilisations in 
Newham were as much about  critiquing the undemocratic tendencies of the local 
Labour  Group.  AK Sheikh specifically  argued that  his  defection  from Labour  to 
Respect  was not  about  religion at  all  but  arose from concerns  about  the internal 
democracy of the Labour Group, particularly reflected in the whip action during the 
Council chamber debate on the Iraq War. 
Importantly, these insights counter Weber's (1946) secularisation thesis. There was a 
vocal disenchantment with the possibilities of secularism.  It was described as grey, 
dour,  as lacking in life force,  colour,  meaning and music.  The allure of dynamic 
religion was strong,  also revealing the  incredible  staying power and capacity  for 
revitalisation amongst local religious institutions. 
However, some of these claims about offering an alternative can be questioned. In 
Chapter  4,  I  reflected  on  the  multiple  ways  in  which  religious  organisations  are 
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invested in bolstering rather than challenging state discourses and systems. Chapters 
3,  6  and  7  also  provide  examples  of  where  religious  groups  have  invested  in 
capitalism, their accumulation of assets and the ways in which they exert a social 
pressure on people to make financial  contributions to religious institutions. So in 
some  places,  religious  commitment  was  rationalised  to  reproduce  bureaucratic 
procedures or calculated in the same marketised way.
A second dimension to the question of religion as critique emerged from anti-racists' 
descriptions  of a changing political  landscape,  particularly the growth of Muslim 
political identification.  Chapter 5 engaged with their attempts to negotiate this new 
terrain. Here I want to note that they provided a number of reasons for the transition 
from an anti-racist politics premised on a secular Black unity to a growing Muslim 
political  identity  including:  the  professionalisation  and  growth  of  self-interest 
amongst social movement groups pre-occupied with service provision and survival in 
the context of the marketisation and decimation of the voluntary sector; the demise of 
a  larger  Left  liberatory  narrative;  the  growth  of  an  Islamist  narrative  that  offers 
explanations for global and local events; and the active consolidation of religious 
identities and religious leaderships by the state. These features converged to ensure 
that Muslim political identifications are all the more viable and have grown at a pace 
that  might  otherwise  have  been  unimaginable.  Ironically,  the  current  Coalition 
government's cuts agenda has re-ignited some of the civil society vibrancy of that 
earlier period and also made the hegemonic flow of morality between instrumental 
state communitarianism and civil society conservatism that much more obvious. 
The movement from below
In this thesis I have insisted that multifaithism arose from a double movement: from 
above through a state-led construction of communities and social welfare practice but 
equally  from  below  through  the  success  of  social  movements  in  encouraging 
religious  political  identifications  and  lobbying  for  the  recognition  of  religious 
identities  and  claims.  A number  of  contributions  on  religion  and  politics  have 
highlighted the proactive transnational dimension of religious political mobilisations 
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of (notably S. Sayyid, Oliver Roy and dozens of others on Islam, Chetan Bhatt's 
work  on  the  Hindu  and  Islamic  Right,  Jose  Casanova  and  Luke  Bretherton  on 
Christian  formations,  and  more  recently  Gurharpal  Singh  and  Darshan  Tatla  in 
relation to Sikh groups). Importantly, these activities have impacted on local areas.
Politicians referred to the pressure of religious mobilisations but there was a distinct 
absence of publicly visible mobilisations lobbying for the retention of secular spaces. 
The  Labour  to  Conservative  defector  Gurcharan  Singh,  for  instance,  specifically 
noted the vociferous demand for a Sikh school but that he had not been lobbied by 
secularists opposed to faith schools.  In Newham, inspite of the local Labour Group's 
scepticism, religion still became an organising principle within civil society through 
three avenues. Anti imperialist politics such as the Stop the War Coalition relied on 
religious,  particularly  Muslim,  organisations  as  spaces  of  mobilisation.  More 
recently, civil society groups accessed central government funds tied to 'faith sector 
engagement' to establish at least 7 faith-based or interfaith initiatives with the Faith 
Sector  Forum positioning itself  as  a  key critic  of  the local  state.  Moreover,  both 
boroughs had experienced the impact of Citizens UK chapters.
I was concerned to acknowledge the possibilities that can emerge from drawing upon 
religious belief for political interventions. Chapter 3, in particular, brought together 
points  about  the sociality of religious discourse, the ways in which it can  be  a 
framework for creating positive change  by placing  an  obligation  on  believers  to 
engage  with  the  world  and  social  issues  around  them. Interviewees  argued  that 
religion can encourage people to be more outward facing and also provide a kind of 
added value to human relations, a sense of empathy and an ethics of care. Moreover, 
several examples were provided where religiosity and secular humanism could flow 
in the same direction as a commitment to dignity, respect and social justice, towards 
charitable work and the collective improvement of people's lives.  
Moreover,  religious  commitment  could  inhere  an  affective  disposition  thought 
otherwise to be blocked by the tropes of bureaucracy and market. Indeed many of the 
ontological assertions about living out religious commitments through social action 
were also referred to as feelings or rather as depth or longevity of feeling. Moreover, 
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the positive emotions of 'religious' interviewees potentially provided a stark contrast 
to  longstanding  anti-racist  and  feminist  discourses  seeking  to  validate  'negative' 
expressions of pain and suffering. Conversely, the affective store of religious groups 
claimed 'love' and 'hope' as their driving forces. 
Notably there were signs of the local  rolling out of the Citizens UK discourse. 
Citizens UK events make dynamic use of testimonies to inhere hope and create a 
kind of lifting up and energised feeling of solidarity.  They demonstrated that  the 
'catchiness' of religious emotion could combine in a productive fashion with music 
and time management to energise people and push forward political demands. In this 
context, religion seemed to make available other facets as modes of organising such 
as the ability to inhere a sense of belonging and the aesthetic value of religious dress. 
Indeed, the Citizens UK mode of organising is a strong example of the enduring 
weight of religious signs and dress within British society inspite of accusations about 
secular imposition.  Similarly, Chapter 5 reflected on Asad Rehman's recognition of 
the symbolic weight of religious leaders, which he garnered in his own faith-based 
approach to a public meeting about the Forest Gate raids.
Citizens UK events claimed to make use of a liturgical framework without the 'overt' 
imposition of belief but the second half of this Conclusion emphasises other ways in 
which  they  contributed  to  the  sedimentation  of  local  religious  orders.  Moreover, 
there were  many examples where be-getting religion had restricted people’s social 
worlds and encouraged forms of displaced agency, discussed below.  
The numbers game
As  noted  above,  the  growth  of  civil  society  faith-based  mobilisations  and  the 
simultaneous decline of  expressly  'secular'  mobilisations  in  each of  the  boroughs 
directly impacted upon electoral politics and created an imbalance in representational 
claims. I was surprised by the reluctance of some local politicians to challenge or 
publicly stand against religious mobilisations and their preference to critique these in 
a confidential way for fear of alienating their constituents or losing votes. The head 
of a Catholic school astutely remarked that elected politicians are alert to the possible 
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impact  on  their  positions  if  they  express  strong views  either  way on faith-based 
provision.  Even  the  avowedly  'secular'  Newham  Labour  Group  seemed  to  feel 
obliged  to  engage  with  ‘faith  speak’.  The  pressure  of  Newham's  religious 
mobilisations, particularly the rise of the Christian Peoples Alliance, could even have 
led to the revival of the local branch of the Christian Socialist Movement.  
Moreover, responses to questions about the likely impact on women of a growth of 
religion  in  the  public  sphere  by  and  large  sparked  references  to  the  scale  and 
visibility  of  pious  women in both boroughs with little  regard  for  the substantive 
dimensions  and  normative  implications  for  empowerment,  representation  and 
engagement.  Electoral  politics  seemed  to  be  a  male-dominated  game  in  both 
boroughs, with women's voices muted and certainly not at the forefront of defections. 
In Ealing the ones that stayed put were less likely to be referenced against religious 
identities,  marking  a  separation  of  'gender'  and 'religion'  concerns,  whilst  it  was 
rumoured  that  critique  within  the  Newham  Labour  Group  comes  largely  from 
Muslim women.
Often the representational implications of these numbers manifest as a crude politics 
of  majoritarianism fermenting  around the  construction  of  prominent  buildings  as 
corporeal guarantees of access to consultation mechanisms, public resources and the 
ability to dominate the representation of particular religions at a local, national, and 
even international, level. This problematic dimension of representational politics is 
reflected  in  the  actual  geography  of  local  landscapes.  Chapter  4  discussed  the 
Neighbourhood Walks interfaith initiative to exchange knowledge and understanding 
on the basis of physical sites of worship which paradoxically provided space for the 
religious Right Vishwa Hindu Parishad group to proliferate their supremacist politics 
because  of  their  longstanding  and  anomalous  control  of  a  local  state  owned 
community  centre.  Chapter  6  highlighted  the  position  of  the  the  Sri  Guru  Singh 
Sabha Southall buildings as a definitive point with regards to projections of Sikhism 
whilst Chapter 7 noted similarities with the East London Mosque in Tower Hamlets 
and the representation of Muslims and Islam. Also in Chapter 5, I noted the latent 
pressure within Newham from Hizb ut-Tahrir activists to follow these examples by 
establishing  a  large  central  religious  centre  in  the  borough.  Conversely  Newham 
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Council's  support  for  a  proposed  Tablighi  Jamaat  mosque  potentially  breaks  the 
relationship  between  architectural  prominence  and  representational  status;  whilst 
Tablighi Jamaat are planning one of the largest mosques in Britain, the group itself 
does  not  encourage  or  seek  engagement  with  temporal  British  political  systems. 
Nevertheless, the multiplication of religious sites of worship and their scale could be 
compared with other gradual changes to the local architecture and particularly the 
disappearance of pubs, clubs and out gay bodies. 
Moreover, these points relate to the reproductive capacity of the faith agenda where 
public visibility draws additional resources and enables access to spaces of power. 
The two SGSSS sites in Southall are exemplary cases of this kind. Their capacity to 
raise funds enabled them to purchase the land for a Khalsa Primary School which in 
turn  gained  financial  and  political  support  from  the  local  and  national  state. 
Moreover,  their  annual  Vaisakhi  processions  are  public  performances  of  their 
legitimacy as representatives of local people, a significant source of income, a means 
for consolidating political relations and for perpetuating a specifically Khalsa norm.  
If  'majoritarianism'  was  the  basis  for  accommodating  religious  claims, 
'proportionality'  was  the  basis  of  an  argument  against. It  was  interesting  to  see 
participants  that  had  made a  strong case for  acknowledging the  size of  religious 
congregations  and the  strength  of  belief  also asserting  the  importance  of  secular 
public institutions and wanting to ensure that these numbers would not be translated 
into large-scale faith based welfare provision. 
Modalities of Identification
Faith-based approaches and services within local areas now encompass a stream of 
issues all the way through from sex and relationships education to counselling to anti 
imperialist  mobilisations  to  environmental  campaigning.  This  section  attempts  to 
bring  together  key  points  about  the  substantive  nature  of  political  practice  and 
ideological projects in order to develop a much needed, but largely absent, critique of 
religion and local politics. A number of interrelated aspects comprise this emerging 
critique  namely:  questions  of  patriotism  and  the  symbiotic  relationship  between 
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Right  leaning religious  formations  and the (imperial)  British state;  the  frames of 
reference or registers for religious claims and engagement; the fundamental question 
of what is overlooked and accumulated through alliances; moral hegemonic agendas 
premised  on  state  and  religious  appeals  for  stronger  values;  the  structuring, 
particularly gendered dimensions, of 'respectability'; a more critical eye to religious 
agency,  again  particularly  gendered;  and the  emergence  of  new local  systems of 
election  where  local  areas  are  re-ordered  according  to  religious  beliefs  with 
significant consequences for access to limited resources.    
Of queen, country and multiple gods
An explosion of writings on religious political mobilisations since 9/11 have toyed 
with questions of loyalty, sovereignty and authority in relationships between US and 
European nation states and resident religious bodies and identities. Conversely, in my 
local areas study, I found a great many examples of mutually reinforcing nationalist 
projects. A number of dramatic visual performances reflected the repetitive annual, in 
many ways ritualised, symbiotic relationship between various religious formations 
and an imperial sense of Britishness. In particular, Chapter 6 described the enormous 
annual  Vaisakhi  processions  in  Southall,  which  reflect  a  number of  nodes  in  the 
formulation of a symbiotic British / Sikh  identity. Headed by the Territorial Army 
and ensconced in displays of the martial art Gatka, it  reflects the legacy of Sikh-
British complicity in the strengthening of the Khalsa stream of Sikhism, the power of 
Singh Sabha movements across the globe, the entrenchment of a colonial projection 
of Sikhs as a 'martial race' alongside the Khalsa projection of them as continuously at 
war.  The  predominance  and  reproduction  of  the  Khalsa  version  of  Sikhism  is 
reflected in the use of the orange Nishan Sahib (Sikh flag) alongside the Union Jack. 
Indeed the simultaneous images of  Khalistani flags and t-shirts (a fundamentalist 
movement  calling  for  an  independent  theologically  based  state)  alongside 
declarations of loyalty to the British state could reflect the potentiality for Britishness 
to harbour and encompass rather than push out the religious Right. Moreover, women 
are not excluded from these projections, they are also reproducers of the nationalist 
discourse. These  annual  Vaisakhi  processions  are  strong  examples  of  various 
pathways established through colonial governance, transferred through post-colonial 
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diasporic  settlement  and then  consolidated  through raced managerialism at  every 
level  including local institutions,  local  political  parties and the local authority,  to 
create  a  clearing for specific  Sikh groups to exercise authority  and control  at  an 
epistemological level.
Similar nationalist tendencies run through the Christian components of the Strangers 
into  Citizens  demonstrations  discussed  within  Chapter  7.  These  are  large-scale 
mobilisations calling for changes to immigration laws. Yet at these events, ethnically 
diverse audiences waving Union Jacks are addressed by a stage full of male religious 
leaders (also reflecting the Establishment position of the Church of England) and led 
into a sing-a-long to Rule Britannia and God Save the Queen. This is supplemented 
by a growing practice within faith-based schools to celebrate St George's day as well 
as the rise of Christian Democratic political parties in Britain calling for a strong 
Christian character to Britishness. Only the anti-imperialist politics of the Respect 
Party  and  a  handful  of  Muslim  groups  seemed  to  break  from  this  hegemony. 
However, even then, Asad Rehman's use of the term 'the mirror game' captures the 
relative positioning of someone like Mizan Raja of Islamic Circles and the Newham 
Councillor with the Communities Portfolio Unmesh Desai. Whilst Raja denied the 
problem of Islamist mobilisation in the borough, Desai had difficulty acknowledging 
the role of the state and political parties in creating the spaces for dissatisfaction. 
Neither of them critiqued the Preventing Violent Extremism programme and indeed 
the Islamic Circles public meeting on the allocation of PVE funds did more to reveal 
their relationship with central government and a desire to control the allocation of 
funds and projections of Islam than anything else. Interestingly it was the women at 
this public meeting that wanted to break out of Muslim identity politics and raise 
their concerns as tax payers.
So a key point made in this  thesis, particularly by looking at  Sikh and Christian 
groups, is that religious political organising does not necessarily counter or even seek 
to question the sovereign identity of the Queen or the legacy and legitimacy of the 
Union  Jack.  Religious  mobilisations  provide  ample  evidence  of  the  mutually 
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reinforcing ethnic and religious nationalist projects within the UK. Moreover, this 
was in the context of attempts to revive some sense of patriotism as the register for 
making  claims  about  democracy  and  human  rights.  Yet  the  Comment  is  Free 
responses to Newham Councillor Desai's article reflected the tendency for such talk 
to become assmiliationist and the propensity for such agendas to be inflected with 
superiority claims. 
It is Naomi Goldenberg's suggestion that religious organisations can be viewed as 
'vestigial states' that clears the way to think more carefully about the shared pastoral 
and surveillance functions across the British state and religious organisations. These 
relationships  were  often  embodied  in  the  role  of  'religious  leaders'  and  centred 
around a desire to police territories, boundaries and behaviour. Two prime examples 
of the role of religious groups as vestigial states comprised: their administrative role 
in conducting marriages through which they are reporting illegitimacy and illegality 
to the UK Borders Agency; and their consultative role in the policing of local areas, 
which simultaneously enabled them to proliferate concerns about what they consider 
to be 'offensive' behaviour. These shared functions are performed so long as there is a 
mutually supportive sense of authority, which is why the shift from multiculturalism 
to multifaithism is so important.
Given  the  multiple  local  examples  of  the  propensity  for  cohesion  talk  to  turn 
assimilationist and be used by the local state to side step critique (exemplified by the 
Southall  Black  Sisters  legal  action  against  Ealing  Council  and  the  civil  society 
petition against Newham Council) and also the emergence of a securitisation agenda, 
it was unsurprising that there was a great deal of scepticism about the regulatory 
function of the state. What role remains for state intervention in a context where the 
state  agendas  are  subject  to  accusations  of  'homonationalism'  and  'enlightened 
fundamentalism'?  Importantly,  it was  Newham  councillors  that  repeated  their 
commitment to secularism (and the reasons for its emergence), continued to voice a 
critique of the undemocratic nature of religious leaderships against the grain of New 
Labour funding to strengthen these,  actively defended LGBT and women's rights 
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(notably pledging its support for the local Asian women's project working against 
domestic violence), and also offered redress for dissenting religious minorities, such 
as  the  Ahmadiyyas  who  were  marginalised  by  pretty  much  every  faith-based 
intervention in the borough.   
Glocal Registers
The first half of this Conclusion has already noted the local impact of transnational 
mobilisations in terms of numerical and architectural prominence providing access to 
spaces of power.  Here I want to add some new reflections to Back et al's (2009) use 
of the term 'glocal',  to denote global impacts on local relations, alongside Chetan 
Bhatt's  (1997)  insights  into  the  use of  various  equalities  frames  by the  religious 
Right,  as  spaces  for  mobilisation  and  the  furtherance  of  their  own  supremacist 
claims. In particular,  there seemed to be three particular registers for framing the 
activities of religious organisations: anti-racism and parity arguments; human rights; 
and  the  multiculturalist  tropes  of  tolerance,  offence,  respect  and  sensitivity.  The 
attachment to  anti-racist and human rights discourses is discussed below so in this 
subsection I will focus on the multiculturalism frame.  
I believe these insights raise important questions for Wendy Brown's (2008) claims 
about  the  paternalistic  and  civilisational  dimensions  of  'tolerance'.  In  particular, 
Chapters 4, 6 and 7 provide ample evidence of the proactive use of spaces by Right 
leaning religious projects to further their own supremacist politics by utilising the 
language  and  mechanisms  of  'tolerance'  and  'respect'.  This  is  enabled  by  the 
normative institutionalisation of decades of multiculturalist practice through which 
raced managerialism and culturalist  or ethnicist  projects  were able  to  find public 
support.  Whilst  it  is  true  that  interfaith  initiatives  brokered  some  important 
relationships such as helping to overcome a long-standing enmity between Shia and 
Sunni mosques in Newham, cultural  sensitivity had turned to religious sensitivity 
which in turn led to civic exercises. These exercises were intended to inform but also 
to equip people so as not to offend, insult or overstep boundaries. Moreover, AK 
Sheikh's examples of his input into police consultation sessions included insisting on 
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the need to tackle prostitution not because of concerns about the empowerment of 
women but rather because of its propensity for ‘causing offence’ to ethnic minority 
elders. This sense of cleaning up the streets also reverberated through Citizens UK 
campaigns  –  notably  Whitechapel  Watch  and  Bin  the  Rats  –  demonstrating 
undercurrents of a coming together of concerns about 'offence' with rather parochial 
interests in preservation. 
The discussion of inter-faith alliances within Chapter 4 shows that these are akin to 
Parekh's 'community of communities' in which the principle of co-existence enables 
relationships  on  the  basis  of  crude  systems  of  representation  and  degrees  of 
autonomy wherein  values  and practices  are  established  as  norms without  ethical 
evaluation  and enable  the consolidation  of  intra  relations  of  power.  It  is  through 
seemingly mundane relations that one can see the Hindu Right living and thriving 
within local spaces whilst the repetitive exclusion or marginalisation of Ahmadiyya 
Muslims assumed the status of a common understanding across religious leaders and 
their organisations, even amongst the most liberal-left religious groups. Furthermore, 
this sense of 'community of communities' was not limited to state funded interfaith 
initiatives but also comprised the basis of Citizens UK membership and is regularly 
performed at their events. In this case, participation in the alliance was encouraged 
through an assurance that certain issues would remain off limits.
There was not space in this thesis to cover the overwhelming number of interfaith 
initiatives referred to during the research but it is interesting to recall that one forum 
chose to appoint someone they regarded as visibly neutral, as a means of avoiding 
anticipated problems with bringing religious organisations in contact with each other. 
Paradoxically, such an ethos supports the tenets of a view of secular public culture as 
one where privatising religious beliefs could enable rather than prevent engagement. 
However, it also brought to the fore by the presumed neutrality of whiteness.
Finally,  I  want  to  note  that  a  sense  of  'respectful  engagement'  came to  structure 
relations both at the level of groups and also intersubjective interactions. At the heart 
were  gendered  prescriptions.  Whilst  it  is  true  that  there  were a  great  number  of 
330
women at the religious institutions and events that I visited, little was said about what 
was  actually  involved  in  engaging  women  through  religious  groups  or  even  the 
problems for  women of  interacting  with  religious  groups.  To me these  problems 
seemed  to  involve  normative  segregation  (highlighted  by  the  experience  of  one 
woman obliged to address male constituents through a wall) and dress codes based 
on the injunctions of modesty (different degrees of expectations around covering up). 
I personally felt under pressure and under dressed in these spaces and found little 
evidence of the civilisational/gendered social engineering that has been part of the 
critique of PVE. 
Morality
Communitarianism,  as  opposed  to  the  collective  solidarities  located  within  the 
liberatory  politics  of  1970s  Britain,  carries  a  certain  social  conservatism.  The 
multiculturalist  push  for  a  'community  of  communities'  maps  easily  onto  a 
multifaithist defence of religion and faith-based services as providing strong moral 
frameworks,  something  that  Gurcharan  Singh  summarised  in  his  statement  that 
'Sikhs have their moral code and Muslims have theirs'. Moreover, multifaithism maps 
onto recent interventions on the importance of associationalism (notably by theology 
graduates  such as  Luke Bretherton,  Philip  Blond and Adam Dinham but  also by 
socialist  Maurice Glasman),  which  emphasise the role  of  religious  institutions  in 
providing relationships and offering permanence. Much of this work is also informed 
through contact with Citizens UK where morality is referred to in two different ways: 
as a claim that religious groups/beliefs can reignite a moral compass and concerns 
with social  justice issues;  and as problem areas,  or 'wedge issues'  outside of  the 
purview of the alliance including discussions about god, sexuality and reproductive 
rights. Neil Jameson described the latter as matters of personal preference. 
Some of the associationalist defenders of faith-based mobilisations also enforce the 
merits  of  marriage  and  families  as  part  of  the  importance  of  relationships  over 
individualism.  The  claim  that  society  has  broken  down  and  religions  have  an 
important role to play in fixing it potentially connects forces across Left and Right. 
Mizan Raja's affinity with the Conservative Party's claims about a break down in 
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society were more than matched by the assertions of the Southall Labour councillor 
Swarn  Singh  Kang  whose  argument  for  Sikh  schools  almost  entirely  hinged  on 
getting control of young people and getting them away from the problems associated 
with the failing families accommodated by regular state comprehensives. Kang was a 
strong example of an anxiety about the loss of tradition and religious or cultural 
knowledge being bound up with an anxiety of losing young people and women and a 
defence of the ability of faith schools'  selection procedures to separate the wheat 
from the chaff. Far more subtle arguments were made by Catholic schools that also 
invoked the need to revive strong values as their premise but tactically taught sex and 
relationships  education  as  per  national  curriculum  requirements  alongside  a 
normative  insistence  on  the  Catholic  commitment  to  heterosexuality,  to  chastity 
before marriage and to Pope Benedict XIV Joseph Ratzinger who is known for his 
Right-leaning interpretations  of  Catholic  obligations  and defence  of  natural  laws. 
Moreover,  whilst  associationalists  and civic republicans blamed liberalism for the 
prevalence of individual self interest, in the shadows lay an attack on feminism. The 
view that women have accumulated too much power repeats through faith circles, 
exemplified in Glasman's (2010) analogy between the Labour Party and the family 
unit but also very clear in Mizan Raja's pronouncements about 'the problems with 
Muslim women'. 
I  have  argued  within  this  thesis  that  it  is  precisely  because  religious  groups  are 
regaled  as  moral  antidotes  to  the  problems  with  state  accountability  and  market 
exploitation that we are seeing a rise and rise in conservatism. Alan Craig's energy 
for  Saving  Queens  Market  and  his  David  versus  Goliath  like  stand  against  the 
Newham Casino could  be  seen  as  strong anti-capitalist  activism.  However,  these 
were  equally  matched  by  allegations  about  teenagers  getting  pregnant  to  secure 
housing  and  an  anti-abortionist  multifaith  picket  outside  the  British  Pregnancy 
Advisory Service in Stratford. 
Craig positioned his search for strong values against the 'values free managerialism' 
of the state and yet also accused the state of bi-partisan support for business interests 
and opposition to Christianity. Those engaged with the Christian Peoples Alliance 
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could be easily distinguished from members of the Christian Socialist Movement by 
the former's lack of support for the Labour Party's equality agenda. This is the reason 
that CPA members were never inside the Labour Party. This was a different story for 
ethnic minority politicians for whom the Labour Party had been a 'natural' home for 
many decades  (and continue to  be for  the  Right  leaning councillor  Swarn  Singh 
Kang). Yet even those in Newham that defected to become Respect Party councillors 
did  little  to  actually  raise  concerns  about  the  shifting  ideological  ground  of  the 
Labour Party beyond a pre-election concern with Iraq. Inside council, they remained 
silent other than to raise a motion against the Nikab ban in France.
 
Agency
A great  number  of  interviewees  noted  the  capacity  of  religious  organisations  to 
inhere social responsibility and encourage political action, but what kind of agency 
was  being  invoked?  The  emphasis  on  depth  of  feeling  was  also  what  attached 
individuals to a higher authority and this attachment could both enable, as in the 
dozens of believers motivated to look out for others, or lead to destruction, as in the 
suicide bombers that hit Aldgate station exactly one day after my first interview with 
Neil Jameson at the Citizens UK premises near there. The latter is precisely the sort 
of  agency  that  Chetan  Bhatt  (1997)  problematises  as  acts  of  displacement.  The 
particular danger of religiously inspired displaced agency was also evident in Pastor 
Odulele’s testimony in his admission of guilt on two counts of sexual assault; he 
depicted this as a human struggle with the forces of evil rather than as an act of 
power over someone more vulnerable. 
Neither  Odulele’s  group  nor  the  7/7  bombers  were  attached  to  the  Citizens  UK 
chapters  and  this  appears  to  support  Citizens'  projection  of  fundamentalism  as 
maverick  behaviour,  the  actions  of  lost  individuals,  without  connections,  without 
roots, existing outside  of association. Something very similar was argued by Mizan 
Raja  in  his  description  of  Roshnara  Choudhry's  stabbing of  Stephen Timms MP. 
Importantly, Islamic Circles and Citizens UK shared a common discursive base line – 
the projection of society as broken, of the family and key institutions as in decline 
(notably the public function of religious institutions), and the need for activism to 
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bring people back into relationships. 
Many interviewees appeared to be relying upon or pointing to flawed 'man made' 
laws on the one hand and pure divinity as actually existing oppositional categories. 
Yet it seemed difficult to understand how the desires or injunctions of the divine 
could be rendered other than through fallible humans and human systems especially 
when very few claimed to adhere to a literal interpretation of any text. Not all of the 
religious organisations referred to in each of the boroughs had any interest in 
changing the situation for others. Rather for some, religious belief was expressly 
directed towards gaining a secure place in the afterlife. This is where  Citizens UK 
were  praised  for  drawing  believers  away  from the  'deep  ontologies'  of  religious 
identity politics and rather towards engagement with generic community demands. 
Yet Chapter 3 raised questions about the façade of participatory democracy in action, 
the  use of repetition and corporate identity and the pressure of form over content, 
which can efface real critique and democratic debate. As performances they can be 
exhilarating experiences and clearly the numbers at these mobilisations tap into the 
political  logic  of  majoritarianism  noted  above,  but  the  semblance  of  vitality  is 
usurped by a form that Maurice Bloch describes as ‘the effacement of propositional 
content’ and in turn increases the capacity for social control. 
As already noted above under the subsection on 'Morality', there was a strong gender 
dimension to the question of agency. Notably there was a tendency to emphasise 
women’s proximity to nature, to nurture, to emotion and to god. Even for the self-
defined liberal catholic, Reverend Canon Ann Easter, who actively challenged the 
gendered dress and civic  engagement  codes noted above and defended same sex 
relationships,  her  theorisation  of  women  and  religion  bore  some  parallels  with 
contemporary fundamentalist attempts to sever the ties between religion and culture 
and project  more  essentialised  characterisations  of  women and men.  Other  faith-
based gender identities were more directly pushing differentiated roles such as the 
female  Hindu  representative  at  the  Faith  Forum  conference  who  asserted  that 
separate roles are a reflection of what god intended as well as Sara Jawad Malik's use 
of Laura Doyle's personal development model and quotes from the quran to train 
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Muslim women struggling  with  difficult  marriages  to  learn  to  surrender  to  their 
husbands, to recognise them as heads of the family, to praise them and move away 
from confrontation.  
Proximity
Above  I  have  noted  that  the  new  context  of  multifaithist  practice  picks  up  on 
multiculturalist  principles  of  'respect'  to  structure  relations  between  groups  and 
between individuals according to the intersubjective and psychosocial injunctions of 
'respectability'.  This  subsection  turns  to  the  points  made  in  Chapters  5  and  7  to 
consider the implications of standing alongside others in political alliances and what 
that affords fundamentalist organisations. The question of proximity has been a key 
issue – it is the hammer of critique and, as specifically explored in chapters 5,6 and 
7, it is a source of legitimacy and aggregated benefits. 
There  were  multiple  examples  of  the  localised  manifestations  of  a  range  of 
transnational religious projects including the activities of Ahmadiyyas, the Vishwa 
Hindu Parishad, the Muslim Brotherhood, Salafists, the Jamaat-e-Islami,  the Hizb 
Ut-Tahrir,  Khalistanis,  members  of  the  Punjabi  based  Singh  Sabha  movement, 
branches of African Evangelical churches, and of course the enormous global reach 
of the Catholic Church. Notably, the vast majority of Muslim groups referred to by 
participants were Right wing. Importantly, the ethnic minority organisations acquired 
qudos from their diasporic connections and yet many civil society and state actors 
were willing to overlook what these transnational links could mean for the protection 
of rights. The Citizens UK assertion that it is only interested in what the East London 
Mosque is doing for local people is typical of that response.
The question of alliances and what alliances tell us is fundamental now - how and 
when  are  under  resourced  civil  liberties,  human  rights,  anti  racist  and  feminist 
organisations able to provide legitimacy, capacity, resources and power? The War on 
Terror reinforced both the power of the state and some anti  racists'  focus on the 
surveillance dimensions of the state. Their engagement with the field arose from a 
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sense that local politics is 'forged' and they wanted to influence the construction of an 
emerging political field that would otherwise be dominated by Islamists. 
The response to these developments was not unified but rather ranged from critical 
distance to complete acquiescence. Interestingly there were still  traces of the anti 
racist register in the regular comparisons between positions taken vis a vis Islamists 
and positions vis a vis the British National Party (BNP). Ansar Ahmed Ullah likened 
the Jamaat-e-Islami to the BNP and took a 'no platform' approach to public events 
involving them or other Islamists. Suresh Grover and Unmesh Desai 's parallels were 
rather  more  about  the  importance  of  drawing  the  membership  away  whilst 
simultaneously  challenging  the  views  of  the  leadership.  Self-defining  as  a 
'progressive Muslim', Asad Rehman saw himself as carrying an ethical responsibility 
to avoid self-censorship and influence Muslim spaces whatever they comprised but 
he also reflected on the difficulties he had encountered and confessed that, in the 
final instance, the capacity of Islamist projects overshadowed the depleted attempts 
and resources of Left and anti-racist activists. In addition to all of these, a young man 
in Newham refused to work with Ahmadiyyas, a group persecuted by the supremacist 
politics of Islamists, by likening their beliefs to the abhorrent views of the BNP. 
Gita  Sahgal's  points  about  the  relocation  of  fundamentalist  groups  within  human 
rights and civil  liberties spaces and their ability to shift  secular discourse to gain 
legitimacy  for  their  own  supremacist  projects  further  problematises  Rehman's 
attempts  to  bring  a  human  rights  language  to  bear  on  Muslim  identity  politics. 
Citizens UK equally argued that they were drawing religious groups out of identity 
politics towards generic local regeneration issues and that the emphasis on alliance 
working circumvented the involvement of fundamentalist organisations. Yet Chapter 
7 attempted to demonstrate that Jamaat-e-Islami groupings had gained strength and 
access  to  resources  through association  and  the  establishment  of  reciprocal 
relationships with a range of civil society organisations. 
Re-ordering local areas into new systems of 'election'
This  thesis  moves towards  the conclusion that  new systems, practices,  orders,  of 
‘election’ are being established and consolidated in local areas. It is from Chapter 4 
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onwards that I seek to develop the notion of election, as the cornerstone of the new 
multifaithism and its  virtuous extension of  the  multiculturalist  logic  to  transform 
relations of power previously structured through 'race', culture and ethnicity into ones 
effected  and  consolidated  through  the  proliferation  and  normative  acceptance  of 
religious claims ranging from what causes offence to what it means to be Sikh to 
terms like 'defensive jihad'. This is the reality of the politics of virtue, where public 
spaces including architectural landscapes and local relations between people and the 
state are slowly, incrementally, re-ordered according to dominant categorisations of 
what  constitutes  belief.  The  implications  have  been  tracked  in  terms  of  the 
Ahmadiyyas' experience in Newham, the proliferation of the Khalsa norm in Southall 
and the bolstering of the Jamaat-e-Islami base in Tower Hamlets. 
The implications include the ability of some ethnic minorities to put their children 
into faith-based schools and escape the more difficult  aspects of poverty or local 
change in a way that parallels the 1960s to 1980s phenomena of 'white flight' but 
does  not  require  anyone  to  move  address.  Moreover,  in  Southall  one  Sikh 
organisation (the SGSSS) out of twelve in the local area has the ear of local and 
national  politicians  and increasingly  harnesses  public  resources.  Their  numerical, 
financial and architectural capacity itself has the reproductive effect of enabling them 
to  access  more  resources  and  increasingly  set  the  terms  of  engaging  'Sikhs'  or 
'Sikhism' and push out (or gradually de-authenticate) a plethora of other Sikhs doxies 
including  those,  such  as  the  Nirankaris  who  have  incurred  violence  for  pushing 
against  the  grain  of  Khalsa  attempts  to  seal  the  boundaries  of  the  religion  by 
declaring Gobind the last living guru. Importantly, both the East London Mosque and 
the Sri Guru Singh Sabha claims to move beyond caste and sectarianism, to offer a 
version of their  respective religions that is  more inclusive than the self-organised 
ethnically or caste determined gurdwaras and mosques in their local areas. Yet this 
turns out to be a counterfactual position when one looks into their trajectories, their 
international  ties,  their  membership and leadership.  Both bodies are  moving ever 
closer to a cradle to the grave sense of welfare provision, building association with 
their  respective projects  and increasingly with real  material  consequences  for  the 
ability of those that do not subscribe to their definitions to be able to access limited 
community based public services.
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Conclusion: Going Forward
I want to end by noting the scope for future research and the critical questions that 
are  left  hanging.  During  the  course  of  disseminating  some  of  the  findings,  I 
discovered that they chime with experiences within local areas in other parts of the 
country,  experiences  that  have  been  particularly  accentuated  by  a  resurgence  in 
Christian mobilisations within a context of rampant public sector cuts. As such, I 
believe  this  thesis  offers  a  good  basis  from  which  to  bring  a  more  critical 
intersectional eye to other localities. Moreover, critical questions are left hanging that 
could be pursued in future research. What future is there for secularism in a context 
where  religious  mobilisations  are  increasingly  part  of  the  tapestry  of  political 
engagement  and  more  visible  than  overtly  secular  ones,  indeed  where  the  term 
'secularism' is used in an instrumental way by multifaithists proliferating the faith 
agenda or authoritatively by a  local  state  pushing against a  vibrant  civil  society? 
What are the real possibilities for living out intersectional theoretical frameworks 
through the praxis of indivisibility of rights? 
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Appendix A: Map of the London Borough of Ealing
Crown Copyright. Licence LA100019807 2008 
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Appendix B: Map of the London borough of Newham
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Appendix C: Details of Fieldwork
Table 1: Interviews
Number Name Position/Group Date of Interview(s) Length Borough Type/State or 
Civil 
Society175
M/F
1 Neil Jameson Executive Director, 
Citizens UK
7/06/05 1 hour 30 min Both Civil/Faith M
2 Catherine Howarth Ex-Lead Organiser, 
West London Citizens
In two parts:
18/08/06
+
22/08/07
38 min
+
49 min
Ealing Civil/Faith F
3 Julie Camacho Lead Organiser, 
West London Citizens 
2/06/10 1 hour 14 min Ealing Civil/Faith F
175 These categories were used very loosely. I take note of the problems with making clean distinctions between the 'religious' and the 'secular' as well as what constitutes 'state' and 
'civil society' when a number of interviewees moved easily across these spaces and may have been working for a 'secular' organisation but engaged in faith based initiatives or may 
be a vicar but define as a secularist or may be both a member of a local civil society organisation and also be an elected politician reflecting on the work of the local state. Rather 
these tables reflect either the preferred self-description of the interviewee, their speaking position as opposed to their individual identity, the main sentiment expressed during the 
interview and/or acted as a marker for me to ensure that I sought a balanced number of interviews from different spaces and perspectives. 
4 Asad Rehman Chair, 
Newham Monitoring Project 
(NMP)
9/08/07 1 hour 40 min Newham Civil/Secular M
5 Kevin Blowe Activist, 
Newham Monitoring Project
+
CIU, Aston Mansfield Trust
In two parts:
9/08/07
+
25/04/08
1 hour 40 min
+
2 hours 21 min
Newham Civil/Secular M
6 Suresh Grover Director, 
The Monitoring Group (TMG)
In two parts:
15/08/07
+
14/02/08
1 hour 44 min
+
3 hours 25 min
Ealing Civil/Secular M
7 Ansar Ahmed Ullah Member, 
International Forum for a 
Secular Bangladesh 
or Nirmul Committee
3/10/07 1 hour 17 min Key 
respondent
Civil/Secular M
8 Pavan Dhaliwal Head of Policy, 
1990 Trust
3/12/07 2 hours 21 min Key 
respondent
Civil/Secular F
9 Wilf Sullivan Race Equality Officer,
Trades Union Congress (TUC)
25/01/08 2 hours 6 min Key 
respondent
Civil/Secular M
10 Anonymous Trade Union Officer,
London
29/08/07 1 hour 21 min Key 
respondent
Civil/Secular M
11 Pragna Patel Director,
Southall Black Sisters (SBS)
15/10/07 1 hour 23 min Ealing Civil/Secular F
12 Anonymous 'Worker at an ethnic minority 
women's group in Newham'
20/10/09 1 hour 5 min Newham Civil/Secular F
13 Sarah Ruiz Director,
Newham Voluntary Sector 
Consortium (NVSC)
14/05/09
+
12/11/09
1hour 38 min 
+
1 hour 44 min
Newham Civil/Faith F
14 Sarbjit Johal Representative, Londec
+ 
Member, South Asia Solidarity 
Group (SASG)
+
Member, Asian Women Unite
19/05/08 1 hour 37 min Ealing Civil/Secular F
15 Surjit Singh Kumar Manging Director,
Panjab Radio
13/08/07 59 min Ealing Civil/Faith M
16 Didar Singh Randhawa Ex President,
Sri Guru Singh Sabha Southall 
(SGSSS)
In two parts:
11/05/09
+
18/05/09
1 hour 43 min
+
38 min
Ealing Civil/Faith M
17 Balwant Singh Gill Founder member, 
Sri Guru Singh Sabha Southall
(SGSSS)
21/05/09 1 hour 2 min Ealing Civil/Faith M
18 Anonymous Head teacher,
Catholic School
18/09/09
+
2/10/09
53 min
+
1 hour 54 min
Ealing Civil/Faith M
19 Paul Halliwell Head teacher,
St Bonaventure's Catholic 
School
28/09/10 1 hour 30 min Newham Civil/Faith M
20 Janpal Basran Manager, 
Southall Community Alliance
20/09/10 2 hours 22 min Ealing Civil/Secular M
21 Revd Canon Anne Easter Chief Executive Officer, 
The Renewal Programme
4/11/10 1 hour 32 min Newham Civil/Faith F
22 Revd Michael Bolley Vicar,
Holy Trinity Church
14/07/11 1 hour 57 min Ealing Civil/Faith M
23 Dilbagh Chana Ex President,
Ramgharia gurdwara
14/06/11 3 hours 30 min Ealing Civil/Faith M
24 Alan Partridge Manager, 
Harold Road Centre
3/06/11 2hours 25 min Newham Civil/Faith M
25 Revd Barnabas Matloob Faithful Friends 19/11/10 1 hour 37 min Newham Civil/Faith M
26 Martin Pinder BME Community Development 
Officer,
Newham New Deal Partnership
18/05/11 1 hour 40 min Newham Civil/Secular M
27 Revd Dr Colin Marchant Retired In two parts:
26/05/11
+
21/06/11
1 hour 22 min
+
1 hour 40 min
Newham Civil/Faith M
28 Mizan Raja Islamic Circles
+
Muslim Youth Network
7/12/09 3 hours 54 min Newham Civil/Faith M
29 Julia Acott
+
Jo Sell
Director
+
Education and Training 
Manager,
Alternatives Trust
30/06/11 3 hours 27 min Newham Civil/Faith F
30 Suzanne Fernandes Ex Christian Party electoral 
candidate
Now Labour Party 
Member of Elim Church
16/09/10 1 hour 33 min Ealing Civil/Faith F
31 Anonymous Council Officer 13/10/09 30 min recorded 
30 min hand written
Newham State M
32 Anonymous Development Worker 16/09/09 1 hour 50 min Newham State/Secular M
33 Anonymous Councillor 25/09/09 2 hours 51 min Newham State F
34 Swarn Singh Kang Councillor 28/09/09 2 hours Ealing State M
35 Clive Furness Councillor 16/09/09 2 hours 20 min Newham State/faith M
36 AK Sheikh Ex Councillor, 
Trustee of Green Street mosque,
Lifelong Secretary of the 
Alliance of Newham Muslim 
Associations
8/10/09 49 min Newham State/Faith M
37 Virendra Sharma MP for Ealing Southall 18/10/09 3 hours 54 min Ealing State M
38 Gurcharan Singh Councillor 9/10/09 58 min Ealing State M
39 Unmesh Desai Councillor 8/10/09 2 hours 2 min Newham State M
40 Lakmini Shah Councillor 8/10/09 1 hour Newham State F
41 Alan Craig Councillor 22/10/09 2 hours 14 min Newham State M
42 Revd Quintin Peppiatt Councillor 20/10/09 1 hour 28 min Newham State/Faith M
43 Joy Laguda Councillor 2/12/09 1 hour 7 min Newham State F
44 Anonymous Councillor 2/12/09 38 min Newham State M
45 Stephen Timms MP for East Ham 11/12/09 51 min Newham State M
46 Anita Kapoor Councillor 18/07/10 2 hours 40 min Ealing State F
47 Kamaljit Dhindsa Councillor 27/07/10 1 hour 46 min Ealing State M
Table 2: Ethnography
Event Date Description
Introductory meeting with Citizens UK 8th August 2006 Meeting with Catherine Howarth in response to request 
for interview
Public Meeting: 'Bin the Rats' 11th September 2006
Evening
Venue: Dominion Centre, The Green, 
Southall
Organised by West London Citizens holding Ealing 
Council to account on cleaning and hygiene in Southall
West London Citizens First Anniversary Assembly Date: 4th October 2006
Evening
Venue: Acton Town Hall
A review of their membership and what they achieved 
over the year
London Citizens'
Leadership Training
Friday 13th and Saturday 14th July 2007
Venue: 16 Dawson Place, Notting Hill, 
London W2 4TJ
Participant observation of a two day training for 
potential 'leaders'
West London Citizens Second Anniversary 
Assembly
Date: Thursday 25th October 2007
Time: arrive by 7.15pm to start 7.30pm until 9pm
Annual review of membership and work
Venue: Hammersmith Assembly Hall, King Street, 
London W6 9JU
TELCO 11th assembly 14th November 2007 At the round chapel, hackney
Start 7.15pm / end?
Public meeting: Creating a Climate of Fear: 
Counter-Terrorism and Punishment without Trial
14th March 008
6.30-9pm
London Muslim Centre,
Whitechapel Road.
Organised by Campaign Against Criminalising 
Communities and the Centre for the Study of Terrorism.
Co-sponsored by London Muslim Centre, Islamic 
Forum of Europe, Cage Prisoners and the Newham 
Monitoring Project
Vaisakhi Procession Sunday 6th April 2008
Southall
One day starting with ritual at Havelock Rd gurdwara 
ending with prayers at Park Ave gurdwara
Vaisakhi Procession Sunday 27th April 2008
Newham
One day starting at Roseberry Ave gurdwara in Manor 
Park and ending Plashet Grove gurdwara in Plaistow
Gilly Mundy Memorial Debate:
'Racism and the state'?
23rd April 2008
Brunei Gallery,
SOAS
Organised by Kevin Blowe and others involved with 
NMP and RAN
SBS case / R (Kaur & Shah) v London Borough of 
Ealing
Thursday 17th and Friday 18th July 2008
At the Royal Courts of Justice
SBS judicial review hearing of Ealing Council decision 
to cut their funding
TELCO 12th Anniversary Assembly Wednesday 12th November 2008 Annual review of their membership and work plus guest 
speakers 
Time: 7.15pm to 9.15pm
Venue: York Hall, Old Ford Road, 
London E2 9PL
Public Meeting: Faith, Equality and Cohesion: Are 
they compatible?
Tuesday 25th November 2008
House of Commons
Organised by Women Against Fundamentalism and 
Southall Black Sisters
Vaisakhi Procession Sunday 12th April 2009
10.30am to 2pm
Southall
One day starting with ritual at Havelock Rd gurdwara 
ending with prayers at Park Ave gurdwara
Foundation Stone laying ceremony at Khalsa 
Primary School
Sunday 26th April 2009 10am to 4pm
Norwood Hall
Norwood Green Road
Southall
Strangers into Citizens May Day Rally Monday 4th May 2009
12pm to 3pm
Trafalgar Square
Organised by Citizens UK
1984 Never Forget demonstration Sunday 7th June 2009
Hyde Park to Trafalgar Square
Marking 25 years since anti Sikh riots in India
Public Meeting: 28th November 2009
3-6pm
Organised by
Women Against Fundamentalism
Struggle not submission
20 Years of Women Against Fundamentalism 
Room 3A, University of London Union,
Malet Street, 
London WC1E 7HY
Islamic Circles session for women:
'The Surrendered Muslimah: Marriage & 
Etiquettes Workshop'
Saturday 5th December 2009
Time: 10am - 5pm
Venue: Froud Centre, Romford Road, 
Manor Park, 
London, E12 5JF
A one day workshop organised by Islamic Circles and 
delivered by Sister Sara Malik, Surrendered Wife 
Trainer (UK)
West London Citizens Ealing Local 
Accountability Assembly
Thursday 22nd April 2010
At Our Lady of the Visitation Parish
Greenford Road
Greenford
Elections hustings and presentation of West London 
Citizens demands
Strangers into Citizens Rally Monday 4th May 2010
Trafalgar Square
Organised by Citizens UK
A day exploring new African/South American 
evangelical (mobile) services and churches in 
Newham
Sunday 15th August 2010 Starting at 9am with Visit to Glory House Church 
service, key African evangelical church, followed by 
walk along Barking Road from Tabernacle Street to East 
Ham High Street, rough count of religious sites of 
worship along the way.
Then drive around south Newham and stop off at 
Christ's Embassy service in Silvertown
Islamic Circles public meeting: Thursday 4th November 2010, Pre meeting with Mizan Raja
'Question Time: PVE in Newham - £2 million 
missing & unaccounted for'
Froud Centre,
1 Toronto Avenue, off Romford Road, London, E12 
5JF
Followed by public meeting from 7pm to 8.30pm plus 
post discussion with activists
Public meeting: 'Eastern European Worship in 
Newham'
Date: Tuesday 10th May 2011
Venue: The Hub, Canning Town 
5.45pm until 7.30pm
Public meeting organised by Newham New Deal 
Partnership
Attended with Prity Patel at Newham Monitoring 
Project
Muslim Youth Network public meeting: 'Muslim 
Women and the Struggle for Justice'
Thursday 21st July 2011
Time: 6pm - 8pm
Venue: Toynbee Hall, 28 Commercial Street, 
London E1 6LS
Research dissemination by Laura Zahra Macdonald 
organised by Newham based group Muslim Youth 
Network linked to Islamic Circles
Appendix D: Sample Topic Guide 
Date:
Time: 
Venue:
Anonymity or Happy to be identified: 
Introduction:
• Comparing London boroughs Newham and Ealing through a series of 
in depth interviews 
• Investigating the role of religion in the public sphere and more 
specifically looking at the kinds of arguments that are made for faith 
based organising and faith based services;
• Particularly concerned with the implications of a growth in faith based 
organising and service provision for ethnic minority women;
• The aim of this interview:
o To understand how you as a long standing (elected 
representative/activist/service provider) in the area view 
religious identities and religious mobilisation
o To explore your views about whether religious groups should be 
involved in shaping social policy and legislation and / or 
whether they should be involved in providing public services 
such as education, housing and health services
o To explore any information you may have with regards to the 
experiences of or views about the specific implications for 
ethnic minority women
• Recording, transcription, write up and anonymity – happy to be 
identified (as individual or as spokesperson of group) or preference for 
anonymity in which case decide how can refer to him/her in the write 
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up
• Test equipment / sound
Background:
• Could you start by very briefly identifying your current job, your 
political and work history, your involvement in London or nationally? 
What sorts of issues and groups have you been involved in over time? 
What do you do right now?
• Who are the people that you work with or for? (I.e. constituents? 
colleagues? casework?)
Religious identity:
• Do you think that religious identity is an issue? In what way? And since 
when?
• Has anything changed in the last 20 years in terms of the place of 
religious identity?
• How does this impact upon your work? Please can you provide 
examples? How have you attempted to respond to these incidents or 
features?
• How do you personally prefer to deal with it, if this is different to the 
response of agencies you are involved with?
• What are the outstanding tensions or difficulties that are not being 
addressed and why do you think this is the case?
Religious Groups:
• Do you work with religious groups in this borough, regionally or 
nationally? 
354
• Can you provide examples? Discuss these… 
• Would you make any distinction between religious groups that you 
would be willing to work with and those that you would not be willing to 
work with?
Service provision:
• This study is particularly concerned with the involvement of religion, 
religious identity and religious groups in making decisions about and 
providing public services. What is your feeling about this?
• Do you think that the role of religious groups in providing education 
and youth/ or housing/ or health/ or other welfare/social services/ or 
community services differs from their role in any other public service 
like education and youth/housing/health/welfare/social 
services/community services?
• What do you think should be the basis of service provision?
• Do you think religion is as important, more important, or less 
important than class in terms of basis of service provision or 
community mobilisation? What about in terms of 'race', ethnicity and 
gender?
Implications for ethnic minority women:
Do you happen to know what percentage of your constituents/users are 
ethnic minority women?
What sorts of issues do they present?
Do you or have you campaign(ed) against sexism or heterosexism, the rights 
of ethnic minority women in any way? Details if have. If not, ask why?
Have you supported events or campaigns of women’s groups? If so, how and 
why and when did you do this? If not, ask why this is.
How do you see religious identity in respect of ethnic minority women?
What, in your view, are the implications for ethnic minority women of religious 
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groups being involved in the development of social policy and the 
provision of services?
Do you think women have a different or the same relationship with religion as 
men? 
Do you think ethnic minority women have the same or different relationship 
with religion as white women?
Imagined futures:
• If you could imagine the future, what would you say your politics was 
striving towards?
• How do you think relations between individuals should be? Between 
groups? Within groups/communities?
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